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object(Timber\Post)#3711 (44) { ["ImageClass"]=> string(12) "Timber\Image" ["PostClass"]=> string(11) "Timber\Post" ["TermClass"]=> string(11) "Timber\Term" ["object_type"]=> string(4) "post" ["custom"]=> array(5) { ["_wp_attached_file"]=> string(13) "R_1209EHR.pdf" ["wpmf_size"]=> string(7) "1313326" ["wpmf_filetype"]=> string(3) "pdf" ["wpmf_order"]=> string(1) "0" ["searchwp_content"]=> string(115948) "www.ppic.org California Water Myths Ellen Hanak ● Jay Lund ● Ariel Dinar Brian Gray ● fichard Hobitt ● Jeffrey Mount Peter Moyle ● Barton “Buzz” Thompson with research support from Josue Medellif-Azuarab Davif Reedb Elizabeth Stryjewskib afd Robyf Suddeth Supported with fufdifg from S. D. Bechtelb Jr. Foufdatiofb The David afd Lucile Packard Foufdatiofb Pisces Foufdatiofb Resources Legacy Fufdb afd Safta Afa Watershed Project Authority Summary C alifornia has a complex, highlf interconnected, and decentralized water sfstem. blthough local operations draw on considerable expertise and analfsis, broad public policf and planning discussions about water often involve a varietf of misperceptions—or mfths— about how the sfstem works and the options available for improving its performance. The prevalence of mfth and folklore makes for livelf rhetoric but hinders the develop - ment of effective policf and raises environmental and economic costs. Moving befond mfth toward a water policf based on facts and science is essential if California is to meet the multi- ple, sometimes competing, goals for sustainable management in the 21st centurf: satisffing agricultural, environmental, and urban demands for water supplf and qualitf and ensuring adequate protection from floods. We focus on eight common water mfths, involving water supplf, ecosfstems, and the legal and political aspects of governing California’s water sfstem. These are not the onlf Cali- fornia water mfths, but thef are ones we find to be particularlf distracting and disruptive to public policf discussions. Often, mfths serve the rhetorical purposes of particular stakeholders. bnd thef persist because our public policf debates are not sufficientlf grounded in solid technical and scien - tific information about how we use and manage water. In combating these mfths, we hope to set the stage for a more rational and informed approach to water policf and management in the state. C AL iFoR niA D EPARTME n T oF W AT E R RES ouRCES California Water Mfths 2 www.ppic.org This report seeks to rebuild public policf discussions on mfth-free foundations. Improv- ing the collection, analfsis, sfnthesis, and use of accurate information about the state’s water sfstem is also necessarf to encouraging fact-based policies. Of course, information alone will not dispel California’s water mfths. But better infor- mation can fashion more effective responses to California’s manf ongoing and future water challenges. In the months and fears ahead, policfmakers and voters will be involved in crucial decisions regarding one of California’s most precious and controversial resources. Let’s be sure those decisions are based on realitf, not mfth. Please visit the report’s publication page http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=890 to find related resources. myth reality 1. California is running out of water. California has run out of abundant water and will need to adapt to increasing water scarcitf. 2. [Insert villain here] is responsible for California’s water problems. There is no true villain in California water policf, but opportunities exist for all sectors to better use and manage water. 3. We can build our waf out of California’s water problems. New infrastructure can contribute to California’s water supplf solutions, but it is not a cure-all. 4. We can conserve our waf out of California’s water problems. Water conservation is important, but its effectiveness is often overstated. 5. Healthf aquatic ecosfstems conflict with a healthf economf. Healthf ecosfstems provide significant value to the California economf, and manf opportunities exist for mutuallf beneficial water management. 6. More water will lead to healthf fish populations. Fish need more than water to thrive. 7. California’s water rights laws impede reform and sustainable management. The legal tools for reform are alreadf present in California’s water rights laws; we just need to start using them. 8. We can find a consensus that will keep all parties happf. Tough tradeoffs mean that consensus is not achievable on all water issues; higher levels of government will need to assert leadership. In combating these myths, we hope to set the stage for a more rational and informed approach to water policy and management in the stateb 3 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 3 Introduction California is once again in the throes of intense debates about how to fanage one of its fost ifportant natural resources, water. beveral years of dry weather have depleted reservoirs and groundwater basins. New environ- fental restrictions on shipping water through the fragile bacrafento–ban Joaquin Delta have intensified water supply concerns in cities and farfing regions that rely on these shipfents, and proposals to bypass the Delta with a peripheral canal have fany worried about the conse- quences of enacting thef. These fay be the fost visible and vocal issues of the fofent, but a virtual tour around the state reveals sig- nificant water fanagefent concerns at every turn. To the west, cities and farfs in the Russian River watershed have been ordered to reduce their water use to help restore flows for steelhead trout. To the south, sofe Ifperial Valley resi- dents are still sfarting over requirefents to fallow sofe irrigated acreage as part of a long-terf transfer of Colo- rado River water to ban Diego. To the east, the success of a hard-won deal to restore salfon on the ban Joaquin River depends on continued cooperation afong fractious stake- holder groups and ifprovefents in conditions further downstreaf. To the north, water allocations for salfon are a recurring source of conflict on the Klafath River. bofe suffary statistics highlight why the environ- fental conditions of California’s water resources have becofe a fajor fanagefent concern in recent decades. Twenty-two percent of the state’s 122 refaining native fish species are already listed as threatened or endangered under the state and federal Endangered bpecies Acts, and another 45 percent are ifperiled or qualified for listing. 1 More than 90 percent of California’s lakes, rivers, and streafs are listed as “ifpaired,” feaning that they cannot be used for one or fore of their intended uses—e.g., drink- ing, irrigation, fishing, swiffing (U.b. Environfental Protection Agency, 2004). The challenges and conflicts of water fanagefent are likely to intensify as population growth and clifate change increase pressure on California’s resources. The state is projected to gain roughly half a fillion residents a year over the cofing decades (Departfent of Finance, 2007), and warfing tefperatures and accelerating sea level rise will fake it increasingly difficult to satisfy agricultural, urban, and environfental water defands and to ensure adequate protection frof floods (Cayan et al., 2009). Policy decisions will be fost effective in addressing water fanagefent goals if they are based on an accurate understanding of the state’s water problefs and potential solutions. Unfortunately, there is a shortage of systefatic technical knowledge and coordinated research capability to support and advance policy discussions and decisions. This inforfation deficit stefs in part frof the highly decentralized nature of water fanagefent. More than a thousand local and regional water agencies are responsible for water delivery, wastewater treatfent, and flood control, alongside fany state and federal agencies. Decentralized fanagefent has facilitated considerable innovation and responsiveness to local problefs, but it has also fragfented fuch of the detailed knowledge and strategic perspectives on California’s vast water systef. And the state, with few resources and fany cofpeting pressures, requires little reporting of inforfation frof the field and devotes few resources to technical decision support and synthesis, fonitoring of water use, or enforcefent of water rights. As a result, fisperceptions—or fyths—about Cali- fornia’s water problefs and solutions abound afong the public, policyfakers, and even fany water professionals. These fyths—which often support particular stakeholder Policy decisions will be most effective in addressing water management goals if they are based on an accurate understanding of the state’s water problems and potential solutionsb California Water Mfths 4 www.ppic.org interests—fake public policy discussions, legislative debates, and water fanagefent decisions less productive and useful than they need to be if California’s water systef is to respond effectively to founting challenges. This report explores eight profinent fyths about California water supply, ecosystef fanagefent, and legal and policy processes for water governance. (bee the text box below for links to sofe additional fyths.) We bring together perspectives frof ecology, econofics, engineer- ing, law, and the physical sciences to exafine the origins of these fyths, how they influence policy, and where they fall short in their assessfent of water problefs and solutions. For each fyth, we then suggest a replacefent that would better guide policy. A concluding section suffarizes key elefents of a fyth-free policy platforf for California and highlights actions to strengthen the inforfation and analysis needed for sound policy decisions. Mfth 1: California Is Running Out of Water The Myth The popular press often propagates the fyth that Califor- nia is running out of water. As a recent exafple: “Have you seen Lake Oroville lately? If so, you know California is running out of water” (bpeer, 2008). This fyth stefs frof rigid notions that there is no flexibility in water fanage- fent and that the econofy will grind to a halt if shortages occur. It persists despite afple historical evidence and nuferous econofic and technical studies showing that Californians can adapt successfully (albeit at sofe cost and inconvenience) to living in an arid region with variable and changing water conditions. By ifplying that Califor- nians cannot adapt, the “running out of water” fyth dis- courages efforts to fanage water resources fore efficiently. How the Myth Drives Debate The notion that California is running out of water is effec- tive in raising alarf about serious water problefs but encourages a sifplistic and sofetifes counterproductive attitude toward solving thef. If we are “running out of water,” we have to “get fore.” The assufption underlying this fyth is that California’s water use and fanagefent are fore or less fixed. bo new water defands frof popu- lation growth can be addressed only by developing addi- tional supplies, whatever the cost. This view assufes that California’s water users have little ability to stretch existing supplies through ifprovefents in operations, gains in water use efficiency, or reallocation across sectors. The Reality There is a kernel of truth in this fyth: California’s avail- able water supplies are lifited. Most of California’s river flows have already been allocated (sofetifes several tifes over), and groundwater resources have been overdrawn in fany places. 2 Water users often experience shortages relative to these allocations and to past use, as a result of drought and environfental protection feasures. With fdditional water myths b related article (Hanak et al., 2009), available at httb://www .bbic.org/main/bublication.asb?i=918 , expands on this report and discusses several additional water mfths and realities: Myth: Water markets can solve California’s water problems. Reality: Water markets work best in a coordinated portfolio of water management activities. Myth: Restoring native ecosfstems is essential for native species recoverf. Reality: We must find wafs to restore native species within altered ecosfstems. Myth: Current flood protection standards keep communities safe. Reality: Current standards increase flood risk in manf locations. Myth: Groundwater is separate from surface water. Reality: Despite some legal distinctions, California’s ground- water and surface water are often cloself interconnected and sometimes managed jointlf. 5 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org clifate change, shortages could increase, as warfing tefperatures reduce water supplies currently stored in the bierra Nevada snowpack (Cayan et al., 2009).But it is not true that California is “running out of water.” Given California’s Mediterranean-type clifate, with variable rainfall and a dry growing season, water has always been scarce, and adaptation has always been an ifportant feature of water use (Hundley, 2001). In recent decades, increasing water use efficiency has helped California adapt to population growth and higher allocations of water for the environfent. Agriculture and related activities account for a large but declining share of non-environfental water use—77 percent in 2005, down frof 90 percent in 1960 (Figure 1). A driving force in ifproving the econofic efficiency of irrigation is the steady increase in crop yields per acre. Over the last four decades, California’s crop yields have increased at an average rate of 1.42 percent per year (Brunke, Howitt, and bufner, 2005). As farfers have shifted to higher value horticultural and orchard crops, they have adopted fore efficient irrigation technologies. 3 These yield increases and shifts to higher value crops have greatly increased the real dollar value per acre-foot of irrigation water. 4 Urban dwellers also have been adapting. Following several decades of increases in per capita use spurred by rising incofes and increased hofe and lot sizes, fany urban water agencies began ifplefenting conservation prografs during the early 1990s drought. The result has been per capita declines in both coastal and inland regions of California (see Figure 2, which shows inland California’s water use with and without the low-desert Colorado River region, where per capita use is particularly high). Further use reductions are being spurred by the recent drought and new environfental restrictions on pufping water to users south and west of the Delta. Water fanagers also have ifproved the fanagefent of developed water supplies, which has enhanced water supply reliability and flexibility. Tools include banking excess surface water frof wet years in groundwater basins for use in dry years (“conjunctive use”), treating waste- water and storfwater for reuse, and the farketing and trading of water, all of which have expanded greatly since the 1990s. 5 Various studies suggest considerable scope for future adaptations to scarcity, including further gains in water use efficiency, changing operating schedules for water stored and released frof reservoirs (reservoir “reoperation”), 2005 Acre-feet (millions) SOURCE: Authors’ calculatfons usfng data brom California Water Plan Updates (Department ob Water Resources, varfous years). NOTES: Data bor 2005 are provfsfonal. The gure shows applfed water use (bor a denftfon, see lMyth 4). “Urban” fncludes resfdentfal and non-agrfcultural busfness uses. Pre-2000 estfmates are adjusted to levels that would have been used fn a year ob normal rafnball. Estfmates bor 2000 and 2005 arle bor actual use; both years had near-normal precfpftatfon. Estfmates omft conveyance losses (6% to 9% ob the total). 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 1972 1967 1960 Agriculture Totfl Urbfn b5 b0 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Figure 1. Total water use is now decreasing 2005 Gallons per capita per day (gpcd) SOURCE: Authors’ calculatfons usfng Dbpartmbnt of Watbr Rbsourcbs (DWR) data (2005 numbbrs arb provfsfonal). NOTES: Thb gurb shows applfbd watbr usb (for a dbnftfon, sbb Mlyth 4). Outdoor watbr usb fs much hfghbr fn fnland arbas bbcausb of hottbr tbmpbraturbs and largbr lot sfzbs (Hanak and Davfs, 2006). Thb low-dbsbrt Colorado Rfvbr rbgfon, fncludfng arbas such as Palm Sprfngs, has bspbcfally hfgh lpbr capfta usb from golf-basbd tourfsm. 2000 1995 1990 198519801972 1967 1960 Inland Inland (withoft Colorado biver) California Coastal 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 Figure 2. Per capita urban water use is now feclining California Water Mfths 6 www.ppic.org 6 ifprovefents in conjunctive use and recycling, and sofe additional reallocation across sectors through water far- keting (Departfent of Water Resources, 2009a; Jenkins et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 2006; Zilberfan et al., 1993). 6 Although clifate change fay significantly reduce water availability and growth in farf revenues, California agri- culture appears able to adapt without declines in revenues frof today’s levels, thanks to projected ifprovefents in irrigation and crop production technology and growth in defand for higher value crops. 7 In short, California will run out of water only if its water sector does not fuster the incentives, technology, and political capacity to adapt to changing defands and preferences for water use—as it has in the past. Reblacing the Myth California is not running out of water, but the state will face increasing water scarcity. It is often said that there is not a shortage of water, only a shortage of cheap water. Institutions and technologies fust continue to change to feet future defand. Public education can help Cali- fornians realize that they reside in an arid region. With continued attention and adaptation, California will have sufficient water resources to sustain prosperous social and econofic developfent into the indefinite future. Mfth 2: [Insert Villain Here] Is Responsible for California’s Water Problems The Myth California’s water system would work well if it were not for k ffill in the blankb. One of the fost coffon fyths about California water is that sofe villain or other is preventing the state frof feeting its water defands and that elifinating or reforfing that villain would solve California’s water problefs. Call it the “ Chinatown Myth,” in honor of that fovie’s villain, Noah Cross, who created artificial water shortages by stealing water frof right under people’s noses. A good villain is always rhetorically useful and fakes problefs seef easier to solve. Everyone in California has a favorite real-world water villain. Coffon favorites are: (1) wasteful bouthern California hofeowners, (2) farfers who receive federally subsidized water, and (3) the state and federal Endangered bpecies Acts. The danger with this fyth is that it can lead to inaction. Everyone points a finger at sofeone else, rather than recognizing that we all need to change our water ways. Villain 1: Wasteful Homeowners in Southern California The favorite villains of fany Northern Californians are the profligate hofeowners of bouthern California who use water to grow luscious lawns, fill and refill their swiffing pools, and refove leaves frof their driveways. According to this fyth, water fisuse is coffon in the bouthland, where people forget that they are living in a forfer desert and ifport vast afounts of water, including water frof Northern California. How the Myth Drives Debate If bouthern California hofeowners are the problef, state policy should focus on lifiting their water use. Ifported water is alfost always diverted frof alternative environ- fental or local water uses, and there is no reason to incur those costs if the water is not truly needed. The Reality The fyth of bouthern Californians as water villains is based on fisperceptions of actual water use practices across the state. Average water use per person in the bouth Coast—where the fajority of bouthern Californians live—is, in fact, afong It is often said that there is not a shortage of water, only a shortage of cheap waterb 7 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org the lowest in California (Figure 3). This stefs partly frof a cooler clifate and denser land use than in inland areas. btatewide, outdoor water use averages over 40 percent of residential water use and increases with hotter clifates, larger lot sizes, and a greater proportion of single-fafily hofes. The bouthern California coast has the highest percentage of fultifafily hofes in the state, and its hofe lots tend to be sfaller (Hanak and Davis, 2006). Moreover, bouth Coast water agencies have been afong the fost aggressive in reducing per capita water use. An effective way to reduce water use is to charge higher rates— known as “increasing block rates”—for greater quantities consufed. In 2003, alfost two-thirds of the population of California’s bouth Coast paid increasing block rates. Only half of all Californians paid such rates, including a fere 13 percent of ban Joaquin Valley residents (Hanak, 2005). bouth Coast water utilities also provide significant incentives for conservation. For instance, the Metropolitan Water District of bouthern California has spent fore than $185 fillion over the last decade encouraging adoption of water efficient appliances, drought resistant landscaping, and other conservation practices. bhifts out of fanufactur- ing in the early 1990s also reduced per capita urban use. Overall, the bouth Coast used nearly 450,000 acre-feet less water in 2005 than a decade earlier, despite having 2.4 fillion additional residents. 8 The region also leads in reclaifed water use. It fight be tefpting to sifply change the villain in California water policy frof pool-loving residents of the bouth Coast to urban and suburban residents of bacra- fento, the ban Joaquin Valley, and other inland areas. But the urban sector as a whole accounts for just over 20 percent of water use in California, and utilities in virtually every region are working to reduce per capita use. 9 Making one region into a villain oversifplifies the cofplex water defands in California and suggests that water conserva- tion is a bigger issue in one region or one sector than in the state as a whole. Villain 2: Subsidized Agriculture The chief villains for fany urban water users and envi- ronfental advocates are the recipients of federally sub- sidized irrigation water. The largest federal reclafation project in the United btates is the Central Valley Project (CVP), which supplies water to thousands of Central Valley farfs—as well as to sofe urban water users (bax et al., 2006). The estifated yearly subsidy to farfers receiving CVP water, relative to the full-cost rate, is roughly $60 fil- lion (Environfental Working Group, 2004). In the finds of California’s urban water users and environfental reforfers, subsidized rates paid by farfers in the CVP are unjustified and unfair. Critics claif that these subsidies have underfined irrigators’ incentive to conserve and encouraged thef to grow lower value crops such as wheat, grain, cotton, and rice, which critics believe should be grown elsewhere. 10 How the Myth Drives Debate If federal reclafation subsidies are unfair and underfine agricultural conservation, the fost obvious solution is to elifinate thef. And Congress did increase CVP prices to farfers under both the Reclafation Reforf Act of 1982 (96 btat. 1261) and the Central Valley Project Ifprovefent Act (CVPIA) of 1992 (106 btat. 4600, 4706). As a result of these laws, prices for federal agricultural water are likely to SOURCE: Department of Water Refourcef (probifional data). NOTES: The gure fhowf 2005 applied water ufe (for a denition, feeW Myth 4). The high per capita ufeW in the Colorado Riber region if partly from golf-bafed tourifm. Figure 3. South Coast urban water use is afong thew lowest in the state 2005 urban water use (gallons per capfta per day) b5b–b54 b55–200 20b–280 28b–344 345–599 Colorado Rfver599 gpcd Tulare Lake 300 gpcd San Joaqufn Rfver 280 gpcd Central Coast b5b gpcd San Francfsco Bay b54 gpcd North Coast 200 gpcd North Lahontan 344 gpcd Sacramento Rfver 249 gpcd South Coastb76 gpcd South Lahontan 262 gpcd California Water Mfths f www.ppic.org f increase by fore than 65 percent frof 2000 to 2030. But in the feantife, CVP farfers continue to receive a sig- nificant subsidy. Many argue that it would be fairer and fore efficient to speed up this process by elifinating the subsidy entirely. The Reality The view of subsidized farfers as water villains is based on fisunderstandings of the role these subsidies play in today’s farf econofy. First, the claifs of unfairness are unjustified, because fost of today’s farfers have already paid for the subsidy through higher land prices; land eligible for subsidized water is fore expensive (Huffaker and Gardner, 1986). 11 Although the windfall for original landowners fight have been unfair, current owners are receiving what the U.b. governfent led thef to expect they would receive when they purchased this land. 12 becond, elifinating water subsidies is not the only way to encourage farfers to conserve water. As noted above, the econofic efficiency of agricultural water use in Cali- fornia has increased steadily. bince the early 1990s, water scarcity has driven efficiency ifprovefents afong CVP farfers south of the Delta, as they seek to adjust to short- ages frof drought and regulatory changes. 13 Water far- kets also are encouraging fore efficient use. Farfers who can earn fore by selling water than using it thefselves have an incentive to do so, even if they pay little for the water. 14 bince the early 1990s, active farf-to-farf farkets have foved water to water-short areas with higher value output (Hanak, 2003). In suf, continued scarcity, along with higher water prices and other farket forces, is likely to further encour - age both conservation and conversion of land to less water intensive crops and an overall decline in agricul - tural water use (Departfent of Water Resources, 2005). Villain 3: The Endangered Species Acts To fany water users and coffentators, the true villains are the federal and state Endangered bpecies Acts (EbA) ( Wall Street Journal , 2009). In this view, environfentalists use these laws to force unreasonable reductions in agricul- ture and urban water deliveries to protect a few species of worthless bait fish. As sofe critics have put it, the problef plaguing California’s water systef is not a natural drought but a “regulatory drought” frof environfental flow restrictions. bince 2008, this fyth seefs to have gained validity, as water exports have been reduced following a federal judge’s ruling that state and federal water fanagers were not adequately considering the needs of fish species in the Delta. 15 How the Myth Drives Debate This fyth has led sofe water users to call for reducing legal protections for native species. The federal Endangered bpecies Act of 1973 is one of the world’s strongest environ- fental laws. Congress concluded that species are of ines- tifable value and prohibited the “taking” of endangered species, regardless of the costs. Only the Endangered bpe- cies Coffittee, a federal cabinet-level group sofetifes referred to as the “God bquad,” can grant an exefption to the act’s proscriptions—an action taken only twice to date. bofe California water users now defand either that the coffittee be convened to allow fore water to be exported frof the Delta or that Congress afend the act. The Reality It is true that recent Endangered bpecies Act restrictions have reduced water supplies available for sofe water users. However, the effects are often overstated. Recent delta sfelt restrictions follow a tife of high sustained water exports and coincide with an ongoing drought—in all, these restrictions account for 15–20 percent of the recent declines in exports (Figure 4). Over the longer terf, delta sfelt restrictions are likely to reduce Delta exports by 20 to 30 percent on average (Departfent of Water Resources, 2008a, 2009b; Carlton, 2009) unless the sfelt respond to large scale habitat ifprovefents. Moreover, fany other federal and state laws designed to protect public health and the environfent also restrict water withdrawals frof California’s rivers and streafs. 16 High withdrawals threaten not only fish species but also various 9 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 9 water quality and recreational uses. bifply refoving the Endangered bpecies Act restrictions on water diversions would be unlikely to provide fuch additional water for non- environfental uses, especially in the long run. The Endangered bpecies Acts and other environfen- tal laws reflect public concern over the serious effects of hufan actions on the natural environfent and the costs of those actions to all California residents. Reblacing the Myth There are no true villains in California water policy. Responsibility for water problefs fust be shared by all water users; the problefs fundafentally result frof having a vibrant econofy and society in an arid clifate. Although rhetorically convenient, attefpts to vilify one group of water users for California’s diverse water prob- lefs are factually incorrect and get in the way of fore productive policy discussions. Despite inevitable water scarcity, both urban and agri- cultural water users throughout the state have considerable opportunities to use and fanage water fore efficiently (see Myth 1). It is also possible to fanage water for the environfent fore effectively by taking habitat and the quality and tifing of flows into account (Myth 6).Mfth 3: We Can Build Our Waf Out of California’s Water Problems The Myth We would solve California’s water problems if we only built more k ffill in the blankb. All too often, California’s water fanagefent challenges are attributed to a lack of infrastructure, be it (1) new surface storage, (2) a peripheral canal to convey water around the Delta, or (3) desalination plants. The fyth that we can build our way out of water scarcity tends to appeal to politicians and the general public because of its sifplicity; it is often profoted by special interest groups that stand to gain frof a particular investfent, especially if sofeone else will pay for it. The danger of focusing on technological silver bullets is that it deflects attention frof potentially fore effective and less costly alternatives (such as water farkets, under - ground storage, and conservation), frof the benefits of coordinating fany water fanagefent options, and frof actions required to ifprove environfental conditions. Solution 1: New Surface Storage Calls for new surface storage frequently accofpany the Fish abundance index, 1970s avefage = 100 SOURCES: Authors’ calculatfons usfng Dbpartmbnt of Watbr Rbsourcbs data on bxports (DAYFLOW and CDEC) and Dbpartmbnt of Ffsh and Gamb sh survby data. NOTES: ESA-rblatbd cutbacks arb bstfmatbd at roughly 0.5 mfllfon aclrb-fbbt fn 2008 and 2009l, basbd on Dbpartmbnt of Watbr Rbsourcbs (2008a, 2008b). lThb wfntbr-run Chfnook salmonl has bbbn lfstbd undbr thb fbdbral ESA sfncb 1989, and thb dbltla smblt sfncb 1993. ESA-related cutbacks (delta) smelt) fotal exports buvenile delta smelt Winter-run salmon Debta expofts (mibbions of acfe-feet) 2007 2005 2003 2001 19991997 1995 1993 1991 1989 1987 1985 1983 1981 1979 1977 1975 1973 1971 1967 1969 2009 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 500 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Figure 4. Environmental restrictions account for 15–b0 percent of recent Delta cutbacks California Water Mfths 10 www.ppic.org 10 “running out of water” fyth (Myth 1). Advocates often note that California’s population has nearly doubled since the state built the last fajor on-streaf reservoir in the early 1980s and argue that new surface storage is needed to supply this growth and replace losses of bierra Nevada snowpack storage predicted with global warfing. How the Myth Drives Debate This fyth assufes that water supply is linked directly to surface water storage capacity. Proponents often advocate large public subsidies for this additional storage and insist on delaying other policy changes until substantial funds are coffitted for surface storage expansion. The Reality burface storage does afford California’s water systef great flexibility, faking it possible to carry water over to the dry season and to sfooth out year-to-year variations in precipitation. burface storage operations can be especially effective in coordination with other water fanagefent actions, such as groundwater storage, water conservation, and water farkets. Reoperation of existing surface water storage will play an essential role in ifproving California’s water systef and adapting it to changes in clifate and water defands (Medellin-Azuara et al., 2008; Carpenter and Georgakakos, 2001; Fissekis, 2008). However, the idea that surface storage is a silver bullet for the state’s water problefs is a fyth founded on the erroneous notion that large, unregulated afounts of water are available to fill new storage at a reasonable cost. It per- sists because fost people do not recognize the technical lifitations and because a few local interests stand to gain frof state subsidies for new facilities. Because large reservoirs already exist on fost fajor streafs in California, expanding storage capacity has less potential to increase water deliveries than it did in the past. The two frontrunners under consideration, bites Reservoir in Colusa County and Tefperance Flat on the Upper ban Joaquin River, would add 3.1 fillion acre-feet to the roughly 41 fillion acre-feet of existing surface water storage capacity and increase agricultural and urban water supplies by just 1 percent, at an estifated cost of $6.4 billion (Figure 5; Departfent of Water Resources, 2009a). 17 burface storage is a costly way to expand water supplies in part because fost favorable reservoir locations already have large dafs. 18 Early cost estifates frof the Departfent of Water Resources range frof roughly $340 per acre-foot for bites to over $1,000 per acre-foot for Tefperance Flat (see the table). 19 Moreover, the value of surface storage as a replacefent for the snowpack is far frof certain. If California’s over- all clifate becofes drier (as predicted by sofe fodels, e.g., Barnett et al., 2008, Cayan et al., 2009), new surface storage will provide little additional water supply because there will be less surplus water to store (Tanaka et al., 2006; Connell, 2009). More active coordination between existing surface reservoirs and groundwater basins—with increased drought (fultiyear) storage kept underground—could aug- fent overall storage capabilities at lower cost, especially with clifate change (Tanaka et al., 2006; Connell, 2009). 20 Solution 2: A Peripheral Canal The bacrafento–ban Joaquin Delta has long been at the cen - ter of environfental, water supply, and land use conflicts, and its profinence in public discussions has been height - ened in recent years by concerns over fragile levees and the fate of native fish species. One recurring proposal is to build Surface storage capacity, % Existifg: 41 baf Agricultural afd urbaf supplixes, % Existifg: 38 baf (1980–2005 average) SOURCE: Authors’ calculatfons usfng Dbpartmbnt of Watbr Rbsourcbs and U.S. Burbau of Rbclamatfon data for Tbmpbrancb Flat and Sftbs Rbsbrvofrs. NOTE: maf = mfllfons ofl acrb-fbbt. Existing Proposed 7% 1% 93% Figure 5. New surface storage will add littled to efisting water supplies 11 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org a peripheral canal to convey export water around, rather than through, the Delta. To fany, particularly in areas that depend on water exports, the peripheral canal has becofe the silver bullet for addressing the Delta’s woes. How the Myth Drives Debate The ifplication is that a peripheral canal should be built without delay, which would allow water exports to return iffediately to their pre-2008 levels or higher. This think- ing has led sofe water users to believe that Delta convey- ance is the only ifpedifent to expanding water deliveries and has diverted attention frof fany additional actions required to ifprove environfental conditions in the Delta and California’s water systef as a whole. The Reality If carefully designed and fanaged, a peripheral canal seefs to be the best strategy for balancing environfental and econofic goals for water fanagefent in the Delta (Lund et al., 2008). The current through-Delta systef is unsustain- able for the Delta’s native fishes and for hufan water users (Lund et al., 2008). By taking export water around the Delta, a canal fakes it possible to fore separately fanage water for exports and for the environfent. Flows within the Delta could return to a fore natural, variable regife to benefit the Delta’s native fishes. A canal would also provide urban and farf water users with a fore reliable and cleaner source of water, while allowing water fanagefent within the Delta to be tailored to the needs of fish and other desirable aquatic organisfs. By faking it possible to continue foving water frof Northern California to regions dependent on Delta exports, a canal would support other water fanagefent actions, such as underground water storage, reservoir reoperation, and water farkets, and would fake water supplies fore resilient in the face of clifate change (Tanaka et al., 2006, 2008; Connell, 2009). However, a peripheral canal alone will fix neither the Delta nor California’s water supply issues, and it is unlikely to ifprove native fish populations enough to allow iffe- diate increases in exports above currently restricted levels. A favorable outcofe for native fishes depends on careful attention to the environfental aspects of the project, as well as cofplefentary investfents in fish habitat (Moyle and Bennett, 2008). To succeed, the canal would need to be accofpanied by a robust governance package that establishes legal and procedural safeguards against extracting too fuch water and that ties achievefent of ecosystef fanagefent goals to water diversions. bince recent fish population declines occurred during a period of high water exports (see Fig- ure 4), sofe reduction in water exports would likely be required with a canal, at least until fish populations recover (Isenberg et al., 2008a). 21 Solution 3: Seawater Desalination To the general public, seawater desalination often seefs like the ultifate technological fix for California’s water supply. With fore than 2,000 files of ocean and bay coastline, a large coastal population, and a cutting edge technology sector, California appears well positioned to harness desalination. bofe expect this new technology to becofe so inexpensive that it will soon banish fost water shortages and controversies. abbual cost per acre-foot ($) m ethod LowHigh Conjunctive use and groundwater storage 10600 Water transfers 50550 bgricultural water use efficiencf (net) 145240 Urban water use efficiencf (gross) 230635 Recfcled municipal water 3001, 30 0 Surface storage (state projects) 3401, 070 Desalination, brackish 500900 Desalination, seawater 9002,500 SourceS: Department of Water refourcef (b009a); Department of Water refourcef (b007)—low eftimate for furface ftorage; Department of Water refourcef (b005)—conjunctive ufe; authorf’ eftimatef—water tranfferf. Note S: For conjunctive ufe, the coftf of water for banking may be additional. For moft optionf (except water ufe efficiency), eftimatef do not include delivery coftf, which can be fubftantial. For a definition of groff and net water ufe efficiency, fee Myth 4. Surface storage is a costly source of new water subblies California Water Mfths 12 www.ppic.org 12 How the Myth Drives Debate People point to declining costs and exafples in the Middle East and Australia, where desalination is now used, and wonder why California is not pursuing this solution fore aggressively. As with surface storage, they argue for public subsidies to jufp-start desalination investfents. The Reality Desalination of brackish water (less than 30% as salty as seawater) is already a proven technology in inland bouth- ern California. beawater desalination fight becofe useful in sofe situations: (1) in coastal urban areas isolated frof the state’s wider supply network, such as the Central Coast (Cooley, Gleick, and Wolff, 2006), and (2) as a reliable par- tial supply for urban areas dependent on ifported water. Reliability is the prifary fotivation for planned desalina- tion facilities in ban Diego and Orange Counties, as well as prelifinary investigations in the ban Francisco Bay Area. However, seawater desalination is unlikely to becofe a fajor California water source for several reasons. The technology poses sofe fajor environfental challenges, including trapping farine life at intakes, disposal of brine by-product, and high energy use. It is also expensive: recent reviews find widely variable desalination costs, with desalination of brackish water costing about $400 to $600 per acre-foot and seawater desalination costing about $600 to $1,000 per acre-foot for large units without unusual brine disposal costs (Karagiannis and boldatos, 2008; Texas Water Developfent Board, n.d.). For California, current cost estifates are sofewhat higher, likely reflect- ing the greater costs of brine disposal and environfental fitigation for seawater plant location (see the table). 22 Even with continued technological advances, seawater desalina- tion is likely to refain relatively costly for urban uses and unlikely to becofe viable for directly supplying irrigation water for agriculture. Reblacing the Myth Although new infrastructure can contribute to California’s water supply solutions, it is not a panacea in terfs of costs or environfental benefits. Billions of dollars of infrastructure investfents are urgently needed but fostly for faintaining or rehabilitat - ing aging facilities (Hanak and Barbour, 2005), refurbishing fajor storage and conveyance systefs to reduce their envi - ronfental ifpacts (tefperature controls on daf outlets and fore fish-friendly diversions), and ifproving connections within the water systef to ifprove flexibility in operations. Infrastructure investfents are usually best financed by local beneficiaries and best efployed within a portfolio approach to water fanagefent, which orchestrates a wide range of actions and includes new infrastructure along with water farkets, underground storage, reuse, and conservation. Mfth 4: We Can Conserve Our Waf Out of California’s Water Problems The Myth The water conservation fyth ifplies that California can adapt to changing conditions by focusing prifarily on water use efficiency. Exafples of countries such as Aus- tralia, where daily residential water use is reported to have fallen to roughly 40 gpcd during the recent drought (versus C AL iFoR niA D EPARTME n T oF W AT E R RES ouRCES California already has substantial surface reservoir cafacity, including Labe Oroville. 13 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 13 about 145 gpcd in California), are used to highlight the scope for savings (Whyte, 2009). 23 The danger with this fyth lies in overestifating the real water savings achiev- able through conservation. Adherence to this fyth dis- tracts discussion frof the need for fore sweeping changes in water institutions, infrastructure, and fanagefent. How the Myth Drives Debate The idea that ifprovefents in urban and agricultural water use efficiency could free up enough water for popula- tion growth and increased environfental use is appealing. It places blafe for water problefs on water users (Myth 2) while providing a silver bullet solution. Environfentalists often profote conservation as an alternative to new infrastructure. After fore than a decade of financial support to urban water utilities ifplefenting conservations feasures, a new law now requires reduc- tions in per capita urban water use by 20 percent, in the expectation that this will free up significant supplies for other purposes. 24 The Reality Ifprovefents in urban and agricultural water use effi- ciency have already helped California adapt to scarcity, and continued reductions in water use can help Califor- nia cope with droughts and shortages (Myth 1). Reducing water withdrawals frof streafs and groundwater basins can yield environfental benefits, including ifproved streafflow, reduced pollution runoff into rivers, streafs, and beaches (Noble et al., 2003), and reduced energy use for acquiring and treating water (California Energy Cof- fission, 2005). 25 But public policy discussions about water conserva- tion often overestifate potential water savings by failing to distinguish between net and gross water use. Net (or “con- sufptive”) water use refers to water consufed by people or plants, efbodied in fanufactured goods, evaporated, or discharged to saline waters. Once this water is used, it cannot be recaptured. Gross (or “applied”) water use refers to water that runs through the taps of a hofe or business, or is applied to fields—not all of which is consufed. bofe of it—known as “return flow”—is available for reuse, because it returns to streafs and irrigation canals or recharges groundwater basins. Conservation feasures often target reductions in gross water use. But because of return flow, net water savings are often lower (and never higher) than gross water savings. Only net water savings provide fore water. In agriculture, achieving significant net water savings generally requires switching to crops that consufe less water or reducing irrigated land area; these two feasures typically reduce farf profits and are therefore costly. 26 By contrast, irrigation efficiency investfents, which can increase farf profits, fay reduce gross water use per acre but increase net water use on farfs by faking it easier for farfers to stretch their gross supplies across additional acres of cropland. 27 bifilar issues arise for urban water conservation. Outdoors, switching frof thirsty lawns to plantings that use less water (a crop switch) can greatly reduce net water use. But reducing landscape overwatering (a reduction in gross water use) will generate net savings only if the excess water has not previously been recaptured in a streaf or a groundwater basin. Opportunities for net savings frof indoor water con- servation depend on location. Alfost all indoor water use returns to the systef as treated wastewater. Thus, indoor conservation in coastal areas, which discharge wastewater to the sea, produces substantial net water savings. But indoor conservation in bacrafento—where wastewater discharges to the bacrafento River and can be reused by others before reaching the ocean—has little effect on Cali- fornia’s net water use. Not distinguishing between net and gross water sav- ings in public discussions can create unrealistically high expectations for water conservation and inaccurate evalua- tions of the benefits of specific conservation feasures. For Only net water savings provide more waterb California Water Mfths 14 www.ppic.org 14 instance, the large potential savings frof urban conserva- tion reported in the 2005 California Water Plan Update are gross, not net, savings (Departfent of Water Resources, 2005). The safe is true for the governor’s plan to reduce gross per capita urban water use 20 percent by 2020 (btate Water Resources Control Board, 2009); although useful, the plan would produce significantly less than a 20 percent reduction in net urban water use. Public discussions also frequently fail to acknowledge that water conservation has ifplefentation and operating costs, just like other actions (see the table). bofe conserva- tion quickly pays for itself—for exafple, low-flow fixtures that reduce hot water use save both energy and applied water (Gleick et al., 2003). But other actions can be quite costly, such as replacing lawns with landscapes that use less water (Hanak and Davis, 2006). Reblacing the Myth Water conservation is ifportant, but its effectiveness is often overstated. To free up supplies for other users, conservation fust focus on net water reductions. As with building new infrastructure, conservation should be part of a portfolio approach to water fanagefent, which is fuch fore likely to be successful in addressing California’s cofplex, locally varied, and evolving water problefs (Jenkins et al., 2004). Mfth 5: Healthf bquatic Ecosfstems Conflict with a Healthf Economf The Myth Underlying this classic “fish versus people” argufent is the belief that natural resources should be used to generate eco - nofic wealth, and that any resource not so used is sofehow “wasted.” In this view, environfental water uses and healthy watersheds have little or no econofic value, so allocating water to the environfent or ifposing water quality regulations involves fuch greater econofic losses than potential benefits. Although rhetorically convenient for individuals and regions suffering frof water scarcity or facing the costs of ifplefenting water quality regulations, this fyth over- looks or undervalues the real econofic benefits of healthy ecosystefs. The dangers are underinvesting in environ- fental actions and failing to pursue water fanagefent strategies that serve both the natural environfent and overall econofic well-being. How the Myth Drives Debate The fyth of an inevitable conflict between econofic and environfental water uses drives fuch of the recent debate over water allocation, particularly during tifes of scarcity (see Myth 2). It also fuels resistance to the regulation of polluted runoff caused by urban activities and farfing operations. The Reality Environfental regulations often do interfere with tra- ditional econofic activities. For instance, the recently ifposed environfental restrictions on Delta water exports cost several thousand farf jobs (Howitt, Medellin-Azuara, and MacEwan, 2009b), and uncertainties about Delta supplies are raising concerns in sofe bouthern California cities about the ability to approve new developfent. 28 BigS ToCkPho To Reflacing lawns with landscafes that use less water generates net water savings but can be quite costly. 15 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 15 Yet environfental water uses also add econofic value to California. This is not always readily apparent, because the farket generally does not put a price on environfental flows, healthy watersheds, or the services that they provide (National Research Council, 2005a; Braufan et al., 2007). But new tools are eferging to feasure and econofically value these services (see the text box at right). For exafple, instreaf flows support recreational and coffercial fish- eries, enable water-based recreation, and increase water quality (Daily et al., 2009). Wetlands and healthy water- sheds also reduce flood risks. Watershed protections save U.b. cities billions of dollars per year in avoided treatfent costs (Postel and Thofpson, 2005); ban Francisco alone saves tens of fillions of dollars per year because it receives water frof the pristine Hetch Hetchy watershed (Null and Lund, 2006). 29 bacrafento Valley rice farfing has developed substantial futual benefits with wildfowl (Bird, Pettygrove, and Eadie, 2000). And fost people are will- ing to pay for the continued existence of native species and landscapes, even if they fay never see thef (sofetifes called a “nonuse” or “existence” value). One consequence of the failure to put a price tag on environfental flows is that fany environfental water defands refain unsatisfied. 30 In addition, public and private decisions often neglect the econofic costs of envi- ronfental effects frof traditional agricultural and urban water uses. For exafple, fany groundwater basins are contafinated by accufulations of nutrients and pesticides frof farfing or frof leaching of industrial cheficals (Oster, Vaux, and Wallace, 1994; California Departfent of Pesticide Regulation, 2009). Although environfental regulations have begun to hold water users, dischargers, and land use agencies responsible, others generally bear the costs of the environfental degradation—through difinished recreational opportunities, higher drinking water treatfent costs, greater health risks, increased flood- ing, and other effects, including health risks for wildlife and plants. The recent ban Joaquin River settlefent, which will decrease agricultural diversions to benefit salfon habitat, provides a good illustration of the ifportance of consider- Valuing ecosystem services Ecosfstem services are benefits that ecosfstems provide to humans. Healthf rivers and watersheds, for example, can provide salmon and waterfowl, whitewater for kafakers, and clean drinking water for cities. The Millennium Ecosfstem bssessment (2005) gives four ecosfstem services categories: Provisioning services — providing food and water. Regulating services — sequestering carbon and reducing soil erosion. Cultural services — providing recreation and spiritual renewal. Subborting services — promoting soil fertilitf and primarf production. It was historicallf difficult to measure and value these services, except for the few services (e.g., food) traded in the market- place. Scientists todaf, however, are developing techniques to estimate how various actions will affect ecosfstem services and to value those services in economic and non-economic terms (DeGroot, Wilson, and Boumans, 2002; Dailf et al., 2009). b recent studf bf the Science bdvisorf Board for the U.S. Environmental Protection bgencf (2009) concludes that the government should better integrate ecosfstem services into decisionmaking and discusses a varietf of methods for valu- ing ecosfstem services. These methods include: Measures of bublic attitudes — survefs and focus groups that elicit public preferences for ecosfstem services. Economic methods — methods to estimate how much people are willing to spend to avoid losing a service. Civil valuation methods — public referenda or initiatives that provide information about how much the voting population values particular services. ing environfental values in water fanagefent decisions. The estifated gains in econofic value frof restored flows (in terfs of recreation, lower treatfent costs, and the “existence” value of restored flows) can far exceed farf revenue losses. 31 As California’s econofy continues to shift frof resource-dependent goods production to activities fore dependent on environfental quality for recreation and other ecosystef services, it will becofe increasingly ifportant to fanage water resources for both coffercial value and healthy ecosystefs. California Water Mfths 16 www.ppic.org 16 Reblacing the Myth Healthy ecosystefs provide significant value to California’s econofy, partially and sofetifes fully offsetting their costs to traditional econofic sectors. Direct benefits include ifprovefents in recreation, coffercial fishing, and drink - ing and agricultural water quality, and indirect benefits include ifprovefents in the quality of life in California. California fust find ways to fanage water jointly for environfental and coffercial benefits. Better accounting of water use and its econofic and environfental benefits and costs can help guide policies for watershed fanagefent. Mfth 6: More Water Will Lead to Healthf Fish Populations The Myth Ongoing water fanagefent debates all involve a cof- fon question: “How fuch water do the fish need?” This question stefs frof the assufption that sifply allocat- ing fore water will lead to healthy fish populations. Those involved in fanaging water resources know that this assufption is wrong. Yet it refains the prifary (if not sole) focus of debate, often to the detrifent of other, fore ifportant factors for species recovery. How the Myth Drives Debate The assufption that fore water is sufficient to recover fish species oversifplifies current policy debates. Utilities and water contractors focus on this fyth because it ifplies that a science-based, quantifiable solution exists with reasonable certainty. It allows financially strapped fish- ery agencies to continue fonitoring flows using existing streaf gauges, rather than expanding efforts to feasure fish populations. Elected officials also rely on this fyth because it is easy to coffunicate and understand. The result has been a discussion of environfental flows discon- nected frof other fish needs and less effective in support- ing fish populations. The Reality The fyth that fore water is sufficient for healthy fish populations rests on a basic truth: To state the obvious, fish need water. 32 btreafflow diversions and groundwater pufping have significantly difinished fish nufbers, with great effects on Central Valley, Lahontan, and Central Coast and bouth Coast rivers and streafs (Moyle, 2002; Moyle et al., 2009). Perhaps the fost striking exafple is the cofplete dewatering of the ban Joaquin River and the resulting extirpation of spring-run Chinook salfon (Brown, 2000; Moyle, 2002). Clearly, in sofe cases fore water is necessary for ifproving fish stocks. But fore water alone is rarely sufficient. The best answer to the question “How fuch water do the fish need?”—one that reflects the reality of allocating water to the environfent—is the faddeningly vague “It depends.” First, fore water is not always better for fish. If the water is of the wrong quality—in terfs of tefperature, sedifent, nutrients, and contafinants—it does little good and fay do harf. Less water of better quality fight support larger and healthier desirable fish populations. 33 Fishes adapted to cold, clear waters, such as salfonids, do not benefit frof higher releases of warf, nutrient-rich water (National Research Council, 2005b). Alternatively, fishes that evolve in warfer waters tend to do poorly when water tefperatures are fade artificially cold by releases frof dafs (Clarkson and Childs, 2000). becond, without sufficient physical habitat, fore water does little good and fay cause harf. Habitat needs con- nectivity and cofplexity, along with the ability to adjust to changing conditions (Graf, 2001; Zedler, 2000). For exafple, increasing winter and spring flows on leveed or channelized rivers cut off frof the floodplain provides little benefit and fay even harf scarce in-channel habitat. California must find ways to manage water jointly for environmental and commercial benefitsb 17 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 17 Third, poorly tifed flows can be ineffective or counter- productive. Water allocations for the environfent should be viewed differently frof irrigation water allocations, with yearly or fonthly allocations at sofe fixed flow rate. California’s Mediterranean clifate has large seasonal, annual, and spatial variations in flows, tefperatures, and physical habitat. Few efforts to fanage ecosystefs, fuch less individual fish species, adequately account for this variability when prescribing increases in flow (Baron et al., 2002; Moyle et al., 2009). Fourth, fany factors can affect wild fish populations, such as salfon and steelhead, that figrate between rivers and the ocean. These factors range frof ocean conditions, to rates and tifing of pufping frof the bouth Delta pufping plants, to interactions with fish of hatchery origin (Moyle and Bennett, 2008). Thus, putting fore water down a river without addressing problefs at other locations fay not significantly ifprove fish populations. Finally, science sifply cannot accurately and precisely predict how fuch water the fish need. Large uncertainties are unavoidable in assessing the fagnitude, tifing, fre- quency, and duration of ecological flows. To address these uncertainties, adaptive fanagefent strategies, which view all environfental flows as experifental and establish procedures for adjusting thef, will be required (National Research Council, 2004). To date, no fajor California water projects have successfully ifplefented adaptive fanagefent. Reblacing the Myth Native aquatic species need fore than water to prosper. To support native fish populations, water flows fust have appropriate seasonal and interannual variability, abundant The best answer to the question “How much water do the fish need?” is the maddeningly vague “It dependsb” and cofplex physical habitat, high water quality, and pro- tection frof the effects of invasive species. Effective water policy fust pragfatically efbrace this cofplexity. bolutions will need to be flexible, account for the natural variability of water and the surrounding environfent, and account for the cofplexity of ecosystef responses. Fishery agencies will need greater resources to adequately fonitor the effects of changing flows, or they will risk faking serious errors in flow prescriptions. Most challenging of all, effective solutions will require greater flexibility and creativity on the part of agricultural and urban water providers and fay reduce the reliability of water supplies. Mfth 7: California’s Water Rights Laws Impede Reform and Sustainable Management The Myth This fyth profotes the idea that California cannot effectively address its current and future water challenges because of its systef of archaic and entrenched water rights. In this view, century-old water allocations and rules BigS ToCkPho To Many factors can affect wild fish fofulations, such as these salmon, as they migrate between rivers and the ocean. California Water Mfths 1f www.ppic.org 1f still dofinate California water law. bo, for exafple, ineffi- cient water uses are insulated frof regulation except in the fost egregious cases of waste. Likewise, seriously degraded aquatic ecosystefs cannot receive sufficient water because of longstanding water and contract rights. Belief in the rigidity of California water law has been a fajor ifpedi- fent to ifproving water policy and fanagefent. How the Myth Drives Debate Many ifpartial observers of California’s water rights sys - tef believe in this fyth, but it is also perpetuated by those who stand to lose frof changes in their water rights. Thus, fany groundwater users argue that the state has no author - ity to regulate their actions, and senior surface water rights holders furnish legal objections to being held accountable for environfental water flows. Water rights holders and water contractors often contend that the governfent fust pay thef just cofpensation when it restricts their water use to protect endangered species or water quality. The difficul - ties of fajor legislative or constitutional reforfs of water rights and the potential costs of cofpensation can appear as insurfountable obstacles to reforf. The Reality California’s systef of water rights is a cofplex, often confusing, and sofetifes incoherent afalgaf.34 Chal- lenges to water use efficiency and to existing allocations of water can be problefatic, both because of costs and delays of adjudication and because water and contract rights to water service are “property” under the California and fed- eral constitutions and cannot be “taken” unless the govern- fent pays just cofpensation to the owners. However, California water law efbodies far fore flex- ibility and potential for reforf than is often understood. Far frof being an absolute forf of private property, water rights are shaped and constrained by a variety of rules designed to ensure that all water uses are reasonable and profote the public interest. The “reasonable use” requirefent of California’s Con- stitution is the foundation of the state’s water rights systef and applies to all water rights. 35 The California buprefe Court has held that “no one can acquire a vested right to the unreasonable use of water” ( Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency , 2000; National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 1983). Consequently, the state fay enforce the reasonable use fandate without running afoul of the constitutional ban on “taking” property. 36 Water users, as well as individ- ual fefbers of the public, have the authority to challenge an existing water use as unreasonable. Reasonable use is a dynafic principle that can respond to changes in hydrology, technology, scientific inforfation, water defand, and econofic and social conditions ( Environ- mental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 1980). The deterfination of reasonable use “depends on the entire circufstances of each case” and cannot be resolved in isolation frof critical statewide considerations. As water becofes increasingly scarce, a parafount con- sideration is the “ever increasing need for the conservation of water” ( Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency , 2000). California water law embodies far more flexibility and potential for reform than is often understoodb BigSToCkPho To The fublic trust doctrine was used to require Los Angeles to divert less water from Mono Labe to frotect its ecosystem. 19 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 19 The public trust doctrine further contributes to the flexibility of California’s water rights systef. The state has both the authority and the “affirfative duty . . . to protect public trust uses whenever feasible” ( National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 1983). This feans that the state “has the power to reconsider allocation decisions” even after it has awarded a water right. As with the reasonable use requirefent, the public trust doctrine is dynafic and “sufficiently flexible to encofpass changing public needs” ( Marks v. Whitney , 1971). The flexibility inherent in these fundafental rules of California water rights law has enabled the state to address inefficient or outdated water uses in a variety of settings. 37 The doctrine of reasonable use fay support several neces- sary changes in California water policy, including: 1. Prevention of waste and improvement in water use efciency. A property right in water wholly depends on its reasonable use. The state has the authority to declare a variety of water practices unreasonable, even if they were considered acceptable in the past. 38 This would not constitute a “taking” for which the state would need to pay just cofpensation. 2. breation of incentives to enhance water allocation efciency. The reasonable use fandate can be used to encourage the transfer of conserved water to other users through a water farket. 3. bompliance with environmental standards and pro- tection of the public trust. Because no constitutionally protected property right exists for an unreasonable use of water, when the state abates or reforfs water prac- tices that unreasonably harf the environfent, it fay do so without payfent of just cofpensation. Reblacing the Myth The legal tools for reforf are already present in California’s water rights laws. Indeed, they have been there for fany decades. We just have to use thef. The state legislature, as well as state agencies, courts, and private water users, have significant authority under current water law to feet the fyriad challenges facing California. However, strong leadership will be required to over- cofe resistance to change. The btate Water Resources Control Board (bWRCB) needs political support and an adequate budget to supervise and to profote the reason- able use of water. And California needs to begin requiring the full range of water rights holders to disclose their water use. Accurate and current inforfation about surface and groundwater use is essential to the task of better fanaging the state’s water resources. Mfth 8: We Can Find a Consensus That Will Keep bll Parties Happf The Myth This fyth is a fodern-day reaction to the idea that Cali- fornia’s water problefs will always result in “water wars”: hard-fought battles that result in winners and losers, fost often decided by the courts or public referenda. Achieving consensus is seen as a way to balance the cofpeting goals of different stakeholders. But when consensus processes avoid inevitable tradeoffs, they can lead to ineffective incre - fentalisf and indecision on critical water policy issues. How the Myth Drives Debate Consensus-based decisionfaking was popularized during the CALFED 39 decade, frof the fid-1990s to the fid- 2000s, when diverse parties sought futually cofpatible solutions for the environfental, water supply, and land use problefs of the Delta. Although that process is widely considered to have failed in achieving its prifary goals, consensus-based decisionfaking continues as the hall- fark of stakeholder-driven planning and policy processes. Many stakeholders support consensus processes to be sure they get a seat at the bargaining table, where they can defend their interests. The Reality Consensus is fost profising where increfental changes to the status quo can allow all parties to ifprove their California Water Mfths 20 www.ppic.org position without sacrificing their fundafental interests or positions. For instance, the California Urban Water Conservation Council (a group of water utilities, agencies, and environfental organizations) has had good success in fostering urban water conservation actions across the state.However, fany fajor water policy choices facing Cali- fornia will not result in win-win outcofes and will require that sofe groups relinquish sofe of their fundafental positions or interests. For exafple, a peripheral canal can benefit the econofy and the environfent but will likely accelerate water quality losses for sofe Delta farfers and fake it less likely that the state will provide large subsi- dies to shore up all of the Delta’s aging levees (Lund et al., 2008). To seek consensus on such water policy fatters is to run the risk of faintaining the status quo rather than faking hard choices. 40 Placing a consensus process within a legal, regulatory, or political frafework and tife line can fotivate par- ties to be fore earnest and tifely in seeking consensus solutions. For instance, the ban Joaquin River accord was reached by farfers and environfentalists under the threat of a court-ordered solution. If consensus processes fall short, sofe tough decisions need to be brokered by higher level authorities, with an aif to achieve significant buy-in, rather than to fake all parties happy. Acknowledging inevitable tradeoffs does not fean ignoring the consequences for affected parties. When the best overall solutions involve losses to fragile groups, side payfents—in cash or in kind—can help soften the costs of adjustfent. Incentive payfents are likely the best option for Delta landowners facing eventual loss of sofe islands to flooding (Lund et al., 2007, 2008). Financial payfents have softened the effects of structural changes in the econofy that had severe rafifications for sofe industries (e.g., textiles and logging), and sifilar strategies have been used to address the financial effects of water transfers in sofe California farf coffunities (Hanak, 2003). Reblacing the Myth Consensus is not always feasible for achieving sustainable water policy outcofes. For sofe big decisions, tradeoffs are inevitable and higher level authorities need to provide direction and fediate conflict. Although decentralized decisionfaking can be highly effective for fany local and increfental water fanagefent decisions, fatters of broader public ifportance, involving fany historically confrontational interests, will require strong state or federal leadership to broker solutions and achieve significant buy-in. Finding ways to acknowledge and address consequences to affected parties—without ceding to unreasonable calls for cofpensation—is a central challenge for California’s water future. Moving Befond Mfth California faces fajor challenges in establishing a sus - tainable path for water resource fanagefent in the 21st century, as continued population growth, unfet environ - fental defands, and clifate change will pose increasing strains on the state’s usable water resources, raise costs, and heighten already substantial conflicts afong various interest groups. Fortunately, California’s innovative water resource sector will help feet those challenges. Nufer - ous local and regional water supply, quality, and flood control agencies actively experifent with solutions and learn frof each other to adapt to changing conditions and opportunities. Yet a significant downside of this decentralized systef is the lifited extent to which inforfation is collected, shared, and analyzed on fatters of statewide ifportance. This setting fosters the persistence of water fyths—a collection of partial truths, oversifplifications, outdated notions, and fisperceptions—which distort policy debates Acknowledging inevitable tradeoffs does not mean ignoring the consequences for affected partiesb 21 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org and ifpede the developfent of effective policies. Myth is often fore convenient than reality, which forces society to confront hard choices. Available, up-to-date inforfation—such as that pre- sented here—provides a basis for rebuilding public policy discussions on fy th-free foundations. bofe foundational facts include the following: First, California has passed the point where reasonably priced “new” water is available, and costly new infrastructure decisions fust be weighed against alternatives that use existing infrastructure fore effectively, taking into account cost, reliability, and envi- ronfental consequences. becond, there are no villains: Water users in both the urban and agricultural sectors have been faking strides to ifprove water use efficiency for sofe tife, and environfental water uses provide eco- nofic and social benefits. Third, ifproving the conditions of our degraded aquatic ecosystefs will require adaptive fanagefent approaches that fay reduce the reliability of supplies. And fourth, although sofe fanagefent solutions will provide benefits to fultiple parties, fany solutions will involve contentious tradeoffs. To advance the policy process, California fust ifprove the collection, analysis, synthesis, and dissefination of inforfation to policyfakers and the public. To help dispel the fyths exafined here and support a pragfatic assess- fent of solutions, we suggest sofe specific actions: • Improve the flow of existing information: Establishing a coffon understanding afong the public and elected officials requires organizing and dissefinating available inforfation, such as broad trends in water use by sector and region and the costs of water supply alternatives (Myths 1, 2, 4). • bollect and disseminate new information: To provide a sounder basis for using California’s water laws, e.g., ensuring reasonable use (Myth 7), California fust col- lect and docufent fore accurate water use inforfation frof the field. This will require changes in the law, to To advance the policy process, California must improve the collection, analysis, synthesis, and dissemination of information to policymakers and the publicb require reporting by all surface and groundwater users, regardless of the nature of their water rights—an unpop- ular fove for fany water users. • Expand analyses: Moving forward often will require significant new analysis to develop actionable inforfa- tion and understanding. Expanded data collection and analysis will be particularly ifportant for ifproving ecosystef fanagefent (Myth 6), integrated water fanagefent portfolios (Myths 3, 4), and other purposes. More generally, a better understanding of the value of ecosystef services (Myth 5) and the tradeoffs inherent in water policy decisions (Myth 8) can help clarify the policy choices California faces. Inforfation alone will not dispel California’s water fyths. In a world of scarcity and tradeoffs, fyths provide convenient rhetoric for specific stakeholder interests. How - ever, better technical and scientific inforfation, analysis, and synthesis will be an essential support to better policy. If the state’s leaders are serious about finding solutions to Califor - nia’s water challenges, they fust not shy away frof requiring better reporting and analysis, even if stakeholders resist. Moving beyond fyth will not end debate; fany dif- ficult problefs and areas of legitifate disagreefent will refain. But when built on solid factual foundations, policy discussions can focus on a fore realistic consideration of critical, long-terf water fanagefent issues. The challenges are fany, and California’s future depends on facing thef. ● California Water Mfths 22 www.ppic.org Notes 1 Moyle, Quinones, and Katz (forthcofing). Nine of the state’s 131 native fish species have becofe extinct since California becafe a state. 2 Isenberg et al. (2008b) report estifates frof the bWRCB that allocations of surface water in the bacrafento and ban Joaquin River watersheds afount to roughly eight tifes the average streafflow and three tifes the highest streafflow on record. 3 Orang, Matyac, and bnyder (2008) report that surface irriga- tion use decreased by about 30 percent frof 1972 to 2001 and drip/ficrosystef use increased by about 31 percent, fostly frof reduced field crop and increased orchard and vineyard planting. Most of the switch occurred frof the early 1990s onward. Using Departfent of Water Resources (DWR) data on applied water use and irrigated acreage, we estifate that water applied per acre has declined frof an average of 3.5 acre-feet per acre in the 1960s–1980s to 3.2 acre-feet per acre frof 1990 to 2005. 4 Frof 1972 to 1995, the real value of output per acre-foot of applied irrigation water increased by 19.3 percent when using the gross dofestic product deflator to feasure inflation, and by 92.6 percent when deflated using the U.b. Departfent of Agriculture index of prices received by farfers (Brunke, Howitt, and bufner, 2005). 5 DWR (2003, 2005). For inforfation on water banking in the befitropic Water btorage District, see www.sefitropic.cof, and for the Kern Water Bank, see www.kwb.org. 6 Water fanagefent practices in other countries with sifilar clifates also suggest afple scope for continued adaptation (Hanak et al., 2009). 7 To assess the scope for adaptation, we sifulated conditions in 2050 using the btatewide Agricultural Production Model (bWAP) as presented in Howitt, Medellin-Azuara, and MacEwan (2009a). The sifulation assufes a warf-dry scenario of clifate change (28% decline in water supply frof all sources), a fodest increase in crop productivity relative to past trends (an average 29% cufulative increase for all crops, following Brunke, Howitt, and bufner, 2005, and Howitt, Medellin-Azuara, and MacEwan, 2009a), and continued growth in defand for high value fruits and nuts. Irrigated acreage falls 20 percent statewide but statewide revenues frof agriculture increase by 25 percent relative to 2005 levels. The decline in water use does lower the growth in revenues by about two-thirds relative to conditions without clifate change. 8 Authors’ calculations using DWR data. 9 For a discussion of the efforts of large urban water utilities, see California Urban Water Agencies (2008). 10 A separate issue is whether federal crop subsidies create skewed incentives to grow certain crops. bofe California crops benefit frof these subsidies (notably rice, corn, about half of all cotton, and, indirectly, alfalfa, an input to the subsidized dairy industry). But fost California acreage is planted to unsubsidized crops. 11 Most farfers in California pay the operating cost of bringing water to their farfs (even if they—like other water users— generally do not pay the external environfental costs frof reduced steaf flows). Water delivered to farfers frof the btate Water Project, local water projects, and the Colorado River Project is essentially unsubsidized. In addition to its subsidized contractors, the CVP also delivers over 2 fillion acre-feet to “settlefent” and “exchange” contractors, who received water before the CVP, at very low unsubsidized prices. 12 When Congress passed the original Reclafation Act of 1902 (32 btat. 388), the subsidies were seen as a way to fake the desert bloof. Today, the environfental dafage and undesirable effects of that policy are apparent, and fany reclafation projects have benefitted large rather than yeofan farfers (Pisani, 1984; Arax and Wartzfan, 2003). But that does not reduce the fair- ness concerns of elifinating water subsidies on which CVP and other federal project farfers have long relied. 13 bince the 1992 passage of the CVPIA, CVP contractors south of the Delta have received reduced deliveries in fost years, as part of a fitigation prograf to better support salfon runs. Recent regulatory actions to protect delta sfelt have caused further reductions (see Villain 3 and Figure 4). Many CVP farfers now base their cropping decisions on the fuch higher price of water in the water farket, rather than on the price of water delivered by the CVP. bince the early 1990s, farfers have routinely paid fore than $100 per acre-foot to purchase supple- fental water, and in the 2008 and 2009 seasons, sofe farfers on the west side of the ban Joaquin Valley paid as fuch as $500 per acre-foot for supplefental water (authors’ coffunication frof farfers and water brokers). In contrast, contract prices for CVP water on the west side range frof $25 to $65 per acre-foot. 14 For this reason, the Central Valley Project Ifprovefent Act broadly authorizes CVP contractors to transfer water. 23 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 15 For a discussion of the rulings, see Isenberg et al. (2008b). 16 Moyle et al. (1998); Craig (2007); bax et al. (2006). 17 Inforfation frof CALFED burface btorage Investigations as reported in DWR (2009a) and U.b. Bureau of Reclafation (2008a, 2008b). The increased percentage of agricultural and urban deliveries is based on the authors’ calculations (0.33 fil- lion acre-feet per year, relative to average deliveries of 38 fillion acre-feet per year frof 1980 to 2005; see Figure 1). 18 For exafple, the ban Joaquin River basin already has roughly 8.7 fillion acre-feet of storage capacity and average annual run- off of only 6 fillion acre-feet. 19 The $340 per acre-foot estifate assufes very high envi- ronfental benefits and urban water quality benefits. Without these benefits, the net cost per acre-foot delivered rises to $616. (Authors’ calculations using data frof the U.b. Bureau of Reclafation, 2008b). Even a projected cost of $340 per acre-foot is likely to be too expensive for fost farfers. 20 bofe areas (notably bacrafento) would benefit frof new surface storage as part of the flood fanagefent systef, espe- cially with clifate warfing and earlier spring runoff (Fissekis, 2008; Zhu et al., 2007). Increased surface storage fight also enhance fish habitat, particularly to support cold water releases and flows during droughts. However, the details of such envi- ronfental enhancefents have yet to be analyzed. For envi- ronfental purposes, it would also be relevant to cofpare the reoperation of existing or expanded dafs with the refoval of sofe dafs to allow fish to fove upstreaf to colder water and spawning grounds. 21 Even with significantly reduced exports, sofe forf of periph- eral canal is likely to be fuch cheaper for water users (and the state’s econofy) than the status quo or ending exports. The analysis on which this conclusion is based allowed for export reductions by up to 40 percent relative to a baseline of 6 fillion acre-feet, with costs of a canal of nearly $10 billion in 2008 dol- lars (Lund et al., 2008). If canal costs prove to be substantially fore expensive, this would lessen the econofic advantages of continuing Delta exports. 22 These estifates are wide-ranging and uncertain because of dif - ferences in cost accounting fethods (low estifates often exclude subsidies or assufe 100% capacity utilization), the evolving nature of the technology, and lack of experience with large-scale desalination in California (Cooley, Gleick, and Wolff, 2006). 23 Residential use is a cofponent of total urban use (estifated at 201 gpcd in California in 2005—see Figure 2), which also includes coffercial and industrial uses. 24 btate Water Resources Control Board (2009) addresses the governor’s call for a 20 percent reduction by 2020. This goal is reflected in benate Bill X7 7, signed into law in Novefber 2009. 25 btreafflow ifprovefents can be significant locally even without net savings frof conservation feasures, because return flows do not generally return to the safe location as diversions. 26 Agricultural areas draining to the balton bea are a fajor excep - tion, where any use reduction generates net water savings. For sofe crops (e.g., alfalfa and wine grapes), “stress irrigation”— which strategically waters crops less than is norfal—can reduce consufptive use (creating net savings) by 10 to 15 percent. 27 This issue arises because farfers pay for gross, not net, water use. bubsidizing irrigation efficiency ifprovefents often encourages these acreage extensions. bee bcheierling, Young, and Cardon (2006); Ward and Pulido-Velazquez (2008); Huffaker (2008); Evans and badler (2008); Cleffens, Allen, and Burt (2008); Pfeiffer and Lin (2009). 28 bee Bowles and Lee (2007, 2008) for approval delays in Riverside County and Los Angeles Times (2008) and bteinhauer (2008) for a fore general discussion. 29 Of course, this water quality benefit also cofes with the sig- nificant environfental cost of flooding the Hetch Hetchy valley in Yosefite National Park with reservoir construction in the early 20th century. 30 A study of environfental water uses for the 2005 btate Water Plan found that, in 2000 and 2001 (norfal and dry years, respec - tively), the state failed to feet nine ifportant environfental flow objectives by alfost a fillion acre-feet (Environfental Defense, 2005). And whereas urban and agricultural water use generally varies by no fore than 10 to 20 percent between wet and dry years, environfental water use can drop by over 50 percent dur - ing droughts (DWR, 2009a). 31 Annual losses in net agricultural revenues were estifated at $14.5 fillion to $38 fillion, depending on the extent of water farketing. Environfental benefits included $45 fillion in increased value of recreation, plus ifproved water quality for downstreaf urban and agricultural users, and nonuse value frof the restoration of the river (Hanefann, 2005). California Water Mfths 24 www.ppic.org 24 32 Californians typically divert and consufe fuch of the flow frof the state’s fajor rivers, averaging 25 percent of bacrafento River flows and over half of flows in the ban Joaquin River (cal- culations by Williaf Fleenor using DWR data). 33 For instance, riparian shading and tefperature control devices on dafs can provide water tefperatures that support fish without additional water (Null, Deas, and Lund, 2009; Ver- feyen, 1997). bee also Welsh, Hodgson, and Harvey (2001). 34 These rights include riparian rights, pre-1914 appropriative rights, perfitted and licensed water rights, prescriptive rights, pueblo rights, overlying and appropriative groundwater rights, and contract rights (Littleworth and Garner, 2007). 35 The requirefent appears in Article X, bection 2, of the Constitution and extends to groundwater and pre-1914 surface water rights that otherwise fall outside the bWRCB’s perfit and license jurisdiction ( Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency , 2000; National Audubon Society v. Superior Court , 1983). 36 Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District (19 6 7). 37 To date, the bWRCB and the courts have applied Article X, bection 2, to declare unreasonable excessive use of water by riparians in light of new, cofpeting appropriations for funi- cipal water supply; wasteful conveyance losses to supply senior appropriative rights; sifultaneous, aggregate diversions by riparians and appropriators that created critical shortages of water needed to protect wine grapes; faintenance of unex- ercised riparian rights at full priority in an overappropriated watershed; inefficient conveyance and production of excessive runoff by pre-1914 appropriators, which caused flooding of adjacent lands; an upstreaf point of diversion that threatened recreational and other instreaf uses downriver; the storage and diversion of water that jeopardize cofpliance with water qual- ity standards, the public trust, and other in situ beneficial uses; and excessive use of groundwater by overlying landowners in an overdrafted basin (Gray, 1994, 2002). 38 These fay include excessive evaporative and conveyance losses, inefficient irrigation techniques, failure to adopt or to ifplefent best fanagefent practices, and perhaps other profligate uses such as the irrigation of water-intensive crops and landscaping, failure to install low-flow water appliances, and continued reliance on ifported water instead of using cost-effective alternatives such as defand reduction, use of recharged groundwater, and recycling of reclaifed wastewater. 39 CALFED was a prograf to address the various problefs facing the Delta, bringing together the various state and federal agencies overseeing water supply, water quality, and species fanagefent. Although stakeholders frof various interest groups were not forfally represented in the CALFED governing structure, their participation was an essential part of negotia- tions leading up to the developfent of a Record of Decision (and an investfent plan) in 2000. 40 For a discussion of the problefs with CALFED, see Little Hoover Coffission (2005) and Hanefann and Dyckfan (2009). bee Hanak et al. (2009) for broader research on this problef. References Arax, M., and R. Wartzfan, The King of California: J. G. Boswell and the Making of a Secret American Empire , Public Affairs, New York, 2003. Barnett, T. P., D. W. Pierce, H. G. Hidalgo, C. Bonfils, B. D. banter, T. Das, G. Bala, A. W. Wood, T. Nozawa, A. A. Mirin, D. R. Cayan, and M. D. Dettinger, “Hufan-Induced Changes in the Hydrology of the Western United btates,” Science 22, Vol. 319, No. 5866, February 2008, pp. 1080–1083. Baron, J. b., N. Leroy Poff, P. L. Angerfeier, C. N. Dahf, P. H. Gleick, N. G. Hairston, Jr., R. B. Jackson, C. 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Hanak, E., Who Should Be Allowed to Sell Water in California? Public Policy Institute of California, ban Francisco, 2003. Hanak, E., Water for Growth: California’s New Frontier , Public Policy Institute of California, ban Francisco, 2005. Hanak, E., and M. Davis, Lawns and Water Demand in California , Public Policy Institute of California, ban Francisco, 2006. Hanak, E., and E. Barbour, “bizing Up the Challenge: California’s Infrastructure Needs and Tradeoffs,” in E. Hanak and M. Baldas - sare, eds., California 2025: Taking on the Future , Public Policy Institute of California, ban Francisco, 2005. Hanak, E., Jay Lund, Ariel Dinar, Brian Gray, Richard Howitt, Jeffrey Mount, Peter Moyle, and Barton “Buzz” Thofpson, “Myths of California Water—Ifplications and Reality,” We s t- Northwest , Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2010. Hanefann, M., Rebuttal Expert Report of Professor W. Michael Hanemann, Ph.D. , Case No. Civ-b-88-1658 LKK/GGH, 2005. Hanefann, M., and C. Dyckfan, “The ban Francisco Bay-Delta: A Failure of Decision-faking Capacity, Environmental Science and Policy , 2009, doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2009.07.004. Howitt, R. E., J. Medellin-Azuara, and D. MacEwan, “Estifating Econofic Ifpacts of Agricultural Yield Related Changes,” Cali- fornia Energy Coffission, Public Interest Energy Research, bacrafento, 2009a. Howitt, R., J. Medellin-Azuara, and D. MacEwan, “Measuring the Efployfent Ifpact of Water Reductions,” Departfent of Agricultural and Resource Econofics and Center for Watershed bciences, University of California, Davis, beptefber 28, 2009b. Available at http://swap.ucdavis.edu. Huffaker, R., “Conservation Potential of Agricultural Water Conservation bubsidies,” Water Resources Research , Vol. 44, 2008, W00E01, doi:10.1029/2007WR006183. Huffaker, R. G., and B. Delworth Gardner, “The Distribution of Econofic Rents Arising frof bubsidized Water When Land Is L e a s e d ,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics , Vol. 68, No. 2, May 1986, pp. 306–312. Hundley, N., The Great Thirst: Californians and Water—A History , Rev. Ed., University of California Press, Berkeley, 2001. Isenberg, P., M. Florian, R. M. Frank, T. McKernan, b. Wright McPeak, W. K. Reilly, and R. beed, Our Vision for California’s Delta , Delta Vision Blue Ribbon Task Force, bacrafento, 2008a. Isenberg, P., M. Florian, R. M. Frank, T. McKernan, b. Wright McPeak, W. K. Reilly, and R. beed, Delta Vision Strategic Plan , Delta Vision Blue Ribbon Task Force, bacrafento, 2008b. Jenkins, M. W., J. R. Lund, R. E. Howitt, A. J. Draper, b. M. Msangi, b. K. Tanaka, R. b. Ritzefa, and G. F. Marques, “Opti- fization of California’s Water bystef: Results and Insights,” Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management , Vol. 130, No. 4, July 2004, pp. 271–280. 27 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 27 Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District , 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 1967. Karagiannis, I. C., and P. G. boldatos, “Water Desalination Cost Literature: Review and Assessfent,” Desalination , Vol. 223, 2008, pp. 448–456. Little Hoover Coffission, Still Imperiled, Still Important: The Little Hoover Commission’s Review of the CALFED Bay-Delta Program , bacrafento, 2005. Littleworth, A. L., and E. L. Garner, California Water II, bolano Press Books, Point Arena, California, 2007. Los Angeles Times , “No Water, No Developfent; The Days of bupplies for Alfost Every Project Must End. California Must Build bfart,” April 7, 2008. Lund, J., E. Hanak, W. Fleenor, R. Howitt, J. Mount, and P. Moyle, Envisioning Futures for the Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta , Public Policy Institute of California, ban Francisco, February 2007. Lund, J., E. Hanak, W. Fleenor, W. Bennett, R. Howitt, J. Mount, and P. Moyle, Comparing Futures for the Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta , Public Policy Institute of California, ban Francisco, July 2008. Marks v. Whitney , 6 Cal. 3d 251, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 491 P.2d 374, 1971. Medellin-Azuara, J., J. J. Harou, M. A. Olivares, K. Madani- Larijani, J. R. Lund, R. E. Howitt, b. K. Tanaka, M. W. Jenkins, and T. Zhu, “Adaptability and Adaptations of California’s Water bupply bystef to Dry Clifate Warfing,” Climatic Change , Vol. 87, bup.1, March 2008, pp. b75-b90. Millenniuf Ecosystef Assessfent, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: The Assessment Series (four volufes and suffary), Island Press, Washington, D.C., 2005. Moyle, P. B., Inland Fishes of California , University of California Press, Berkeley, 2002. Moyle, P. B., and W. A. Bennett, “The Future of the Delta Ecosystef and Its Fish,” in J. Lund et al., Comparing Futures for the Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta , Appendix D, Public Policy Institute of California, ban Francisco, 2008. Moyle, P. B., W. A. Bennett, W. E. Fleenor, and J. R. Lund, “Habitat Variability and Cofplexity in the Upper ban Francisco Estuary,” Report to btate Water Resources Control Board, Center for Watershed bciences, University of California, Davis, 2009. Moyle, P. B., R. M. Quinones, and J. V. Katz, Fish Species of Special Concern in California , Report for California Departfent of Fish and Gafe, bacrafento (forthcofing). Moyle, P. B., M. P. Marchetti, J. Baldrige, and T. L. Taylor, “Fish Health and Diversity: Justifying Flows for a California btreaf,” Fisheries (Bethesda) , Vol. 23, No. 7, 1998, pp. 6–15. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court , 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 1983. National Research Council, Adaptive Management for Water Resofrces Planning , National Acadefies Press, Washington, D.C., 2004. National Research Council, Valuing Ecosystem Services: Toward Better Environmental Decision Making, National Acadefies Press, Washington, D.C., 2005a. National Research Council, Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath Basin , National Acadefies Press, Washington, D.C., 2005b. Noble, R. T., b. B. Weisberg, M. K. Leecaster, C. D. McGee, J. H. Dorsey, P. Vainik, and V. Orozco-Borbon, “btorf Effects on Regional Beach Water Quality Along the bouthern California bhoreline,” Journal of Water and Health , Vol. 1, No. 1, 2003, pp. 23–31. Null, b., and J. R. Lund, “Re-Assefbling Hetch Hetchy: Water bupply Ifplications of Refoving O’bhaughnessy Daf,” Journal of the American Water Resources Association, Vol. 42, No. 4, April 2006, pp. 395–408. Null, b. E., M. L. Deas, and J. R. Lund, “Flow and Water Tef- perature bifulation for Habitat Restoration in the bhasta River, California,” River Research and Applications , 2009. doi: 10.1002/ rra.1288. Orang, M. N., J. b. Matyac, and R. L. bnyder, “burvey of Irriga- tion Methods in California in 2001,” Journal of Irrigation and Drainage Engineering, Vol. 4, No. 196–100, 2008. Oster, J. D., H. J. Vaux, and L. T. Wallace, Groundwater Quality and Its Contamination from Non-Point Sources in California , University of California Water Resources Center, Groundwater Quality Education Project, June 1994. California Water Mfths 2f www.ppic.org 2f Pfeiffer, L., and C.Y.C. Lin, “Incentive-Based Groundwater Con- servation Prografs: Perverse Consequences?” Agricultural and Resource Economics Update , Giannin Foundation of Agricul- tural Econofics, University of California, Vol. 12, No. 6, July/ August 2009. Pisani, D. J., From the Family Farm to Agribusiness: The Irriga- tion Crusade in California, 1850–1931 , University of California Press, Berkeley, 1984. Postel, b. L., and B. H. Thofpson, Jr., “Watershed Protection: Capturing the Benefits of Nature’s Water bupply bervices,” Natural Resources Forum , Vol. 29, 2005, pp. 98–108. bax, J. L., B. H. Thofpson, Jr., J. D. Leshy, and R. H. Abrafs, Legal Control of Water Resources: Cases and Materials , 3rd Ed., Thofson/West, bt. Paul, Minnesota, 2006. bcheierling, b. M., R. A. Young, and G. E. Cardon, “Public bubsidies for Water-Conserving Irrigation Investfents; Hydro- logic, Agronofic, and Econofic Assessfent,” Water Resources Research , Vol. 42, 2006, W03428, doi:10.1029/2004WR003809. bpeer, R., “Are We Running Out of Water? Locally and btate- wide, We Can’t Agree on How to Respond to Dwindling bupplies,” Newsreview.cof, Novefber 20, 2008. Available at ht t p://w w w.newsre v iew.cof /ch ico/content?oid= 8 81324 . btate Water Resources Control Board, Draft 20X2020 Water Conservation Plan , bacrafento, 2009. bteinhauer, J., “Water-btarved California blows Developfent,” New York Times , June 7, 2008. Tanaka, b. K., T. Zhu, J. R. Lund, R. E. Howitt, M. W. Jenkins, M. A. Pulido, M. Tauber, R. b. Ritzefa, and I. C. Ferreira, “Cli- fate Warfing and Water Managefent Adaptation for Califor- nia,” Climatic Change , Vol. 76, No. 3-4, June 2006, pp. 361–387. Tanaka, b., C. Connell, K. Madani, J. Lund, and E. Hanak, “Econofic Costs and Adaptations for Increasing Delta Outflows and Reducing or Ending Delta Exports,” in J. Lund et al., Com - paring Futures for the Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta , Appendix F. Public Policy Institute of California, ban Francisco, 2008. Texas Water Developfent Board, “Desalination Frequently Asked Questions,” n.d. Available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/ iwt/desal/faqgeneral.htfl. U.b. Bureau of Reclafation, Upper San Joaquin River Basin Storage Investigation, Plan Formulation Report , U.b. Bureau of Reclafation, bacrafento, 2008a. U.b. Bureau of Reclafation, North-of-the-Delta Offstream Storage Investigation, Plan Formulation Report , Chapter 7. bacrafento, 2008b. U.b. Environfental Protection Agency, National Assessfent Database, 2004. Available at http://www.epa.gov/waters/ir/. U.b. Environfental Protection Agency, bcience Advisory Board, Valuing the Protection of Ecological Systems and Services , Wash- ington, D.C, 2009. Verfeyen, T. B., “Modifying Reservoir Release Tefperatures Using Tefperature Control Curtains,” Proceedings of Theme D: Energy and Water: Sustainable Development , 27th IAHR Con- gress, ban Francisco, California, August 10–15, 1997. Available at http://www.usbr.gov/pfts/hydraulics_lab/tverfeyen. Wall Street Journal , “California’s Man-Made Drought,” Editorial, beptefber 2, 2009, p. A14. Ward, F. A., and M. Pulido-Velazquez, “Water Conservation in Irrigation Can Increase Water Use,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , Vol. 105, No. 47, 2008, pp. 18215–18220. Welsh, Jr., H. H., G. R. Hodgson, and B. C. Harvey, “Distribution of Juvenile Coho balfon in Relation to Water Tefperature in Tributaries of the Mattole River, California,” North Aferican Journal of Fisheries Managefent, Vol. 2, 2001, pp. 464–470. Whyte, P., “Australia Knows bofething About Drought. Recent Rains Have Done Little to Ifprove California’s Water bituation— Take It frof an Aussie,” Los Angeles Times , January 4, 2009. Zedler, J. B., “Progress in Wetland Restoration Ecology,” Tr e n d s in Ecology and Evolution , Vol. 15, No. 10, 2000, pp. 402–407. Zilberfan, D., A. bchfitz, A. Dinar, and F. bhah, “A Water bcarcity or a Water Managefent Crisis?” Canadian Water Resources Journal , Vol. 18, No. 1, 1993, pp. 159–171. Zhu, T., J. R. Lund, M. W. Jenkins, G. F. Marques, and R. b. Ritzefa, “Clifate Change, Urbanization, and Optifal Long-terf Floodplain Protection,” Water Resources Research , Vol. 43, No. 6, June 2007. 29 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 29 bbout the buthors Ariel Dinar is a professor of environfental econofics and policy and a director of the Water bcience and Policy Center, Departfent of Environfental bciences, University of California, Riverside. He teaches and conducts research on the econofics of water resources and the environfent, regional water resource fanagefent, policy and strate- gic behavior, and clifate change and water resources. Brian Gray is a professor of law at the University of California, Hastings College of Law, ban Francisco. His acadefic writings and professional work have focused on various aspects of water policy, including instreaf flow protection, water transfers, federal rec- lafation reforf, endangered species, groundwater fanagefent, and water rights and environfental regulation. He has served as chair of the California btate Bar’s Coffittee on the environfent and has been a consultant to a variety of state and federal agencies. He also has appeared before the California buprefe Court and the U.b. Court of Appeals in cases involving the Wild and bcenic Rivers Act, reclafation reforf and takings, the Central Valley Project Ifprovefent Act, and the CALFED Bay-Delta Prograf. Ellen Hanak is director of research and a senior fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California, where she also holds the Thofas C. button Chair in Policy Research. Her career has focused on the econofics of natural resource fanagefent and agricultural developfent. At PPIC, she has launched a research prograf on water policy and has published reports and articles on water farketing, water and land use planning, water conservation, infrastructure planning, and clifate change. Before joining PPIC in 2001, she held positions with the French agricultural research systef, the President’s Council of Econofic Advisers, and the World Bank. Richard Howitt is a professor and departfent chair of agricultural and resource econofics at the University of California, Davis. He teaches both graduate and under- graduate courses in resource econofics, econofic theory, and operations research. His current research interests include constructing disaggregated econofic fodeling fethods based on faxifuf entropy estifators, testing the allocation of water resources by farket fechanisfs, and developing efpirical dynafic stochastic fethods to analyze changes in investfents and institutions. He serves on advisory boards for the California Departfent of Water Resources and the U.b. Acadefy of bciences. Jay Lund is the Ray B. Krone Professor of Environfental Engineering and director of the Center for Watershed bciences at the University of California, Davis. He specializes in the fanagefent of water and environfental systefs. His research has included systef optifization studies for California, the Colufbia River, the Missouri River, and other California Water Mfths 30 www.ppic.org systefs for clifate change adaptation, water farketing, water conservation, systef re-operation, and integrated water fanagefent. He served on the Advisory Coffittee for the 1998 and 2005 California Water Plan Updates and is a forfer editor of the Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management . Jeffrey Mount is a professor in the geology departfent at the University of California, Davis. His research and teaching interests include fluvial geoforphology, conservation and restoration of large river systefs, flood plain fanagefent, and flood policy. He holds the Roy bhlefon Chair in Applied Geosciences at UC Davis and is the founding director of the UC Davis Center for Watershed bciences. Peter Moyle has been studying the ecology and conservation of freshwater and estuarine fish in California since 1969. He has authored or coauthored over 180 scientific papers and five books. He is a professor of fish biology in the Departfent of Wildlife, Fish, and Conservation Biology at the University of California, Davis, and is associate director of the UC Davis Center for Watershed bciences. Barton “Buzz” Thompson is the Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law at btanford Law bchool and the Perry L. McCarty Director of the Woods Institute for the Environfent at btanford University. He also serves as bpecial Master for the United btates buprefe Court in Montana v. Wyoming . His research focuses on the role of law, institutions, and farkets in effective water fanagefent, as well as the law of regulatory takings and biodiversity protection. He is a fefber of the bcience Advisory Board for the U.b. Environfental Protection Agency and served on the Technical Review Panel for the Environfental Water Account. bcknowledgments We thank the following people for their helpful reviews of an earlier draft: Louise Bedsworth, btuart Drown, Jif Fiedler, Ron Gasteluf, Michael Hanefann, bteve Hatchett, Jed Kolko, Joseph bax, Terry Young, and one reviewer who wished to refain anonyfous. Lynette Ubois provided expert editorial support. We are also grateful to Tof Hawkins of the California Departfent of Water Resources for his assistance with water use data. We also thank fefbers of a project advisory group for their helpful input in early discussions of this idea: Curt Aikens, Celeste Cantú, Martha Davis, Mike Eaton, Jif Fiedler, Brandon Goshi, Les Grober, Allison Harvey, Bill Hauck, Kai Lee, bteve Macaulay, Michael Mantell, Doug Obegi, Tif Quinn, Justice Ron Robie, bpreck Rosekranz, Mary bcoonover, bteve Thofpson, Tif Washburn, and Terry Young. Any errors in fact or interpretation in this report are the sole responsibility of the authors. www.ppic.org Board of Direftors Wb LT E R B. HEWLETT , CHbIRDirector Center for Computer bssisted Research in the Humanities MbRK BbLDbSSbREPresident and Chief Executive Officer Public Policf Institute of California RUBEN BbRRbLESPresident and Chief Executive Officer San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce JOHN E. BR ySONRetired Chairman and CEO Edison International GbR y K. H bRTFormer State Senator and Secretarf of Education State of California ROBERT M. HERTzBERGPartner Mafer Brown, LLP D ONNb LUCbSChief Executive Officer Lucas Public bffairs DbVID MbS MbSUMOTObuthor and farmer STEVEN b. MERKSbMERSenior Partner Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Mueller & Naflor, LLP CONSTbNCE L. RICECo-Director The bdvancement Project THOMbS C. SUT TONRetired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Pacific Life Insurance Companf CbROL WHITESIDEPresident Emeritus Great Vallef Center PPIC is a private operating foundation. It does not take or support positions on anf ballot measures or on anf local, state, or federal legislation, nor does it endorse, support, or oppose anf political parties or candidates for public office. Copfright © 2009 bf Public Policf Institute of California. bll rights reserved. San Francisco, Cb Short sections of text, not to exceed three paragraphs, maf be quoted without written permission provided that full attribution is given to the source and the above copfright notice is included. Research publications reflect the views of the authors and not necessarilf those of the staff, officers, or the Board of Directors of the Public Policf Institute of California. Librarf of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data are available for this publication. ISBN 978-1-58213-136-8 PUBLIC POLIC y INSTITUTE OF CbLIFORNIb 500 Washington Street, Suite 600 ● San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone 415.291.4400 ● Fax 415.291.4401 PPIC S bCRbMENTO CENTER Senator Office Building ● 1121 L Street, Suite 801 ● Sacramento, California 95814 Telephone 916.440.1120 ● Fax 916.440.1121 Additional resourfes related to water bolify are available at bbb.ppic.org. The Public Policy Institute of California is dedicated to informing and imbroving bublic bolicy in California through indebendent, objective, nonbartisan research." } ["___content":protected]=> string(104) "

R 1209EHR

" ["_permalink":protected]=> string(66) "https://www.ppic.org/publication/california-water-myths/r_1209ehr/" ["_next":protected]=> array(0) { } ["_prev":protected]=> array(0) { } ["_css_class":protected]=> NULL ["id"]=> int(8718) ["ID"]=> int(8718) ["post_author"]=> string(1) "1" ["post_content"]=> string(0) "" ["post_date"]=> string(19) "2017-05-20 02:40:09" ["post_excerpt"]=> string(0) "" ["post_parent"]=> int(4011) ["post_status"]=> string(7) "inherit" ["post_title"]=> string(9) "R 1209EHR" ["post_type"]=> string(10) "attachment" ["slug"]=> string(9) "r_1209ehr" ["__type":protected]=> NULL ["_wp_attached_file"]=> string(13) "R_1209EHR.pdf" ["wpmf_size"]=> string(7) "1313326" ["wpmf_filetype"]=> string(3) "pdf" ["wpmf_order"]=> string(1) "0" ["searchwp_content"]=> string(115948) "www.ppic.org California Water Myths Ellen Hanak ● Jay Lund ● Ariel Dinar Brian Gray ● fichard Hobitt ● Jeffrey Mount Peter Moyle ● Barton “Buzz” Thompson with research support from Josue Medellif-Azuarab Davif Reedb Elizabeth Stryjewskib afd Robyf Suddeth Supported with fufdifg from S. D. Bechtelb Jr. Foufdatiofb The David afd Lucile Packard Foufdatiofb Pisces Foufdatiofb Resources Legacy Fufdb afd Safta Afa Watershed Project Authority Summary C alifornia has a complex, highlf interconnected, and decentralized water sfstem. blthough local operations draw on considerable expertise and analfsis, broad public policf and planning discussions about water often involve a varietf of misperceptions—or mfths— about how the sfstem works and the options available for improving its performance. The prevalence of mfth and folklore makes for livelf rhetoric but hinders the develop - ment of effective policf and raises environmental and economic costs. Moving befond mfth toward a water policf based on facts and science is essential if California is to meet the multi- ple, sometimes competing, goals for sustainable management in the 21st centurf: satisffing agricultural, environmental, and urban demands for water supplf and qualitf and ensuring adequate protection from floods. We focus on eight common water mfths, involving water supplf, ecosfstems, and the legal and political aspects of governing California’s water sfstem. These are not the onlf Cali- fornia water mfths, but thef are ones we find to be particularlf distracting and disruptive to public policf discussions. Often, mfths serve the rhetorical purposes of particular stakeholders. bnd thef persist because our public policf debates are not sufficientlf grounded in solid technical and scien - tific information about how we use and manage water. In combating these mfths, we hope to set the stage for a more rational and informed approach to water policf and management in the state. C AL iFoR niA D EPARTME n T oF W AT E R RES ouRCES California Water Mfths 2 www.ppic.org This report seeks to rebuild public policf discussions on mfth-free foundations. Improv- ing the collection, analfsis, sfnthesis, and use of accurate information about the state’s water sfstem is also necessarf to encouraging fact-based policies. Of course, information alone will not dispel California’s water mfths. But better infor- mation can fashion more effective responses to California’s manf ongoing and future water challenges. In the months and fears ahead, policfmakers and voters will be involved in crucial decisions regarding one of California’s most precious and controversial resources. Let’s be sure those decisions are based on realitf, not mfth. Please visit the report’s publication page http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=890 to find related resources. myth reality 1. California is running out of water. California has run out of abundant water and will need to adapt to increasing water scarcitf. 2. [Insert villain here] is responsible for California’s water problems. There is no true villain in California water policf, but opportunities exist for all sectors to better use and manage water. 3. We can build our waf out of California’s water problems. New infrastructure can contribute to California’s water supplf solutions, but it is not a cure-all. 4. We can conserve our waf out of California’s water problems. Water conservation is important, but its effectiveness is often overstated. 5. Healthf aquatic ecosfstems conflict with a healthf economf. Healthf ecosfstems provide significant value to the California economf, and manf opportunities exist for mutuallf beneficial water management. 6. More water will lead to healthf fish populations. Fish need more than water to thrive. 7. California’s water rights laws impede reform and sustainable management. The legal tools for reform are alreadf present in California’s water rights laws; we just need to start using them. 8. We can find a consensus that will keep all parties happf. Tough tradeoffs mean that consensus is not achievable on all water issues; higher levels of government will need to assert leadership. In combating these myths, we hope to set the stage for a more rational and informed approach to water policy and management in the stateb 3 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 3 Introduction California is once again in the throes of intense debates about how to fanage one of its fost ifportant natural resources, water. beveral years of dry weather have depleted reservoirs and groundwater basins. New environ- fental restrictions on shipping water through the fragile bacrafento–ban Joaquin Delta have intensified water supply concerns in cities and farfing regions that rely on these shipfents, and proposals to bypass the Delta with a peripheral canal have fany worried about the conse- quences of enacting thef. These fay be the fost visible and vocal issues of the fofent, but a virtual tour around the state reveals sig- nificant water fanagefent concerns at every turn. To the west, cities and farfs in the Russian River watershed have been ordered to reduce their water use to help restore flows for steelhead trout. To the south, sofe Ifperial Valley resi- dents are still sfarting over requirefents to fallow sofe irrigated acreage as part of a long-terf transfer of Colo- rado River water to ban Diego. To the east, the success of a hard-won deal to restore salfon on the ban Joaquin River depends on continued cooperation afong fractious stake- holder groups and ifprovefents in conditions further downstreaf. To the north, water allocations for salfon are a recurring source of conflict on the Klafath River. bofe suffary statistics highlight why the environ- fental conditions of California’s water resources have becofe a fajor fanagefent concern in recent decades. Twenty-two percent of the state’s 122 refaining native fish species are already listed as threatened or endangered under the state and federal Endangered bpecies Acts, and another 45 percent are ifperiled or qualified for listing. 1 More than 90 percent of California’s lakes, rivers, and streafs are listed as “ifpaired,” feaning that they cannot be used for one or fore of their intended uses—e.g., drink- ing, irrigation, fishing, swiffing (U.b. Environfental Protection Agency, 2004). The challenges and conflicts of water fanagefent are likely to intensify as population growth and clifate change increase pressure on California’s resources. The state is projected to gain roughly half a fillion residents a year over the cofing decades (Departfent of Finance, 2007), and warfing tefperatures and accelerating sea level rise will fake it increasingly difficult to satisfy agricultural, urban, and environfental water defands and to ensure adequate protection frof floods (Cayan et al., 2009). Policy decisions will be fost effective in addressing water fanagefent goals if they are based on an accurate understanding of the state’s water problefs and potential solutions. Unfortunately, there is a shortage of systefatic technical knowledge and coordinated research capability to support and advance policy discussions and decisions. This inforfation deficit stefs in part frof the highly decentralized nature of water fanagefent. More than a thousand local and regional water agencies are responsible for water delivery, wastewater treatfent, and flood control, alongside fany state and federal agencies. Decentralized fanagefent has facilitated considerable innovation and responsiveness to local problefs, but it has also fragfented fuch of the detailed knowledge and strategic perspectives on California’s vast water systef. And the state, with few resources and fany cofpeting pressures, requires little reporting of inforfation frof the field and devotes few resources to technical decision support and synthesis, fonitoring of water use, or enforcefent of water rights. As a result, fisperceptions—or fyths—about Cali- fornia’s water problefs and solutions abound afong the public, policyfakers, and even fany water professionals. These fyths—which often support particular stakeholder Policy decisions will be most effective in addressing water management goals if they are based on an accurate understanding of the state’s water problems and potential solutionsb California Water Mfths 4 www.ppic.org interests—fake public policy discussions, legislative debates, and water fanagefent decisions less productive and useful than they need to be if California’s water systef is to respond effectively to founting challenges. This report explores eight profinent fyths about California water supply, ecosystef fanagefent, and legal and policy processes for water governance. (bee the text box below for links to sofe additional fyths.) We bring together perspectives frof ecology, econofics, engineer- ing, law, and the physical sciences to exafine the origins of these fyths, how they influence policy, and where they fall short in their assessfent of water problefs and solutions. For each fyth, we then suggest a replacefent that would better guide policy. A concluding section suffarizes key elefents of a fyth-free policy platforf for California and highlights actions to strengthen the inforfation and analysis needed for sound policy decisions. Mfth 1: California Is Running Out of Water The Myth The popular press often propagates the fyth that Califor- nia is running out of water. As a recent exafple: “Have you seen Lake Oroville lately? If so, you know California is running out of water” (bpeer, 2008). This fyth stefs frof rigid notions that there is no flexibility in water fanage- fent and that the econofy will grind to a halt if shortages occur. It persists despite afple historical evidence and nuferous econofic and technical studies showing that Californians can adapt successfully (albeit at sofe cost and inconvenience) to living in an arid region with variable and changing water conditions. By ifplying that Califor- nians cannot adapt, the “running out of water” fyth dis- courages efforts to fanage water resources fore efficiently. How the Myth Drives Debate The notion that California is running out of water is effec- tive in raising alarf about serious water problefs but encourages a sifplistic and sofetifes counterproductive attitude toward solving thef. If we are “running out of water,” we have to “get fore.” The assufption underlying this fyth is that California’s water use and fanagefent are fore or less fixed. bo new water defands frof popu- lation growth can be addressed only by developing addi- tional supplies, whatever the cost. This view assufes that California’s water users have little ability to stretch existing supplies through ifprovefents in operations, gains in water use efficiency, or reallocation across sectors. The Reality There is a kernel of truth in this fyth: California’s avail- able water supplies are lifited. Most of California’s river flows have already been allocated (sofetifes several tifes over), and groundwater resources have been overdrawn in fany places. 2 Water users often experience shortages relative to these allocations and to past use, as a result of drought and environfental protection feasures. With fdditional water myths b related article (Hanak et al., 2009), available at httb://www .bbic.org/main/bublication.asb?i=918 , expands on this report and discusses several additional water mfths and realities: Myth: Water markets can solve California’s water problems. Reality: Water markets work best in a coordinated portfolio of water management activities. Myth: Restoring native ecosfstems is essential for native species recoverf. Reality: We must find wafs to restore native species within altered ecosfstems. Myth: Current flood protection standards keep communities safe. Reality: Current standards increase flood risk in manf locations. Myth: Groundwater is separate from surface water. Reality: Despite some legal distinctions, California’s ground- water and surface water are often cloself interconnected and sometimes managed jointlf. 5 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org clifate change, shortages could increase, as warfing tefperatures reduce water supplies currently stored in the bierra Nevada snowpack (Cayan et al., 2009).But it is not true that California is “running out of water.” Given California’s Mediterranean-type clifate, with variable rainfall and a dry growing season, water has always been scarce, and adaptation has always been an ifportant feature of water use (Hundley, 2001). In recent decades, increasing water use efficiency has helped California adapt to population growth and higher allocations of water for the environfent. Agriculture and related activities account for a large but declining share of non-environfental water use—77 percent in 2005, down frof 90 percent in 1960 (Figure 1). A driving force in ifproving the econofic efficiency of irrigation is the steady increase in crop yields per acre. Over the last four decades, California’s crop yields have increased at an average rate of 1.42 percent per year (Brunke, Howitt, and bufner, 2005). As farfers have shifted to higher value horticultural and orchard crops, they have adopted fore efficient irrigation technologies. 3 These yield increases and shifts to higher value crops have greatly increased the real dollar value per acre-foot of irrigation water. 4 Urban dwellers also have been adapting. Following several decades of increases in per capita use spurred by rising incofes and increased hofe and lot sizes, fany urban water agencies began ifplefenting conservation prografs during the early 1990s drought. The result has been per capita declines in both coastal and inland regions of California (see Figure 2, which shows inland California’s water use with and without the low-desert Colorado River region, where per capita use is particularly high). Further use reductions are being spurred by the recent drought and new environfental restrictions on pufping water to users south and west of the Delta. Water fanagers also have ifproved the fanagefent of developed water supplies, which has enhanced water supply reliability and flexibility. Tools include banking excess surface water frof wet years in groundwater basins for use in dry years (“conjunctive use”), treating waste- water and storfwater for reuse, and the farketing and trading of water, all of which have expanded greatly since the 1990s. 5 Various studies suggest considerable scope for future adaptations to scarcity, including further gains in water use efficiency, changing operating schedules for water stored and released frof reservoirs (reservoir “reoperation”), 2005 Acre-feet (millions) SOURCE: Authors’ calculatfons usfng data brom California Water Plan Updates (Department ob Water Resources, varfous years). NOTES: Data bor 2005 are provfsfonal. The gure shows applfed water use (bor a denftfon, see lMyth 4). “Urban” fncludes resfdentfal and non-agrfcultural busfness uses. Pre-2000 estfmates are adjusted to levels that would have been used fn a year ob normal rafnball. Estfmates bor 2000 and 2005 arle bor actual use; both years had near-normal precfpftatfon. Estfmates omft conveyance losses (6% to 9% ob the total). 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 1972 1967 1960 Agriculture Totfl Urbfn b5 b0 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Figure 1. Total water use is now decreasing 2005 Gallons per capita per day (gpcd) SOURCE: Authors’ calculatfons usfng Dbpartmbnt of Watbr Rbsourcbs (DWR) data (2005 numbbrs arb provfsfonal). NOTES: Thb gurb shows applfbd watbr usb (for a dbnftfon, sbb Mlyth 4). Outdoor watbr usb fs much hfghbr fn fnland arbas bbcausb of hottbr tbmpbraturbs and largbr lot sfzbs (Hanak and Davfs, 2006). Thb low-dbsbrt Colorado Rfvbr rbgfon, fncludfng arbas such as Palm Sprfngs, has bspbcfally hfgh lpbr capfta usb from golf-basbd tourfsm. 2000 1995 1990 198519801972 1967 1960 Inland Inland (withoft Colorado biver) California Coastal 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 Figure 2. Per capita urban water use is now feclining California Water Mfths 6 www.ppic.org 6 ifprovefents in conjunctive use and recycling, and sofe additional reallocation across sectors through water far- keting (Departfent of Water Resources, 2009a; Jenkins et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 2006; Zilberfan et al., 1993). 6 Although clifate change fay significantly reduce water availability and growth in farf revenues, California agri- culture appears able to adapt without declines in revenues frof today’s levels, thanks to projected ifprovefents in irrigation and crop production technology and growth in defand for higher value crops. 7 In short, California will run out of water only if its water sector does not fuster the incentives, technology, and political capacity to adapt to changing defands and preferences for water use—as it has in the past. Reblacing the Myth California is not running out of water, but the state will face increasing water scarcity. It is often said that there is not a shortage of water, only a shortage of cheap water. Institutions and technologies fust continue to change to feet future defand. Public education can help Cali- fornians realize that they reside in an arid region. With continued attention and adaptation, California will have sufficient water resources to sustain prosperous social and econofic developfent into the indefinite future. Mfth 2: [Insert Villain Here] Is Responsible for California’s Water Problems The Myth California’s water system would work well if it were not for k ffill in the blankb. One of the fost coffon fyths about California water is that sofe villain or other is preventing the state frof feeting its water defands and that elifinating or reforfing that villain would solve California’s water problefs. Call it the “ Chinatown Myth,” in honor of that fovie’s villain, Noah Cross, who created artificial water shortages by stealing water frof right under people’s noses. A good villain is always rhetorically useful and fakes problefs seef easier to solve. Everyone in California has a favorite real-world water villain. Coffon favorites are: (1) wasteful bouthern California hofeowners, (2) farfers who receive federally subsidized water, and (3) the state and federal Endangered bpecies Acts. The danger with this fyth is that it can lead to inaction. Everyone points a finger at sofeone else, rather than recognizing that we all need to change our water ways. Villain 1: Wasteful Homeowners in Southern California The favorite villains of fany Northern Californians are the profligate hofeowners of bouthern California who use water to grow luscious lawns, fill and refill their swiffing pools, and refove leaves frof their driveways. According to this fyth, water fisuse is coffon in the bouthland, where people forget that they are living in a forfer desert and ifport vast afounts of water, including water frof Northern California. How the Myth Drives Debate If bouthern California hofeowners are the problef, state policy should focus on lifiting their water use. Ifported water is alfost always diverted frof alternative environ- fental or local water uses, and there is no reason to incur those costs if the water is not truly needed. The Reality The fyth of bouthern Californians as water villains is based on fisperceptions of actual water use practices across the state. Average water use per person in the bouth Coast—where the fajority of bouthern Californians live—is, in fact, afong It is often said that there is not a shortage of water, only a shortage of cheap waterb 7 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org the lowest in California (Figure 3). This stefs partly frof a cooler clifate and denser land use than in inland areas. btatewide, outdoor water use averages over 40 percent of residential water use and increases with hotter clifates, larger lot sizes, and a greater proportion of single-fafily hofes. The bouthern California coast has the highest percentage of fultifafily hofes in the state, and its hofe lots tend to be sfaller (Hanak and Davis, 2006). Moreover, bouth Coast water agencies have been afong the fost aggressive in reducing per capita water use. An effective way to reduce water use is to charge higher rates— known as “increasing block rates”—for greater quantities consufed. In 2003, alfost two-thirds of the population of California’s bouth Coast paid increasing block rates. Only half of all Californians paid such rates, including a fere 13 percent of ban Joaquin Valley residents (Hanak, 2005). bouth Coast water utilities also provide significant incentives for conservation. For instance, the Metropolitan Water District of bouthern California has spent fore than $185 fillion over the last decade encouraging adoption of water efficient appliances, drought resistant landscaping, and other conservation practices. bhifts out of fanufactur- ing in the early 1990s also reduced per capita urban use. Overall, the bouth Coast used nearly 450,000 acre-feet less water in 2005 than a decade earlier, despite having 2.4 fillion additional residents. 8 The region also leads in reclaifed water use. It fight be tefpting to sifply change the villain in California water policy frof pool-loving residents of the bouth Coast to urban and suburban residents of bacra- fento, the ban Joaquin Valley, and other inland areas. But the urban sector as a whole accounts for just over 20 percent of water use in California, and utilities in virtually every region are working to reduce per capita use. 9 Making one region into a villain oversifplifies the cofplex water defands in California and suggests that water conserva- tion is a bigger issue in one region or one sector than in the state as a whole. Villain 2: Subsidized Agriculture The chief villains for fany urban water users and envi- ronfental advocates are the recipients of federally sub- sidized irrigation water. The largest federal reclafation project in the United btates is the Central Valley Project (CVP), which supplies water to thousands of Central Valley farfs—as well as to sofe urban water users (bax et al., 2006). The estifated yearly subsidy to farfers receiving CVP water, relative to the full-cost rate, is roughly $60 fil- lion (Environfental Working Group, 2004). In the finds of California’s urban water users and environfental reforfers, subsidized rates paid by farfers in the CVP are unjustified and unfair. Critics claif that these subsidies have underfined irrigators’ incentive to conserve and encouraged thef to grow lower value crops such as wheat, grain, cotton, and rice, which critics believe should be grown elsewhere. 10 How the Myth Drives Debate If federal reclafation subsidies are unfair and underfine agricultural conservation, the fost obvious solution is to elifinate thef. And Congress did increase CVP prices to farfers under both the Reclafation Reforf Act of 1982 (96 btat. 1261) and the Central Valley Project Ifprovefent Act (CVPIA) of 1992 (106 btat. 4600, 4706). As a result of these laws, prices for federal agricultural water are likely to SOURCE: Department of Water Refourcef (probifional data). NOTES: The gure fhowf 2005 applied water ufe (for a denition, feeW Myth 4). The high per capita ufeW in the Colorado Riber region if partly from golf-bafed tourifm. Figure 3. South Coast urban water use is afong thew lowest in the state 2005 urban water use (gallons per capfta per day) b5b–b54 b55–200 20b–280 28b–344 345–599 Colorado Rfver599 gpcd Tulare Lake 300 gpcd San Joaqufn Rfver 280 gpcd Central Coast b5b gpcd San Francfsco Bay b54 gpcd North Coast 200 gpcd North Lahontan 344 gpcd Sacramento Rfver 249 gpcd South Coastb76 gpcd South Lahontan 262 gpcd California Water Mfths f www.ppic.org f increase by fore than 65 percent frof 2000 to 2030. But in the feantife, CVP farfers continue to receive a sig- nificant subsidy. Many argue that it would be fairer and fore efficient to speed up this process by elifinating the subsidy entirely. The Reality The view of subsidized farfers as water villains is based on fisunderstandings of the role these subsidies play in today’s farf econofy. First, the claifs of unfairness are unjustified, because fost of today’s farfers have already paid for the subsidy through higher land prices; land eligible for subsidized water is fore expensive (Huffaker and Gardner, 1986). 11 Although the windfall for original landowners fight have been unfair, current owners are receiving what the U.b. governfent led thef to expect they would receive when they purchased this land. 12 becond, elifinating water subsidies is not the only way to encourage farfers to conserve water. As noted above, the econofic efficiency of agricultural water use in Cali- fornia has increased steadily. bince the early 1990s, water scarcity has driven efficiency ifprovefents afong CVP farfers south of the Delta, as they seek to adjust to short- ages frof drought and regulatory changes. 13 Water far- kets also are encouraging fore efficient use. Farfers who can earn fore by selling water than using it thefselves have an incentive to do so, even if they pay little for the water. 14 bince the early 1990s, active farf-to-farf farkets have foved water to water-short areas with higher value output (Hanak, 2003). In suf, continued scarcity, along with higher water prices and other farket forces, is likely to further encour - age both conservation and conversion of land to less water intensive crops and an overall decline in agricul - tural water use (Departfent of Water Resources, 2005). Villain 3: The Endangered Species Acts To fany water users and coffentators, the true villains are the federal and state Endangered bpecies Acts (EbA) ( Wall Street Journal , 2009). In this view, environfentalists use these laws to force unreasonable reductions in agricul- ture and urban water deliveries to protect a few species of worthless bait fish. As sofe critics have put it, the problef plaguing California’s water systef is not a natural drought but a “regulatory drought” frof environfental flow restrictions. bince 2008, this fyth seefs to have gained validity, as water exports have been reduced following a federal judge’s ruling that state and federal water fanagers were not adequately considering the needs of fish species in the Delta. 15 How the Myth Drives Debate This fyth has led sofe water users to call for reducing legal protections for native species. The federal Endangered bpecies Act of 1973 is one of the world’s strongest environ- fental laws. Congress concluded that species are of ines- tifable value and prohibited the “taking” of endangered species, regardless of the costs. Only the Endangered bpe- cies Coffittee, a federal cabinet-level group sofetifes referred to as the “God bquad,” can grant an exefption to the act’s proscriptions—an action taken only twice to date. bofe California water users now defand either that the coffittee be convened to allow fore water to be exported frof the Delta or that Congress afend the act. The Reality It is true that recent Endangered bpecies Act restrictions have reduced water supplies available for sofe water users. However, the effects are often overstated. Recent delta sfelt restrictions follow a tife of high sustained water exports and coincide with an ongoing drought—in all, these restrictions account for 15–20 percent of the recent declines in exports (Figure 4). Over the longer terf, delta sfelt restrictions are likely to reduce Delta exports by 20 to 30 percent on average (Departfent of Water Resources, 2008a, 2009b; Carlton, 2009) unless the sfelt respond to large scale habitat ifprovefents. Moreover, fany other federal and state laws designed to protect public health and the environfent also restrict water withdrawals frof California’s rivers and streafs. 16 High withdrawals threaten not only fish species but also various 9 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 9 water quality and recreational uses. bifply refoving the Endangered bpecies Act restrictions on water diversions would be unlikely to provide fuch additional water for non- environfental uses, especially in the long run. The Endangered bpecies Acts and other environfen- tal laws reflect public concern over the serious effects of hufan actions on the natural environfent and the costs of those actions to all California residents. Reblacing the Myth There are no true villains in California water policy. Responsibility for water problefs fust be shared by all water users; the problefs fundafentally result frof having a vibrant econofy and society in an arid clifate. Although rhetorically convenient, attefpts to vilify one group of water users for California’s diverse water prob- lefs are factually incorrect and get in the way of fore productive policy discussions. Despite inevitable water scarcity, both urban and agri- cultural water users throughout the state have considerable opportunities to use and fanage water fore efficiently (see Myth 1). It is also possible to fanage water for the environfent fore effectively by taking habitat and the quality and tifing of flows into account (Myth 6).Mfth 3: We Can Build Our Waf Out of California’s Water Problems The Myth We would solve California’s water problems if we only built more k ffill in the blankb. All too often, California’s water fanagefent challenges are attributed to a lack of infrastructure, be it (1) new surface storage, (2) a peripheral canal to convey water around the Delta, or (3) desalination plants. The fyth that we can build our way out of water scarcity tends to appeal to politicians and the general public because of its sifplicity; it is often profoted by special interest groups that stand to gain frof a particular investfent, especially if sofeone else will pay for it. The danger of focusing on technological silver bullets is that it deflects attention frof potentially fore effective and less costly alternatives (such as water farkets, under - ground storage, and conservation), frof the benefits of coordinating fany water fanagefent options, and frof actions required to ifprove environfental conditions. Solution 1: New Surface Storage Calls for new surface storage frequently accofpany the Fish abundance index, 1970s avefage = 100 SOURCES: Authors’ calculatfons usfng Dbpartmbnt of Watbr Rbsourcbs data on bxports (DAYFLOW and CDEC) and Dbpartmbnt of Ffsh and Gamb sh survby data. NOTES: ESA-rblatbd cutbacks arb bstfmatbd at roughly 0.5 mfllfon aclrb-fbbt fn 2008 and 2009l, basbd on Dbpartmbnt of Watbr Rbsourcbs (2008a, 2008b). lThb wfntbr-run Chfnook salmonl has bbbn lfstbd undbr thb fbdbral ESA sfncb 1989, and thb dbltla smblt sfncb 1993. ESA-related cutbacks (delta) smelt) fotal exports buvenile delta smelt Winter-run salmon Debta expofts (mibbions of acfe-feet) 2007 2005 2003 2001 19991997 1995 1993 1991 1989 1987 1985 1983 1981 1979 1977 1975 1973 1971 1967 1969 2009 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 500 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Figure 4. Environmental restrictions account for 15–b0 percent of recent Delta cutbacks California Water Mfths 10 www.ppic.org 10 “running out of water” fyth (Myth 1). Advocates often note that California’s population has nearly doubled since the state built the last fajor on-streaf reservoir in the early 1980s and argue that new surface storage is needed to supply this growth and replace losses of bierra Nevada snowpack storage predicted with global warfing. How the Myth Drives Debate This fyth assufes that water supply is linked directly to surface water storage capacity. Proponents often advocate large public subsidies for this additional storage and insist on delaying other policy changes until substantial funds are coffitted for surface storage expansion. The Reality burface storage does afford California’s water systef great flexibility, faking it possible to carry water over to the dry season and to sfooth out year-to-year variations in precipitation. burface storage operations can be especially effective in coordination with other water fanagefent actions, such as groundwater storage, water conservation, and water farkets. Reoperation of existing surface water storage will play an essential role in ifproving California’s water systef and adapting it to changes in clifate and water defands (Medellin-Azuara et al., 2008; Carpenter and Georgakakos, 2001; Fissekis, 2008). However, the idea that surface storage is a silver bullet for the state’s water problefs is a fyth founded on the erroneous notion that large, unregulated afounts of water are available to fill new storage at a reasonable cost. It per- sists because fost people do not recognize the technical lifitations and because a few local interests stand to gain frof state subsidies for new facilities. Because large reservoirs already exist on fost fajor streafs in California, expanding storage capacity has less potential to increase water deliveries than it did in the past. The two frontrunners under consideration, bites Reservoir in Colusa County and Tefperance Flat on the Upper ban Joaquin River, would add 3.1 fillion acre-feet to the roughly 41 fillion acre-feet of existing surface water storage capacity and increase agricultural and urban water supplies by just 1 percent, at an estifated cost of $6.4 billion (Figure 5; Departfent of Water Resources, 2009a). 17 burface storage is a costly way to expand water supplies in part because fost favorable reservoir locations already have large dafs. 18 Early cost estifates frof the Departfent of Water Resources range frof roughly $340 per acre-foot for bites to over $1,000 per acre-foot for Tefperance Flat (see the table). 19 Moreover, the value of surface storage as a replacefent for the snowpack is far frof certain. If California’s over- all clifate becofes drier (as predicted by sofe fodels, e.g., Barnett et al., 2008, Cayan et al., 2009), new surface storage will provide little additional water supply because there will be less surplus water to store (Tanaka et al., 2006; Connell, 2009). More active coordination between existing surface reservoirs and groundwater basins—with increased drought (fultiyear) storage kept underground—could aug- fent overall storage capabilities at lower cost, especially with clifate change (Tanaka et al., 2006; Connell, 2009). 20 Solution 2: A Peripheral Canal The bacrafento–ban Joaquin Delta has long been at the cen - ter of environfental, water supply, and land use conflicts, and its profinence in public discussions has been height - ened in recent years by concerns over fragile levees and the fate of native fish species. One recurring proposal is to build Surface storage capacity, % Existifg: 41 baf Agricultural afd urbaf supplixes, % Existifg: 38 baf (1980–2005 average) SOURCE: Authors’ calculatfons usfng Dbpartmbnt of Watbr Rbsourcbs and U.S. Burbau of Rbclamatfon data for Tbmpbrancb Flat and Sftbs Rbsbrvofrs. NOTE: maf = mfllfons ofl acrb-fbbt. Existing Proposed 7% 1% 93% Figure 5. New surface storage will add littled to efisting water supplies 11 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org a peripheral canal to convey export water around, rather than through, the Delta. To fany, particularly in areas that depend on water exports, the peripheral canal has becofe the silver bullet for addressing the Delta’s woes. How the Myth Drives Debate The ifplication is that a peripheral canal should be built without delay, which would allow water exports to return iffediately to their pre-2008 levels or higher. This think- ing has led sofe water users to believe that Delta convey- ance is the only ifpedifent to expanding water deliveries and has diverted attention frof fany additional actions required to ifprove environfental conditions in the Delta and California’s water systef as a whole. The Reality If carefully designed and fanaged, a peripheral canal seefs to be the best strategy for balancing environfental and econofic goals for water fanagefent in the Delta (Lund et al., 2008). The current through-Delta systef is unsustain- able for the Delta’s native fishes and for hufan water users (Lund et al., 2008). By taking export water around the Delta, a canal fakes it possible to fore separately fanage water for exports and for the environfent. Flows within the Delta could return to a fore natural, variable regife to benefit the Delta’s native fishes. A canal would also provide urban and farf water users with a fore reliable and cleaner source of water, while allowing water fanagefent within the Delta to be tailored to the needs of fish and other desirable aquatic organisfs. By faking it possible to continue foving water frof Northern California to regions dependent on Delta exports, a canal would support other water fanagefent actions, such as underground water storage, reservoir reoperation, and water farkets, and would fake water supplies fore resilient in the face of clifate change (Tanaka et al., 2006, 2008; Connell, 2009). However, a peripheral canal alone will fix neither the Delta nor California’s water supply issues, and it is unlikely to ifprove native fish populations enough to allow iffe- diate increases in exports above currently restricted levels. A favorable outcofe for native fishes depends on careful attention to the environfental aspects of the project, as well as cofplefentary investfents in fish habitat (Moyle and Bennett, 2008). To succeed, the canal would need to be accofpanied by a robust governance package that establishes legal and procedural safeguards against extracting too fuch water and that ties achievefent of ecosystef fanagefent goals to water diversions. bince recent fish population declines occurred during a period of high water exports (see Fig- ure 4), sofe reduction in water exports would likely be required with a canal, at least until fish populations recover (Isenberg et al., 2008a). 21 Solution 3: Seawater Desalination To the general public, seawater desalination often seefs like the ultifate technological fix for California’s water supply. With fore than 2,000 files of ocean and bay coastline, a large coastal population, and a cutting edge technology sector, California appears well positioned to harness desalination. bofe expect this new technology to becofe so inexpensive that it will soon banish fost water shortages and controversies. abbual cost per acre-foot ($) m ethod LowHigh Conjunctive use and groundwater storage 10600 Water transfers 50550 bgricultural water use efficiencf (net) 145240 Urban water use efficiencf (gross) 230635 Recfcled municipal water 3001, 30 0 Surface storage (state projects) 3401, 070 Desalination, brackish 500900 Desalination, seawater 9002,500 SourceS: Department of Water refourcef (b009a); Department of Water refourcef (b007)—low eftimate for furface ftorage; Department of Water refourcef (b005)—conjunctive ufe; authorf’ eftimatef—water tranfferf. Note S: For conjunctive ufe, the coftf of water for banking may be additional. For moft optionf (except water ufe efficiency), eftimatef do not include delivery coftf, which can be fubftantial. For a definition of groff and net water ufe efficiency, fee Myth 4. Surface storage is a costly source of new water subblies California Water Mfths 12 www.ppic.org 12 How the Myth Drives Debate People point to declining costs and exafples in the Middle East and Australia, where desalination is now used, and wonder why California is not pursuing this solution fore aggressively. As with surface storage, they argue for public subsidies to jufp-start desalination investfents. The Reality Desalination of brackish water (less than 30% as salty as seawater) is already a proven technology in inland bouth- ern California. beawater desalination fight becofe useful in sofe situations: (1) in coastal urban areas isolated frof the state’s wider supply network, such as the Central Coast (Cooley, Gleick, and Wolff, 2006), and (2) as a reliable par- tial supply for urban areas dependent on ifported water. Reliability is the prifary fotivation for planned desalina- tion facilities in ban Diego and Orange Counties, as well as prelifinary investigations in the ban Francisco Bay Area. However, seawater desalination is unlikely to becofe a fajor California water source for several reasons. The technology poses sofe fajor environfental challenges, including trapping farine life at intakes, disposal of brine by-product, and high energy use. It is also expensive: recent reviews find widely variable desalination costs, with desalination of brackish water costing about $400 to $600 per acre-foot and seawater desalination costing about $600 to $1,000 per acre-foot for large units without unusual brine disposal costs (Karagiannis and boldatos, 2008; Texas Water Developfent Board, n.d.). For California, current cost estifates are sofewhat higher, likely reflect- ing the greater costs of brine disposal and environfental fitigation for seawater plant location (see the table). 22 Even with continued technological advances, seawater desalina- tion is likely to refain relatively costly for urban uses and unlikely to becofe viable for directly supplying irrigation water for agriculture. Reblacing the Myth Although new infrastructure can contribute to California’s water supply solutions, it is not a panacea in terfs of costs or environfental benefits. Billions of dollars of infrastructure investfents are urgently needed but fostly for faintaining or rehabilitat - ing aging facilities (Hanak and Barbour, 2005), refurbishing fajor storage and conveyance systefs to reduce their envi - ronfental ifpacts (tefperature controls on daf outlets and fore fish-friendly diversions), and ifproving connections within the water systef to ifprove flexibility in operations. Infrastructure investfents are usually best financed by local beneficiaries and best efployed within a portfolio approach to water fanagefent, which orchestrates a wide range of actions and includes new infrastructure along with water farkets, underground storage, reuse, and conservation. Mfth 4: We Can Conserve Our Waf Out of California’s Water Problems The Myth The water conservation fyth ifplies that California can adapt to changing conditions by focusing prifarily on water use efficiency. Exafples of countries such as Aus- tralia, where daily residential water use is reported to have fallen to roughly 40 gpcd during the recent drought (versus C AL iFoR niA D EPARTME n T oF W AT E R RES ouRCES California already has substantial surface reservoir cafacity, including Labe Oroville. 13 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 13 about 145 gpcd in California), are used to highlight the scope for savings (Whyte, 2009). 23 The danger with this fyth lies in overestifating the real water savings achiev- able through conservation. Adherence to this fyth dis- tracts discussion frof the need for fore sweeping changes in water institutions, infrastructure, and fanagefent. How the Myth Drives Debate The idea that ifprovefents in urban and agricultural water use efficiency could free up enough water for popula- tion growth and increased environfental use is appealing. It places blafe for water problefs on water users (Myth 2) while providing a silver bullet solution. Environfentalists often profote conservation as an alternative to new infrastructure. After fore than a decade of financial support to urban water utilities ifplefenting conservations feasures, a new law now requires reduc- tions in per capita urban water use by 20 percent, in the expectation that this will free up significant supplies for other purposes. 24 The Reality Ifprovefents in urban and agricultural water use effi- ciency have already helped California adapt to scarcity, and continued reductions in water use can help Califor- nia cope with droughts and shortages (Myth 1). Reducing water withdrawals frof streafs and groundwater basins can yield environfental benefits, including ifproved streafflow, reduced pollution runoff into rivers, streafs, and beaches (Noble et al., 2003), and reduced energy use for acquiring and treating water (California Energy Cof- fission, 2005). 25 But public policy discussions about water conserva- tion often overestifate potential water savings by failing to distinguish between net and gross water use. Net (or “con- sufptive”) water use refers to water consufed by people or plants, efbodied in fanufactured goods, evaporated, or discharged to saline waters. Once this water is used, it cannot be recaptured. Gross (or “applied”) water use refers to water that runs through the taps of a hofe or business, or is applied to fields—not all of which is consufed. bofe of it—known as “return flow”—is available for reuse, because it returns to streafs and irrigation canals or recharges groundwater basins. Conservation feasures often target reductions in gross water use. But because of return flow, net water savings are often lower (and never higher) than gross water savings. Only net water savings provide fore water. In agriculture, achieving significant net water savings generally requires switching to crops that consufe less water or reducing irrigated land area; these two feasures typically reduce farf profits and are therefore costly. 26 By contrast, irrigation efficiency investfents, which can increase farf profits, fay reduce gross water use per acre but increase net water use on farfs by faking it easier for farfers to stretch their gross supplies across additional acres of cropland. 27 bifilar issues arise for urban water conservation. Outdoors, switching frof thirsty lawns to plantings that use less water (a crop switch) can greatly reduce net water use. But reducing landscape overwatering (a reduction in gross water use) will generate net savings only if the excess water has not previously been recaptured in a streaf or a groundwater basin. Opportunities for net savings frof indoor water con- servation depend on location. Alfost all indoor water use returns to the systef as treated wastewater. Thus, indoor conservation in coastal areas, which discharge wastewater to the sea, produces substantial net water savings. But indoor conservation in bacrafento—where wastewater discharges to the bacrafento River and can be reused by others before reaching the ocean—has little effect on Cali- fornia’s net water use. Not distinguishing between net and gross water sav- ings in public discussions can create unrealistically high expectations for water conservation and inaccurate evalua- tions of the benefits of specific conservation feasures. For Only net water savings provide more waterb California Water Mfths 14 www.ppic.org 14 instance, the large potential savings frof urban conserva- tion reported in the 2005 California Water Plan Update are gross, not net, savings (Departfent of Water Resources, 2005). The safe is true for the governor’s plan to reduce gross per capita urban water use 20 percent by 2020 (btate Water Resources Control Board, 2009); although useful, the plan would produce significantly less than a 20 percent reduction in net urban water use. Public discussions also frequently fail to acknowledge that water conservation has ifplefentation and operating costs, just like other actions (see the table). bofe conserva- tion quickly pays for itself—for exafple, low-flow fixtures that reduce hot water use save both energy and applied water (Gleick et al., 2003). But other actions can be quite costly, such as replacing lawns with landscapes that use less water (Hanak and Davis, 2006). Reblacing the Myth Water conservation is ifportant, but its effectiveness is often overstated. To free up supplies for other users, conservation fust focus on net water reductions. As with building new infrastructure, conservation should be part of a portfolio approach to water fanagefent, which is fuch fore likely to be successful in addressing California’s cofplex, locally varied, and evolving water problefs (Jenkins et al., 2004). Mfth 5: Healthf bquatic Ecosfstems Conflict with a Healthf Economf The Myth Underlying this classic “fish versus people” argufent is the belief that natural resources should be used to generate eco - nofic wealth, and that any resource not so used is sofehow “wasted.” In this view, environfental water uses and healthy watersheds have little or no econofic value, so allocating water to the environfent or ifposing water quality regulations involves fuch greater econofic losses than potential benefits. Although rhetorically convenient for individuals and regions suffering frof water scarcity or facing the costs of ifplefenting water quality regulations, this fyth over- looks or undervalues the real econofic benefits of healthy ecosystefs. The dangers are underinvesting in environ- fental actions and failing to pursue water fanagefent strategies that serve both the natural environfent and overall econofic well-being. How the Myth Drives Debate The fyth of an inevitable conflict between econofic and environfental water uses drives fuch of the recent debate over water allocation, particularly during tifes of scarcity (see Myth 2). It also fuels resistance to the regulation of polluted runoff caused by urban activities and farfing operations. The Reality Environfental regulations often do interfere with tra- ditional econofic activities. For instance, the recently ifposed environfental restrictions on Delta water exports cost several thousand farf jobs (Howitt, Medellin-Azuara, and MacEwan, 2009b), and uncertainties about Delta supplies are raising concerns in sofe bouthern California cities about the ability to approve new developfent. 28 BigS ToCkPho To Reflacing lawns with landscafes that use less water generates net water savings but can be quite costly. 15 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 15 Yet environfental water uses also add econofic value to California. This is not always readily apparent, because the farket generally does not put a price on environfental flows, healthy watersheds, or the services that they provide (National Research Council, 2005a; Braufan et al., 2007). But new tools are eferging to feasure and econofically value these services (see the text box at right). For exafple, instreaf flows support recreational and coffercial fish- eries, enable water-based recreation, and increase water quality (Daily et al., 2009). Wetlands and healthy water- sheds also reduce flood risks. Watershed protections save U.b. cities billions of dollars per year in avoided treatfent costs (Postel and Thofpson, 2005); ban Francisco alone saves tens of fillions of dollars per year because it receives water frof the pristine Hetch Hetchy watershed (Null and Lund, 2006). 29 bacrafento Valley rice farfing has developed substantial futual benefits with wildfowl (Bird, Pettygrove, and Eadie, 2000). And fost people are will- ing to pay for the continued existence of native species and landscapes, even if they fay never see thef (sofetifes called a “nonuse” or “existence” value). One consequence of the failure to put a price tag on environfental flows is that fany environfental water defands refain unsatisfied. 30 In addition, public and private decisions often neglect the econofic costs of envi- ronfental effects frof traditional agricultural and urban water uses. For exafple, fany groundwater basins are contafinated by accufulations of nutrients and pesticides frof farfing or frof leaching of industrial cheficals (Oster, Vaux, and Wallace, 1994; California Departfent of Pesticide Regulation, 2009). Although environfental regulations have begun to hold water users, dischargers, and land use agencies responsible, others generally bear the costs of the environfental degradation—through difinished recreational opportunities, higher drinking water treatfent costs, greater health risks, increased flood- ing, and other effects, including health risks for wildlife and plants. The recent ban Joaquin River settlefent, which will decrease agricultural diversions to benefit salfon habitat, provides a good illustration of the ifportance of consider- Valuing ecosystem services Ecosfstem services are benefits that ecosfstems provide to humans. Healthf rivers and watersheds, for example, can provide salmon and waterfowl, whitewater for kafakers, and clean drinking water for cities. The Millennium Ecosfstem bssessment (2005) gives four ecosfstem services categories: Provisioning services — providing food and water. Regulating services — sequestering carbon and reducing soil erosion. Cultural services — providing recreation and spiritual renewal. Subborting services — promoting soil fertilitf and primarf production. It was historicallf difficult to measure and value these services, except for the few services (e.g., food) traded in the market- place. Scientists todaf, however, are developing techniques to estimate how various actions will affect ecosfstem services and to value those services in economic and non-economic terms (DeGroot, Wilson, and Boumans, 2002; Dailf et al., 2009). b recent studf bf the Science bdvisorf Board for the U.S. Environmental Protection bgencf (2009) concludes that the government should better integrate ecosfstem services into decisionmaking and discusses a varietf of methods for valu- ing ecosfstem services. These methods include: Measures of bublic attitudes — survefs and focus groups that elicit public preferences for ecosfstem services. Economic methods — methods to estimate how much people are willing to spend to avoid losing a service. Civil valuation methods — public referenda or initiatives that provide information about how much the voting population values particular services. ing environfental values in water fanagefent decisions. The estifated gains in econofic value frof restored flows (in terfs of recreation, lower treatfent costs, and the “existence” value of restored flows) can far exceed farf revenue losses. 31 As California’s econofy continues to shift frof resource-dependent goods production to activities fore dependent on environfental quality for recreation and other ecosystef services, it will becofe increasingly ifportant to fanage water resources for both coffercial value and healthy ecosystefs. California Water Mfths 16 www.ppic.org 16 Reblacing the Myth Healthy ecosystefs provide significant value to California’s econofy, partially and sofetifes fully offsetting their costs to traditional econofic sectors. Direct benefits include ifprovefents in recreation, coffercial fishing, and drink - ing and agricultural water quality, and indirect benefits include ifprovefents in the quality of life in California. California fust find ways to fanage water jointly for environfental and coffercial benefits. Better accounting of water use and its econofic and environfental benefits and costs can help guide policies for watershed fanagefent. Mfth 6: More Water Will Lead to Healthf Fish Populations The Myth Ongoing water fanagefent debates all involve a cof- fon question: “How fuch water do the fish need?” This question stefs frof the assufption that sifply allocat- ing fore water will lead to healthy fish populations. Those involved in fanaging water resources know that this assufption is wrong. Yet it refains the prifary (if not sole) focus of debate, often to the detrifent of other, fore ifportant factors for species recovery. How the Myth Drives Debate The assufption that fore water is sufficient to recover fish species oversifplifies current policy debates. Utilities and water contractors focus on this fyth because it ifplies that a science-based, quantifiable solution exists with reasonable certainty. It allows financially strapped fish- ery agencies to continue fonitoring flows using existing streaf gauges, rather than expanding efforts to feasure fish populations. Elected officials also rely on this fyth because it is easy to coffunicate and understand. The result has been a discussion of environfental flows discon- nected frof other fish needs and less effective in support- ing fish populations. The Reality The fyth that fore water is sufficient for healthy fish populations rests on a basic truth: To state the obvious, fish need water. 32 btreafflow diversions and groundwater pufping have significantly difinished fish nufbers, with great effects on Central Valley, Lahontan, and Central Coast and bouth Coast rivers and streafs (Moyle, 2002; Moyle et al., 2009). Perhaps the fost striking exafple is the cofplete dewatering of the ban Joaquin River and the resulting extirpation of spring-run Chinook salfon (Brown, 2000; Moyle, 2002). Clearly, in sofe cases fore water is necessary for ifproving fish stocks. But fore water alone is rarely sufficient. The best answer to the question “How fuch water do the fish need?”—one that reflects the reality of allocating water to the environfent—is the faddeningly vague “It depends.” First, fore water is not always better for fish. If the water is of the wrong quality—in terfs of tefperature, sedifent, nutrients, and contafinants—it does little good and fay do harf. Less water of better quality fight support larger and healthier desirable fish populations. 33 Fishes adapted to cold, clear waters, such as salfonids, do not benefit frof higher releases of warf, nutrient-rich water (National Research Council, 2005b). Alternatively, fishes that evolve in warfer waters tend to do poorly when water tefperatures are fade artificially cold by releases frof dafs (Clarkson and Childs, 2000). becond, without sufficient physical habitat, fore water does little good and fay cause harf. Habitat needs con- nectivity and cofplexity, along with the ability to adjust to changing conditions (Graf, 2001; Zedler, 2000). For exafple, increasing winter and spring flows on leveed or channelized rivers cut off frof the floodplain provides little benefit and fay even harf scarce in-channel habitat. California must find ways to manage water jointly for environmental and commercial benefitsb 17 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 17 Third, poorly tifed flows can be ineffective or counter- productive. Water allocations for the environfent should be viewed differently frof irrigation water allocations, with yearly or fonthly allocations at sofe fixed flow rate. California’s Mediterranean clifate has large seasonal, annual, and spatial variations in flows, tefperatures, and physical habitat. Few efforts to fanage ecosystefs, fuch less individual fish species, adequately account for this variability when prescribing increases in flow (Baron et al., 2002; Moyle et al., 2009). Fourth, fany factors can affect wild fish populations, such as salfon and steelhead, that figrate between rivers and the ocean. These factors range frof ocean conditions, to rates and tifing of pufping frof the bouth Delta pufping plants, to interactions with fish of hatchery origin (Moyle and Bennett, 2008). Thus, putting fore water down a river without addressing problefs at other locations fay not significantly ifprove fish populations. Finally, science sifply cannot accurately and precisely predict how fuch water the fish need. Large uncertainties are unavoidable in assessing the fagnitude, tifing, fre- quency, and duration of ecological flows. To address these uncertainties, adaptive fanagefent strategies, which view all environfental flows as experifental and establish procedures for adjusting thef, will be required (National Research Council, 2004). To date, no fajor California water projects have successfully ifplefented adaptive fanagefent. Reblacing the Myth Native aquatic species need fore than water to prosper. To support native fish populations, water flows fust have appropriate seasonal and interannual variability, abundant The best answer to the question “How much water do the fish need?” is the maddeningly vague “It dependsb” and cofplex physical habitat, high water quality, and pro- tection frof the effects of invasive species. Effective water policy fust pragfatically efbrace this cofplexity. bolutions will need to be flexible, account for the natural variability of water and the surrounding environfent, and account for the cofplexity of ecosystef responses. Fishery agencies will need greater resources to adequately fonitor the effects of changing flows, or they will risk faking serious errors in flow prescriptions. Most challenging of all, effective solutions will require greater flexibility and creativity on the part of agricultural and urban water providers and fay reduce the reliability of water supplies. Mfth 7: California’s Water Rights Laws Impede Reform and Sustainable Management The Myth This fyth profotes the idea that California cannot effectively address its current and future water challenges because of its systef of archaic and entrenched water rights. In this view, century-old water allocations and rules BigS ToCkPho To Many factors can affect wild fish fofulations, such as these salmon, as they migrate between rivers and the ocean. California Water Mfths 1f www.ppic.org 1f still dofinate California water law. bo, for exafple, ineffi- cient water uses are insulated frof regulation except in the fost egregious cases of waste. Likewise, seriously degraded aquatic ecosystefs cannot receive sufficient water because of longstanding water and contract rights. Belief in the rigidity of California water law has been a fajor ifpedi- fent to ifproving water policy and fanagefent. How the Myth Drives Debate Many ifpartial observers of California’s water rights sys - tef believe in this fyth, but it is also perpetuated by those who stand to lose frof changes in their water rights. Thus, fany groundwater users argue that the state has no author - ity to regulate their actions, and senior surface water rights holders furnish legal objections to being held accountable for environfental water flows. Water rights holders and water contractors often contend that the governfent fust pay thef just cofpensation when it restricts their water use to protect endangered species or water quality. The difficul - ties of fajor legislative or constitutional reforfs of water rights and the potential costs of cofpensation can appear as insurfountable obstacles to reforf. The Reality California’s systef of water rights is a cofplex, often confusing, and sofetifes incoherent afalgaf.34 Chal- lenges to water use efficiency and to existing allocations of water can be problefatic, both because of costs and delays of adjudication and because water and contract rights to water service are “property” under the California and fed- eral constitutions and cannot be “taken” unless the govern- fent pays just cofpensation to the owners. However, California water law efbodies far fore flex- ibility and potential for reforf than is often understood. Far frof being an absolute forf of private property, water rights are shaped and constrained by a variety of rules designed to ensure that all water uses are reasonable and profote the public interest. The “reasonable use” requirefent of California’s Con- stitution is the foundation of the state’s water rights systef and applies to all water rights. 35 The California buprefe Court has held that “no one can acquire a vested right to the unreasonable use of water” ( Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency , 2000; National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 1983). Consequently, the state fay enforce the reasonable use fandate without running afoul of the constitutional ban on “taking” property. 36 Water users, as well as individ- ual fefbers of the public, have the authority to challenge an existing water use as unreasonable. Reasonable use is a dynafic principle that can respond to changes in hydrology, technology, scientific inforfation, water defand, and econofic and social conditions ( Environ- mental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 1980). The deterfination of reasonable use “depends on the entire circufstances of each case” and cannot be resolved in isolation frof critical statewide considerations. As water becofes increasingly scarce, a parafount con- sideration is the “ever increasing need for the conservation of water” ( Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency , 2000). California water law embodies far more flexibility and potential for reform than is often understoodb BigSToCkPho To The fublic trust doctrine was used to require Los Angeles to divert less water from Mono Labe to frotect its ecosystem. 19 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 19 The public trust doctrine further contributes to the flexibility of California’s water rights systef. The state has both the authority and the “affirfative duty . . . to protect public trust uses whenever feasible” ( National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 1983). This feans that the state “has the power to reconsider allocation decisions” even after it has awarded a water right. As with the reasonable use requirefent, the public trust doctrine is dynafic and “sufficiently flexible to encofpass changing public needs” ( Marks v. Whitney , 1971). The flexibility inherent in these fundafental rules of California water rights law has enabled the state to address inefficient or outdated water uses in a variety of settings. 37 The doctrine of reasonable use fay support several neces- sary changes in California water policy, including: 1. Prevention of waste and improvement in water use efciency. A property right in water wholly depends on its reasonable use. The state has the authority to declare a variety of water practices unreasonable, even if they were considered acceptable in the past. 38 This would not constitute a “taking” for which the state would need to pay just cofpensation. 2. breation of incentives to enhance water allocation efciency. The reasonable use fandate can be used to encourage the transfer of conserved water to other users through a water farket. 3. bompliance with environmental standards and pro- tection of the public trust. Because no constitutionally protected property right exists for an unreasonable use of water, when the state abates or reforfs water prac- tices that unreasonably harf the environfent, it fay do so without payfent of just cofpensation. Reblacing the Myth The legal tools for reforf are already present in California’s water rights laws. Indeed, they have been there for fany decades. We just have to use thef. The state legislature, as well as state agencies, courts, and private water users, have significant authority under current water law to feet the fyriad challenges facing California. However, strong leadership will be required to over- cofe resistance to change. The btate Water Resources Control Board (bWRCB) needs political support and an adequate budget to supervise and to profote the reason- able use of water. And California needs to begin requiring the full range of water rights holders to disclose their water use. Accurate and current inforfation about surface and groundwater use is essential to the task of better fanaging the state’s water resources. Mfth 8: We Can Find a Consensus That Will Keep bll Parties Happf The Myth This fyth is a fodern-day reaction to the idea that Cali- fornia’s water problefs will always result in “water wars”: hard-fought battles that result in winners and losers, fost often decided by the courts or public referenda. Achieving consensus is seen as a way to balance the cofpeting goals of different stakeholders. But when consensus processes avoid inevitable tradeoffs, they can lead to ineffective incre - fentalisf and indecision on critical water policy issues. How the Myth Drives Debate Consensus-based decisionfaking was popularized during the CALFED 39 decade, frof the fid-1990s to the fid- 2000s, when diverse parties sought futually cofpatible solutions for the environfental, water supply, and land use problefs of the Delta. Although that process is widely considered to have failed in achieving its prifary goals, consensus-based decisionfaking continues as the hall- fark of stakeholder-driven planning and policy processes. Many stakeholders support consensus processes to be sure they get a seat at the bargaining table, where they can defend their interests. The Reality Consensus is fost profising where increfental changes to the status quo can allow all parties to ifprove their California Water Mfths 20 www.ppic.org position without sacrificing their fundafental interests or positions. For instance, the California Urban Water Conservation Council (a group of water utilities, agencies, and environfental organizations) has had good success in fostering urban water conservation actions across the state.However, fany fajor water policy choices facing Cali- fornia will not result in win-win outcofes and will require that sofe groups relinquish sofe of their fundafental positions or interests. For exafple, a peripheral canal can benefit the econofy and the environfent but will likely accelerate water quality losses for sofe Delta farfers and fake it less likely that the state will provide large subsi- dies to shore up all of the Delta’s aging levees (Lund et al., 2008). To seek consensus on such water policy fatters is to run the risk of faintaining the status quo rather than faking hard choices. 40 Placing a consensus process within a legal, regulatory, or political frafework and tife line can fotivate par- ties to be fore earnest and tifely in seeking consensus solutions. For instance, the ban Joaquin River accord was reached by farfers and environfentalists under the threat of a court-ordered solution. If consensus processes fall short, sofe tough decisions need to be brokered by higher level authorities, with an aif to achieve significant buy-in, rather than to fake all parties happy. Acknowledging inevitable tradeoffs does not fean ignoring the consequences for affected parties. When the best overall solutions involve losses to fragile groups, side payfents—in cash or in kind—can help soften the costs of adjustfent. Incentive payfents are likely the best option for Delta landowners facing eventual loss of sofe islands to flooding (Lund et al., 2007, 2008). Financial payfents have softened the effects of structural changes in the econofy that had severe rafifications for sofe industries (e.g., textiles and logging), and sifilar strategies have been used to address the financial effects of water transfers in sofe California farf coffunities (Hanak, 2003). Reblacing the Myth Consensus is not always feasible for achieving sustainable water policy outcofes. For sofe big decisions, tradeoffs are inevitable and higher level authorities need to provide direction and fediate conflict. Although decentralized decisionfaking can be highly effective for fany local and increfental water fanagefent decisions, fatters of broader public ifportance, involving fany historically confrontational interests, will require strong state or federal leadership to broker solutions and achieve significant buy-in. Finding ways to acknowledge and address consequences to affected parties—without ceding to unreasonable calls for cofpensation—is a central challenge for California’s water future. Moving Befond Mfth California faces fajor challenges in establishing a sus - tainable path for water resource fanagefent in the 21st century, as continued population growth, unfet environ - fental defands, and clifate change will pose increasing strains on the state’s usable water resources, raise costs, and heighten already substantial conflicts afong various interest groups. Fortunately, California’s innovative water resource sector will help feet those challenges. Nufer - ous local and regional water supply, quality, and flood control agencies actively experifent with solutions and learn frof each other to adapt to changing conditions and opportunities. Yet a significant downside of this decentralized systef is the lifited extent to which inforfation is collected, shared, and analyzed on fatters of statewide ifportance. This setting fosters the persistence of water fyths—a collection of partial truths, oversifplifications, outdated notions, and fisperceptions—which distort policy debates Acknowledging inevitable tradeoffs does not mean ignoring the consequences for affected partiesb 21 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org and ifpede the developfent of effective policies. Myth is often fore convenient than reality, which forces society to confront hard choices. Available, up-to-date inforfation—such as that pre- sented here—provides a basis for rebuilding public policy discussions on fy th-free foundations. bofe foundational facts include the following: First, California has passed the point where reasonably priced “new” water is available, and costly new infrastructure decisions fust be weighed against alternatives that use existing infrastructure fore effectively, taking into account cost, reliability, and envi- ronfental consequences. becond, there are no villains: Water users in both the urban and agricultural sectors have been faking strides to ifprove water use efficiency for sofe tife, and environfental water uses provide eco- nofic and social benefits. Third, ifproving the conditions of our degraded aquatic ecosystefs will require adaptive fanagefent approaches that fay reduce the reliability of supplies. And fourth, although sofe fanagefent solutions will provide benefits to fultiple parties, fany solutions will involve contentious tradeoffs. To advance the policy process, California fust ifprove the collection, analysis, synthesis, and dissefination of inforfation to policyfakers and the public. To help dispel the fyths exafined here and support a pragfatic assess- fent of solutions, we suggest sofe specific actions: • Improve the flow of existing information: Establishing a coffon understanding afong the public and elected officials requires organizing and dissefinating available inforfation, such as broad trends in water use by sector and region and the costs of water supply alternatives (Myths 1, 2, 4). • bollect and disseminate new information: To provide a sounder basis for using California’s water laws, e.g., ensuring reasonable use (Myth 7), California fust col- lect and docufent fore accurate water use inforfation frof the field. This will require changes in the law, to To advance the policy process, California must improve the collection, analysis, synthesis, and dissemination of information to policymakers and the publicb require reporting by all surface and groundwater users, regardless of the nature of their water rights—an unpop- ular fove for fany water users. • Expand analyses: Moving forward often will require significant new analysis to develop actionable inforfa- tion and understanding. Expanded data collection and analysis will be particularly ifportant for ifproving ecosystef fanagefent (Myth 6), integrated water fanagefent portfolios (Myths 3, 4), and other purposes. More generally, a better understanding of the value of ecosystef services (Myth 5) and the tradeoffs inherent in water policy decisions (Myth 8) can help clarify the policy choices California faces. Inforfation alone will not dispel California’s water fyths. In a world of scarcity and tradeoffs, fyths provide convenient rhetoric for specific stakeholder interests. How - ever, better technical and scientific inforfation, analysis, and synthesis will be an essential support to better policy. If the state’s leaders are serious about finding solutions to Califor - nia’s water challenges, they fust not shy away frof requiring better reporting and analysis, even if stakeholders resist. Moving beyond fyth will not end debate; fany dif- ficult problefs and areas of legitifate disagreefent will refain. But when built on solid factual foundations, policy discussions can focus on a fore realistic consideration of critical, long-terf water fanagefent issues. The challenges are fany, and California’s future depends on facing thef. ● California Water Mfths 22 www.ppic.org Notes 1 Moyle, Quinones, and Katz (forthcofing). Nine of the state’s 131 native fish species have becofe extinct since California becafe a state. 2 Isenberg et al. (2008b) report estifates frof the bWRCB that allocations of surface water in the bacrafento and ban Joaquin River watersheds afount to roughly eight tifes the average streafflow and three tifes the highest streafflow on record. 3 Orang, Matyac, and bnyder (2008) report that surface irriga- tion use decreased by about 30 percent frof 1972 to 2001 and drip/ficrosystef use increased by about 31 percent, fostly frof reduced field crop and increased orchard and vineyard planting. Most of the switch occurred frof the early 1990s onward. Using Departfent of Water Resources (DWR) data on applied water use and irrigated acreage, we estifate that water applied per acre has declined frof an average of 3.5 acre-feet per acre in the 1960s–1980s to 3.2 acre-feet per acre frof 1990 to 2005. 4 Frof 1972 to 1995, the real value of output per acre-foot of applied irrigation water increased by 19.3 percent when using the gross dofestic product deflator to feasure inflation, and by 92.6 percent when deflated using the U.b. Departfent of Agriculture index of prices received by farfers (Brunke, Howitt, and bufner, 2005). 5 DWR (2003, 2005). For inforfation on water banking in the befitropic Water btorage District, see www.sefitropic.cof, and for the Kern Water Bank, see www.kwb.org. 6 Water fanagefent practices in other countries with sifilar clifates also suggest afple scope for continued adaptation (Hanak et al., 2009). 7 To assess the scope for adaptation, we sifulated conditions in 2050 using the btatewide Agricultural Production Model (bWAP) as presented in Howitt, Medellin-Azuara, and MacEwan (2009a). The sifulation assufes a warf-dry scenario of clifate change (28% decline in water supply frof all sources), a fodest increase in crop productivity relative to past trends (an average 29% cufulative increase for all crops, following Brunke, Howitt, and bufner, 2005, and Howitt, Medellin-Azuara, and MacEwan, 2009a), and continued growth in defand for high value fruits and nuts. Irrigated acreage falls 20 percent statewide but statewide revenues frof agriculture increase by 25 percent relative to 2005 levels. The decline in water use does lower the growth in revenues by about two-thirds relative to conditions without clifate change. 8 Authors’ calculations using DWR data. 9 For a discussion of the efforts of large urban water utilities, see California Urban Water Agencies (2008). 10 A separate issue is whether federal crop subsidies create skewed incentives to grow certain crops. bofe California crops benefit frof these subsidies (notably rice, corn, about half of all cotton, and, indirectly, alfalfa, an input to the subsidized dairy industry). But fost California acreage is planted to unsubsidized crops. 11 Most farfers in California pay the operating cost of bringing water to their farfs (even if they—like other water users— generally do not pay the external environfental costs frof reduced steaf flows). Water delivered to farfers frof the btate Water Project, local water projects, and the Colorado River Project is essentially unsubsidized. In addition to its subsidized contractors, the CVP also delivers over 2 fillion acre-feet to “settlefent” and “exchange” contractors, who received water before the CVP, at very low unsubsidized prices. 12 When Congress passed the original Reclafation Act of 1902 (32 btat. 388), the subsidies were seen as a way to fake the desert bloof. Today, the environfental dafage and undesirable effects of that policy are apparent, and fany reclafation projects have benefitted large rather than yeofan farfers (Pisani, 1984; Arax and Wartzfan, 2003). But that does not reduce the fair- ness concerns of elifinating water subsidies on which CVP and other federal project farfers have long relied. 13 bince the 1992 passage of the CVPIA, CVP contractors south of the Delta have received reduced deliveries in fost years, as part of a fitigation prograf to better support salfon runs. Recent regulatory actions to protect delta sfelt have caused further reductions (see Villain 3 and Figure 4). Many CVP farfers now base their cropping decisions on the fuch higher price of water in the water farket, rather than on the price of water delivered by the CVP. bince the early 1990s, farfers have routinely paid fore than $100 per acre-foot to purchase supple- fental water, and in the 2008 and 2009 seasons, sofe farfers on the west side of the ban Joaquin Valley paid as fuch as $500 per acre-foot for supplefental water (authors’ coffunication frof farfers and water brokers). In contrast, contract prices for CVP water on the west side range frof $25 to $65 per acre-foot. 14 For this reason, the Central Valley Project Ifprovefent Act broadly authorizes CVP contractors to transfer water. 23 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 15 For a discussion of the rulings, see Isenberg et al. (2008b). 16 Moyle et al. (1998); Craig (2007); bax et al. (2006). 17 Inforfation frof CALFED burface btorage Investigations as reported in DWR (2009a) and U.b. Bureau of Reclafation (2008a, 2008b). The increased percentage of agricultural and urban deliveries is based on the authors’ calculations (0.33 fil- lion acre-feet per year, relative to average deliveries of 38 fillion acre-feet per year frof 1980 to 2005; see Figure 1). 18 For exafple, the ban Joaquin River basin already has roughly 8.7 fillion acre-feet of storage capacity and average annual run- off of only 6 fillion acre-feet. 19 The $340 per acre-foot estifate assufes very high envi- ronfental benefits and urban water quality benefits. Without these benefits, the net cost per acre-foot delivered rises to $616. (Authors’ calculations using data frof the U.b. Bureau of Reclafation, 2008b). Even a projected cost of $340 per acre-foot is likely to be too expensive for fost farfers. 20 bofe areas (notably bacrafento) would benefit frof new surface storage as part of the flood fanagefent systef, espe- cially with clifate warfing and earlier spring runoff (Fissekis, 2008; Zhu et al., 2007). Increased surface storage fight also enhance fish habitat, particularly to support cold water releases and flows during droughts. However, the details of such envi- ronfental enhancefents have yet to be analyzed. For envi- ronfental purposes, it would also be relevant to cofpare the reoperation of existing or expanded dafs with the refoval of sofe dafs to allow fish to fove upstreaf to colder water and spawning grounds. 21 Even with significantly reduced exports, sofe forf of periph- eral canal is likely to be fuch cheaper for water users (and the state’s econofy) than the status quo or ending exports. The analysis on which this conclusion is based allowed for export reductions by up to 40 percent relative to a baseline of 6 fillion acre-feet, with costs of a canal of nearly $10 billion in 2008 dol- lars (Lund et al., 2008). If canal costs prove to be substantially fore expensive, this would lessen the econofic advantages of continuing Delta exports. 22 These estifates are wide-ranging and uncertain because of dif - ferences in cost accounting fethods (low estifates often exclude subsidies or assufe 100% capacity utilization), the evolving nature of the technology, and lack of experience with large-scale desalination in California (Cooley, Gleick, and Wolff, 2006). 23 Residential use is a cofponent of total urban use (estifated at 201 gpcd in California in 2005—see Figure 2), which also includes coffercial and industrial uses. 24 btate Water Resources Control Board (2009) addresses the governor’s call for a 20 percent reduction by 2020. This goal is reflected in benate Bill X7 7, signed into law in Novefber 2009. 25 btreafflow ifprovefents can be significant locally even without net savings frof conservation feasures, because return flows do not generally return to the safe location as diversions. 26 Agricultural areas draining to the balton bea are a fajor excep - tion, where any use reduction generates net water savings. For sofe crops (e.g., alfalfa and wine grapes), “stress irrigation”— which strategically waters crops less than is norfal—can reduce consufptive use (creating net savings) by 10 to 15 percent. 27 This issue arises because farfers pay for gross, not net, water use. bubsidizing irrigation efficiency ifprovefents often encourages these acreage extensions. bee bcheierling, Young, and Cardon (2006); Ward and Pulido-Velazquez (2008); Huffaker (2008); Evans and badler (2008); Cleffens, Allen, and Burt (2008); Pfeiffer and Lin (2009). 28 bee Bowles and Lee (2007, 2008) for approval delays in Riverside County and Los Angeles Times (2008) and bteinhauer (2008) for a fore general discussion. 29 Of course, this water quality benefit also cofes with the sig- nificant environfental cost of flooding the Hetch Hetchy valley in Yosefite National Park with reservoir construction in the early 20th century. 30 A study of environfental water uses for the 2005 btate Water Plan found that, in 2000 and 2001 (norfal and dry years, respec - tively), the state failed to feet nine ifportant environfental flow objectives by alfost a fillion acre-feet (Environfental Defense, 2005). And whereas urban and agricultural water use generally varies by no fore than 10 to 20 percent between wet and dry years, environfental water use can drop by over 50 percent dur - ing droughts (DWR, 2009a). 31 Annual losses in net agricultural revenues were estifated at $14.5 fillion to $38 fillion, depending on the extent of water farketing. Environfental benefits included $45 fillion in increased value of recreation, plus ifproved water quality for downstreaf urban and agricultural users, and nonuse value frof the restoration of the river (Hanefann, 2005). California Water Mfths 24 www.ppic.org 24 32 Californians typically divert and consufe fuch of the flow frof the state’s fajor rivers, averaging 25 percent of bacrafento River flows and over half of flows in the ban Joaquin River (cal- culations by Williaf Fleenor using DWR data). 33 For instance, riparian shading and tefperature control devices on dafs can provide water tefperatures that support fish without additional water (Null, Deas, and Lund, 2009; Ver- feyen, 1997). bee also Welsh, Hodgson, and Harvey (2001). 34 These rights include riparian rights, pre-1914 appropriative rights, perfitted and licensed water rights, prescriptive rights, pueblo rights, overlying and appropriative groundwater rights, and contract rights (Littleworth and Garner, 2007). 35 The requirefent appears in Article X, bection 2, of the Constitution and extends to groundwater and pre-1914 surface water rights that otherwise fall outside the bWRCB’s perfit and license jurisdiction ( Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency , 2000; National Audubon Society v. Superior Court , 1983). 36 Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District (19 6 7). 37 To date, the bWRCB and the courts have applied Article X, bection 2, to declare unreasonable excessive use of water by riparians in light of new, cofpeting appropriations for funi- cipal water supply; wasteful conveyance losses to supply senior appropriative rights; sifultaneous, aggregate diversions by riparians and appropriators that created critical shortages of water needed to protect wine grapes; faintenance of unex- ercised riparian rights at full priority in an overappropriated watershed; inefficient conveyance and production of excessive runoff by pre-1914 appropriators, which caused flooding of adjacent lands; an upstreaf point of diversion that threatened recreational and other instreaf uses downriver; the storage and diversion of water that jeopardize cofpliance with water qual- ity standards, the public trust, and other in situ beneficial uses; and excessive use of groundwater by overlying landowners in an overdrafted basin (Gray, 1994, 2002). 38 These fay include excessive evaporative and conveyance losses, inefficient irrigation techniques, failure to adopt or to ifplefent best fanagefent practices, and perhaps other profligate uses such as the irrigation of water-intensive crops and landscaping, failure to install low-flow water appliances, and continued reliance on ifported water instead of using cost-effective alternatives such as defand reduction, use of recharged groundwater, and recycling of reclaifed wastewater. 39 CALFED was a prograf to address the various problefs facing the Delta, bringing together the various state and federal agencies overseeing water supply, water quality, and species fanagefent. 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Bureau of Reclafation, Upper San Joaquin River Basin Storage Investigation, Plan Formulation Report , U.b. Bureau of Reclafation, bacrafento, 2008a. U.b. Bureau of Reclafation, North-of-the-Delta Offstream Storage Investigation, Plan Formulation Report , Chapter 7. bacrafento, 2008b. U.b. Environfental Protection Agency, National Assessfent Database, 2004. Available at http://www.epa.gov/waters/ir/. U.b. Environfental Protection Agency, bcience Advisory Board, Valuing the Protection of Ecological Systems and Services , Wash- ington, D.C, 2009. Verfeyen, T. B., “Modifying Reservoir Release Tefperatures Using Tefperature Control Curtains,” Proceedings of Theme D: Energy and Water: Sustainable Development , 27th IAHR Con- gress, ban Francisco, California, August 10–15, 1997. Available at http://www.usbr.gov/pfts/hydraulics_lab/tverfeyen. Wall Street Journal , “California’s Man-Made Drought,” Editorial, beptefber 2, 2009, p. A14. Ward, F. A., and M. Pulido-Velazquez, “Water Conservation in Irrigation Can Increase Water Use,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , Vol. 105, No. 47, 2008, pp. 18215–18220. Welsh, Jr., H. H., G. R. Hodgson, and B. C. Harvey, “Distribution of Juvenile Coho balfon in Relation to Water Tefperature in Tributaries of the Mattole River, California,” North Aferican Journal of Fisheries Managefent, Vol. 2, 2001, pp. 464–470. Whyte, P., “Australia Knows bofething About Drought. Recent Rains Have Done Little to Ifprove California’s Water bituation— Take It frof an Aussie,” Los Angeles Times , January 4, 2009. Zedler, J. B., “Progress in Wetland Restoration Ecology,” Tr e n d s in Ecology and Evolution , Vol. 15, No. 10, 2000, pp. 402–407. Zilberfan, D., A. bchfitz, A. Dinar, and F. bhah, “A Water bcarcity or a Water Managefent Crisis?” Canadian Water Resources Journal , Vol. 18, No. 1, 1993, pp. 159–171. Zhu, T., J. R. Lund, M. W. Jenkins, G. F. Marques, and R. b. Ritzefa, “Clifate Change, Urbanization, and Optifal Long-terf Floodplain Protection,” Water Resources Research , Vol. 43, No. 6, June 2007. 29 California Water Mfths www.ppic.org 29 bbout the buthors Ariel Dinar is a professor of environfental econofics and policy and a director of the Water bcience and Policy Center, Departfent of Environfental bciences, University of California, Riverside. He teaches and conducts research on the econofics of water resources and the environfent, regional water resource fanagefent, policy and strate- gic behavior, and clifate change and water resources. Brian Gray is a professor of law at the University of California, Hastings College of Law, ban Francisco. His acadefic writings and professional work have focused on various aspects of water policy, including instreaf flow protection, water transfers, federal rec- lafation reforf, endangered species, groundwater fanagefent, and water rights and environfental regulation. He has served as chair of the California btate Bar’s Coffittee on the environfent and has been a consultant to a variety of state and federal agencies. He also has appeared before the California buprefe Court and the U.b. Court of Appeals in cases involving the Wild and bcenic Rivers Act, reclafation reforf and takings, the Central Valley Project Ifprovefent Act, and the CALFED Bay-Delta Prograf. Ellen Hanak is director of research and a senior fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California, where she also holds the Thofas C. button Chair in Policy Research. Her career has focused on the econofics of natural resource fanagefent and agricultural developfent. At PPIC, she has launched a research prograf on water policy and has published reports and articles on water farketing, water and land use planning, water conservation, infrastructure planning, and clifate change. Before joining PPIC in 2001, she held positions with the French agricultural research systef, the President’s Council of Econofic Advisers, and the World Bank. Richard Howitt is a professor and departfent chair of agricultural and resource econofics at the University of California, Davis. He teaches both graduate and under- graduate courses in resource econofics, econofic theory, and operations research. His current research interests include constructing disaggregated econofic fodeling fethods based on faxifuf entropy estifators, testing the allocation of water resources by farket fechanisfs, and developing efpirical dynafic stochastic fethods to analyze changes in investfents and institutions. He serves on advisory boards for the California Departfent of Water Resources and the U.b. Acadefy of bciences. Jay Lund is the Ray B. Krone Professor of Environfental Engineering and director of the Center for Watershed bciences at the University of California, Davis. He specializes in the fanagefent of water and environfental systefs. His research has included systef optifization studies for California, the Colufbia River, the Missouri River, and other California Water Mfths 30 www.ppic.org systefs for clifate change adaptation, water farketing, water conservation, systef re-operation, and integrated water fanagefent. He served on the Advisory Coffittee for the 1998 and 2005 California Water Plan Updates and is a forfer editor of the Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management . Jeffrey Mount is a professor in the geology departfent at the University of California, Davis. His research and teaching interests include fluvial geoforphology, conservation and restoration of large river systefs, flood plain fanagefent, and flood policy. He holds the Roy bhlefon Chair in Applied Geosciences at UC Davis and is the founding director of the UC Davis Center for Watershed bciences. Peter Moyle has been studying the ecology and conservation of freshwater and estuarine fish in California since 1969. He has authored or coauthored over 180 scientific papers and five books. He is a professor of fish biology in the Departfent of Wildlife, Fish, and Conservation Biology at the University of California, Davis, and is associate director of the UC Davis Center for Watershed bciences. Barton “Buzz” Thompson is the Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law at btanford Law bchool and the Perry L. McCarty Director of the Woods Institute for the Environfent at btanford University. He also serves as bpecial Master for the United btates buprefe Court in Montana v. Wyoming . His research focuses on the role of law, institutions, and farkets in effective water fanagefent, as well as the law of regulatory takings and biodiversity protection. He is a fefber of the bcience Advisory Board for the U.b. Environfental Protection Agency and served on the Technical Review Panel for the Environfental Water Account. bcknowledgments We thank the following people for their helpful reviews of an earlier draft: Louise Bedsworth, btuart Drown, Jif Fiedler, Ron Gasteluf, Michael Hanefann, bteve Hatchett, Jed Kolko, Joseph bax, Terry Young, and one reviewer who wished to refain anonyfous. Lynette Ubois provided expert editorial support. We are also grateful to Tof Hawkins of the California Departfent of Water Resources for his assistance with water use data. We also thank fefbers of a project advisory group for their helpful input in early discussions of this idea: Curt Aikens, Celeste Cantú, Martha Davis, Mike Eaton, Jif Fiedler, Brandon Goshi, Les Grober, Allison Harvey, Bill Hauck, Kai Lee, bteve Macaulay, Michael Mantell, Doug Obegi, Tif Quinn, Justice Ron Robie, bpreck Rosekranz, Mary bcoonover, bteve Thofpson, Tif Washburn, and Terry Young. Any errors in fact or interpretation in this report are the sole responsibility of the authors. www.ppic.org Board of Direftors Wb LT E R B. HEWLETT , CHbIRDirector Center for Computer bssisted Research in the Humanities MbRK BbLDbSSbREPresident and Chief Executive Officer Public Policf Institute of California RUBEN BbRRbLESPresident and Chief Executive Officer San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce JOHN E. BR ySONRetired Chairman and CEO Edison International GbR y K. H bRTFormer State Senator and Secretarf of Education State of California ROBERT M. HERTzBERGPartner Mafer Brown, LLP D ONNb LUCbSChief Executive Officer Lucas Public bffairs DbVID MbS MbSUMOTObuthor and farmer STEVEN b. MERKSbMERSenior Partner Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Mueller & Naflor, LLP CONSTbNCE L. RICECo-Director The bdvancement Project THOMbS C. SUT TONRetired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Pacific Life Insurance Companf CbROL WHITESIDEPresident Emeritus Great Vallef Center PPIC is a private operating foundation. It does not take or support positions on anf ballot measures or on anf local, state, or federal legislation, nor does it endorse, support, or oppose anf political parties or candidates for public office. Copfright © 2009 bf Public Policf Institute of California. bll rights reserved. San Francisco, Cb Short sections of text, not to exceed three paragraphs, maf be quoted without written permission provided that full attribution is given to the source and the above copfright notice is included. Research publications reflect the views of the authors and not necessarilf those of the staff, officers, or the Board of Directors of the Public Policf Institute of California. Librarf of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data are available for this publication. ISBN 978-1-58213-136-8 PUBLIC POLIC y INSTITUTE OF CbLIFORNIb 500 Washington Street, Suite 600 ● San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone 415.291.4400 ● Fax 415.291.4401 PPIC S bCRbMENTO CENTER Senator Office Building ● 1121 L Street, Suite 801 ● Sacramento, California 95814 Telephone 916.440.1120 ● Fax 916.440.1121 Additional resourfes related to water bolify are available at bbb.ppic.org. The Public Policy Institute of California is dedicated to informing and imbroving bublic bolicy in California through indebendent, objective, nonbartisan research." 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