



PPIC

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Do Local Realignment Policies Affect Recidivism in California?

Technical Appendix

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August 2014

Methodology

This study is designed to identify and estimate the effects of local realignment implementation policies on recidivism outcomes. We utilize the natural experiment created by the court-induced rapid and universal policy change made at the state level to identify the statewide effects of realignment on recidivism for the largest initial segment of the realignment population, the Post-release Community Supervision (PRCS) population. As a robustness check, we conducted a falsification test using the pre-realignment period to look for evidence of preexisting trends in statewide recidivism that may show up in our analysis.

We then use realignment-induced variation in local implementation policies and budget allocations to identify and estimate differential changes in recidivism rates associated with these policies, holding constant time-invariant county characteristics. Isolating the impact of county-level implementation policies with confidence requires the following considerations. First, because the composition of the prison release population may change over the course of realignment, we control for differences in the characteristics of the pre- and post-realignment cohorts. Second, because county-level characteristics may affect recidivism outcomes, we control for time-invariant county-level characteristics using a differences-in-differences approach. Although some county characteristics may vary over time, the short time window under consideration lends credibility to this approach. Finally, we use a falsification check for a preexisting relationship between realignment implementation policies and recidivism outcomes.

At the outset, it is important to distinguish the present research objectives from a more traditional evaluation study, which would use individual-level data to identify the effects of specific treatments on recidivism outcomes. Data for this type of investigation is not currently available statewide in California.¹ Instead, we use data collected on county realignment plans and budget allocations to examine the relationship between strategic choices made at the county level by community corrections leadership and the individual-level recidivism outcomes of offenders.

Individual-level Prison Release Data

Realignment created the following three populations of realigned offenders:

1. Post-Release Community Supervision (PRCS) offenders released from state prison to county supervision instead of state parole, with non-violent, non-serious, and non-sexual convictions;
2. 1170(h) new, lower-level felony offenders with no current or prior serious, violent, or sexual offenses incarcerated and supervised at the county level; and
3. State parole violators revoked to county jails.

Under realignment, counties directly manage the PRCS and 1170(h) populations, but have no direct contact with the parole population prior to a new violation. As a result, county strategies primarily focus on policies related to the core PRCS and 1170(h) realignment populations. Data capturing the 1170(h) population is currently unavailable on a statewide basis in California.² Therefore, we focus our analysis on interventions for the PRCS population and the subsequent outcomes of this population under realignment.

¹ The Public Policy Institute of California is currently collaborating with the California Board of State and Community Corrections to develop a data collection system to do this. That study will collect individual transactional data on realigned offenders in eleven California counties (BSCC 2013).

² The BSCC-PPIC project will collect data to allow for an analysis of the full realignment population in a subset of counties, but that data will not be available for several years.

Offenders serving current commitments for non-serious and non-violent offenses are easily identified and included. These are the largest share of the relevant group. However, the precision of this flag is weakened by two omissions. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) could not identify with certainty individuals who would be labeled mentally disordered (MDO) or high-risk sex offenders (HRSO). In the post-realignment period, these groups are excluded from the PRCS population. While these groups are small, it is important to make the pre- and post-realignment groups as identical as possible. Our approach was to run separate analyses excluding all individuals with serious mental health designations (e.g., individuals identified as Enhanced Outpatients or EOP inmates and Department of Mental Health commitments) as well as all sex offenders. Although these categories are overinclusive, removing these variables also removes all MDOs and HRSOs from the analysis and provides a gauge of whether differences in the pre- and post-realignment offender populations based on these characteristics may be driving the findings when they are included. The resulting analysis showed no substantive differences in findings when the sexual offenders and mental health designees were removed.

Prison Releases and Recidivism Outcomes

CDCR provided us with individual-level prison release data. CDCR data allow us to identify post-realignment PRCS released offenders and their counterparts released prior to realignment. CDCR data also provide offender demographic characteristics, criminal histories, county identifiers and recidivism outcomes, including returns to custody, rearrests and reconvictions. We select a control population of offenders released from prison between October 2010 and March 2011, prior to realignment, allowing for a six-month recidivism window before the start of realignment. These pre-realignment offenders were convicted of crimes that would have placed them in the realignment population had they been released after realignment took effect. We then select a population exposed to the realignment treatment environment, consisting of offenders released from prison to PRCS after realignment. These offenders were released between October 2011 and March 2012, in the first six months after realignment, and were also allowed a six-month post-realignment recidivism window. The same release months were chosen for the control and treatment population to control for seasonal effects.

The characteristics of these two prison release cohorts are presented in Table A1. In most respects, these populations are similar. However, a key purpose of realignment was to reduce returns to prison custody, as the legislation required that offenders who violate the terms of their supervision instead go to county jail. As a result, there has been a compositional shift in the prison-release population. Offenders released in the post-realignment period are more likely to have entered prison on new charges and, consequently, to have served longer terms. In this descriptive snapshot, felony rearrest and reconviction rates are somewhat higher in the post-realignment population. When all rearrests are included, recidivism rates are lower in the post-realignment population. However, when all reconvictions are included, this measure of recidivism is higher in the post-realignment period. Although these descriptive findings offer a preliminary indication of the changes in recidivism post-realignment, the differences in offender characteristics shown in Table A1 demonstrate the need to separate the effect of the changing composition of the prison release population from the role of county management.

There is also substantial variation in the extent to which individual counties match this statewide trend. Table A2 summarizes variation across counties in recidivism rates before and after realignment. Some counties experienced large reductions in recidivism, while others experienced increases in rearrest or

reconviction rates. It is this variation in outcomes across counties that holds the potential for identifying the underlying causal mechanisms at work.

Plan Characteristics and Budget Categories

We designed a coding scheme based upon reviewing a subsample of realignment implementation plans. The coding scheme captures the types of reentry services included in the plans and directly targeted toward PRCS offenders. After this scheme was established, three research assistants independently carried out the coding of these plans. They also collaboratively reconciled discrepancies in the resulting data. When disagreements remained, the principal investigators made final coding judgments. A dummy variable was created to code when an implementation plan describes the particular element as planned or expanded from a preexisting program and when a plan did not identify the particular element or that the particular element was planned or in existence, but not going to be used on PRCS offenders. The presence of these elements in plans were summed to produce the measures of reentry services discussed in the report and capture the range of reentry services described (Table A3).

The study team also coded data extracted from realignment budgets. After examining coding schemes used by the American Civil Liberties Union, Stanford Law School, and the California Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC), we settled on our own approach to classifying the budget data. Two research assistants compiled the budget data from the plans and the principal investigators provided guidance on how to resolve ambiguous cases (Table A4).

Characterizing Implementation Policies Based on Plans and Budgets

To categorize realignment implementation policies based on plans and budgets, we employ a form of cluster analysis known as Partitioning Around Medoids (PAM), a data mining technique that uses an algorithm to search for groups in a dataset that represent the central tendency of a given group of cases (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 2005). The centrally located case is called the medoid. The algorithm then compares each medoid to all other cases to determine which cases are most similar to it based upon the data and forms clusters that minimize the sum of the pairwise dissimilarities between the medoid case and each other case. The user specifies the number of clusters they believe to exist in the data, although evidence of the optimal number of clusters can be explored through the use of a graphical analysis called a silhouette plot.

We use data coded from the implementation plans and budgets to search for groups that share similar policy strategies. We selected one measure of the budget priorities and another measure drawn from the coding of the strategies counties intended to pursue. The former captures the proportion of the budget devoted to sheriff's agencies, jails, and law enforcement. The latter measures the range of reentry services identified. The statistic used to determine whether the user-specified number of clusters fits the data best is called a silhouette width. Silhouette widths measure the relative similarity of a given case (e.g., county) to the cluster to which it has been assigned versus its similarity to its neighboring cluster. A case's silhouette width provides a measure of the degree to which each case fits into the cluster to which it has been assigned and the average silhouette width of a given cluster provides evidence of how well the data fits the number of clusters specified by the user. Varying the number of clusters and examining how silhouette widths change helps determine the number of clusters best supported by the underlying structure in the data. General thresholds have been defined for making assessments about how many clusters exist in the data. Silhouette widths from 0.71 to 1.00 indicate that a strong structure has been found, and from 0.51 to 0.70 that a reasonable structure has been found. Silhouette widths between 0.25 and 0.5 suggest a weak structure and

below 0.25 indicate that no substantial structure has been found. Negative silhouette widths suggest that the case fits poorly into any cluster (Kaufman and Rouseeuw 2005).

We experimented with three and four clusters, and also explored including additional variables. However, the strongest silhouette coefficients were achieved by categorizing implementation strategies in two groups based on two variables, the budget allocation to the sheriff’s agency, jail beds and law enforcement, and the range of reentry services identified in the realignment plan. The budget numbers were summed to produce a percentage of realignment funds earmarked for the three categories. The reentry services variable is based on the explicit mention of particular strategies in the implementation plan (summarized in Table A3) and ranges from 0 to 16.

Figure A1 shows the silhouette plot based upon a two-cluster solution. With average silhouette widths of 0.58, the results show a reasonable structure exists in the data, which means that the two measures sorted implementation plans into groups with a high degree of confidence. However, not all implementation plans fit well within the cluster to which they have been assigned. Using the thresholds described above, a number of plans in each cluster have silhouette widths below 0.50, which suggests that while they fit closer to the cluster they have been assigned than the other cluster, their association is not particularly strong. As a result, we set aside implementation plans with silhouette widths below 0.50 and concentrate on plans that have a strong association with a particular cluster.

Table A5 shows how the clusters differ in terms of key dimensions of interest. Budgets devoted to sheriff’s agency, jails, and law enforcement are nearly twice as large among Group 2 plans and the range of reentry services is greater in Group 1 plans. Although it was not used to identify the clusters, we include percentage allocated to programs and services in Table A5 to show that plans in the Group 2 cluster also direct a substantially smaller portion of their allocations to reentry services than plans in the Group 1 cluster. As a result of these patterns, we denoted Group 1 plans as “reentry-focused” and Group 2 plans as “enforcement-focused.” Nineteen plans grouped in the enforcement-focused cluster and 24 in the reentry-focused cluster.

In addition to these plan and budget dimensions, the clusters also vary in the compositions and recidivism outcomes of PRCS offenders. Table A6 presents the mean population characteristics for each cluster before and after realignment. We see variation across and within groups over the period. Given this variation, it is important to control for these characteristics in our analysis.

We also see variation in recidivism outcomes. Felony recidivism rates increased for both clusters over the period of realignment. However, increases appear larger for the enforcement-focused cluster. When we broaden the definition of recidivism to include felonies, misdemeanors, and returns to custody, the descriptive analysis suggests declines in rearrest rates for both groups, although the declines are larger for the reentry-focused cluster. However, in the case of convictions, the descriptive analysis shows an increase in the reconviction rate for the enforcement-focused cluster, but a decrease in the reconviction rate for the reentry-focused cluster. Of course, these differences may be driven by compositional changes. We need further analysis to determine whether these differences suggest one approach to realignment has achieved better recidivism outcomes than the other.

Statewide Effects of Realignment on Recidivism

We use the following regression model to estimate the statewide effect of realignment on recidivism:

$$(1) \text{ recidivism} = \beta_0 + \delta_0 \text{post} + \beta_k X_{ik} + \beta_j C_{ij} + \mu.$$

The coefficient of interest, δ_0 , is our estimate of the effect of realignment on statewide recidivism. A negative and significant coefficient estimate would suggest that realignment is associated with a reduction in recidivism. In addition to the treatment indicator, the regression model includes a vector of offender covariates (X) and county fixed-effects (C).

We first estimate the statewide effects of realignment on felony rearrests and reconvictions. We find felony rearrest rates increased 4.7 percentage points and felony reconviction rates 1.9 percentage points during the realignment period (see Table A7).

When we consider the effects of realignment on all arrests, including rearrests for felonies, rearrests for misdemeanors, and rearrests for supervision violations, we do not find evidence that realignment increased the rate of rearrests statewide. However, we do see an increase in the reconviction rate of 2.3 percentage points (see Table A8). Taken together, these estimates suggest statewide recidivism rates increased over the realignment period for the PRCS population. While it is possible that realignment caused this increase, it is also possible that the increase in recidivism detected here is the result of a preexisting trends.³

We use data from the two years prior to realignment to conduct a falsification test. We first identify a test release cohort in our data, those released from prison between October 2009 and March 2010, who were incarcerated for offenses that would have placed them in the realignment population had they been released later. We use this test cohort, along with our pre-realignment cohort and the models detailed in the main analysis, to test for evidence of underlying trends in recidivism that predate the implementation of realignment.

Statewide, we find no evidence of a pre-existing trend in felony recidivism (see Table A9). However, when we look for a pre-existing statewide trend in all recidivism, we find that combined returns to custody and rearrests increased 5.0 percentage points in the period prior to realignment (see Table A10). We also find evidence of a small increase (0.6 percentage points) in reconvictions in the prior period. These findings suggest increases in recidivism under realignment are related to a preexisting statewide recidivism trend among the PRCS population.

Effects of County Realignment Policies on Recidivism

In this part of our analysis, we draw on the enforcement-focused and reentry-focused implementation plan clusters to differentiate initial policy approaches to realignment. We then use this categorization to estimate the differential change in recidivism outcomes in the cluster adopting a reentry-focused approach relative to the change in the cluster adopting an enforcement-focused approach over the realignment period.

We estimate the differential effect of the strategic approach to realignment on recidivism outcomes using the following regression model:

$$(3) \text{ recidivism} = \beta_0 + \delta_0 \text{strategy} + \beta_1 \text{post} + \delta_1 \text{strategy} * \text{post} + \beta_k X_{ik} + \mu$$

³ As a check on our findings, we examine one-year recidivism rates as well. Using a different release cohort from the main analysis, which allows for a full year of follow-up pre-realignment, we find all measures of recidivism increased over the realignment period. However, given that the time period of our data was restricted, we are unable to run falsification tests for these estimates. Therefore, we present six-month recidivism rates throughout, allowing for falsification testing.

The model includes an indicator of the strategic approach taken in the implementation of realignment (i.e., a dummy variable for the reentry-focused cluster), a post-realignment period indicator, the interaction term between the policy approach and the post-realignment period, and a vector of individual covariates (X). The coefficient on this interaction term, δ_i , represents the differences-in-differences estimator.⁴ In our analysis, a negative and significant δ_i would indicate a reduction in recidivism associated with pursuing a reentry-focused strategy.

Although we find evidence that recidivism increased statewide over the realignment period, we estimate relative reductions in recidivism for offenders released under reentry-focused plans compared with offenders released under enforcement-focused plans. Specifically, we estimate a 3.7 percentage point relative reduction in the felony rearrest rate and a 1.7 percentage point relative reduction in the felony reconviction rate (see Table A11). When we consider all recidivism, we estimate a 1.9 percentage point reduction in the rearrest (including returns to custody) rate and a 2.3 percentage point reduction in the reconviction rate of offenders released under plans that prioritize reentry relative to those released under plans that prioritize enforcement (see Table A12).⁵ This evidence suggests that, in spite of increasing recidivism statewide, offenders released under implementation policies that prioritized reentry had better recidivism outcomes under realignment.

A key concern about our approach is the possibility that both implementation strategies and individual recidivism outcomes are driven by an unobserved, time-variant underlying factor. While we are unable to identify a specific factor as a potential source of bias, we conduct falsification tests in search of evidence that such a factor may be at work.

Using the test and pre-realignment cohorts described above, we run the difference-in-differences regression model described in the main analysis on data from an earlier period to look for a pre-existing relationship between strategic approaches to implementation and recidivism outcomes. The results from these analyses are presented in Tables A13 and A14. We find no evidence of a preexisting relationship between the reentry-focused cluster and recidivism outcomes. When compared to our main findings, the coefficients on our difference-in-differences estimators in this falsification test are very small in magnitude and insignificant. Taken together, these falsification tests dispel the potential concern that our estimates of the effect of strategic approach on recidivism outcomes are driven by differential preexisting recidivism trends across the plan clusters. After ruling out such an explanation, it is still possible that our findings in the main analysis are driven by an unobserved change occurring simultaneously with realignment and affecting both strategic approaches to realignment and recidivism outcomes. We were unable to identify any possible change of this nature.

⁴ For an early presentation of difference-in-differences methodology, see: David Card and Alan Krueger. 1994. "Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania." *American Economic Review* 84: 772–793. For updates to the methodology, see also: Alberto Abadie. 2005. "Semiparametric Difference-in-Differences Estimators." *Review of Economic Studies* 72:1–19.

⁵ Separate analyses were conducted with and without the inclusion of Los Angeles County, with no substantive differences in the findings. In addition, separate analyses were conducted for early and late cohorts post-realignment. These analyses did not suggest the effect of county strategic approaches to realignment were changing over the time period. Over time, as we gain a longer implementation window in the data, we will further examine the role of release cohort. Finally, one-year recidivism rates were estimated and were not substantively different from the six-month rates presented here. Given the limitations of our data we were unable to conduct falsification tests for these one-year estimates.

TABLE A1
Pre- and post-realignment offender characteristics (2010–2012)

Offender Characteristics	Pre-realignment cohort (Oct. 2010–Mar. 2011)	Post-realignment cohort (Oct. 2011–Mar. 2012)
Demographics		
Male	89.5%	88.3%
White	32.1%	32.1%
Black	26.4%	23.8%
Hispanic	36.8%	39.2%
Asian	0.7%	0.7%
American Indian	0.9%	0.7%
History of Mental Illness	29.7%	26.3%
Age at Time of Release (years)	36.8	36.5
Criminal History		
Current Offense, Person	12.9%	12.7%
Current Offense, Property	38.9%	38.0%
Current Offense, Drugs	35.4%	34.8%
Current Offense, Other	12.8%	14.5%
High Risk, Violent	24.8%	23.8%
High Risk, Property	21.6%	21.7%
High Risk, Drugs	15.1%	13.0%
Moderate Risk	25.2%	26.0%
Low Risk	13.3%	15.5%
Prior Sex Offense	6.7%	3.3%
Number of Prior Serious Offenses	0.2	0.2
Number of Prior Violent Offenses	0.2	0.2
Admitted for a New Crime	36.2%	51.3%
Parole Violator, New Term	20.4%	28.8%
Parole Violator, Return to Custody	35.7%	19.8%
Pending Revocation	7.8%	0.2%
Term Length (days)	287.4	391.2
Second Striker	13.5%	13.2%
Determinate Sentence	86.4%	86.8%
Recidivism Outcomes		
Felony Rearrest (within six months)	17.2%	20.7%
Felony Reconviction (within six months)	5.9%	7.4%
All Arrest* (within six months)	49.3%	42.7%
All Convictions (within six months)	12.0%	13.0%
Cohort Size	39,290	23,003

SOURCE: CDCR Release Files (2010–2012)

*NOTE, all arrests include felony arrests, misdemeanor arrests, and returns to CDCR custody without a preceding arrest.

TABLE A2
Pre- and post-realignment recidivism rates by county (2010–2012)

County	Felony rearrest (within six months)		Felony reconviction (within six months)		All rearrest** (within six months)		All reconviction (within six months)	
	Pre-realignment	Post-realignment	Pre-realignment	Post-realignment	Pre-realignment	Post-realignment	Pre-realignment	Post-realignment
Alameda	19.4%	22%	5.3%	7.4%	48%	40%	9.4%	11.7%
Alpine*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Amador*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Butte	12.4%	16.8%	5.6%	8.1%	51.0%	45.9%	10.9%	12.2%
Calaveras*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Colusa*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Contra Costa	27.5%	30.0%	5.2%	7.7%	58.8%	50.6%	9.1%	9.0%
Del Norte*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
El Dorado	16.8%	23.6%	9.2%	9.0%	58.8%	41.8%	15.9%	12.7%
Fresno	18.5%	29.5%	4.2%	5.8%	53.5%	48.7%	6.6%	8.7%
Glenn*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Humboldt	15.1%	6.7%	6.9%	4.2%	51.8%	42.0%	9.5%	5.5%
Imperial	14.5%	25.3%	4.5%	9.3%	65.4%	53.3%	13.6%	18.6%
Inyo*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Kern	18.2%	20.5%	5.9%	8.3%	53.1%	41.4%	16.1%	18.2%
Kings	13.3%	14.4%	2.1%	2.8%	49.2%	35.8%	10.4%	12.8%
Lake	17.0%	13.8%	1.1%	1.7%	64.9%	43.1%	9.4%	5.1%
Lassen*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Los Angeles	17.1%	20.5%	6.9%	9.3%	43.2%	39.7%	12.1%	13.7%
Madera	15.9%	16.5%	2.3%	4.1%	53.5%	49.5%	9.4%	13.4%
Marin*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Mariposa*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Mendocino	16.3%	2.6%	5.1%	0.0%	55.1%	39.5%	39.5%	0.0%
Merced	18.5%	22.3%	1.6%	1.4%	51.4%	39.9%	3.3%	4.8%
Modoc*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Mono*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Monterey	10.1%	12.9%	4.5%	7.4%	57.7%	44.0%	17.0%	15.2%
Napa	18.9%	20.9%	15.1%	11.6%	56.6%	44.1%	24.5%	11.6%
Nevada*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Orange	17.8%	28.3%	6.6%	8.1%	49.1%	51.8%	16.3%	18.4%
Placer	17.4%	16.5%	7.0%	7.3%	57.2%	39.4%	10.4%	10.0%
Plumas*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Riverside	16.0%	17.5%	6.8%	5.6%	47.9%	41.1%	11.3%	10.0%

TABLE A2 (continued)

County	Felony rearrest (within six months)		Felony reconviction (within six months)		All rearrest** (within six months)		All reconviction (within six months)	
	Pre-realignment	Post-realignment	Pre-realignment	Post-realignment	Pre-realignment	Post-realignment	Pre-realignment	Post-realignment
Sacramento	15.0%	16.9%	5.0%	7.4%	50.5%	41.0%	11.4%	13.2%
San Benito*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
San Bernardino	17.6%	19.6%	7.9%	7.6%	47.3%	40.6%	12.1%	11.2%
San Diego	16.1%	19.4%	5.1%	4.2%	51.1%	44.7%	9.0%	7.2%
San Francisco	35.0%	29.0%	4.1%	4.9%	64.1%	59.8%	8.9%	9.8%
San Joaquin	19.8%	24.5%	7.2%	7.1%	53.5%	42.3%	13.6%	14.1%
San Luis Obispo	16.0%	8.1%	3.4%	3.2%	50.6%	59.3%	10.5%	15.4%
San Mateo	18.4%	15.0%	3.4%	7.8%	55.0%	42.5%	16.7%	17.6%
Santa Barbara	14.2%	22.6%	2.6%	3.6%	53.0%	46.0%	15.8%	18.9%
Santa Clara	17.0%	14.1%	3.2%	5.3%	50.4%	40.6%	12.6%	12.1%
Santa Cruz	12.7%	10.5%	7.3%	5.2%	64.7%	38.6%	16.0%	10.5%
Shasta	13.4%	11.9%	5.6%	4.9%	48.3%	37.1%	9.7%	9.2%
Sierra*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Siskiyou*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Solano	20.4%	17.1%	7.0%	16.7%	55.9%	42.2%	12.1%	23.5%
Sonoma	14.5%	11.5%	4.7%	5.1%	56.9%	44.6%	15.9%	14.6%
Stanislaus	17.5%	29.4%	7.2%	11.3%	50.0%	43.5%	12.7%	15.4%
Sutter	7.8%	11.8%	2.3%	8.6%	50.8%	35.5%	14.0%	15.0%
Tehama	8.7%	17.0%	4.0%	5.7%	50.0%	33.0%	10.7%	14.7%
Trinity*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Tulare	13.7%	16.8%	4.6%	9.1%	51.7%	43.0%	11.8%	15.7%
Tuolumne*	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Ventura	19.9%	52.8%	3.9%	3.7%	63.4%	66.6%	16.8%	19.7%
Yolo	11.5%	14.7%	4.4%	7.1%	52.2%	34.0%	11.1%	12.1%
Yuba	15.0%	20.2%	3.2%	2.9%	43.9%	34.6%	10.2%	7.6%

* NOTE, rearrest and reconviction rates are not shown for counties with very small offender populations.

** NOTE, all arrests include felony arrests, misdemeanor arrests, and returns to CDCR custody without a preceding arrest.

TABLE A3
Reentry services identified in implementation plans (n=16)

County	Needs Assessment	Cognitive Behavioral Therapy	Mental Health Treatment	Substance Abuse Treatment	Gender-specific Treatment	Family Involvement Program	Parenting Classes	Healthcare Services	Housing Services	Income Support Program	Employment Support Program	Vocational Training Programs	General Education Programs	Mentorship Program	Peer Support Programs	Restorative Justice	Services Total
Alameda	✓		✓	✓				✓	✓		✓						6
Alpine	✓		✓	✓													3
Amador	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓	✓				9
Butte	✓		✓	✓				✓	✓		✓		✓	✓			8
Calaveras	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				12
Colusa	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓										✓	6
Contra Costa	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓		✓	✓	✓			✓	10
Del Norte	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓				10
El Dorado	✓	✓	✓	✓							✓		✓				6
Fresno	✓	✓	✓	✓							✓	✓	✓				7
Glenn	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				11
Humboldt	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓		10
Imperial	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓	✓	✓		✓		11
Inyo	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓		✓	✓	✓				8
Kern	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				9
Kings			✓	✓								✓	✓				4
Lake	✓	✓		✓			✓				✓		✓		✓		7
Lassen	✓		✓	✓		✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓				9
Los Angeles	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				11
Madera	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	14
Marin	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓		✓	✓	✓				8
Mariposa	✓											✓	✓				3
Mendocino	✓	✓	✓	✓							✓		✓				6
Merced	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓				10

TABLE A3 (continued)

County	Needs Assessment	Cognitive Behavioral Therapy	Mental Health Treatment	Substance Abuse Treatment	Gender-specific Treatment	Family Involvement Program	Parenting Classes	Healthcare Services	Housing Services	Income Support Program	Employment Support Program	Vocational Training Programs	General Education Programs	Mentorship Program	Peer Support Programs	Restorative Justice	Services Total
Modoc	✓	✓	✓	✓											✓		5
Mono	✓	✓	✓							✓	✓	✓	✓				7
Monterey	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	13
Napa	✓	✓	✓	✓													4
Nevada	✓	✓		✓									✓				4
Orange	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	13
Placer	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓		✓	✓				9
Plumas	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				10
Riverside	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		13
Sacramento	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓		12
San Benito	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓		✓	✓	✓				9
San Bernardino	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓				10
San Diego	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	11
San Francisco	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	14
San Joaquin	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	12
San Luis Obispo	✓	✓		✓					✓								4
San Mateo	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		12
Santa Barbara	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	14
Santa Clara	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		11
Santa Cruz	✓	✓		✓							✓	✓	✓	✓			7
Shasta	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓			✓	12
Sierra																	0
Siskiyou																	0
Solano	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓				11
Sonoma	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				9

TABLE A3 (continued)

County	Needs Assessment	Cognitive Behavioral Therapy	Mental Health Treatment	Substance Abuse Treatment	Gender-specific Treatment	Family Involvement Program	Parenting Classes	Healthcare Services	Housing Services	Income Support Program	Employment Support Program	Vocational Training Programs	General Education Programs	Mentorship Program	Peer Support Programs	Restorative Justice	Services Total
Stanislaus	✓		✓			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓				✓		8
Sutter	✓	✓	✓	✓							✓	✓	✓				7
Tehama	✓		✓	✓				✓	✓		✓		✓				7
Trinity	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	12
Tulare	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	14
Tuolumne	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓		✓		✓				7
Ventura	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓			✓	✓				8
Yolo	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓						✓				6
Yuba	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				12
Total	55	48	50	53	4	26	19	29	38	23	45	41	49	2	11	12	


TABLE A4
Budget allocations by category in implementation plans

County	% Probation	% Sheriff	% Jail	% Law enforcement	% Program and services
Alameda	27.11	43.38	0.00	0.00	23.86
Alpine	19.51	71.54	0.00	0.00	8.95
Amador	50.00	25.00	0.00	0.00	12.50
Butte	21.09	31.78	0.00	0.00	45.98
Calaveras	4.42	7.13	0.00	22.81	6.96
Colusa	51.15	0.00	12.13	0.00	30.71
Contra Costa	22.43	24.96	29.48	0.00	19.57
Del Norte	86.48	9.00	0.00	0.00	4.52
El Dorado	32.84	10.15	12.39	4.13	40.50
Fresno	23.01	1.39	58.08	2.14	11.79
Glenn	65.74	11.26	0.00	0.60	22.40
Humboldt	17.99	7.62	3.78	0.00	57.27
Imperial	29.31	23.06	30.86	0.00	9.26
Inyo	22.78	18.33	0.00	0.00	7.33
Kern	39.79	30.44	6.31	0.71	21.88
Kings	19.21	1.60	69.54	0.00	0.00
Lake	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	83.66
Lassen	18.46	0.00	25.93	0.00	0.00
Los Angeles	23.92	62.48	0.00	0.00	13.52
Madera	17.99	0.00	4.67	9.21	26.21
Marin	21.88	16.87	5.75	0.00	55.50
Mariposa	18.13	7.55	0.00	0.00	37.77
Mendocino	48.25	18.88	0.00	0.00	7.63
Merced	31.22	14.13	24.01	0.80	24.33
Modoc	4.28	46.17	0.00	3.25	46.29
Mono	50.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Monterey	35.34	0.00	29.99	0.00	34.67
Napa	20.58	0.00	11.56	0.00	0.00
Nevada	20.46	38.33	15.94	0.00	7.92
Orange	29.00	59.00	0.00	3.00	9.00
Placer	23.60	51.21	0.00	4.30	17.55
Plumas	28.07	17.66	0.00	0.00	47.29
Riverside	25.82	26.39	18.03	3.34	18.32
Sacramento	19.66	20.02	33.21	0.00	27.11
San Benito	27.17	23.68	18.26	0.00	14.42
San Bernardino	62.64	13.78	1.36	0.00	17.58
San Diego	19.92	11.15	0.80	0.00	11.95
San Francisco	55.95	6.95	0.00	0.00	33.14
San Joaquin	19.84	8.71	27.01	0.00	33.90
San Luis Obispo	16.66	2.34	55.83	0.00	25.17
San Mateo	27.28	0.00	0.00	5.35	56.49
Santa Barbara	31.55	10.01	19.59	1.55	32.89
Santa Clara	26.58	27.61	0.00	0.00	29.07
Santa Cruz	33.33	33.33	0.00	0.00	33.33
Shasta	35.02	5.27	21.75	5.15	24.45
Sierra	49.92	0.00	50.08	0.00	0.00
Siskiyou	13.48	21.91	0.00	0.00	5.45
Solano	26.23	23.50	14.21	1.75	23.77

TABLE A4 (continued)

County	% Probation	% Sheriff	% Jail	% Law enforcement	% Program and services
Sonoma	30.28	13.20	14.35	0.00	34.22
Stanislaus	37.54	43.53	6.24	1.66	4.07
Sutter	15.64	14.12	7.95	8.57	9.60
Tehama	21.69	30.13	0.00	0.00	12.49
Trinity	64.73	0.00	6.92	0.00	24.90
Tulare	49.38	50.62	0.00	0.00	0.00
Tuolumne	51.37	12.38	0.00	0.00	12.53
Ventura	27.57	27.95	0.00	5.62	16.55
Yolo	35.62	21.74	29.30	7.62	2.96
Yuba	50.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

FIGURE A1
Cluster analysis shows two groups in the data



*NOTE: The regressions using the cluster results focused on the counties that fit best with the cluster, represented by silhouette widths above 0.50, in order to contrast counties that had the most distinctly different approaches to implementing realignment.

TABLE A5
Comparison of enforcement-focused and reentry service-focused plan clusters

	Average number of services identified	Budget allocation to sheriff, jails, & law enforcement	Budget allocation to programs and services*	Characterization	Number of implementation plans in cluster
Cluster 1	8.6	15.3%	27.4%	“Reentry services-focused”	24
Cluster 2	8.0	56.1%	11.6%	“Enforcement-focused”	19
Average	8.4	33.4%	20.5%		

*NOTE: These represent a subset of implementation plans selected based on the strength of their membership in each cluster as measured by a silhouette width of greater than 0.5. Also, we did not include the budget allocation to programs and services in the PAM analysis because as a percentage measure it tends to possess a negative relationship with other large budget items and because omitting it produced more distinct clusters. However we include the measure in this table to show that, on average, the cluster of plans categorized as reentry service-focused directed a considerably larger share of realignment budgets to programs and services when compared with the cluster of plans categorized as enforcement-focused.

TABLE A6
Pre- and post-realignment offender characteristics by cluster (2010–2012)

Offender characteristics	Enforcement-focused plans		Reentry services-focused plans	
	Pre-realignment	Post-realignment	Pre-realignment	Post-realignment
Demographics				
Male	89.2%	88.2%	89.0%	88.3%
White	28.7%	28.3%	36.3%	35.6%
Black	26.8%	25.6%	25.4%	21.9%
Hispanic	40.0%	41.5%	33.0%	36.3%
Asian	0.5%	0.4%	1.0%	1.3%
American Indian	0.6%	0.4%	1.3%	1.3%
History of Mental Illness	29.3%	25.3%	31.0%	27.7%
Age at Time of Release (years)	36.9	36.6	37.2	36.8
Criminal History				
Current Offense, Person	12.4%	11.3%	14.1%	15.0%
Current Offense, Property	38.4%	38.4%	41.2%	38.7%
Current Offense, Drugs	36.3%	35.9%	33.3%	32.0%
Current Offense, Other	12.9%	14.4%	11.4%	14.3%
High Risk, Violent	22.8%	21.6%	25.2%	25.2%
High Risk, Property	21.5%	21.1%	21.6%	21.5%
High Risk, Drugs	14.3%	13.0%	15.6%	12.5%
Moderate Risk	26.6%	27.2%	24.5%	25.1%
Low Risk	14.8%	17.1%	13.1%	15.7%
Prior Sex Offense	6.6%	3.1%	7.5%	3.4%
Number of Prior Serious Offenses	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Number of Prior Violent Offenses	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1
Admitted for a New Crime	39.2%	52.5%	32.7%	50.5%
Parole Violator, New Term	22.1%	30.5%	19.7%	27.8%
Parole Violator, Return to Custody	31.3%	16.9%	38.6%	21.5%
Pending Revocation	7.4%	0.1%	9.0%	0.2%
Term Length (days)	311.4	408.8	296.0	375.0
Second Striker	14.3%	13.9%	14.2%	13.9%
Determinate Sentence	85.7%	86.1%	85.8%	86.1%
Recidivism Outcomes				
Felony Rearrest (six months)	16.8%	21.5%	17.7%	18.2%
Felony Reconviction (six months)	6.2%	8.2%	5.7%	5.9%
All Arrest* (six months)	47.4%	42.4%	50.9%	42.7%
All Convictions (six months)	11.9%	13.4%	11.4%	10.2%
Cohort Size	22,026	13,322	9,456	5,756

SOURCE: CDCR Release Files (2010-2012)

*NOTE, all arrests include felony arrests, misdemeanor arrests and returns to CDCR custody without a preceding arrest.

TABLE A7
Effects of realignment on felony recidivism statewide (2010–2012)

	Felony rearrest (within six months)	Felony reconviction (within six months)
Intercept	0.018 (0.112)	0.025 (0.072)
Post-realignment population	0.047*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.002)
Male	0.033*** (0.005)	0.013*** (0.003)
White	0.019*** (0.008)	0.005 (0.005)
Hispanic	0.003 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.005)
Black	0.001 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.005)
Age at Release	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Mental Health History	0.006* (0.004)	0.007*** (0.002)
Person Offense	-0.016*** (0.006)	0.001 (0.004)
Property Offense	0.021*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.003)
Drug Offense	0.010* (0.005)	0.014*** (0.003)
Term Served	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Number of Prior Serious Offenses	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Number of Prior Violent Offenses	0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)
Sex Offense History	-0.032*** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.005)
High Risk, Violent	0.082*** (0.007)	0.039*** (0.004)
High Risk, Property	0.083*** (0.006)	0.045*** (0.004)
High Risk, Drug	0.075*** (0.006)	0.040*** (0.004)
Moderate Risk	0.026*** (0.005)	0.008** (0.003)
New Admission	-0.051*** (0.008)	-0.018*** (0.005)
Parole Violator with New Term	0.023*** (0.008)	0.021*** (0.005)
Returned to Custody	0.021*** (0.008)	0.013*** (0.005)
Determinate Sentence	0.076 (0.110)	-0.001 (0.071)
Second Striker	0.060 (0.110)	-0.017 (0.071)
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y
R ²	0.042	0.024
N	62,093	62,093

*** Statistically significant at one percent level of confidence

** Statistically significant at five percent level of confidence

* Statistically significant at ten percent level of confidence

TABLE A8
Effects of realignment on all recidivism statewide (2010–2012)

	Rearrest of RTC (within six months)	Reconviction (within six months)
Intercept	0.265* (0.138)	0.064 (0.095)
Post-realignment Population	-0.004 (0.004)	0.023*** (0.003)
Male	0.075*** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.004)
White	0.044*** (0.009)	0.015** (0.006)
Hispanic	0.011 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.006)
Black	0.021** (0.010)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age at Release	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Mental Health History	0.076*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.003)
Person Offense	0.008 (0.008)	0.007 (0.005)
Property Offense	0.038*** (0.006)	0.032*** (0.004)
Drug Offense	0.028*** (0.006)	0.026*** (0.004)
Term Served	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Number of Prior Serious Offenses	0.008** (0.004)	-0.006** (0.002)
Number of Prior Violent Offenses	0.009*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)
Sex Offense History	0.139*** (0.009)	-0.018*** (0.006)
High Risk, Violent	0.238*** (0.008)	0.073*** (0.006)
High Risk, Property	0.199*** (0.008)	0.064*** (0.005)
High Risk, Drug	0.200*** (0.008)	0.062*** (0.005)
Moderate Risk	0.084*** (0.007)	0.016*** (0.005)
New Admission	-0.209*** (0.010)	-0.041*** (0.007)
Parole Violator with New Term	-0.088*** (0.010)	0.010 (0.007)
Returned to Custody	0.005 (0.009)	0.027*** (0.006)
Determinate Sentence	0.082 (0.135)	0.006 (0.094)
Second Striker	0.061 (0.135)	-0.012 (0.094)
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y
R ²	0.132	0.041
N	62,093	62,093

*** Statistically significant at one percent level of confidence

** Statistically significant at five percent level of confidence

* Statistically significant at ten percent level of confidence

TABLE A9

Falsification test: Effects of realignment on felony recidivism statewide (2009–2011)

	Felony rearrest (within six months)	Felony reconviction (within six months)
Intercept	0.136*	0.023
	(0.075)	(0.049)
Falsification Period Population	-0.004	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.002)
Male	0.021***	0.009***
	(0.004)	(0.003)
White	0.010	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.004)
Hispanic	-0.003	-0.008*
	(0.007)	(0.004)
Black	-0.002	-0.008*
	(0.007)	(0.005)
Age at Release	-0.002***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Mental Health History	0.015***	0.009***
	(0.003)	(0.002)
Person Offense	-0.002	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.004)
Property Offense	0.025***	0.012***
	(0.005)	(0.003)
Drug Offense	0.021***	0.013***
	(0.005)	(0.003)
Term Served	0.000***	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Number of Prior Serious Offenses	-0.001	-0.004**
	(0.003)	(0.002)
Number of Prior Violent Offenses	0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Sex Offense History	-0.039***	-0.004
	(0.007)	(0.004)
High Risk, Violent	0.094***	0.049***
	(0.006)	(0.004)
High Risk, Property	0.090***	0.054***
	(0.005)	(0.004)
High Risk, Drug	0.081***	0.046***
	(0.006)	(0.004)
Moderate Risk	0.025***	0.009***
	(0.005)	(0.003)
New Admission	-0.049***	-0.030***
	(0.006)	(0.004)
Parole Violator with New Term	0.020***	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.004)
Returned to Custody	0.016***	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)
Determinate Sentence	-0.052	-0.003
	(0.072)	(0.047)
Second Striker	-0.061	-0.014
	(0.072)	(0.047)
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y
R ²	0.040	0.025
N	73,328	73,328

*** Statistically significant at one percent level of confidence

** Statistically significant at five percent level of confidence

* Statistically significant at ten percent level of confidence

TABLE A10

Falsification test: Effects of realignment on all recidivism statewide (2009–2011)

	Rearrest or RTC (within six months)	Reconviction (within six months)
Intercept	0.526*** (0.094)	0.095 (0.065)
Falsification Period Population	0.050*** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.002)
Male	0.061*** (0.006)	0.011*** (0.004)
White	0.021*** (0.009)	0.009 (0.006)
Hispanic	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.010* (0.006)
Black	0.013 (0.009)	-0.011* (0.006)
Age at Release	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Mental Health History	0.090*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.003)
Person Offense	0.007 (0.007)	0.010** (0.005)
Property Offense	0.029*** (0.006)	0.031*** (0.004)
Drug Offense	0.032*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.004)
Term Served	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Number of Prior Serious Offenses	0.011*** (0.003)	-0.005** (0.002)
Number of Prior Violent Offenses	0.011*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
Sex Offense History	0.171*** (0.008)	-0.020*** (0.006)
High Risk, Violent	0.264*** (0.007)	0.086*** (0.005)
High Risk, Property	0.213*** (0.007)	0.076*** (0.005)
High Risk, Drug	0.220*** (0.007)	0.077*** (0.005)
Moderate Risk	0.085*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.004)
New Admission	-0.234*** (0.007)	-0.052*** (0.005)
Parole Violator with New Term	-0.123*** (0.008)	-0.007 (0.005)
Returned to Custody	-0.011 (0.007)	0.011** (0.005)
Determinate Sentence	-0.135 (0.090)	-0.027 (0.062)
Second Striker	-0.136 (0.090)	-0.040 (0.062)
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y
R ²	0.155	0.042
N	73,328	73,328

*** Statistically significant at one percent level of confidence

** Statistically significant at five percent level of confidence

* Statistically significant at ten percent level of confidence

TABLE A11
Effects of high prioritization of reentry services on felony recidivism (2010–2012)

	Felony rearrest (within six months)	Felony reconviction (within six months)
Intercept	0.131*** (0.026)	0.047** (0.019)
Post-realignment*Services-Focused	-0.037** (0.015)	-0.017** (0.006)
High Services Counties	0.002 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.010)
Post-realignment Population	0.055*** (0.012)	0.023*** (0.004)
Male	0.032*** (0.006)	0.009*** (0.003)
White	0.010 (0.008)	0.008 (0.006)
Hispanic	-0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.004)
Black	0.002 (0.008)	0.001 (0.006)
Age at Release	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Mental Health History	0.006 (0.006)	0.008 (0.005)
Person Offense	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Property Offense	0.020*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.003)
Drug Offense	0.012*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.003)
Term Served	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Number of Prior Serious Offenses	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.007*** (0.003)
Number of Prior Violent Offenses	0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.002)
Sex Offense History	-0.033*** (0.010)	-0.004 (0.005)
High Risk, Violent	0.084*** (0.009)	0.038*** (0.006)
High Risk, Property	0.086*** (0.005)	0.044*** (0.004)
High Risk, Drug	0.077*** (0.007)	0.039*** (0.007)
Moderate Risk	0.031*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.002)
New Admission	-0.045*** (0.012)	-0.014*** (0.005)
Parole Violator with New Term	0.031* (0.016)	0.029*** (0.010)
Returned to Custody	0.022** (0.010)	0.012** (0.005)
Determinate Sentence	0.020 (0.020)	-0.009 (0.013)
Second Striker	0.003 (0.025)	-0.024* (0.013)
R ²	0.035	0.021
N	50,560	50,560

*** Statistically significant at one percent level of confidence

** Statistically significant at five percent level of confidence

* Statistically significant at ten percent level of confidence

Note: Standard errors clustered at the county level.

TABLE A12
Effects of high prioritization of reentry services on all recidivism (2010–2012)

	Rearrest or RTC (within six months)	Reconviction (within six months)
Intercept	0.372*** (0.114)	0.123*** (0.035)
Post-realignment*Services-Focused	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.023*** (0.004)
High Services Counties	0.005 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.013)
Post-realignment Population	0.006 (0.009)	0.025*** (0.003)
Male	0.074*** (0.006)	0.016*** (0.005)
White	0.038*** (0.012)	0.010 (0.008)
Hispanic	0.004 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.009)
Black	0.020** (0.009)	-0.010 (0.010)
Age at Release	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Mental Health History	0.078*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.005)
Person Offense	0.000 (0.009)	0.002 (0.006)
Property Offense	0.033*** (0.007)	0.028*** (0.004)
Drug Offense	0.031*** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.005)
Term Served	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Number of Prior Serious Offenses	0.009 (0.005)	-0.007* (0.004)
Number of Prior Violent Offenses	0.007 (0.005)	0.000 (0.002)
Sex Offense History	0.137*** (0.015)	-0.015* (0.008)
High Risk, Violent	0.238*** (0.010)	0.071*** (0.009)
High Risk, Property	0.199*** (0.007)	0.064*** (0.005)
High Risk, Drug	0.200*** (0.008)	0.062*** (0.008)
Moderate Risk	0.087*** (0.006)	0.017*** (0.003)
New Admission	-0.200*** (0.023)	-0.036*** (0.012)
Parole Violator with New Term	-0.077*** (0.025)	0.016 (0.014)
Returned to Custody	0.014 (0.020)	0.020** (0.009)
Determinate Sentence	-0.012 (0.105)	-0.022 (0.034)
Second Striker	-0.028 (0.105)	-0.039 (0.033)
R ²	0.128	0.120
N	50,560	50,560

*** Statistically significant at one percent level of confidence

** Statistically significant at five percent level of confidence

* Statistically significant at ten percent level of confidence

NOTE: Standard errors clustered at the county level.

TABLE A13

Falsification test: Effects of prioritization of reentry services on felony recidivism (2009–2011)

	Felony rearrest (within six months)	Felony reconviction (within six months)
Intercept	0.241*** (0.066)	0.065*** (0.018)
Falsification Period*Services-Focused Counties	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.005)
High Services Counties	0.011 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.009)
Falsification Period Population	-0.001 (0.007)	0.000 (0.003)
Male	0.024*** (0.004)	0.008*** (0.003)
White	0.003 (0.011)	0.007 (0.007)
Hispanic	-0.005 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.010)
Black	0.004 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.008)
Age at Release	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Mental Health History	0.015*** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.003)
Person Offense	-0.003 (0.007)	0.000 (0.003)
Property Offense	0.028*** (0.006)	0.013*** (0.003)
Drug Offense	0.025*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.003)
Term Served	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Number of Prior Serious Offenses	0.000 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.002)
Number of Prior Violent Offenses	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
Sex Offense History	-0.037*** (0.012)	-0.003 (0.006)
High Risk, Violent	0.096*** (0.008)	0.049*** (0.009)
High Risk, Property	0.093*** (0.006)	0.054*** (0.006)
High Risk, Drug	0.083*** (0.006)	0.046*** (0.007)
Moderate Risk	0.028*** (0.005)	0.008*** (0.003)
New Admission	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.028*** (0.006)
Parole Violator with New Term	0.026** (0.012)	0.009 (0.007)
Returned to Custody	0.011 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.005)
Determinate Sentence	-0.096 (0.060)	-0.012 (0.008)
Second Striker	-0.107* (0.061)	-0.023*** (0.007)
R ²	0.033	0.022
N	59,199	59,199

*** Statistically significant at one percent level of confidence

** Statistically significant at five percent level of confidence

* Statistically significant at ten percent level of confidence

NOTE: Standard errors clustered at the county level.

TABLE A14

Falsification test: Effects of prioritization of reentry services on all recidivism (2009–2011)

	Rearrest and RTC (within six months)	Reconviction (within six months)
Intercept	0.518*** (0.071)	0.144*** (0.028)
Falsification Period*Services-Focused Counties	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.008)
High Services Counties	0.006 (0.010)	-0.017 (0.012)
Falsification Period Population	0.051*** (0.004)	0.006 (0.006)
Male	0.062*** (0.007)	0.010*** (0.003)
White	0.027* (0.016)	0.006 (0.010)
Hispanic	0.000 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.013)
Black	0.026* (0.014)	-0.012 (0.013)
Age at Release	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Mental Health History	0.090*** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.004)
Person Offense	0.000 (0.013)	0.007** (0.003)
Property Offense	0.025*** (0.007)	0.030*** (0.003)
Drug Offense	0.034*** (0.005)	0.030*** (0.004)
Term Served	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Number of Prior Serious Offenses	0.011** (0.005)	-0.005 (0.003)
Number of Prior Violent Offenses	0.010*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
Sex Offense History	0.174*** (0.012)	-0.018*** (0.007)
High Risk, Violent	0.266*** (0.007)	0.085*** (0.010)
High Risk, Property	0.213*** (0.009)	0.078*** (0.007)
High Risk, Drug	0.222*** (0.006)	0.080*** (0.007)
Moderate Risk	0.087*** (0.007)	0.019*** (0.003)
New Admission	-0.219*** (0.020)	-0.048*** (0.014)
Parole Violator with New Term	-0.106*** (0.022)	-0.002 (0.015)
Returned to Custody	-0.001 (0.020)	0.009 (0.012)
Determinate Sentence	-0.185** (0.074)	-0.045** (0.018)
Second Striker	-0.182** (0.074)	-0.059*** (0.016)
R ²	0.153	0.036
N	59,199	59,199

*** Statistically significant at one percent level of confidence

** Statistically significant at five percent level of confidence

* Statistically significant at ten percent level of confidence

NOTE: Standard errors clustered at the county level.

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