PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA

Reforming Pretrial Justice in California

Technical Appendices

CONTENTS

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Appendix A. History of Pretrial Reform

In this section we overview major reforms that have shaped the current pretrial justice landscape nationally and in California.

Pretrial Justice Reform in the United States

Since the advent of the republic, lawmakers have recognized a right to pretrial release or bail—except for capital crimes (Judiciary Act of 1789).[1] The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (1789) prohibits courts from imposing excessive money bail. It does not, however, stipulate how bail might be paid. The commercial money bail system, through which defendants are able to pay bail bondsmen a nonrefundable portion of the bail amount to secure their release, has existed in the United States since the turn of the 20th century. Calls for its reform have existed at least as long (Schnacke 2014).[2]

In describing the history of bail in the United States, Timothy Schnacke (2014) identified three "generations" of reform that began early in the 20th century. The first (early 1920s to mid-1960s) saw money bail curtailed and graduated sanctions introduced at the federal level. The second (mid-1960s to mid-1980s) expanded the objective of pretrial detention from ensuring court appearances to protecting public safety. Persistent inequity and inefficiency motivated the third (early 2000s-today) generation, which has promoted pretrial risk assessment tools as a means of addressing both. The key events in each generation are depicted in Figure A1.

The first generation of reform focused on flaws with the money bail system that continue to motivate pretrial reform today. In the 1920s, legal scholars questioned whether money bail promotes public safety or protects the rights of the accused, noting that "undependable" people can afford to pay money to secure their release, whereas "dependable" but poor people cannot (Beeley 1927, 160; Pound and Frankfurter 1922). The Bail Reform Act of 1966 sought to address these problems by sharply restricting money bail and creating nonmonetary alternatives for those charged in federal courts, including own recognizance and conditional release. The act drew on empirical research, notably the 1961 Manhattan Bail Project, which found that most people appear in court if released without conditions. It also reflected the *Stack v. Boyle* (1951) decision, in which the court ruled that the Judiciary Act established release as the default; that money bail was meant to ensure court appearances—not public safety; and that detention required proof of flight risk—as related to factors described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, such as current charge, evidence, and the accused's character and ability to pay bail.

The second generation of pretrial reform focused on an inconsistency between the law and its practice. In practice, judges routinely imposed high money bail amounts to de facto detain people perceived to be dangerous (Goldkamp 1985; Schnacke 2014). Until 1970, that practice remained unofficial (PDRW 2017). In 1968, the American Bar Association (ABA) published its first pretrial release standards, which promoted preventative detention—pretrial detention to protect public safety. In 1970, the U.S. Congress enacted preventative detention in Washington DC. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 instituted this change nationwide—even as it eliminated money bail in the federal system. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld preventative detention in *United States v. Salerno* (1987, 749-55). However, the court also echoed *Stack*, characterizing pretrial release as "the norm" and pretrial

[1] The concept of bail dates to Roman times. For more exhaustive studies of bail reform see Schnacke (2014) and Baughman (2017).

[2] Alexis de Tocqueville (1835, 30) critiqued the practice of allowing people to pay money to secure pretrial release, "The civil and criminal procedure of the Americans has only two means of action—committal and bail. The first measure taken by the magistrate is to exact security from the defendant, or, in case of refusal, to incarcerate him: the ground of the accusation and the importance of the charges against him are then discussed. It is evident that a legislation of this kind is hostile to the poor man, and favourable only to the rich. The poor man has not always a security to produce, even in a civil cause; and if he is obliged to wait for justice in prison, he is speedily reduced to distress. The wealthy individual, on the contrary, always escapes imprisonment in civil causes; nay, more, he may readily elude the punishment which awaits him for a delinquency by breaking his bail."

detention as a "carefully limited exception" to be reserved for "extremely serious offenses." Yet research undertaken after *Salerno* noted the potential for ill-defined notions of dangerousness to lead to increases, rather than the desired decreases, in pretrial detention rates (Goldkamp 1985). Over time, that potential was realized. Pretrial detention rates rose and helped to motivate a new generation of reform (e.g., Tafoya 2013, 2015).

FIGURE A1
National pretrial reform timeline



SOURCES: Author illustration using data compiled from the following: Baughman (2017; 2018); Beeley (1927); Goldkamp (1985); *Holland v. Rosen (2018)*; NTFFFBP 2019; Schnacke (2014); Senate Bill 10; Smith (2019); Widgery (2018)

NOTES: First generation events are blue. Second generation events are purple. Third generation events are green.

Since 1984, there has been no major national pretrial justice reform legislation. Nevertheless, a third generation of pretrial reform is underway across the nation. In 2011, the Attorney General of the United States convened the National Symposium on Pretrial Justice, which advocated for risk-based approaches to pretrial release decisions. In the ensuing years, all fifty states instituted some form of pretrial reform (Widgery 2018).

Notably, New Jersey's reforms are similar to those proposed in California. Research attributing jail overcrowding to pretrial detention motivated New Jersey's reforms, which were coordinated across all branches of government and sanctioned by its voters, who approved a constitutional amendment that enabled reform (NTFFFBP 2019; VanNostrand 2013). Since 2017, New Jersey has made release decisions using pretrial risk assessments. Although New Jersey did not eliminate money bail, it is now applied rarely (Anderson et al. 2019). For example, in 2018, bail was imposed in only 102 of 44,383 cases and 99 of those cases involved violations of previously imposed nonmonetary release conditions (Grant 2019). New Jersey's reforms have also withstood challenges. In *Holland v. Rosen* (2018), the court rejected the appellant's claim that he was constitutionally entitled to money bail.

Pretrial Justice Reform in California

In California, pretrial justice reform has often presaged national reform, but with far more volatility. As shown in Figure A2, research, legislation, litigation, and voter initiatives have directly and indirectly shaped California's pretrial justice system over the past 150 years. Notably, a tremendous amount of activity has taken place in the last decade, during which the pretrial justice system has been in a state of near-constant flux.

California's penal code, which was established in 1872, provides for pretrial release in noncapital cases. Moreover, unlike the Constitution of the United States, the current Constitution of California, which was ratified in 1879, instituted a constitutional right to pretrial release for noncapital crimes (California Constitution, Article 1 §6 (1879).[3] Bail can be denied for capital offenses. In an early challenge to denying bail for capital crimes, the court upheld the practice when "substantial evidence" sustains the charge (*Ex parte Curtis* 1891, 190).[4]

Nearly two decades before the federal rules of criminal procedure were instantiated, California enacted SB 364 (1927), which codified many factors that guide pretrial release today: "the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his appearing at the trial" (Chapter 737 §1 1927, 1387). Two subsequent bills (SB 811 and SB 821) asserted the sole right of the courts to grant release and set money bail at levels "reasonable and sufficient for the appearance of the defendant" (Chapter 242 §1 1933, 749). Through repeated challenges to excessive bail amounts (e.g., *In re Christie* 2001; *Galen v. County of Los Angeles* 2007), appeals courts upheld trial courts' discretion to set bail—a precedent that originated with *In re Burnette* (1939), in which the court ruled that bail is not excessive just because a person cannot pay it.

FIGURE A2

California pretrial reform timeline



SOURCE: Author illustration using data compiled from the following: California State Assembly, Office of the Chief Clerk, Statutes and Amendments to the Codes; California Legislative Information; Nexis Uni; CSJ (n.d.); PDRW (2017); Tafoya (2013)

NOTE: First generation events are blue. Second generation events are purple. Third generation events are green. Events that indirectly affected the pretrial justice system and its reform are orange.

In the mid-twentieth century, California's second generation of reform attempted to create more uniformity in pretrial release processes that increasingly prioritized preventative detention. To standardize bail amounts within counties, AB 1277 (1973) required judges to develop bail schedules and update them over time. Concurrently, the court ruled in *In re Underwood* (1973) that state law did not allow public safety to factor into release decisions. To address this, California enacted AB 2 (1979). Like the national Bail Reform act of 1966, AB 2 outlined conditions (i.e., graduated sanctions), such as regular check-ins, that could be imposed to monitor those released during the pretrial period.

[3] Constitutional rights are more indelible than rights established by laws because only a vote of the people can amend the state's Constitution. Laws can amend laws.

[4] As noted by Schnacke (2014), the "substantial evidence" provision for denying pretrial release dates to a 1682 Pennsylvania law that has become a national norm.

Voters, however, demanded more protection. Proposition 4 (1982) amended the state constitution to make public safety the primary consideration in pretrial release or detention decisions[5] and expanded the crimes to which preventive detention could be applied. The legislature responded in kind. As crime rates rose in the 1980s and 1990s, many laws were passed to make pretrial release harder to obtain for certain crimes, including witness tampering (AB 1284 1989), drug crimes (AB 3314 1988), and gun crimes (AB 599 1989).[6] Proposition 189, which voters passed in 1994, again amended the constitution to extend preventive detention to felony sex cases.

During the past decade, broader criminal justice reform highlighted problems in California's pretrial justice system and accelerated the current generation of pretrial reform.[7] In the final ruling associated with *Brown v. Plata* (2011), the United States Supreme Court ordered California to reduce its prison population—from nearly double to 137.5 percent of capacity—to alleviate overcrowding that prevented prisoners from receiving adequate health care. To meet that mandate, the legislature passed AB 109, commonly known as public safety realignment, which diverted many parole violators and most people with a new felony conviction for a non-serious, non-violent, and non-sexual offense from state prisons to county jails. Proposition 47 (2014), which reduced the level of many property and drug crimes from felony to misdemeanor, also served this aim because most misdemeanants serve time in jail, not prison (Bird et al. 2016; Grattet et al. 2016; Lofstrom and Raphael 2015; Lofstrom, Bird, and Martin 2016). Reductions in prison overcrowding therefore came at the cost of increased jail overcrowding.

However, research undertaken in the wake of realignment and Proposition 47 showed that those serving post-conviction sentences were not driving jail overcrowding in California. Instead, the primary drivers of jail overcrowding were found to be high rates of pretrial detention, the nation's highest bail amounts, and rising trends in both (Tafoya 2013, 2015). Efforts to address these issues ensued. Advocacy groups promoted pretrial risk assessment as an alternative to money bail (Amatya et al. 2017; Rabuy and Kopf 2016; HRW 2017; Mamalian 2011; PJI 2013). Individual counties then implemented it, often with the help of research and advocacy organizations (Harris, Goss, and Gumbs 2019; Levin 2012; Lovins and Lovins 2015; Robertson and Jones 2013). The state legislature entertained, but did not pass, several bills aimed at pretrial reform. SB 210 (2012) would have expanded own recognizance release. AB 1118 (2013) would have lowered and standardized bail amounts statewide. AB 42 (2016) would have required pretrial risk assessment after most arrests.

In 2016, the court system accelerated this halting local and legislative reform process. Two key court challenges to money bail began and ultimately reversed a long established trend of upper courts deferring to lower courts' discretion in setting bail. In the first, the court ruled in seeming contradiction to precedent (*In re Burnette* 1939) that people should not be detained purely for want of the ability to pay (*In re Humphrey* 2018), In the second, the court similarly found that the plaintiffs had been denied their liberty because they could not pay bail set according to a unscientific schedule that did not attempt to ensure court appearances *(Buffin v. the City and County of San Francisco* 2019). However, at present the reforms tied to these cases remain enmeshed in the appeals process.

Also in 2016, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California established the Pretrial Detention Reform Workgroup (PDRW) to study pretrial policies and potential reforms. The PDRW released its report in 2017, with the Chief Justice endorsing each of the ten recommendations made in the report (Bonta 2018). The legislature then codified those recommendations in Senate Bill 10 (SB 10), which the governor signed into law in 2018. Signaling a continued commitment to pretrial risk assessment, the legislature passed and the governor signed SB

[5] In 1987, SB 630, which has similar language prioritizing public safety in bail decisions, was signed into law.

[6] AB 4285 (1988) required judges to state on the record reasons for amending bail amounts for people charged with violent felonies. AB 729 (1997) lowered the likelihood of reduced bail for serious felonies.

[7] In 2008, voters passed Proposition 9, commonly known as Marsy's Law, which gave victims the right to be heard during pretrial release decisions. However the proposition also introduced an inconsistency in the laws governing pretrial release. Article 1 §12 reads, "A person shall be released on bail…" whereas 28(f)(3) reads, "A person may be released on bail…" This inconsistency has yet to be resolved, as discussed in the PDRW (2017, 19-23) report.

36, which requires regular validation of risk assessment tools, including evaluation of whether they propagate "bias or disparate effect based on gender, income level, race, or ethnicity" (SB 36). Should voters repeal SB 10, SB 36 will remain in effect as will the court challenges to money bail. For instance, the Supreme Court of California has yet to rule in *Humphrey* and could still declare money bail unconstitutional.

Pretrial reform remains ongoing in California and nationally primarily because systems of pretrial release and detention have not yet solved the fundamental problems identified nearly 100 years ago by Beeley (1927) and echoed in the PDRW (2017) report. Researchers, policymakers, and citizens have little confidence that the current pretrial release system identifies and detains the people most likely to threaten public safety and fail to appear in court.

Appendix B. MACR Processing

This section describes how we created our analysis data from the MACR. The first section describes how we categorized offenses and generated indicators of hold for risk assessment criteria. The second section describes how we matched across arrests to create arrest histories.

Mapping MACR Offense Codes to Risk Assessment Criteria

Below we list the MACR codes categorized to approximate the reasons people can be held for risk assessment under SB 10. (Note: lists of current codes and associated crimes are available here: https://oag.ca.gov/law/code-tables). To build these categorizations, we first mapped the MACR offense codes into broad offense types. We then determined whether arrests met the criteria for risk assessment based on charge, criminal history, and circumstances. By circumstances we mean, for example, crimes committed by prisoners. Such crimes are unlikely to lead to pretrial risk assessment because no pretrial release or detention decision needs to be made: prisoners will remain prisoners. Similarly, those who escape will be returned to confinement. MACR codes that reflect these types of circumstances are: 350-2, 840, and 870-3.

MACR offense codes are not as specific as penal codes. Some MACR offenses codes include an assortment of crimes. As such there are likely some crimes included in some offense codes that may not meet the criteria for risk assessment as intended by the legislature, which is why we have taken care to list our categorizations here. In general, we tried to include only those codes for which (a) the majority of offenses would clearly meet the risk assessment criteria or (b) included more serious crimes that would clearly meet the criteria for risk assessment. We have noted a few (but not all) of the instances where this is the case.

Finally, all possible MACR offense codes may not be listed here. Only offense codes that satisfy the risk assessment criteria in our coding structure and are represented in the 2010 to 2015 MACR are listed here.

Violent Felonies in the 2015 MACR

100 103 110 120 121 150 151 160 200 210 220 230 250 300 310 320 321 323 330 341 342 343 344 345 353 361 362 363 370 371 372 373 380 382 383 384 385 390 391 392 393 600 610 611 620 621 630 635 640 700 705 710 711 712 713 714 720 731 732 733 734 740 760 770 775 780 781 790 791 793 841 842 843 844 845 850 855 860 865 880 881 882 883 884 891 920 921 922 923 924 925 927 960 961 981 985 992

Spousal, child, and elder assaults (370, 371, 372, and 373) are the most prevalent violent felonies. Together they accounted for one-third of all violent felony arrests in California in 2015.

Other Felonies in the 2015 MACR

63 64 93 94 400 410 420 425 430 450 500 501 502 503 504 505 510 511 530 531 550 551 552 560 570 572 580 581 582 584 585 750 751 800 801 802 803 804 805 810 811 812 813 820 821 822 825 828 831 832 833 834 835 854 890 900 901 911 940 943 944 950 970 971 980 990 991 993 994 995 998

Misdemeanor Domestic Violence in the 2015 MACR

376 377 397

Offense codes 376 and 377 include child and elder abuse. Offense code 397 includes spousal assault and battery, but also assaults on others (e.g., emergency personnel, school workers, highway workers, etc.). We expect domestic assaults to dominate this category, but cannot definitively say whether they do.

Misdemeanor Sex Offenses in the 2015 MACR

26 27 646 726 737 738 739 746 766 776 777 786 787

Offense code 726 includes charges related to contributing to the delinquency of a minor, which may not be a sex crime. However, also included in 726 are publishing child sex abuse imagery and strangers luring children. We therefore mapped 726 into this exclusion criterion. We also included failure to register in this category (offense codes 27 and 746). Registration failures are 12.5 percent of misdemeanor sex crimes that we categorized as meeting risk assessment criteria. Offense code 726 accounts for 17.9 percent. The bulk of these crimes are lewd conduct (26), at 25.4 percent, and indecent exposure (766), which accounts for 27.1 percent.

Supervision Violations in the 2015 MACR

17 93 94

Serious and Violent Criminal History in the 2010 to 2015 MACR

100 103 110 120 121 150 151 160 200 210 220 230 250 310 320 321 323 330 341 342 345 361 362 370 372 373 380 382 383 384 391 392 410 500 610 611 620 621 630 635 700 705 710 711 712 713 714 730 731 732 733 734 791 803 820 832 844 860 865 880 881 884 891 920 921 923 924 925 927 950 981 985 990 992 995

Prior Failure to Appear in the 2010 to 2015 MACR

88 98 993

Most failures to appear (68.1 percent) are non-traffic related misdemeanors (98). Slightly more than one-quarter of FTAs are felony-related (993). Just over five percent are traffic related (88).

Creating Arrest Histories

We created arrest histories using name and birthdate matching and verified our matches using other information in the MACR, including race, gender, and county of arrest. In this section, we describe the steps that we took to generate and verify those histories.

1. Keep only adult arrests in which a complaint was sought, 2010-2015. We did this to better approximate the SB 10 exclusions, some of which are based on convictions. We add the 2015 no-complaint arrests back in to generate risk assessment predictions because a person might be assessed before the decision about whether to pursue a complaint is made.
2. Birthdate and arrest dates are in three fields (month, day, and year) in the MACR. We joined them together and corrected invalid dates by replacing them with the immediately previous valid date (e.g., February 30 would become February 28 in non-leap years).
3. Full names are in one data field. We stripped those names of all punctuation and separated full names into first, middle, last, etc. fields (up to 6 fields: nm1-6). We corrected the following common errors:
    a. Moved suffixes in first and middle name fields to the last name field
    b. Separated suffixes from last names
    c. Eliminated invalid names (e.g., "NMN")
4. Created matching versions of nm1-5 variables using the *soundex* and *nysiis* commands in Stata
5. Created the following identifiers and verification variables
    a. ID: group by birthdate, nm1, and nm2
    b. IDS: group by birthdate, soundex nm1, soundex nm2
    c. IDY: group by birthdate, nysiis nm1, nysiis nm2
    d. Numeric versions of first letters of nm3-5: fi3-5
6. Evaluated ID matches using additional information to assess match quality:
    a. All observations within ID have same: fi3-5, race, gender, county of arrest[8]
    b. All observations within ID have same: fi3-5, race, gender
    c. All observations within ID have same: fi3-5
    d. All observations within ID have same: fi3, race, gender, county of arrest
    e. All observations within ID have same: fi3, gender, county of arrest
    f. All observations within ID have same: fi3
    g. All observations within ID have same: race, gender, county of arrest
    h. All observations within ID have same: race, gender
    i. All observations within ID have same: gender and county of arrest
    j. All observations within ID have same: county of arrest

[8] Within counties, the law enforcement agency identifier can also be used.

7. At this point, there were matches we were not able to make within those that did not match and/or those that did not match may match matches already made. IDS made too many mismatches (e.g., Alexander and Alexandra would be a match), but IDY made many matches that ID did not. We looked for more matches using similar evaluation criteria as above to assign a match quality variable for IDY and IDS matches as well as the following additional match criteria.
    a. ID1: nm1, f3nm2 dob; ID2: f3nm1, f3nm2 dob; ID3: nm1, f1nm2 dob
8. We visually inspected within matches with the same match quality. The main name matching errors were for uncommon names spelled multiple ways that were not captured by *nysiis* and therefore being missed (i.e., no match) or with very common names matching too aggressively (i.e., mismatches). We looked at sections of the MACR with names that fit these characteristics to determine whether the errors were too prevalent: more than about one in five observations were mismatches or non-matches.
9. Created a final identifier variable (MID) by resolving across match type and quality variables, keeping the highest quality matches.
10. Resolved gender across multiple observations within MID according to the following rules:
    a. All same
    b. Most frequent
    c. If different gender appeared with same frequency, assigned gender based on name, typically by identifying female names
    d. Any unresolved genders assigned male
11. Resolved race across multiple observations within MID according to the following rules:
    a. All same
    b. Most frequent
    c. Within same number of two or more races
        i. If second race of two is other, assign non-other
        ii. If four or three races plus other, assign other
        iii. If Hispanic/Asian-white: assign Hispanic/Asian
        iv. If black-white/Hispanic/Asian; assign black
        v. If Asian-Hispanic, assign Asian
        vi. If there are two dominant races, assign race in this order:
            1. If Hispanic is one: Assign Hispanic
            2. If white is one: Assign white
            3. If black is one: Assign black
12. After creating arrest histories, we integrated the 2015 adult arrests for which a complaint was not sought back into the data because risk assessments would likely be made for those arrests that qualify, regardless of whether a complaint was sought.

13. We found that some people were arrested multiple times on the same day. Some of these arrests seem to be unique arrests (e.g., a person was cited and released, then picked up on another charge and booked). However, others seem to be multiple charges (e.g., one person was arrested 30 times in one day, which strains credulity). We therefore kept the most "serious" arrest (i.e., felonies over misdemeanors and lower over higher offense codes) under two assumptions (1) a person would only be risk assessed one time in one day; (2) it would be for the more serious arrest. Although, it is true that under SB 10 that people who have pending charges will be risk assessed, we simply could not make a definitive determination about which same day arrests were duplicates and which were indicative of multiple charges in the same arrest. So, we did not include the second arrest as meeting the risk assessment criteria. In total, there were 10,911 same-day arrests statewide in the 2015 MACR.
14. Created the following variables for each 2015 arrest
    a. Indicators of: violent and any felony; misdemeanor sex, domestic violence, DUI; supervision violation; serious/violent offense, FTA, DUI
    b. Risk assessment criteria indicator variables associated with each in (a)

Appendix C. Additional Calculations and Analyses

TABLE C1

Arrests, bookings, and risk assessments by county for 2015

County	Number of Arrests	Number of Misdemeanor Arrests	Number of Felony Arrests	Number of Bookings	Number of Cite and Release	Number of Risk Assessments	Adjusted Number of Risk Assessments
Alameda	43,692	33,149	10,543	33,238	10,454	11,924	14,798
Alpine	46	34	12	40	6	13	16
Amador	1,426	1,046	380	957	469	385	478
Butte	11,560	9,230	2,330	7,906	3,654	2,415	2,997
Calaveras	1,579	1,195	384	1,169	410	459	570
Colusa	1,328	1,034	294	1,032	296	320	397
Contra Costa	28,227	19,568	8,659	21,365	6,862	7,701	9,557
Del Norte	1,418	1,101	317	1,275	143	419	520
El Dorado	5,428	4,007	1,421	4,022	1,406	1,512	1,876
Fresno	47,234	36,498	10,736	22,642	24,592	10,333	12,823
Glenn	1,026	718	308	897	129	338	419
Humboldt	8,453	6,927	1,526	6,738	1,715	1,688	2,095
Imperial	7,886	5,373	2,513	5,426	2,460	2,296	2,849
Inyo	697	521	176	548	149	204	253
Kern	46,914	37,316	9,598	27,344	19,570	10,311	12,796
Kings	7,322	5,414	1,908	5,551	1,771	1,813	2,250
Lake	4,079	3,094	985	2,770	1,309	1,076	1,335
Lassen	1,086	749	337	735	351	319	396
Los Angeles	274,212	203,151	71,061	224,742	49,470	78,401	97,296
Madera	3,548	2,407	1,141	2,626	922	1,149	1,426
Marin	7,335	6,077	1,258	4,738	2,597	1,343	1,667
Mariposa	764	567	197	705	59	230	285
Mendocino	4,842	3,614	1,228	3,558	1,284	1,258	1,561
Merced	10,435	7,826	2,609	6,482	3,953	2,497	3,099
Modoc	474	309	165	452	22	178	221
Mono	398	297	101	289	109	110	137
Monterey	12,838	9,602	3,236	9,216	3,622	3,366	4,177
Napa	6,325	5,005	1,320	4,593	1,732	1,294	1,606
Nevada	3,776	3,012	764	2,413	1,363	779	967
Orange	81,064	64,316	16,748	54,637	26,427	17,418	21,616
Placer	9,415	6,960	2,455	6,305	3,110	2,354	2,921
Plumas	901	699	202	829	72	263	326
Riverside	52,576	38,569	14,007	36,852	15,724	14,087	17,482
Sacramento	39,711	25,959	13,752	31,550	8,161	13,452	16,694

San Benito	1,939	1,331	608	1,699	240	612	759
San Bernardino	74,322	49,418	24,904	64,142	10,180	25,176	31,243
San Diego	104,260	81,866	22,394	72,444	31,816	23,882	29,638
San Francisco	20,456	13,116	7,340	14,335	6,121	5,710	7,086
San Joaquin	20,987	15,049	5,938	15,921	5,066	6,355	7,887
San Luis Obispo	11,841	10,201	1,640	8,244	3,597	2,249	2,791
San Mateo	21,599	18,062	3,537	9,965	11,634	3,535	4,387
Santa Barbara	26,107	22,118	3,989	12,468	13,639	4,000	4,964
Santa Clara	42,043	32,734	9,309	28,638	13,405	9,852	12,226
Santa Cruz	11,098	8,949	2,149	7,387	3,711	2,069	2,568
Shasta	10,877	8,713	2,164	5,334	5,543	1,607	1,994
Sierra	120	73	47	117	3	48	60
Siskiyou	2,719	1,836	883	2,043	676	795	987
Solano	16,242	11,927	4,315	11,259	4,983	4,409	5,472
Sonoma	18,909	15,497	3,412	11,164	7,745	3,819	4,739
Stanislaus	23,109	16,063	7,046	13,860	9,249	6,078	7,543
Sutter	3,786	2,697	1,089	3,751	35	1,195	1,483
Tehama	3,493	2,448	1,045	2,652	841	889	1,103
Trinity	808	398	410	770	38	345	428
Tulare	24,695	17,917	6,778	19,984	4,711	6,769	8,400
Tuolumne	2,467	1,835	632	1,931	536	611	758
Ventura	31,133	24,345	6,788	23,510	7,623	7,135	8,855
Yolo	7,751	5,769	1,982	5,398	2,353	1,930	2,395
Yuba	3,548	2,373	1,175	3,041	507	1,051	1,304

SOURCES: Author calculation from 2010-2015 MACR

NOTES: Numbers of arrests, offense levels, and booking decisions are based on all 2015 arrests. The adjusted number of risk assessment is our estimate plus 24.1 percent, the underestimate based on comparing our original estimate with the actual number of assessments reported by Sonoma and Santa Cruz in 2018.

TABLE C2

Determining the number of people cited and released within hours

	Released (N)	Cited (%)	Booked (%)	Misdemeanor cited (N)	Misdemeanor cited (%)	Felony booked (N)	Felony booked (%)
Low misdemeanor	256,987	79.6		204,562			
High misdemeanor	135,140	63.6		85,949			
Low felony	244,669		52.4			128,207	
High felony	11,495		62.6			7,196	
Totals	648,291			290,511	74.09	135,402	52.86

SOURCE: Tafoya et al. (2017) report the number released by offense type in Technical Appendix Figure A1. They report the percent cited and booked by some offense types in the text box on page 13 and note on the same page that those cited are released within hours. We use data reported in Table 1 to calculate felony release within hours in the main report.

NOTES: Comparisons reflect racial differences in how misdemeanor arrests are handled now relative to how they would be under SB 10.

TABLE C3

Release on bail by offense type

	N	Percent released on bail	N released within 2 days	N released on bail
Misdemeanor bail	360,017	11.3	180,009	20,341
Felony bail	227,744	52.9	68,323	36,143

SOURCE: Author calculation from Tafoya et al. (2017) and the 2015 MACR.

TABLE C4

Racial inequity in cite and book decisions varies by risk assessment criteria

	Hispanic		White		Black		Asian		Other	
	Cite	Book	Cite	Book	Cite	Book	Cite	Book	Cite	Book
No Assessment	87,342	127,638	59,897	95,810	23,494	34,398	6,895	8,969	9,387	9,120
Felony	1,964	96,258	2,274	72,188	672	45,612	146	7,447	173	6,239
Misdemeanor Exclusion	2,309	15,347	2,646	12,022	1,702	6,953	289	1,346	316	1,290
Criminal History Exclusion	8,597	20,067	8,735	16,252	4,819	9,074	468	864	380	867
Total	100,212	259,310	73,552	196,272	30,687	96,037	7,798	18,626	10,256	17,516

SOURCE: Author estimates from the 2010-2015 MACR.

FIGURE C1

Current arrest handling and pre-arraignment release with race



SOURCE: Author calculation based on 2010-2015 MACR and Tafoya et al. (2017).

NOTE: H=Hispanic; W=White; B=African American; A=Asian American; O=Other.

FIGURE C2

Arrest handing and pre-arraignment release under SB 10 with race



SOURCE: Author calculation based on 2010-2015 MACR.
NOTE: H=Hispanic; W=White; B=African American; A=Asian American; O=Other.

FIGURE C3
Projected rate of risk assessments per arrest by county



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2015 MACR

FIGURE C4
Projected rate of risk assessments per 1,000 people living in county in 2015



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2015 MACR and Department of Finance population data.

FIGURE C5
Arrests by county, 2015



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2015 MACR

FIGURE C6
Percent of arrests that are booked by county, 2015



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2015 MACR

FIGURE C7
Percent of arrests that are violent felonies by county, 2015



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2015 MACR

FIGURE C8
Percent of arrests that are felonies by county, 2015



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2015 MACR

FIGURE C9

Percent of arrests that are misdemeanors by county, 2015



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2015 MACR

Appendix D. County-Level Analyses

In this appendix, we provide for each county information similar to that presented in the main report. First, however, we briefly describe how counties might improve upon our estimates using arrest, jail, and court data that may be available to them.

How Counties Might Use Their Data to Improve these Estimates

Counties may have more detailed information that they can use to make better projections than we have made about how many risk assessments are likely to be required annually under SB 10.

Making Better Estimates of Who Is Likely to Be Held for Risk Assessment

Counties can make better risk predictions by making the following improvements to our process:

1. *Categorize offenses that do and do not meet the risk assessment criteria more accurately*. As discussed in Technical Appendix B, the MACR only includes the most serious offense and does not uniquely identify all offense types. With more detailed offense type information, counties can more accurately categorize offenses.
2. *More accurately assess whether the criminal history criteria are met*. With more detailed criminal history information that includes court data (e.g., convictions and FTA warrants) and each arrestee's first recorded arrest, counties can more accurately determine how many people meet the criminal history criteria. For example, our measure of FTA history was an FTA arrest in the past 12 months. However, more warrants were certainly issued than arrests made.
3. *Measure the hold criteria we were unable to measure*. For example, we were not able to determine the number of people pending trial or conviction at the time of arrest. Counties may be able to make these determinations by combining court and arrest data. Likewise, we could not measure whether pretrial release conditions were violated. Pretrial services or probation departments may have this information.
4. *Determine how often people should be reassessed*. We assumed people would be assessed only once per year. Counties may choose to reassess more or less frequently, at every eligible arrest, only after arrests for certain crimes, or using some other decision rule. To promote transparency and equity, the same decision rule should be clearly defined and applied to all people.

Alameda County

FIGURE ALA1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE ALA2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE ALA3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Alpine County

FIGURE ALP1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE ALP2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment

SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE ALP3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Amador County

FIGURE AMA1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE AMA2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment

SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE AMA3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Butte County

FIGURE BUT1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE BUT2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE BUT3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Calaveras County

FIGURE CAL1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE CAL2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE CAL3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Colusa County

FIGURE COL1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE COL2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE COL3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Contra Costa County

FIGURE CC1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE CC2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE CC3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Del Norte County

FIGURE DN1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE DN2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

FIGURE DN3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

El Dorado County

FIGURE ED1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

FIGURE ED2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

FIGURE ED3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

Fresno County

FIGURE FRE1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

FIGURE FRE2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

FIGURE FRE3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

Glenn County

FIGURE GLE1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

FIGURE GLE2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

FIGURE GLE3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

Humboldt County

FIGURE HUM1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

FIGURE HUM2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

FIGURE HUM3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

Imperial County

FIGURE IMP1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

FIGURE IMP2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE IMP3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Inyo County

FIGURE INY1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE INY2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE INY3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Kern County

FIGURE KER1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE KER2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE KER3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Kings County

FIGURE KIN1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE KIN2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE KIN3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Lake County

FIGURE LAK1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE LAK2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE LAK3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Lassen County

FIGURE LAS1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE LAS2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE LAS3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Los Angeles County

FIGURE LA1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE LA2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE LA3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Madera County

FIGURE MAD1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MAD2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MAD3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Marin County

FIGURE MRN1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MRN2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MRN3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Mariposa County

FIGURE MPA1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MPA2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MPA3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Mendocino County

FIGURE MEN1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MEN2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MEN3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calcula4tion from the 2010-2015 MACR

Merced County

FIGURE MER1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MER2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MER3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Modoc County

FIGURE MOD1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MOD2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment

SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MOD3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Mono County

FIGURE MNO1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MNO2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment

SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MNO3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Monterey County

FIGURE MON1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MON2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE MON3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Napa County

FIGURE NAP1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE NAP2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE NAP3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Nevada County

FIGURE NEV1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MAC

FIGURE NEV2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE NEV3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Orange County

FIGURE ORA1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE ORA2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE ORA3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Placer County

FIGURE PLA1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE PLA2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE PLA3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Plumas County

FIGURE PLU1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE PLU2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE PLU3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Riverside County

FIGURE RIV1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE RIV2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE RIV3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Sacramento County

FIGURE SAC1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SAC2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SAC3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

San Benito County

FIGURE SBT1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SBT2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SBT3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

San Bernardino County

FIGURE SBD1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SBD2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SBD3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

San Diego County

FIGURE SD1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SD2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SD3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria

SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR



San Francisco County

FIGURE SF1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SF2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SF3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

San Joaquin County

FIGURE SJ1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SJ2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SJ3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

San Luis Obispo County

FIGURE SLO1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SLO2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SLO3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

San Mateo County

FIGURE SM1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SM2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SM3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Santa Barbara County

FIGURE SB1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SB2
Likely racial disparity in risk asses



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SB3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Santa Clara County

FIGURE SCL1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SCL2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SCL3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Santa Cruz County

FIGURE SCR1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SCR2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SCR3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Shasta County

FIGURE SHA1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SHA2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SHA3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Sierra County

FIGURE SIE1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SIE2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment

SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SIE3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Siskiyou County

FIGURE SIS1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SIS2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SIS3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Solano County

FIGURE SOL1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SOL2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SOL3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Sonoma County

FIGURE SON1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SON2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SON3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Stanislaus County

FIGURE STA1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE STA2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE STA3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Sutter County

FIGURE SUT1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SUT2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE SUT3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Tehama County

FIGURE TEH1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE TEH2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE TEH3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Trinity County

FIGURE TRI1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE TRI2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment

SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE TRI3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Tulare County

FIGURE TUL1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE TUL2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE TUL3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Tuolumne County

FIGURE TUO1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE TUO2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE TUO3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Ventura County

FIGURE VEN1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE VEN2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE VEN3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Yolo County

FIGURE YOL1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE YOL2

Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE YOL3

Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

Yuba County

FIGURE YUB1
Likely risk assessments by criteria met



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE YUB2
Likely racial disparity in risk assessment



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

FIGURE YUB3
Racial disparity that could be eliminated by booking all those who meet risk assessment criteria



SOURCE: Author calculation from the 2010-2015 MACR

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