

Redistricting and Legislative Partisanship Technical Appendix

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Description

In this document, we describe the methods behind the measures used in the report, and offer evidence that was cited in the report but not presented there.

Contents

- A. Ratings
- B. Counterfactuals
- C. Alternative Scatter Plots
- D. Regressions



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Appendix A

Ratings

The report makes use of ratings from three different interest groups, as well as providing a general measure of party loyalty. This appendix describes a variety of miscellaneous issues involved in calculating and using those scores.

All of the ratings record the percentage of the time a legislator voted with each interest group's position on the bills that group identifies as important. The interest groups provide scores separately for each year; to calculate a score for both years of each legislature, we take the average of these two separate scores weighted by the total number of bills involved in each score.

If two legislators served in a seat in a given Legislature and both received a Chamber of Commerce score, we use the ratings for the second legislator. If one legislator did not serve long enough to receive a Chamber score, we use the ratings for the one who did. In the special case of the party loyalty scores, we included only those legislators who were rated by the Chamber and for whom Jeff Lewis at UCLA collected roll call voting data. This group sometimes differed slightly from those who received interest group ratings because of different standards for including legislators who missed a large number of roll call votes. One district—Senate District 38 in 1995-96 and 1997-98—was included by both Professor Lewis and the interest groups, but the legislator representing that district missed so many votes in those legislatures (over 85%) that we omitted that party loyalty score from all calculations. No other legislator in both data sets missed so many votes.

Though the basics of each score are the same, the interest groups differ somewhat on how they handle abstentions/absences and committee votes:

Chamber of Commerce – Abstentions or absences on bills the Chamber opposes are counted as votes in favor of the Chamber position. Committee votes are not included. The average is based on total bills in each year.

League of Conservation Voters – Absences are treated somewhat differently depending on the year. In 2001 and 2004 through 2006, absences count negatively toward the score unless “excused.” In 2002 and 2003, only absences on bills that are supported by the League of Conservation Voters count negatively toward the score. Committee votes are included in 2001, 2002, and 2004 through 2006. The average for the two years is weighted by total floor votes only, with committee votes not included.

Planned Parenthood – Planned Parenthood has not been as clear as other organizations about documenting its policy about absences, but an analysis of the scores they have assigned suggests they “excused” some absences but not others. Unfortunately, they did not calculate their own ratings for 1997 or 1998, but only provided legislators’ raw votes on each bill. Since they did not distinguish between “excused” and “unexcused” absences in these raw records, we calculated the numbers two ways: first, by treating all absences as “no” votes on the relevant bill, and second, by omitting the votes entirely from my calculations. The scatter plot for the first approach is presented in the body of the report, while the scatter plot for the second approach is presented in Figure C.13 of Appendix C. No committee votes were tracked by Planned Parenthood.

Appendix B

Counterfactuals

This report has included three sets of counterfactuals that estimate the effect of the 2001 redistricting: one for moderates, one for votes on Chamber of Commerce-tracked bills, and one for votes on budget bills. This appendix describes the procedure we used to calculate each one, and provides details about the bills used in the counterfactual for the Chamber of Commerce-tracked legislation.

For the estimate of the change in moderates in Chapter 3, we first ran a probit regression of moderation on district partisanship (percent Democratic minus percent Republican in party registration) separately within each party for the 1997-98 through 2001-02 legislatures. These regressions are in Table D.4 of Appendix D. Moderation was measured with a dummy variable indicating whether the legislator fell in the top 25 percent of his or her party caucus on a given measure of roll call voting. The only exception was multi-issue moderation, which was a dummy indicating that a legislator was moderate on at least three of the other four moderation measures. We then calculated the average district partisanship for each district after the 2001 redistricting (from the 2002 through 2006 elections).

To match these numbers to legislators in the late 1990s, we needed to determine which district from the 1990s could be considered the “old” version of each of the 2001 districts. We used a two-step process. First, we matched 2000s districts to the 1990s districts with the same incumbent, in cases where an incumbent ran for election in 2002. For open seats in 2002, we matched to the 1990s district with the largest plurality overlap. To test the robustness of this approach, we also tried an approach that assumed the rank order of district partisanship would be preserved: that is, the most Republican district in each year of the late 1990s would receive

the highest Republican party registration number from the 2000s, the next most Republican would receive the next highest Republican number, and so on. These two approaches produced virtually identical results, though the two-step version used in the report suggested slightly more change in roll call votes.

Finally, we generated predicted probabilities from the regressions using these numbers. The result was a predicted probability of voting for each bill if the district partisanship could be changed to match the numbers from the 2000s. Finally, we summed these probabilities for each party caucus to produce estimates of the total number of hypothetical moderates.

The process was very similar for the Chamber of Commerce and budget counterfactuals discussed in Chapter 5, but instead of simulating the effect of moving from the 1990s districts to the districts of the 2000s, we simulated the effect of reverting from the 2000s districts to the those from the 1990s. We first ran a probit regression of each actual vote on actual district partisanship and then generated predicted probabilities after substituting the average partisanship of districts from 1992 through 2000.

The official legislative record, our source for the budget votes, has a specific category for abstentions, but some members failed to be listed at all. We omitted these members from all calculations. Those who registered an explicit abstention, however, were treated as “no” votes. Usually there were not enough abstentions on any given bill to model them separately in the probit regression, so we treated them as “no” votes for the sake of this exercise. However, if any bill had more than five abstentions, we maintained abstentions as a separate category and used multinomial probit to calculate a separate coefficient for them.

We dropped Chamber of Commerce-tracked bills where “yes” votes accounted for more than 60 percent of the votes cast, since these bills were less politically interesting (“no” votes never accounted for more than 60 percent of any bill by themselves). In 20 of the remaining 22

Chamber-tracked bills from the Senate and 20 of the 23 Chamber-tracked bills in the Assembly there was not a single “yes” vote in the Republican caucus. Thus, we ran the regression in these cases only for Democrats. We used a similar approach when, as was often the case, Democrats voted unanimously in favor of a budget bill. These regressions can be found in Tables D.14 through D.16 of Appendix D.

The procedure differed slightly for the counterfactuals based on changes in party control. Since a legislator’s party label is categorical, not continuous, it makes more sense to dispense with the probit regression and use the marginals from a cross-tabulation of roll call votes by party. We multiplied the percentage voting “yes” on each bill within each party by the total number within each party in the counterfactual, and rounded up. As with the probit regressions, this technique assumes that the percentage of Republicans and Democrats voting for a bill is constant no matter how many are serving in the legislature. Thus, it assumes that the six new Republicans – four in the Assembly and two in the Senate – would on average be as likely to support each bill as fellow Republicans already serving in each chamber.

For the sake of background information, we have included descriptions of the Chamber of Commerce-tracked bills from 2005-06 in Tables B.1 and B.2 below. The first description for each bill is taken from the official summary on the website of the California Legislative Counsel. We always used the latest analysis available, whether from committee or floor, Assembly or Senate. In cases where there was no heading titled “summary,” we used the “digest” entry. The second description for each bill comes from the Chamber of Commerce report. It provides a more politically interesting – but also less objective – account.

Table B.1
Assembly Bills Tracked by the Chamber of Commerce,
2005-06

Bill	Year	Description by...	
		Legislative Counsel	Chamber of Commerce
AB6	2005	Reinstates the 10% and 11% personal income tax (PIT) brackets for high-income taxpayers and increases the alternative minimum tax (AMT) rates to 8.5% for taxable years beginning in 2005, and specifically appropriates the revenues received from the increased tax in support of K-14 education programs.	Increases the tax burden on small business by increasing personal income tax rate to 10 and 11 percent and the alternative tax rate to 8.5 percent.
AB32	2006	Enacts the Global Warming Act of 2006 (Act), which creates a statewide greenhouse gas (GHG) emission limit that would reduce emissions by 25% by 2020.	Increases costs for California businesses, makes them less competitive and discourages economic growth with little or no proven environmental benefit by adopting an arbitrary cap on carbon emissions.
AB391	2005	Allows otherwise eligible workers, to receive unemployment compensation benefits, if locked out as a result of a trade dispute, not to be implemented until January 1, 2007.	Increases the cost of doing business in California by forcing California employers to subsidize a strike against their own company by providing unemployment insurance benefits to workers unemployed due to a strike.
AB875	2005	Establishes a "trigger" mechanism for employer tax audits or investigations following wage and hour violations, as specified.	Opens the door to potential harassment by government labor and taxing agencies by requiring the referral of an unspecified labor violation to taxing agencies for a tax audit, exposing employers to an expensive, time-consuming fishing expedition for possible employer tax code violations.
AB1012	2006	Requires the California Air Resources Board (ARB) to adopt regulations to ensure that one-half of new passenger and light-duty trucks, beginning in 2020, sold in California are clean alternative vehicles.	Disrupts California's transportation fuels market by mandating the sale of scarce alternative fuel vehicles and will result in significant gas price spikes.
AB1101	2005	This bill defines diesel magnet sources and establishes the requirements these facilities must meet in order to comply with the Air Toxics "Hot Spots" Information and Assessment Act of 1987.	Hampers operations at ports, rail yards, distribution centers and airports by shifting regulatory authority over mobile emissions from state to local entities, creating a patchwork of potentially inconsistent regulations statewide, creating conflicts with federal law.
AB1310	2005	Establishes disclosure and other requirements for employer severance package offers.	Establishes new reasons to sue certain private sector employers by setting in statute a very detailed notice process that an employer must follow exactly in order to be able to utilize any severance agreement.

**Table B.1
(continued)
Assembly Bills Tracked by the Chamber of Commerce,
2005-06**

Bill	Year	Description by...	
		Legislative Counsel	Chamber of Commerce
AB1381	2006	Enacts the Gloria Romero Educational Reform Act of 2006. Revises the governance and operation of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) in three major areas: broadens the LAUSD Superintendent's authority; limits the authority and responsibilities of the LAUSD governing board ("the Board"); and establishes a council of mayors with specified roles and responsibilities.	Gives the Los Angeles mayor and a council of mayors additional means by which to measure pupil achievement in the Los Angeles Unified School District.
AB1614	2006	Clarifies a definition in existing law regarding income on which the limited liability company (LLC) fee is based.	Retroactively changes, back to 2001, the fee for limited liability companies in a manner that violates the Constitution.
AB1884	2006	Allows otherwise eligible workers to receive unemployment compensation benefits, if locked out as a result of a trade dispute.	Increases the cost of doing business in California by forcing California employers to subsidize a strike against their own company by providing unemployment insurance benefits to workers unemployed due to a strike.
AB1899	2006	AB 1899 would require cities and counties to obtain verification from the Reclamation Board that land proposed for residential development meets specified standards for flood protection.	Prohibits development in the Central Valley by requiring the creation of a 200-year flood standard that is currently impossible to achieve.
AB2371	2006	Precludes involuntary waiver of civil rights laws in the workplace.	Eliminates an employer's ability to mandate the use of the far less expensive and faster process of arbitration rather than court to resolve discrimination claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.
AB2975	2006	Requires the definition of "proficient" for purposes of adequate yearly progress (AYP) for the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) to be set at the level needed to pass the California High School Exit Examination (CAHSEE).	Undermines the effectiveness of the high school exit exam by lowering California student proficiency standards.

SOURCES: California Legislative Counsel; California Chamber of Commerce.

Table B.2

Senate Bills Tracked by the Chamber of Commerce, 2005-06

Bill	Year	Description by...	
		Legislative Counsel	Chamber of Commerce
SB109	2005	Enhances penalties for severe violations of some air pollution control laws and reinstates provisions, that sunsetted on January 1, 2006, subjecting a person who commits a minor violation of an air pollution law only to administrative penalties.	Increases litigation costs and potential lawsuits by allowing for both civil and criminal penalties for specified air quality violations.
SB174	2005	This bill allows employees to act on behalf of themselves and others making less than twice the state minimum wage in recovering unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation.	Increases employer liability by providing new incentives for plaintiffs and their attorneys to file lawsuits by establishing new types of "sue your boss" lawsuits.
SB399	2005	This bill states that certain health care providers who have rendered services to a Medi-Cal beneficiary because of an injury caused by a third party are entitled to a lien against the portion of the beneficiary's recovery relating to past medical expenses.	Increases litigation costs on insurers and the self-insured by requiring medical payments in excess of Medi-Cal reimbursement rates and increasing non-economic damage awards.
SB757	2005	Requires state agencies to reduce the growth of petroleum demand, increase vehicle energy efficiency, and increase the use of alternative fuels.	Introduces a new mandate to reduce gasoline use without taking population growth into consideration, which would likely lead to a massive gas tax causing higher gasoline prices, increased costs for consumer goods and thousands of lost jobs for California.
SB760	2005	This bill imposes a minimum \$30 fee on each shipping container processed at the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (ports) to fund projects to improve the security of ports-related rail transportation and ports facilities and to mitigate pollution caused by ports operations.	Increases the cost of goods movement in California by assessing a \$30 fee per twenty-foot equivalent unit on containers processed through the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports.
SB764	2005	This bill establishes a process for restricting future air pollutant emissions generated by activities at the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles.	Increases the costs of goods movement and drives business and jobs from California ports by requiring the City of Los Angeles and the City of Long Beach to prohibit any growth at their respective ports unless that growth can be accomplished with no air pollution increases.
SB815	2006	This bill states legislative intent regarding fair compensation for disabled workers. This bill revises the formula for computing payments for injuries causing permanent disability which occur on or after January 1, 2007.	Rolls back recent workers' compensation reforms by arbitrarily doubling the permanent disability payments over three years without sound data with which to base the increase.
SB820	2005	This bill amends disclosure requirements for certain information as to water use and planning.	Burdens landowners by imposing new groundwater use reporting requirements; levies penalties for failure to report water usage; and requires small water districts to develop ag management plans.

**Table B.2
(continued)
Senate Bills Tracked by the Chamber of Commerce, 2005-06**

Bill	Year	Description by...	
		Legislative Counsel	Chamber of Commerce
SB832	2006	As amended, this bill provides, with respect to an action filed after August 16, 2004, that results of a final judgment or settlement that is rendered on or before June 30, 2011, and includes punitive damages, that the punitive damages shall be apportioned according to a specified formula.	Hampers needed reforms to California's out-of-control punitive damages system by establishing 75 percent of all punitive damages awards as a source of state funding for the next five years.
SB833	2005	This bill establishes in California the federal opt-in requirement for junk faxes (unsolicited advertising via facsimile machines, computers, or other electronic devices), rather than rely on the application of federal law to regulate these unsolicited fax ads.	Increases costs by placing onerous administrative and economic burdens on businesses by in effect requiring written consent from their own customers and clients prior to sending certain fax communications.
SB840a	2005	Creates the California Health Insurance System, a single payer health care system, administered by the California Health Insurance Agency, to provide health insurance coverage to all California residents.	Imposes a government-run health care system on all Californians.
SB840b	2006	This bill creates the California Health Insurance System (CHIS), a single payer health care system, administered by the California Health Insurance Agency, to provide health insurance coverage to all California residents. States that California Health Insurance System will become operative when the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines the Health Insurance Fund has sufficient revenues to implement this bill.	Imposes a government-run health care system on all Californians.
SB927	2006	This bill imposes a fee on containers that are discharged at the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles (ports) in order to fund rail system improvements, pollution mitigation measures, and port security enhancements.	Increases the cost of exporting and importing goods in California by assessing a \$60 fee per container processed through the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports.
SB1414	2006	This bill requires employers with 10,000 or more employees to spend between six percent and eight percent of its total wages, as specified, on employee health insurance costs, or pay a specified amount to the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) for deposit into the California Fair Share Health Care Fund (Fund).	Imposes a tax on employers with over 10,000 employees to spend the equivalent of 8 percent of their total payroll on health care or pay the equivalent amount to the state.
SB1489	2006	This bill repeals existing Section 1021.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for the award of expert fees, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs in civil actions in which the Attorney General (AG) prevails, and re-enacts that section by revising and recasting its provisions.	Invites unlimited "fishing expeditions" by the Attorney General under numerous statutes, including the Unruh Civil Rights Act and environmental laws, by making defendant companies pay all the investigation and lawsuit costs, including attorneys' fees, if the Attorney General "prevails." The term "prevail" could include settlements, changes in operation by the defendant or even a minuscule monetary award.



SOURCES: California Legislative Counsel; California Chamber of Commerce.

Appendix C

Alternative Scatter Plots

Throughout Chapter 3 of the report, we mention running additional scatter plots to confirm the results of the ones displayed in the main text. These scatter plots are presented here.


- Figures C.1 through C.12 present the scatter plots of district partisanship and the various measures of roll call voting from Chapter 3 for the legislatures from 1990-00 through 2003-04.
- Figure C.13 shows the scatter plot of district partisanship and Planned Parenthood scores for the 1997-98 legislature—the first panels of Figure 3.5 and 3.6--using different assumptions about absences and abstentions.
- Figure C.14 has a scatter plot of district partisanship and DW-Nominate scores for the Assembly, which account for possible changes in the issue environment over time.
- Figures C.15 through C.18 graph party loyalty against two alternative measures of district partisanship: voting on statewide races and Decline-to-State registration.
- Figures C.19 and C.20 graph party loyalty against each legislator's performance in their last race for office.




SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); California Chamber of Commerce (scores)

Figure C.1 - District Partisanship and Chamber of Commerce Scores, 1999-00

Assembly




Senate




SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); California Chamber of Commerce (scores)

Figure C.2 - District Partisanship and Chamber of Commerce Scores, 2001-02

Assembly





Senate



SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); California Chamber of Commerce (scores)


Figure C.3 - District Partisanship and Chamber of Commerce Scores, 2003-04




SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); California League of Conservation Voters (scores)

Figure C.4 - District Partisanship and League of Conservation Voters Scores, 1999-00

Assembly





Senate





SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); California League of Conservation Voters (scores)

Figure C.5 - District Partisanship and League of Conservation Voters Scores, 2001-02





SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); California League of Conservation Voters (scores)

Figure C.6 - District Partisanship and League of Conservation Voters Scores, 2003-04



SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); Planned Parenthood of California (scores).


Figure C.7 - District Partisanship and Planned Parenthood Scores, 1999-2000




SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); Planned Parenthood of California (scores).

Figure C.8 - District Partisanship and Planned Parenthood Scores, 2001-02

Assembly





Senate





SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); Planned Parenthood of California (scores).

Figure C.9 - District Partisanship and Planned Parenthood Scores, 2003-04





SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Figure C.10 - District Partisanship and Party Loyalty, 1999-2000





SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Figure C.11 - District Partisanship and Party Loyalty, 2001-02



SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Figure C.12 - District Partisanship and Party Loyalty, 2003-04




SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); Planned Parenthood of California (scores).


NOTE: All absences and abstentions are ignored when calculating these numbers, instead of treating them as votes against the Planned Parenthood position. Compare to first panel of Figure 3.5 (Assembly) and first panel of Figure 3.6 (Senate).

Figure C.13 - District Partisanship and Planned Parenthood Scores, Absences and Abstentions Excluded, 1997-98

1997-98




2003-04




SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); Seth Masket, University of Denver (scores)

Figure C.14 - District Partisanship and DW-Nominate Scores, Assembly, 1997-98 and 2003-04

1997-98



2005-06




SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).


NOTE: The horizontal axis is the average of the last vote for president and the next vote for governor in each district.

Figure C.15 - District Voting for Statewide Offices and Legislator Party Loyalty, Assembly, 1997-98 and 2005-06

1997-98



2005-06




SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).


NOTE: The horizontal axis is the average of the last vote for president and the next vote for governor in each district.

Figure C.16 - District Voting for Statewide Offices and Legislator Party Loyalty, Senate, 1997-98 and 2005-06

1997-98



2005-06




SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).


NOTE: The horizontal axis is the percentage of voters who register as decline-to-state in each district.

Figure C.17 - District Decline-to-State Registration and Legislator Party Loyalty, Assembly, 1997-98 and 2005-06

1997-98



2005-06




SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).


NOTE: The horizontal axis is the percentage of voters who register as decline-to-state in each district.

Figure C.18 - District Decline-to-State Registration and Legislator Party Loyalty, Senate, 1997-98 and 2005-06

1997-98



2005-06




SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).


NOTE: The horizontal axis is the most recent Assembly vote in each district.

Figure C.19 - Last District Vote for Assembly and Assemblymember's Party Loyalty, 1997-98 and 2005-06

1997-98



2005-06



SOURCES: California Secretary of State (party registration); roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

NOTE: The horizontal axis is the most recent State Senate vote in each district.

Figure C.20 – Last District Vote for Senate and Senator’s Party Loyalty, 1997-98 and 2005-06

Appendix D

Regressions

Throughout the report, we mention regressions that verify our findings, underlie our estimates, or illuminate specific points. These regressions are reported here.

- Tables D.1 and D.2 test whether the parties in the legislature have grown farther apart since the 2001 redistricting, and if they have, whether this change can be attributed to the changing partisanship of the districts. These tables are referenced in Chapter 3.
- Tables D.3 compares the relative influence of a legislator's partisan identification, the vote in each legislator's last race for office, and the partisanship of the legislator's district in explaining roll call scores. This table is referenced in Chapter 3.
- Tables D.4 and D.5 have the probit regressions upon which the "maximum effects" counterfactual in Table 3.1 of Chapter 3 is based. Specifics of this process can be found in Appendix B.
- Table D.6 presents the effect of changes in district partisanship between 2001-02 and 2003-04 (before and after the redistricting) on changes in roll call voting among legislators who served in both legislatures. Table D.7 presents the same regression for changes between the 1997-98 and 2005-06 legislatures. Both tables are referenced in Chapter 4.
- Table D.8 extends the findings of Table D.7 by comparing the effects of district partisanship from 2004 and roll call voting from 1997-98 on 2005-06 roll call voting among those legislators who served in both the 1997-98 and 2005-06 legislatures. This table is referenced in Chapter 4.
- Table D.9 tests whether new legislators in the first legislature after the redistricting (2003-04) were more responsive to their districts than legislators who had won reelection at least once based on a regression of roll call voting on district partisanship, a dummy variable indicating new legislators, and an interaction between the two. Table D.10 runs the same regression for the 2005-06 legislature. Both tables are referenced in Chapter 4.
- Tables D.11 and D.12 demonstrate how a legislator's position on one roll call score is affected by positions on other scores and by district partisanship. Table D.13 presents the same regressions, but explains current roll call voting with roll call voting on other issues in the last legislature. These tables are referenced in Chapter 4.
- Tables D.14 and D.15 have the probit regressions upon which the Chamber of Commerce counterfactual in Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1 of Chapter 5 is based. Table D.16 has the probit regressions upon which the budget counterfactual in Table 5.2 of Chapter 5 is based. Specifics of these processes can be found in Appendix B.

Table D.1

Testing for the Effect of Redistricting
State Assembly, 1997-2006

	Chamber of Commerce		League of Conservation Voters		Planned Parenthood		Overall Partisanship	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
District Partisanship	--	-0.19*** (0.04)	--	0.23*** (0.05)	--	0.04 (0.05)	--	0.15*** (0.02)
Party	-68.62*** (1.42)	-61.77*** (1.93)	77.83*** (1.91)	69.58*** (2.62)	80.37*** (1.92)	79.08*** (2.69)	86.65*** (0.93)	81.45*** (1.26)
Post-redistricting	1.18 (1.73)	0.34 (1.69)	-9.25*** (2.34)	-8.24*** (2.29)	13.59*** (2.34)	13.75*** (2.36)	-2.67* (1.14)	-2.02# (1.10)
Party X Post-redistricting	-3.94# (2.24)	-3.47 (2.18)	5.18# (3.03)	4.61 (2.96)	-8.07** (3.04)	-8.16** (3.04)	2.25 (1.48)	1.79 (1.42)
Constant	95.79***	94.32***	14.46***	16.23	13.47***	13.75***	11.51***	12.64***
Root M.S.E.	10.79	10.46	14.56	14.41	14.61	14.41	7.10	6.82
Adjusted R ²	0.91	0.92	0.88	0.88	0.87	0.88	0.97	0.98
N	399	399	399	399	399	399	397	397
Significant difference?	No		No		No		No	

NOTE: Cases are Assemblymembers in legislatures. "Significant difference" tests whether, for each dependent variable, the difference between the interaction term (Party X Post-Redistricting) in equations (1) and (2) is statistically significant. A statistically significant difference would suggest that larger differences between the parties after the redistricting could be explained by the changing composition of the districts. # p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California League of Conservation Voters; Planned Parenthood of California; roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Table D.2

Testing for the Effect of Redistricting
State Senate, 1997-2006

	Chamber of Commerce		League of Conservation Voters		Planned Parenthood		Overall Partisanship	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
District Partisanship	--	-0.15** (0.05)		0.22** (0.07)	--	0.23** (0.07)	--	0.19** (0.04)
Party	-71.93*** (1.88)	-67.22*** (2.41)	82.28*** (2.59)	75.47*** (3.30)	83.46*** (2.55)	76.38*** (3.25)	85.00*** (1.72)	79.05*** (2.12)
Post-redistricting	1.68 (2.33)	0.71 (2.31)	-7.44* (3.21)	-6.04# (3.16)	9.65** (3.16)	11.11*** (3.11)	-3.81# (2.12)	-2.54# (2.04)
Party X Post-redistricting	-1.63 (2.96)	-0.61 (2.92)	4.01 (4.07)	2.54 (4.00)	-4.48 (4.01)	-6.01 (3.94)	3.64 (2.67)	2.35 (2.57)
Constant	95.09***	94.10***	11.38***	12.81***	9.91***	11.40	12.68***	13.86***
Root M.S.E.	9.98	9.78	13.73	13.42	13.54	13.19	8.86	8.45
Adjusted R ²	0.93	0.93	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.96	0.96
N	201	201	201	201	201	201	194	194
Significant difference?	No		No		No		No	

NOTE: Cases are Senators in legislatures. "Significant difference" tests whether, for each dependent variable, the difference between the interaction term (Party X Post-redistricting) in equation (1) and (2) is statistically significant. A statistically significant difference would suggest that larger differences between the parties after the redistricting could be explained by the changing composition of the districts. # p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California League of Conservation Voters; Planned Parenthood of California; roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Table D.3

Roll call votes as a function of party, district, and election results
1997-2006

	Chamber of Commerce	League of Conservation Voters	Planned Parenthood	Overall Partisanship
Partisan identification	-63.73*** 1.53	72.35*** 2.12	74.56*** 2.21	80.87*** 1.11
Last legislative vote	-0.08# 0.04	0.01 0.06	0.13* 0.06	0.02 0.03
District partisanship	-0.12** 0.04	0.24*** 0.05	-0.01 0.06	0.15*** 0.03
Constant	97.92***	11.95***	12.66***	11.19***
Root M.S.E.	10.30	14.22	14.83	7.39
R ²	0.92	0.89	0.87	0.97
N	598	598	598	592

NOTE: Cases are legislators in legislatures. Last legislative vote is the vote from the last fall election, except in the case of legislators elected by special election or Senators who did not stand for election. # p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California League of Conservation Voters; Planned Parenthood of California; roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Table D.4

Probit Regressions for Table 3.1 Estimates
Assembly, 1997-2002

	Chamber of Commerce		League of Conservation Voters		Planned Parenthood		Overall Partisanship		Overall Partisanship	
	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans
District Partisanship	-0.02# (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.08** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.08** (0.03)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.09** (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.09** (0.03)
Constant	-0.45	-0.36	-0.78**	-0.48#	-0.62*	-0.99**	-0.05	-0.72**	-0.37	-0.85**
-2*Log likelihood	67.64	44.55	67.69	33.50	75.85	23.05	78.95	27.51	50.79	24.99
Pseudo R ²	0.05	0.11	0.00	0.27	0.00	0.33	0.07	0.33	0.12	0.34
N	72	42	72	42	72	42	72	42	72	42

NOTE: Dependent variable is a dummy coded one if legislator was a moderate on each of these dimensions. #p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California League of Conservation Voters; Planned Parenthood of California; roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Table D.5

Probit Regressions for Table 3.1 Estimates
Senate, 1997-2002

	Chamber of Commerce		League of Conservation Voters		Planned Parenthood		Overall Partisanship		Overall Partisanship	
	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans
District Partisanship	-0.02# (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.08** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.08** (0.03)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.09** (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.09** (0.03)
Constant	-0.45	-0.36	-0.78**	-0.48#	-0.62*	-0.99**	-0.05	-0.72**	-0.37	-0.85**
-2*Log likelihood	67.64	44.55	67.69	33.50	75.85	23.05	78.95	27.51	50.79	24.99
Pseudo R ²	0.05	0.11	0.00	0.27	0.00	0.33	0.07	0.33	0.12	0.34
N	72	42	72	42	72	42	72	42	72	42

NOTE: Dependent variable is a dummy coded one if legislator was a moderate on each of these dimensions. #p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California League of Conservation Voters; Planned Parenthood of California; roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Table D.6

**Change in Roll Call Voting as a Function of Changes in District Partisanship,
2001-02 to 2003-04 Legislatures**

	Δ Chamber of Commerce	Δ League of Conservation Voters	Δ Planned Parenthood	Δ Overall Partisanship
Δ District Partisanship	0.13 (0.12)	0.15 (0.16)	0.15 (0.17)	0.18 (0.12)
Constant	0.47	0.43	2.65*	0.30
Root M.S.E.	7.04	9.42	9.61	6.88
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03
N	87	87	87	87

NOTE: Cases are legislators in the 2003-04 Legislature who have been reelected at least once. Change scores are calculated as the difference between the 2001-02 (the last before the redistricting) and 2003-04 (the first after the redistricting) legislatures. # p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California League of Conservation Voters; Planned Parenthood of California; roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Table D.7

Change in Roll Call Voting as a Function of Changes in District Partisanship,
1997-98 to 2005-06 Legislatures

	Δ Chamber of Commerce	Δ League of Conservation Voters	Δ Planned Parenthood	Δ Overall Partisanship
Δ District Partisanship	-0.01 (0.15)	0.14 (0.19)	0.12 (0.26)	-0.10 (0.13)
Constant	1.04	-8.18***	12.25***	-1.19
Root M.S.E.	7.69	9.38	13.26	6.28
R ²	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.03
N	26	26	26	26

NOTE: Cases are legislators in 2005-06 who also served in the 1997-98 Legislature. Change scores are calculated as the difference between their scores in the 1997-98 and 2005-06 Legislatures. # p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California League of Conservation Voters; Planned Parenthood of California; roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Table D.8

2005-06 Roll Call Voting as a Function of 1997-98 Roll Call Voting and Current District Partisanship

	Chamber of Commerce	League of Conservation Voters	Planned Parenthood	Overall Partisanship
2004 District Partisanship	0.08 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.18)	0.25 (0.19)	0.07 (0.12)
1997-98 Chamber of Commerce	0.93*** (0.07)	--	--	--
1997-98 League of Conservation Voters	--	1.02*** (0.09)	--	--
1997-98 Planned Parenthood	--	--	0.72*** (0.10)	--
1997-98 Overall Partisanship	--	--	--	0.95*** (0.06)
Constant	3.86	-8.89 [#]	25.22***	1.69
Root M.S.E.	6.32	9.45	10.81	6.38
R ²	0.97	0.95	0.93	0.98
N	26	26	26	26

NOTE: Cases are Assemblymembers in legislatures. Numbers in the “β” column are standardized beta weights. [#] p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California League of Conservation Voters; Planned Parenthood of California; roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Table D.9

Roll Call Votes as a Function of District Partisanship and Tenure,
2003-04

	Chamber of Commerce	League of Conservation Voters	Planned Parenthood	Overall Partisanship
District Partisanship	-1.56*** (0.11)	1.68*** (0.12)	1.50*** (0.11)	1.74*** (0.12)
New legislator	9.15* (4.31)	-11.96* (4.95)	-10.10* (4.63)	-11.09* (4.90)
District partisanship X New legislator	0.18 (0.17)	-0.15 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.18)	-0.20 (0.19)
Constant	65.12***	41.83***	56.01***	47.58***
Root M.S.E.	20.04	23.02	21.57	22.80
R ²	0.74	0.72	0.70	0.73
N	120	120	120	120

NOTE: Cases are legislators in the 2003-04 Legislature. A legislator is defined as “new” if he or she did not serve in the previous (2001-02) legislature. # p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California League of Conservation Voters; Planned Parenthood of California; roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Table D.10

Roll Call Votes as a Function of District Partisanship and Tenure,
2005-06

	Chamber of Commerce	League of Conservation Voters	Planned Parenthood	Overall Partisanship
District Partisanship	-1.30*** (0.09)	1.58*** (0.11)	1.34*** (0.10)	1.65*** (0.11)
New legislator	-2.11 (4.09)	3.78 (4.93)	0.11 (4.44)	2.09 (5.00)
District partisanship X New legislator	-0.11 (0.17)	0.13 (0.21)	0.16 (0.19)	0.14 (0.21)
Constant	68.85***	37.12***	55.93***	44.15***
Root M.S.E.	18.60	22.42	20.20	22.72
R ²	0.72	0.72	0.70	0.73
N	120	120	120	120

NOTE: Cases are legislators in the 2005-06 legislature. A legislator is defined as “new” if he or she was new to his or her seat, as drawn by the 2001 redistricting. # p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California League of Conservation Voters; Planned Parenthood of California; roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Table D.11

**Predicting Assembly Voting Scores from District Partisanship and Contemporaneous Scores
1997-2006**

	Chamber of Commerce		League of Conservation Voters		Planned Parenthood		Overall Partisanship	
	Coeff.	β	Coeff.	β	Coeff.	β	Coeff.	β
District Partisanship	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.07	0.01 (0.04)	0.01	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.09	0.14*** (0.03)	0.07
Chamber of Commerce Score	--	--	-0.37*** (0.05)	-0.32	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.10	-0.30*** (0.04)	-0.25
League of Conservation Voters Score	-0.30*** (0.04)	-0.35	--	--	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.11	0.39*** (0.03)	0.38
Planned Parenthood Score	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06	--	--	0.34*** (0.02)	0.32
Overall Partisanship	-0.42*** (0.06)	-0.50	0.68*** (0.06)	0.71	0.96*** (0.07)	1.02	--	--
Constant	103.17***		40.16***		18.62*		32.04***	
Root M.S.E.	9.60		10.67		13.65		8.13	
Adjusted R ²	0.93		0.94		0.89		0.97	
N	397		397		397		397	

NOTE: Cases are Assemblymembers in legislatures. Numbers in the “ β ” column are standardized beta weights. # $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California League of Conservation Voters; Planned Parenthood of California; roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Table D.12

Predicting Senate Voting Scores from District Partisanship and Contemporaneous Scores
1997-2006

	Chamber of Commerce		League of Conservation Voters		Planned Parenthood		Overall Partisanship	
	Coeff.	β	Coeff.	β	Coeff.	β	Coeff.	β
District Partisanship	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.04	0.01 (0.05)	0.00	0.02 (0.06)	0.01	0.10* (0.05)	0.05
Chamber of Commerce Score	--	--	-0.37*** (0.06)	-0.32	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.03	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.22
League of Conservation Voters Score	-0.40*** (0.07)	-0.47	--	--	0.21* (0.09)	0.21	0.38*** (0.06)	0.38
Planned Parenthood Score	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03	0.15* (0.06)	0.14	--	--	0.36*** (0.05)	0.36
Overall Partisanship	-0.37*** (0.08)	-0.44	0.52*** (0.08)	0.52	0.70*** (0.09)	0.72	--	--
Constant	101.73***		36.02***		8.66		29.84***	
Root M.S.E.	10.32		10.00		11.87		8.55	
Adjusted R ²	0.92		0.95		0.92		0.96	
N	194		194		194		194	

NOTE: Cases are Senators in legislatures. Numbers in the “ β ” column are standardized beta weights. # p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California League of Conservation Voters; Planned Parenthood of California; roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Table D.13

Predicting Voting Scores from District Partisanship and Lagged Scores
1997-2006

	Chamber of Commerce		League of Conservation Voters		Planned Parenthood		Overall Partisanship	
	Coeff.	β	Coeff.	β	Coeff.	β	Coeff.	β
District Partisanship	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.06	0.01 (0.05)	0.00	-0.09# (0.05)	-0.05	0.11** (0.03)	0.06
Lagged Chamber of Commerce Score	--	--	-0.49*** (0.06)	-0.42	0.01 (0.06)	0.00	-0.29*** (0.04)	-0.25
Lagged League of Conservation Voters Score	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.31	--	--	0.05 (0.07)	0.05	0.40*** (0.04)	0.38
Lagged Planned Parenthood Score	-0.08# (0.05)	-0.09	0.08# (0.05)	0.08	--	--	0.34*** (0.03)	0.33
Lagged Overall Partisanship	-0.42*** (0.07)	-0.51	0.47*** (0.06)	0.48	0.89*** (0.07)	0.95	--	--
Constant	101.67***		47.87***		8.09		31.80***	
Root M.S.E.	11.33		10.92		12.17		8.17	
Adjusted R ²	0.90		0.93		0.91		0.96	
N	352		352		352		354	

NOTE: Cases are legislators in legislatures who have been reelected at least once, including those who have switched chambers. Numbers in the “ β ” column are standardized beta weights. # $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California League of Conservation Voters; Planned Parenthood of California; roll call votes used in party loyalty calculations provided by Jeff Lewis of the University of California, Los Angeles (<http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/california/>).

Table D.14

Probit Regressions for Hypothetical Assembly Votes on Chamber of Commerce-tracked Bills from Table 5.1

	SB109		SB174	SB833	SB399	AB391	AB875	AB1310	AB1101		AB6	AB1381	
	Abstain	Yes							Abstain	Yes		Abstain	Yes
District Partisanship	0.00 (0.03)	0.05# (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.09** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.36# (0.18)	0.02 (0.03)	0.21* (0.09)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.18 (0.12)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.04# (0.02)
Party	--	--	--	-0.55 (0.88)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.26 (1.29)	5.42*** (1.25)
Constant	-0.28	-0.08	0.37	-0.05	0.41	-2.95	1.23	-1.87	0.41	0.22	-0.86	-0.56	-2.27***
-2*Log likelihood	77.68		33.13	48.67	29.01	9.64	15.91	18.10	75.57		10.65		94.60
Pseudo R ²	--		0.08	0.55	0.10	0.57	0.04	0.44	--		0.36		--
χ^2	4.51		3.04#	59.77***	3.07#	12.80***	0.71	13.98***	4.39		5.98*		41.38***
N	48		48	80	48	48	48	48	48		48		80

Table D.14
(continued)
Probit Regressions for Hypothetical Assembly Votes on Chamber of Commerce-tracked Bills from Table 5.1

	AB2975	AB1884	SB815	AB2371	SB832	SB1489	SB840	SB1414	AB32	AB1012	AB1899	AB1614	SB927
District Partisanship	0.15# (0.09)	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)	0.35 (0.22)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05# (0.03)	0.04# (0.02)	0.05# (0.03)
Party	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.01 (1.10)	--	--	--	--
Constant	-0.78	0.13	0.33	-0.23	0.54	0.63	0.48	0.45	-2.39	0.85	0.08	0.17	0.03
-2*Log likelihood	15.30	22.70	23.81	42.82	29.75	25.31	19.28	37.80	10.61	31.31	31.32	35.93	30.88
Pseudo R ²	0.32	0.18	0.14	0.13	0.07	0.08	0.14	0.05	0.90	0.02	0.13	0.10	0.15
χ^2	7.15**	4.83*	3.72#	6.31*	2.32	2.23	3.17#	2.08	97.83***	0.77	4.85*	3.95*	5.29*
N	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	80	48	48	48	48

NOTE: Votes with more than five abstentions were modeled as multinomial probit, with “no” as the reference category. The “party” variable is only included for votes where Republicans did not vote as a bloc. In all other cases, the regression is for Democrats only.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California Legislative Counsel.

Table D.15

Probit Regressions for Hypothetical Senate Votes on Chamber of Commerce-tracked Bills from Table 5.1

	SB109	SB174	SB399	AB391	AB875	AB1310	SB757	SB764	SB820	SB760	AB1381	AB2975	AB1884
District Partisanship	0.09# (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.38 (0.36)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.10# (0.06)	0.11# (0.06)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Party	--	--	3.49** (1.11)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.67# (0.98)	--	--
Constant	-0.76	0.18	-1.90***	15.56	1.48*	1.13#	-0.93	-0.77	1.24#	1.00	-0.96#	0.15	2.20*
-2*Log likelihood	16.55	11.93	30.71	3.58	21.33	21.93	15.79	13.04	24.55	18.28	33.51	20.36	13.13
Pseudo R ²	0.25	0.14	0.45	0.80	0.03	0.00	0.28	0.29	0.02	0.00	0.39	0.07	0.06
χ^2	5.43*	2.01	24.65***	14.77***	0.65	0.05	6.20*	5.31*	0.47	0.07	21.04***	1.62	0.81
N	25	25	40	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	40	25	25

Table D.15
(continued)
Probit Regressions for Hypothetical Senate Votes on Chamber of Commerce-tracked Bills from Table 5.1

	SB815	SB832	SB1489	SB840b	SB1414	AB32	AB1012	AB1614	SB927
District Partisanship	0.05 (0.05)	0.07 (0.08)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.16 (0.11)	0.06 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)
Party	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Constant	0.35	0.53	1.13	3.74#	1.92*	7.32	-0.20	0.97	0.87
-2*Log likelihood	12.36	7.13	18.34	6.43	13.40	5.50	18.90	13.65	18.12
Pseudo R ²	0.11	0.15	0.00	0.23	0.04	0.61	0.14	0.02	0.01
χ^2	1.58	1.27	0.01	1.96	0.54	8.44**	3.08#	0.29	0.23
N	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

NOTE: Votes with more than five abstentions were modeled as multinomial probit, with “no” as the reference category. The “party” variable is only included for votes where Republicans did not vote as a bloc. In all other cases, the regression is for Democrats only.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Chamber of Commerce; California Legislative Counsel.

Table D.16

Probit Regressions for Hypothetical Votes on Budget Bills from Table 5.2

	2003		2004		2005		2006	
	Assembly	Senate	Assembly	Senate	Assembly	Senate	Assembly	Senate
District Partisanship	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.07# (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.04)
Party	1.50* (0.30)	--	-0.34 (0.72)	2.59* (1.23)	--	1.35 (1.23)	1.40# (0.83)	--
Constant	-0.27	-0.35	1.13**	-0.66	1.18*	0.42	-0.31	-0.49
-2*Log likelihood	63.17	19.07	61.61	25.08	38.79	27.49	50.17	19.08
Pseudo R ²	0.35	0.00	0.04	0.46	0.10	0.19	0.49	0.00
χ^2	34.57***	0.03	2.45	21.32***	4.44*	6.32*	48.45***	0.02
N	80	15	80	39	32	40	79	15

NOTE: The "party" variable is only included for votes where Democrats did not vote as a bloc. In all other cases, the regression is for Republicans only.

SOURCES: California Secretary of State; California Legislative Counsel.