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object(Timber\Post)#3742 (44) { ["ImageClass"]=> string(12) "Timber\Image" ["PostClass"]=> string(11) "Timber\Post" ["TermClass"]=> string(11) "Timber\Term" ["object_type"]=> string(4) "post" ["custom"]=> array(5) { ["_wp_attached_file"]=> string(13) "R_1113MBR.pdf" ["wpmf_size"]=> string(6) "441603" ["wpmf_filetype"]=> string(3) "pdf" ["wpmf_order"]=> string(1) "0" ["searchwp_content"]=> string(74695) "Funding Public Safety Realignment November 2013 Mia Bird and Joseph Hayes http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 2 Summary California’s recent p ublic safety realignment transferred substantial authority and funds from the state to the counties to manage lower -level felon populations. The success or failure of this experiment will have profound implications throughout the state, beyond just the realm of public safety. If counties are able to handle these new populations and improve upon the state’s record of reducing recidivism, the results could include dec lining crime rates, lower- cost supervision of offenders, and the liberation of state resources to devote t o other concerns. If the counties’ efforts are insufficient or misdirected, crime rates could stagnate or grow worse, prompting more costly measures such as jail capacity expansion or more intensive supervision, while also shifting the prison overcrowding problem from the state to the county level with all of the attendant implications for county budget priorities. Each county’s experience with realignment will depend, in part, on whether it has sufficient resources to carry out its plan. That is the subjec t of this report : the state’s provision of realignment funds to the counties, the changing allocations of those funds among the counties, and our own proposal for a funding allocation model to use in the future. Our aim is to illuminate the development of the initial and current funding models, to carefully consider their key elements and th eir shortcomings, and to propose a new model that addresses these shortcomings . We begin with a n examination of the state’s mechanism for funding public safety realignment, including the overall funding level , state revenue sources, and the categories of state funding streams . We then turn to our main topic —the allocation of realignment funds across counties. We expla in the initial model developed by the Realignment Allocation Committee to determine the share of total funding for realignment that each county would receive. The Year 1 model allocated funding based primarily on the projected increase in counties’ offender populat ions that realignment would induce. T he committee balanced the model somewhat by also considering each count y’s estimated overall adult population and the county’s success in reducing returns to prison for probation revocations under SB 678. However, concerns emerged among some county officials that th is model rewarded counties with high pre-realignment prison use. In the Year 2 –3 model , the committee attempted to address that concern by introducing great er flexibility into the formula —as a result, cou nties with low levels of state prison us e prior to realignment received relatively large increases in their allocations. Nonetheless , questions about the fairness and efficacy of the allocation persist as the c ommittee continues to work on the development of a permanent allocation model . W e argue that the ideal components of such a model must include differences ac ross counties in the burden of realignment, differences in the capacities of counties to manage their realignment populations , and the inclusion of recidivism reduction bonu ses to incentivize state goals. Finally, as a practical consideration, w e recognize that developing and using such a funding model requires access to app ropriate, high -quality data. To this end, we identify publicly available d ata to measure these components and use them to calculate recommended allocation shares , which we compare with the allocations from previous years’ models . Our proposed Year 4 model consists of a base allocation, adjustments fo r county characteristics, and incentive bonuses for reductions in recidivism. We believe that our model will prove useful to policymakers— not only as they de velop their Year 4 strategies for distributing realignment allocations to the counties , but also as a sound foundation for building a permanent allocation model. Contents Summary 2 Figures 4 Tables 4 Glossary 5 Introduction 6 Overview of Realignment Funding 8 How was Funding Allocated to Counties in Year 1? 10 How Did the County Allocation Model Change in Year 2? 14 Year 3 Allocation Shares 16 Criteria for the Development of a Permanent Funding Allocation Model 17 Key Components of a Permanent Funding Allocation Model 18 Capturing Differences in the Realignment Burden 18 Capturing Differences in County Capacities 19 Incentivizing State Goals 19 Proposed Year 4 Model 21 Realignment Burden: The Base Allocation 21 Capacity Adjustments: Differences in County Characteristics 22 Incentive Bonuses: Recidivism Reduction 23 County Allocations Under Our Proposed Year 4 Model 23 Conclusion 26 References 28 About the Authors 29 Acknowledgments 29 A technical appendi x to this paper is available on the PPIC website: www.ppic.org/content/pubs/other/1113MBR_ appendix.pdf http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 4 Figures 1. Prison incarceration rates by county 13 2. Average change in funding share by model type 16 3. Scatterplot of poverty rates and pre -realignment state prison incarceration rates, 2011 22 Tables 1. Statewide initial realignment funding levels, Years 1– 3 (in millions) 9 2. Year 1 realignment allocations by funding category 11 3. Changes in share of programmatic funding allocations from Year 1 to Year 2 14 4. Proposed Year 4 model: County allocation shares compared with past allocation shares 24 http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 5 Glossary 1170(h) The penal code designation for felony offenders convicted of non-violent, non-serious, non-sexual crimes . Under realignment, these offenders will serve their sentences in county jails rather than state prison. The term “1170(h)s” is often used colloqu ially to refer to these offenders . AB 109 The California state law passed in 2011 mandating the implementation of public safety realignment beginning on October 1, 2011 ADP Average Daily Population BSCC Board of State and Community Corrections CAOAC County Administrative Officers Association of California CBP California Budget Project CCP Community Corrections Partnership CDCR California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation CPOC Chief Probation Officers of California CSAC California State Association of Counties DOF (California) Department of Finance DOJ (California) Department of Justice LAO Legislative Analyst’s Office PRCS Post-Release Community Supervision, the county-based supervision of offenders released from state prison that, under realignment, replaces the state-based parole program for a majority of released prisoners SB 678 The law passed in 2009 encouraging counties to reduce the number of offenders returned to state prison for violation of probation rules http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 6 Introducti on On October 1, 2011, California began to implement the most significant change in its correction s policy in a generation. Months earlier, the U .S. Supreme Court had upheld a federal court order that California reduce its prison population to 137.5 percen t of design capacity within two years. The state’s most significant response to this directive was Assembly Bill 109, or as it has become known colloquially, “public safety realignment.” The state’s realignment efforts began with reduc ing the prison population by transferring authority and supervision over lower- level felons from the state to the counties. Specifically, realignment made the following three changes to the way lower -level felons are managed in the criminal justice system: 1. Individuals newly co nvicted of felonies deemed “ non-serious , non- violent , and non -sexual ” (and who have no prior convictions for a serious, violent, or sexual offense) are now sent to county jail rather than state prison. 2. Parole violators are now returned to county jurisdiction rather than state prison for detention following a revocation . 3. Individuals sent to prison for non- violent, non- serious, and non- sexual offen ses are now released to county probation departments (rather than to the state parole system) f or supervision under a program known as post -release community supervision (PRCS) . 1 Each of these elements has clear implications for the state’s 58 counties. First, counties are now responsible for housing new populations of felony offenders, potentially for much longer terms than the counties are accustomed to . The responsibility for these offenders (known colloquially as 1170(h) s after the penal code section that governs their sentencing) will pose a particular challenge for counties experiencing capacit y constraints (Lofstrom and Raphael , 2013). Second, under PRCS, counties are responsible for monitoring newly released prisoners and guiding them through the battery of available county -level rehabilitation programs. And finally, county resources will be f urther stretched by the need to house released offenders whose state parole term is revoked or who violate the terms of their PRCS (Lofstrom and Raphael , 2013) . T he rationale espoused by proponents of realignment is that counties are better positioned tha n the state to manage these populations. The realignment program also encourages the use of alternatives to incarceration , including “evidence- based practices” designed to improve rehabilitative efforts and reduce recidivism. Proponents argue that b y keepi ng offenders in their own communities and leveraging county -level programs (e.g. , drug treatment, job training, and other social services), the counties will be able to better address the needs of current and former prisoners and will also be able to achieve better community reentry outcomes ( and at a lower cost ) than the state. The state provides funding to compensate counties for these new responsibilities : T he legislature provided nearly $400 million to be distributed among the counties during the f irst nine months of realignment and more than doubled that figure for the following full year. Proposition 30, approved by the voters in the November 2012 election, guarantees the counties a continuing source of realignment funding. However, realignment co sts will vary across counties, given differences in the size and composition of the realigned population and differences in the demographic, economic , and geographic characteristics of the 1 Individuals assessed as High Risk Sex Offenders, Mentally Disordered Offenders, or who are convicted of a “third strike” —even if their third offense is non -serious or non -violent —are still released to state parole instead of PRCS. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 7 counties . The degree to which counties utilize traditional incarceration, alternative sanctioning , or rehabilitative programming tools to manage this population may also affect costs. Now well into the third funding year of realignment, debate persists about the inter -county allocation of available fund ing, and that is t he subject of this report . Wh at was the rationale behind the allocation of realignment fund ing in the first year? How has that rationale changed as the allocation formula was amended for the second and third years? And f inally, how might we arrive at a long-term funding allocation model that is efficacious , reliable, transparent, politically feasible , and responsive to changes in county circumstances over time? The centerpiece of this paper is a proposed allocation funding model that satisfies these crit eria. This new model considers both realignment and general populations, makes adjustments for county characteristics, and includes incentives for reductions in recidivism. Our model uses publicly available data and could be used to generate allocations fo r the fourth funding year and beyond. We begin with an overview of the sources of state funding and the categories of realignment funding streams, including a discussion of the initial funding level, subsequent increases, and the measures designed to guara ntee counties’ access to funding. We then look more closely at the first year’s formula for allocating funding among the counties : its rationale and composition, the resulting allocations, and the counties’ responses to their allotment. This leads us into a discussion of the changes implemented in the second and third years’ formula and an examination of the results of the most recent formula. Finally, we propose a fourth -year model that addresses some of the perceived shortcomings of the early formulas , di scuss the results of th e new model , and consider the challenges confronting its implementation a s a permanent allocation formula. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 8 Overview of Realignment Funding At the outset of realignment, the California State Legislature directed a portion of the state sales tax to the counties to help them implement public safety realignment (Misczynski , 2011). This arrangement provided nearly $400 millio n to the counties during the first nine months of realignment ( referred to in this report as the Year 1 allocat ion). However, c ounty officials worried that while realignment was here to stay, a future g overnor or l egislature might amend or rescind the associated revenue stream, leaving the responsibility for realignment in place while cutting off the funding necess ary to support it. Proposition 30 , passed by the voters in November 2012 , addressed th is concern . It created a constitutional amendment that ensured the state -to - county funding for corrections realignment would continue; and to support this objective, it temporarily increas ed the state sales tax and the income tax on high- income Californians (California Budget Project , 2012 a) . In addition to these dedicated funding sources, Prop 30 provided protections for the counties against future changes in realignment funding (California Budget Project , 2012 b). Because realignment began three months into fiscal year 2011 –12, the Year 1 allocation only covered nine months. The allocations for Year 2 (July 2012– June 2013) and Year 3 (July 2013 –June 2014) cover 12- month p eriods. The state’s realignment funding model anticipates natural caseload growth as counties incrementally assume the corrections responsibilities transferred under realignment. U ndistributed growth is projected for the program for at least the next three fiscal years. The state is currently in the process of finalizing the growth fund allocation for Years 2 and 3. Although the state has dedicated substantial amounts of funding to its counties ( nearly $2.3 billion over the first three years of realignment ), a comparison of this funding level to annual spending prior to realignment reveals net savings in each year of realignment ( California Budget Project, 2013). The CBP estimates that state spending on adult corrections in FY 2013–14 will be approximately $500 million less than in FY 2010– 11, the year prior to realignment. 2 The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) uses projections of state spending in the absence of realignment, rather than pre -realignment spending levels, to calc ulate its budget comparison s. Using this method, CDCR finds general fund savings of more than $1 billion in Year 2 of realignment and $1.3 billion in Year 3. When compared with realignment expenditures during those years (see Table 1), these projections s uggest ongoing annual net savings in the hundreds of millions of dollars under realignment ( California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2012). Table 1 summarizes funding levels by category for the first three years of realignment. The Realign ment Allocation Committee (the decisionmaking body responsible for determining the initial allocation of realignment funding among counties) divide s funding across four categories: 1. Programmatic costs associated with managing the realigned adult offender populations 2. Revocation costs due to hearings for offenders violating the terms of their prison release (these funds are split between the public defender and district attorney offices in each county) 3. Start -up costs involved in building the necessary capac ity for implementing realignment in each county (these were conceived of as one- time costs associated with activities such as hiring, training, staff retention, improving data capacity, contracting, and capacity planning) 4. Community Corrections Partnership (CCP) grants to develop plans for implementing realignment 2 See “A Mixed Picture: State Corrections Spending After the 2011 Realignment,” California Budget Project, 2013. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 9 TABLE 1 Statewide i nitial realignment f unding levels, Years 1– 3 (in millions) Programmatic funding ($) Revocation funding ($) Start- up funding ($) CCP grants ($) Total ($) Year 1 ( Oct . 2011– June 2012) 354.3 12.7 25.0 7.9 399.9 Year 2 ( July 2012– June 2013) 842.9 14.6 – 7.9 865.4 Year 3 ( July 2013– June 2014) 998.9 17.1 – 7.9 1,023.9 SOURCE: Funding amounts provided by CSAC . The committee allocated CCP planning grants according to a simple formula based on county population size. Large counties ( more than 750,000 residents) received $200,000; medium -sized counties received $150,000 ; and small counties (up to 200,000 residents) received $100,00 0 (McIntosh, 2011). Small counties typic ally received a large share of their total funding through th e CCP funding stream to support planning efforts . In larger counties, the CCP funding stream represented a relatively small share of funding when compared to the allocations received through the other three funding streams —programmatic, revocation, 3 and start -up funds. In the first year, the c ommittee allocated these three funding streams based on the Year 1 fu nding allo cation model, as we explain in more detail in the following section. 3 In the first year, the committee allocated revocation funds using the same formula as used for the programmatic funds. For the second and third years, it employed a different formula for the revocation funds than for the programmatic funds. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 10 How Was Funding Allocated to Counties in Year 1? At the request of the governor, the task of determining the initial allocation of programmatic funding among the counties fell to the California State Association of Counties (CSAC). CSAC requested that the Cou nty Administrative Officers Association of California (CAOAC) convene a Realignment Allocation Committee, which consisted of three urban, three suburban, and three rural county administrative off icers (Jett and Hancock , 2013). A CSAC memo det ails the follo wing principles established by the Realignment Allocation Committee to guide the development of the first year model :  The Year 1 allocation for 2011 –12 would apply only for the first year of the AB 109 population shift, given the significance of realignme nt policy changes and the sense of “ unknown.”  The Year 2 and subsequent year allocation formula(s) would be open for discussion and would be informed by additional data and actual programmatic experience.  The allocation formula should be simple in its app roach. (McIntosh, 2012: p.2) At the outset, the c ommittee recognized the f irst-year model would be temporary. Over time, as realignment rolled out, the committee would have access to more information about realignment populations and their outcomes across counties. Under the constraints of limited experience and data , the committee arrived at the model they used to produce the allocation share of each county (Table 2) . The model was composed of the following three key components, weighted to reflect the relative importance of each component: 1. A county’s projected full roll -out realignment population (weighted at 60%) 4 2. A county’s adult pop ulation, ages 18–64 (weighted at 30% ) 3. A county’s performan ce under the implementation of SB 678 ( weighted at 10% ) 5 In a ddition, the c ommittee established a minimum funding level of $76,833 for the three least populous counties —Alpine, Sierra , and Modoc. The c ommittee also enhanced the funding level for the largest county, Los Angeles. As explained in the previous section, the committee used a different model for the CCP planning allocations. 4 The full roll-out reali gnment population, as projected by the Department of Finance, was an estimate of the population counties would need to manage at full implementation of realignment. Implementation was assumed to be complete at the end of Year 4. 5 The California Community Corrections Performance Incentives Act of 2009, or SB 678, established a system that rewarded county probation offices with funding tied to measured decreases in recidivism —specifically, the number of commitments to prison for probation violations. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 11 TABLE 2 Year 1 realignment a llocations by funding c ategory County Programmatic ($) Revocation (PD /DA )* ($) Start- up funding ($) CCP planning ($) Total ($) Alameda 9,221,012 330,530 650,650 200,000 10,402,192 Alpine 76,883 2,756 5,425 100,000 185,064 Amador 543,496 19,482 38,350 100,000 701,328 Butte 2,735,905 98,069 193,050 150,000 3,177,024 Calaveras 350,757 12,573 24,750 100,000 488,080 Colusa 214,352 7,684 15,125 100,000 337,160 Contra Costa 4,572,950 163,919 322,675 200,000 5,259,544 Del Norte 221,438 7,938 15,625 100,000 345,000 El Dorado 1,210,643 43,396 85,425 100,000 1,439,464 Fresno 8,838,368 316,814 623,650 200,000 9,978,832 Glenn 331,271 11,875 23,375 100,000 466,520 Humboldt 1,526,679 54,724 107,725 100,000 1,789,128 Imperial 1,296,384 46,469 91,475 100,000 1,534,328 Inyo 190,968 6,845 13,475 100,000 311,288 Kern 10,834,140 388,353 764,475 200,000 12,186,968 Kings 2,862,035 102,591 201,950 100,000 3,266,576 Lake 820,913 29,426 57,925 100,000 1,008,264 Lassen 384,770 13,792 27,150 100,000 525,712 Los Angeles 112,558,276 4,034,688 7,942,300 200,000 124,735,264 Madera 1,688,240 60,516 119,125 100,000 1,967,880 Marin 1,304,178 46,749 92,025 150,000 1,592,952 Mariposa 165,458 5,931 11,675 100,000 283,064 Mendocino 993,812 35,624 70,125 100,000 1,199,560 Merced 2,498,524 89,560 176,300 150,000 2,914,384 Modoc 76,883 2,756 5,425 100,000 185,064 Mono 100,267 3,594 7,075 100,000 210,936 Monterey 3,846,989 137,897 271,450 150,000 4,406,336 Napa 1,051,917 37,706 74,225 100,000 1,263,848 Nevada 515,152 18,466 36,350 100,000 669,968 Orange 23,078,393 827,253 1,628,450 200,000 25,734,096 Placer 2,986,395 107,048 210,725 150,000 3,454,168 Plumas 153,766 5,512 10,850 100,000 270,128 Riverside 21,074,473 755,421 1,487,050 200,000 23,516,944 Sacramento 13,140,278 471,018 927,200 200,000 14,738,496 San Benito 547,748 19,634 38,650 100,000 706,032 San Bernardino 25,785,600 924,293 1,819,475 200,000 28,729,368 San Diego 25,105,698 899,922 1,771,500 200,000 27,977,120 San Francisco 5,049,838 181,013 356,325 200,000 5,787,176 San Joaquin 6,785,908 243,243 478,825 150,000 7,657,976 San Luis Obispo 2,200,557 78,880 155,275 150,000 2,584,712 San Mateo 4,222,902 151,371 297,975 150,000 4,822,248 Santa Barbara 3,878,876 139,040 273,700 150,000 4,441,616 Santa Clara 12,566,312 450,444 886,700 200,000 14,103,456 Santa Cruz 1,662,730 59,601 117,325 150,000 1,989,656 Shasta 2,988,875 107,137 210,900 100,000 3,406,912 Sierra 76,883 2,756 5,425 100,000 185,064 http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 12 County Programmatic ($) Revocation (PD /DA )* ($) Start- up funding ($) CCP planning ($) Total ($) Siskiyou 445,001 15,951 31,400 100,000 592,352 Solano 3,807,662 136,487 268,675 150,000 4,362,824 Sonoma 3,240,428 116,154 228,650 150,000 3,735,232 Stanislaus 6,010,700 215,456 424,125 150,000 6,800,280 Sutter 1,167,419 41,847 82,375 100,000 1,391,640 Tehama 1,212,415 43,459 85,550 100,000 1,441,424 Trinity 144,554 5,182 10,200 100,000 259,936 Tulare 5,657,817 202,806 399,225 150,000 6,409,848 Tulare 5,657,817 202,806 399,225 150,000 6,409,848 Tuolumne 598,767 21,463 42,250 100,000 762,480 Ventura 5,696,790 204,203 401,975 200,000 6,502,968 Yolo 2,974,703 106,629 209,900 150,000 3,441,232 Yuba 1,005,858 36,055 70,975 100,000 1,212,888 Total 354,300,000 12,700,000 25,000,000 7,850,000 399,850,000 *Revocation funds are split between the public defender and district attorney offices in each county. SOURCE: Funding allocations provided by CSAC . The Year 1 funding allocation model has a number of advantages, including its transparency and simplicity. The rationale behind the Year 1 approach is straightforward: T he model primarily allocates funding among counties based on project ed differences in expected growth of the populations they manage, with a substantial adjustment for county population size and a slight adjustment for efforts on the part of counties to reduce prison incarceration prior to realignment. In the first year ( i.e., nine months) of realignment, the c ommittee emphasized the new burden counties would experience in allocating funding. County responses to the Year 1 funding were mixed. In general, counties expressed concerns about whether the total funding available for the first year of realignment would be adequat e to effectively manage realignment . Counties were also concerned abo ut the stability of funding over time. In Year 2, the total funding level would be increased to reflect the longer funding period (12 months) and to recognize the expected caseload growth stemming from the implementation of realignment sentencing changes. To some extent, this increase in total funding eased concerns about funding adequacy. Furth er, Proposition 30, approved by voters in November 2012, would solidify the funding source for public safety realignment, largely putt ing this concern to rest. In addition to these shared concerns, a select group of counties questioned the fairness of the init ial allocation. T hose counties with low pre -realignment state prison incarceration rates made the case that the Year 1 model unfairly disadvantaged them by tying funding to the relative size of pre -realignment prison populations. Figure 1 shows the va riation across counties in prison incarceration rates prior to realignment. We see a wide range, with some counties sending relatively few offenders to state prison. These counties, the argument goes, had taken the initiative and borne the cost of reducing their contributions to the state prison population prior to realignment and, as a result, received less funding due to the heavy weight on realignment population projections in the Year 1 model . Table 2 (continued) http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 13 FIGURE 1 Prison i ncarceration r ates by c ounty SOURCE : Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice (201 0). The argument made by counties with low prison incarceration rates rested on the method used by the Department of Finance (DOF) to project rea lignment populations. A few words about the construction of this co mponent of the Year 1 model are in order. First, the realignment population projections are expressed in terms of an Average Daily Population (ADP). Instead of estimating counts of low er-level felony offenders entering (and exiting) the county system, the ADP captures the equivalent of one inmate in one jail space for one year (McIntosh, 2011) . Second, the DOF , relying on available data, made these projection s based on the population of offenders housed in state prison in 2010. As a result, those counties that had sent a high share of their felony convictions to state prison were projected to have large realignment populations, while those counties that had retained a high share of their felony convictions at the local level were projected to have relatively small realignment populations. Calculated as such, the DOF projections capture the shift in the burden from the state to counties at the time of realignment , rather than the total b urden counties bear in managing the lower -lev el felon population . As a result, allocations made based on the projected realignment population would be widely divergent from allocations based on the county adult population, a challenge recognized by the c ommittee at the outset (McIntosh, 2012). In cra fting the Year 2 allocation model, the c ommittee attempted to address this concern by introducing greater flexibility into the model components . http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 14 How Did the County Allocation Model Change in Year 2? Given the speed with which realignment l egislation was passed and implemented, the Realignment Allocation Committee had limited time to determine the initial allocation model, but committed to revisit the iss ue in the second funding year (McIntosh , 2012) . Partly i n response t o concerns about the fairness of the initial allocation, the c ommittee introduced flexibility in to the Year 2 allocation model for the largest funding component, the programmatic funding . The Year 2 model ensured that each county would receive a minimum programmatic- funding level equal to twice its Year 1 allocation. An increase this large was possible because the total statewide allocation had more than double d due to the lo nger coverage period in Year 2 (12 months compared to 9 months in Year 1) as well as stronger revenue and stabilized revenue sources. The Year 2 model allow ed each county to receive the best programmatic allocation from the following four possible models : 1. A model that doubled the Year 1 allocation 2. A model that applied the Year 1 formula to updated population and SB 678 data 3. A model based entirely on the size of the projected realignment population 6 or 4. A model based entirely on the size of the county adul t population Table 3 summarizes the resulting changes in the programmatic funding shares from Year 1 to Year 2 by count y. 7 While the dollar value of the allocation incr eased for all counties in Year 2 due to the increase in total funding for realignment, counties experienced substantial shifts in the share of the total funding they received. Some counties received a greater share than they had in Year 1 (as much as a 77% greater share) and other counties received a smaller share (as much as 16 % smaller ). Table 3 shows the percent change in th e share received resulting from the change in the allocation formula in Year 2 and indicates the model used to arrive at the Year 2 allocation for each county . Counties that received their best allocation under m odel 4 (the model based entirely on adult population size) experienced, on average, a relative increase in the share of total programmatic funding they received. In contrast, counties that received their best allocation under one of the other models experienced relative declines in their programmatic shares. TABLE 3 Change s in share of programmatic funding a llocations from Year 1 to Year 2 County Year 1 programmatic share (%) Year 2 programmatic share (%) Change in share (%) Year 2 allocation model Alameda 2.60 3.47 33.20 County adult population Alpine 0.02 0.02 -16.13 Double Year 1 allocation Amador 0.15 0.13 -12.58 Year 1 m odel Butte 0.77 0.66 -13.93 Year 1 m odel Calaveras 0.10 0.09 -4.75 County adult population Colusa 0.06 0.05 -15.21 Year 1 m odel 6 The committee drew on DOF realignment population projections but made slight adjustments to these projections for counties with e xtremely high state prison incarceration rates prior to realignment. 7 Elizabeth Howard Espinosa (CSAC) provided allocation and model information to the authors. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 15 County Year 1 programmatic share (%) Year 2 programmatic share (%) Change in share (%) Year 2 allocation model Contra Costa 1.29 2.29 77.27 County adult population Del Norte 0.06 0.06 3.52 County adult population El Dorado 0.34 0.40 15.60 County adult population Fresno 2.49 2.47 -1.15 Realignment population projection Glenn 0.09 0.08 -15.94 Double Year 1 allocation Humboldt 0.43 0.40 -8.01 Realignment population projection Imperial 0.37 0.37 1.37 County adult population Inyo 0.05 0.05 -12.99 Realignment population projection Kern 3.06 2.78 -9.01 Realignment population projection Kings 0.81 0.72 -11.28 Year 1 m odel Lake 0.23 0.21 -11.35 Realignment population projection Lassen 0.11 0.09 -15.01 Realignment population projection Los Angeles 31.77 31.77 0.00 Special allocation Madera 0.48 0.41 -14.31 Year 1 m odel Marin 0.37 0.54 47.08 County adult population Mariposa 0.05 0.04 -13.92 Year 1 m odel Mendocino 0.28 0.24 -12.73 Year 1 m odel Merced 0.71 0.62 -12.38 Realignment population projection Modoc 0.02 0.02 -8.76 County adult population Mono 0.03 0.03 21.20 County adult population Monterey 1.09 0.94 -13.34 Realignment population projection Napa 0.30 0.29 -1.41 County adult population Nevada 0.15 0.21 44.43 County adult population Orange 6.51 6.68 2.55 County adult population Placer 0.84 0.73 -12.92 County adult population Plumas 0.04 0.04 -2.76 County adult population Riverside 5.95 5.12 -13.87 Realignment population projection Sacramento 3.71 3.33 -10.19 Realignment population projection San Benito 0.15 0.13 -15.91 Double Year 1 a llocation San Bernardino 7.28 6.63 -8.97 Realignment population projection San Diego 7.09 7.02 -0.99 County adult population San Francisco 1.43 2.03 42.16 County adult population San Joaquin 1.92 1.75 -8.45 Realignment population projection San Luis Obispo 0.62 0.61 -1.06 County adult population San Mateo 1.19 1.60 33.91 County adult population Santa Barbara 1.09 0.95 -13.62 Year 1 m odel Santa Clara 3.55 4.00 12.88 County adult population Santa Cruz 0.47 0.61 30.81 County adult population Shasta 0.84 0.74 -12.06 Year 1 model Sierra 0.02 0.02 -16.13 Double Year 1 a llocation Siskiyou 0.13 0.11 -15.21 Year 1 m odel Solano 1.07 1.00 -6.73 Realignment population projection Sonoma 0.91 1.07 17.10 County adult population Stanislaus 1.70 1.45 -14.38 Year 1 m odel Sutter 0.33 0.30 -9.62 Realignment population projection Table 3 (continued) http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 16 County Year 1 programmatic share (%) Year 2 programmatic share (%) Change in share (%) Year 2 allocation model Tehama 0.34 0.30 -11.40 Year 1 m odel Trinity 0.04 0.04 -13.48 Year 1 m odel Tulare 1.60 1.39 -12.96 Year 1 m odel Tuolumne 0.17 0.14 -15.86 Year 1 model Ventura 1.61 1.79 11.20 County adult population Yolo 0.84 0.72 -14.70 Double Year 1 a llocation Yuba 0.28 0.25 -12.40 Realignment population projection SOURCE: Information provided by CSAC . Figure 2 summarizes the average change in county allocation shares by model type for the Year 2 allocation. Note that Los Angeles County continued to receive a special allocation and thus experienced no change in its share of programmatic funding between Year 1 and Year 2. FIGURE 2 Average c hange in funding share by model type SOURCE: Information provided by CSAC (see Table 3) . Year 3 Allocation Shares The Realignment Allocation Committee recommended that the Year 2 (FY 2012–13) allocation shares remain in plac e for Year 3 (FY 2013 –14) to provide counti es with stability and certainty for planning p urposes. As a result, counties are receiving the same relative share of programmatic funding in the current year as they received in FY 2012– 13. Howe ver, the c ommittee is in the process of developing a new, and potentially permanent, program matic funding model and will recommend a model for Year 4 funding allocations to t he governor for consideration during the FY 2014–15 budget process. As the c ommittee develops these recommendations , we, along with other outside groups, hope to provide analysis to infor m the process. The remaining sections of this report offer criteria for the development of a permanent model , outline key model components that flow from those criteria, and propose a Year 4 funding allocation model based on those components . 16.4% -10.2% -13.5% -15.8% 0.0% -20% -15% -10% -5%0% 5% 10% 15% 20% County adult population Realignment population projection Year 1 model Double Year 1 allocation Special allocation (Los Angeles) Percent change Table 3 (continued) http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 17 Permanent Funding Allocation Model We use the term “criteria” here to refer to the principles that we believe should guide the development of the funding allocation model. Before presenting our m odel, we review the criteria we used to guide our analysis. 1. Efficacy . The overriding goal of a funding allocation model is efficacy: T he resulting allocation of funds should incentivize and empower counties to successfully implement their plans for realignment . The additional criteria listed below are largely in the service of this goal. As defined here, an efficacious allocation of funds would en able counties to take on the burden of realignment, while accounting for differences in the counties’ capacities to manag e the realigned population and incorporat e further incentives for reducing recidivism . 2. Reliability . The permanent funding allocation model should produce allocations that are reliable over time. S wings in year -to -year allocations impede the ability of counties to plan and commit res ources to poli cy goals. There are two primary reasons for funding instability : chang es in the underlying model and poor quality data, which can lead to measurement error that produces year -to -year swings in key model components . To achieve reliability, the underlying model must be consistent over time , an d the model must be able to rely upon high- quality data. 3. Responsive ness. T he permanent funding allocation model should be responsive to genuine changes in the burden of real ignment over time and in county capacities to manage that burden. Th us, the data underlying our model need to be selected to reflect both current circumstances and changes over time. Currently, the projected realignment population —the estimate of the burden of realignment —is based on 2010 prison i ncarceration levels and is therefore un responsive to changes in the burden over time. 4. Transparency . The permanent funding allocation model should be public ly accessible and easily understood . The complexity of past models, along with challenges to accessing model documentation, has limited transparency. 5. Political Feasibility . The permanent funding allocation model must be politically feasible. Currently, the Realignment All ocation Committee consists of county representatives . This group must arrive at an alloc ation model that is perceived as fair and acc eptable to committee members . However, the c ommittee must also strive to maintain the trust of other stakeholders —the governor, legislat ors, and the public —in order to continue in this role. In the next section, we highlight t he key components of a permanent funding model that meet the criteria outlined here. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 18 Key Components of a Permanent Funding Allocation Model If a permanent funding mode l is to satisfy the criteria outlined in the pr evious section, it must include certain key c omponents. We highlight those components here and describe how the Realignment Allocation Committee might incorporate them into a n allocation model. Capturing Differences in the Realignment Burden A permanent funding model needs to resolve past controversies over how the model captures the realignment burden . Changes in how the burden is measured have driven the swings we have seen in funding allocations . I nitia lly, the committee emphasized DOF projections of the full roll -out realignment population. These projections varied by county , based on the extent to which counties sent lower -level felons to prison prior to realignment. In the early years of realignment, the re was a clear rationale for measuring the burden of realignment in this way —counties that sent high share s of their lower- level felon population to state prison would experience large increases in the ir locally managed population s relative to counties that had retained large shares of lower -level felons prior to realignment . This realignment-induced change in the locally managed population in the early years may have been particularly difficult to cope wit h and may have required additional resourc es. However, in a permanent funding model , the overall size and composition of the counties ’ lower -level felon populations becomes more importan t than the changes they experienced in the early stages of realignment . An accurate assessment of differences in the realignment burden across counties is essential to producing a n effective and responsive allocation. While the c ommittee emphasized realignment projections by weighting them at 60 percent in the Year 1 model, they also gave some weight (half as much) to an alternative measure —the size of the county adult population. T he committee used these measures together to approximate the size of the realignment population and the burden the counties were undertaking in managing this group . In the face of controversy, the Year 2 allocation s based the entire allocation for some counties on realignment projections and the entire allocation for other counties on adult population, resulting in large swings in the share of total funding received by counties. Furthermore , while the adult population varies over time, the original 2010 realignment projections are fixed in time and unresponsive to changes in the size of lower- level felon populations. Appropriately capturing differences in the realignment burden across counties sh ould be an essential component of a permanent funding model. The key challenge s in capturing the realignment population are the availability and quality of data. In the ideal case, a permanent funding allocation model would include prior year counts of 11 70(h), PRCS, and p arole violator populations. 8 In addition, information on the risk compositions of these populations would be helpful in understanding how the burden of realignment varies across counties. The CDCR currently tracks prison releases, capturing both the PRCS and p arole populations returning to counties; and the DOJ receives data from counties ca pturing convictions, which may allow for the identification of the 1170(h) population. Taken together, these data would allow for an improvement on current projections of the size 8 The distinction between offender counts and jail ADP is important here. A model that captured jail ADP, rather than offender counts, would privilege (and thus incentivize) the incarceration response relative to the use o f alternative sanctions and rehabilitative interventions. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 19 of the realignmen t population by county, dispelling some of the controversy surrounding the weighting of realignment projections and county population size in the allocation model. While it is theoretically possible to identify the realignment population through s tate data sources, the state ma y need to rely on county data collection efforts. Counties individually track these populations through various data collection systems. If counties could be motivated and supported in integrat ing these systems so as to provide stand ardized collection s of essential data, the state could draw on county data to determine the burden of realignment. Some efforts in this direction are currently under way. For example, the BSCC is working to collect population counts through the AB 109 supp lement to the Jail Profile Survey. CPOC is engaging in complementary efforts to collect realignment population data by county. With increased resources to ensure the quality and improve the timeliness and consistency of reporting, these efforts could provi de estimates of the size of the realigned population over time that are free of ties to the state prison incarceration histories of counties. Captur ing Differences in County Capacities In addition to differences in the realignment burden across counties, differences in the demographic, economic , and geographic charact eristics of counties should also be considered in determining the equitable allocation of funding. These characteristics reflect differences across counties in their capacity to manage realig nment and the relative costs associated with this responsibility . C onsider ation of these differences may also improve perceptions of fairness on the part of the counties, which may lead to easier acceptance of the resulting allocation s. Data describing co unty demographic, economic , and geographic characteristics are typically high quality, reliable, and public ly available through state and national data sources . The key challenge to capturing differences in county capacities will be to select a limited num ber of relevant characteristics. Measures within categories are often correla ted, allowing for simplification without much loss of information . Incentivizing State Goals The state has a particular interest in recidivism outcomes, both in terms of how ma ny realigned offenders end up back in state prison and in terms of how realignment affects public safety. Given these interests, the permanent funding model should incentivize reduction s in recidivism . We recommend that such reductions be rewarded in two ways. First, the funding model could reward those counties that achieve relatively low levels of returns to prison. Additional rewards for reductions in the rates at which counties return offenders to state prison would allow even high -recidivism c ounties to respond to this incentive. Second, the funding model could reward counties for reducing the reconviction rates of realigned offenders who commit new crimes. While realignment significantly enhanced the incentive each county faced to reduce the recidivism level of the locally managed population, tying f unding to the size of the realigned population (as proposed above ) may diminish this incentive because funding will increase proportionally with 1170(h) convictions. A recidivism reduction bonus wo uld balance these incentives by rewarding counties for the reductions in convictions they are able to achieve among this population. This recidivism bonus could reward both counties that achieve low levels of reconvictions and counties that show significan t improvement over time in their reconviction rates. While the Realignment Allocation Committee expressed an early interest in rewarding counties based on recidivism outcomes, high -quality recidivism data ha ve only recently become available because of the http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 20 timeframe required to allow for recidivism outcomes to unfold. R ecidivism data, much like the population count and composition data described above, are theoretically available for the full realignment population through state data sources . CDCR collects data on returns to prison custody for all PRCS and p arole releases, and the DOJ collects data on all convictions and thus may be able to identify the reconviction rates of realigned offenders. If CDCR data wer e combined with DOJ data, we could potentially achieve a full picture of county recidivism levels and improvements over time under realignment. Alternatively, the state may need to rely on recidivism data collected at the county level to capture the impact of realignment . While we approach the possibil ities of these new data sources with optimism, the fact remains that the Realignment Allocation Committee will likely need to offer recommendation s for the Year 4 allocation model before new data sources become available. Given these constraints, we apply the key components described here to the Year 4 allocation using currently available public data. The next section describes our proposed model in detail. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 21 Proposed Year 4 Model As the Realignment Allocation Committee works toward a recommendation for a Year 4 funding model, it will be challenging to balance the range of perspectives and concerns brought to the table by state, coun ty, and community stakeholders. This section d escribes our proposed Year 4 allocation model. In develo ping this model, we drew up on the key components presented in the previous section and evaluated the model based on the criteria outlined earlier in the report . We also drew up on recommendations from our colleagues. The Legislative Analyst’s Office ( LAO) has mentioned its concerns about past allocations and offered a possible model for the future (Taylor, 2012) . The LAO is particularly concerned with establishing a model that appropriately estimates the realignment population and changes over time with changes in the bu rden of realignment . The LAO suggests the best approach would be to base funding allocations on two factors: the size of the at -risk (age s 18– 35) county population and the number of felony dispositions within a county, adjusting for dispos itions that result in prison incarceration. This proposal is promising because it would simplify the current (Year 2) allocation model and apply the same model to all counties. While obtaining reliable felony disposition data may be challenging in the near term, resulting in less transparent allocations, it may become easier in the long term. While t he LAO model is better than the current method at capturing the realignment burden , the trade -off to its simplicity is that it omit s consideration of county dif ferences in the capacity to manage real ignment and offers only limited incentive s for county performance . Using the LAO model as a starting point, we propose a possible Year 4 model that uses currently available data ( rather than the ideal data described in the previous section ) to estimate the burden of realignment and construct a base funding allocation. We then adjust this base allocation for relevant differences in county characteristics and introduce bonuses to the base allocation for county reduction s in recidivism . Finally, we assess the degree to which our proposed Year 4 model meets the criteria we have outlined for a permanent funding model. While this model has its limitations , due primarily to the availability of data, we recommend its adoption because it substant ially improves upon past models and provides a foundation for a permanent model . Realignment Burden: The Base Allocation We propose a Year 4 base allocation that capture s the burden counties bear in managing their lower -level felon population . The base allocation would consist of the following elements : 1. The county share of the total projected full roll -out realignment population ( weighted at 40% ) 2. The county share of the total high- risk population , males age s 18– 29 ( weighted at 60% ) The proposed base allocation reconciles the Year 1 and Year 2 –3 models by rebalancing the weighting of both the projected realignment population and the county adult population. In this case, however, we have refined the adult populatio n measure to capture only the high- risk population, identified in the literature as males age s 18– 29, rather than the full adult population (Laub and Sampson , 2001; Piquero et al. , 2003) . P rojected increases in this population vary across counties ove r time. As a result, the model is designed to adapt along with this indicator to changes in the underlying public safety risk. These changes provide a more accurate assessment of the realignment burden over time, improving the responsiveness of the allocat ion. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 22 While the approach outlined here balances and refines past measures, it still falls short of the ideal described in the previous section. Should data be come available that capture the full realigned population, the base allocation could be adjusted a ccordingly. We explain the proposed base allocation in more detail in the Technical Appendix . Capacity Adjustments: Differences in Count y Characteristics Our proposed model allows for adjustments to the base allocation to capture differences in county characteristics that may affect a county’s capacity to manage the realigned population. While no indicators will perfectly capture relevant differences in county characteristics, this model does bring key indicators of economic and geographic difference into the allocation decision. Because the most critical difference in county demographics —the relative size of the high -risk adult population —is included in the base allocat ion to capture the realignment burden, we have not included it here. We propose the following adjustments to capture relevant economic and geographic differences: 1. Poverty Rate . The poverty rate is a key indicator of the overall level of resou rces in a coun ty. 9 High - poverty counties typically have lower tax bases and serve higher- need populations than low-poverty counties. Local resource constraints likely played an important role in the tendency of relatively poor counties to shift their criminal justice pr oblems to the state prison system prior to realignment. Figure 3 demonstrates the positive relationship between county poverty rates and pre- realignment prison inc arceration rates. Poverty rates are also correlated with other common indicators of local eco nomic status, such as the unemployment rate and median income. 10 In our model, c ounties receive adjustments of up to 10 percent of their base allocation depending on their level of poverty. This adjustment is explained in more detail in the Technical Appendix . FIGURE 3 Scatterplot of poverty r ates and pre -realignment s tate prison i ncarceration r ates, 2011 SOURCE S: Poverty rates are from the United States Department of Agriculture (2011); state prison incarceration rates are from the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice (201 0). 9 We recognize that the federal poverty measure is not ideal because there exist substantial differences in the cost of living across the state. Alternative poverty measures are available for Calif ornia (see Bohn et al. 2013), but we have elected to use the federal poverty measure because it is available for all counties and updated annually. 10 County poverty rates are positively correlated with county unemployment rates (r = 0.62) and negatively correlated with county median income (r = - 0.76). 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 0.0% 5.0.0% 15.0.0.0.0% Pre-realignment state prison incarceration rate per 100,000 adult population (ages 18– 69) Percent of total population in poverty (2011) http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 23 2. Rural Population . The percent of the county population living in rural areas is a key indicator of the challenge of managing and supervising the realigned population. Counties with significant rural populations may be limited in their capacity to reach these populations with services and supervision. Residents of rural areas may also face b arriers to accessing services because service providers are concentrated in urban areas and transportation options are more limited in rural areas. Given these additional barriers to actualizing the community supervision and rehabilitation vision of realig nment, we increase the base allocation of sparsely populated counties by u p to 10 percent , depending on the share of the population living in rural areas . Th is adjustment is explained in more detail in the Technical Appendix . The inclusion of adjustments for differences in county characteristics expands the model to include additional factors, as well as allowing allocation shares to adapt along with changes in the circumstances counties face over time. Incentive Bonuses: Recidivism Reduction Achieving lower rates of recidivism is a key goal for the state because the share of individuals returning to crime has a direct bearing on the state’s ability to reduce prison crowding. It is equally important at the county level because it reflect s the degree to which counties are able to mitigate the effects of realignment on public safety. Our proposed Year 4 model includes two types of incent ive bonuses: 1. Low Rates of Return to Prison. Our proposed model offers a 5 percent bonus to the base allocation of counties that achieve low levels of recidivism , as measured by the share of realigned offenders return ed to prison. Counties also receive a 5 percent bonus if they achieve a relatively high reduction in rates of recidivism , as measured by the year -over -year change in the share of realigned offenders return ed to prison. 2. Low Rates of Conviction . Our proposed model also offers a 5 percent bonus to the base allocation of counties that achieve low levels of recidivism, as measu red by the reconviction levels of realigned offenders . Counties that achieve relatively high recidivism reduction rates, as measured by the year- over -year chan ge in the share of realigned offenders who are convicted of new crimes, also receive a 5 percent bonus. Bonuses for counties with low recidivism levels reward high -performing counties, while bonuses for counties that show strong reductions in their recidiv ism rates allow for counties that begin realignment with relatively high level s of recidivism to receive rewards for improvement over time. These incentive bonuses are explained in more detail in the Technical Appendix . County Allocations under Our Proposed Year 4 Model Under our Year 4 model, the majority of counties would receive an allocation share that falls somewhere between their Year 1 and Year 2–3 share. For those counties that would receive a lower allocation share under this model than in past years, we include a minimum allocation rule to ensure they receive at least their minimum past year allocation. We include this rule because it improves th e political feasibility of the model and because we recognize we have made a strong case for the importance of additional data to appropriately capture the burden of realignment. While we view the proposed Year 4 model as an improvement on past models, it is still an incremental step toward a permanent allocation model. Given the history of shifting allocations over time and the less- than-ideal data available for some of the key components in the model, it seems reasonable to provide the stability of a mini mum allocation in Year 4. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 24 Table 4 indicates where the proposed allocation is based on our Year 4 model , as presented above, and where the share relies on the minimum allocation rule. TABLE 4 Proposed Y ear 4 model : County allocation s hares compared with past a llocation s hares County Year 1 allocation share ( %) Year 2– 3 a llocation share ( %) Proposed year 4 a llocation share ( %) Year 4 allocation model Alameda 2.60 3.47 2.86 Proposed model Alpine 0.02 0.02 0.02 Minimum rule Amador 0.15 0.13 0.13 Minimum rule Butte 0.77 0.66 0.85 Proposed model Calaveras 0.10 0.09 0.09 Minimum rule Colusa 0.06 0.05 0.07 Proposed model Contra Costa 1.29 2.29 1.50 Proposed model Del Norte 0.06 0.06 0.08 Proposed model El Dorado 0.34 0.40 0.34 Minimum rule Fresno 2.49 2.47 2.62 Proposed model Glenn 0.09 0.08 0.09 Proposed model Humboldt 0.43 0.40 0.42 Proposed model Imperial 0.37 0.37 0.43 Proposed model Inyo 0.05 0.05 0.05 Minimum rule Kern 3.06 2.78 2.85 Proposed model Kings 0.81 0.72 0.72 Proposed model Lake 0.23 0.21 0.22 Proposed model Lassen 0.11 0.09 0.17 Proposed model Los Angeles 31.77 31.77 31.77 Minimum rule Madera 0.48 0.41 0.46 Proposed model Marin 0.37 0.54 0.37 Minimum rule Mariposa 0.05 0.04 0.04 Proposed model Mendocino 0.28 0.24 0.24 Proposed model Merced 0.71 0.62 0.76 Proposed model Modoc 0.02 0.02 0.02 Proposed model Mono 0.03 0.03 0.03 Proposed model Monterey 1.09 0.94 1.11 Proposed model Napa 0.30 0.29 0.29 Minimum rule Nevada 0.15 0.21 0.15 Minimum rule Orange 6.51 6.68 6.51 Minimum rule Placer 0.84 0.73 0.79 Proposed model Plumas 0.04 0.04 0.04 Proposed model Riverside 5.95 5.12 5.36 Proposed model Sacramento 3.71 3.33 3.57 Proposed model San Benito 0.15 0.13 0.15 Proposed model San Bernardino 7.28 6.63 6.74 Proposed model San Diego 7.09 7.02 7.90 Proposed model San Francisco 1.43 2.03 1.71 Proposed model San Joaquin 1.92 1.75 1.75 Minimum rule San Luis Obispo 0.62 0.61 0.76 Proposed model San Mateo 1.19 1.60 1.23 Proposed model http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 25 County Year 1 allocation share ( %) Year 2– 3 a llocation share ( %) Proposed year 4 a llocation share ( %) Year 4 allocation model Santa Barbara 1.09 0.95 1.27 Proposed model Santa Clara 3.55 4.00 3.80 Proposed model Santa Cruz 0.47 0.61 0.57 Proposed model Shasta 0.84 0.74 0.74 Proposed model Sierra 0.02 0.02 0.02 Minimum rule Siskiyou 0.13 0.11 0.11 Proposed model Solano 1.07 1.00 1.00 Proposed model Sonoma 0.91 1.07 1.01 Proposed model Stanislaus 1.70 1.45 1.50 Proposed model Sutter 0.33 0.30 0.30 Minimum rule Tehama 0.34 0.30 0.31 Proposed model Trinity 0.04 0.04 0.04 Minimum rule Tulare 1.60 1.39 1.40 Proposed model Tuolumne 0.17 0.14 0.16 Proposed model Ventura 1.61 1.79 1.61 Proposed model Yolo 0.84 0.72 0.89 Proposed model Yuba 0.28 0.25 0.27 Proposed model SOURCES: Years 1 –3: information provided by CSAC; Year 4: allocations resulting from the proposed model . In some cases, counties receive their minimum allocation under this model, but there is no need to impose this minimum allocation level. This is particularly true of counties with the same allocation share under all model years. Table 4 (continued) http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 26 Conclusion As the Realign ment Allocation Committee works on its recommendations for the Year 4 model, it faces the challenge of incorporating the range of perspectives and concerns brought to the table by state, county , and community stakeholders. We offer one possible allocation model as a demonstration of how past models could be reconciled and h ow additional factors could be incorporated into future allocations. Our propos ed model starts with a base allocation that takes into account both the projected realignment population an d the county high- risk adult population to capture the realignment burden . The model then allows for capacity adjustments to this base to capture differences in county economic and geographic characteristics. Finally, the model incorporates incentive bonus es to reward counties for working toward state recidivism goals. The inclusion of these capacity adjustments and incentive bonuses enrich the model to reflect genuine variation in the circumstances and achievements of counties over time. Under our proposed Year 4 model, t he majority of counties would receive an allocation share that falls somewhere between their Year 1 and Year 2 –3 shares. For those counties that would receive a lower allocation share under the proposed model than in past years, we impose a “ minimum past allocation” rule. Although f unding allocation processes are notoriously contentious , reconciling the Year 1 and Year 2–3 approaches may go a long way toward improving perceptions o f fairness across counties. In addition to the question of how realignment population projections should be balanced against co unty population size, counties have also pointed to differences in economic and geographic characteristics as relevant factors in the allocation decision. Economic characteristics , such as the poverty rate, may signal differences in the underlying level of available resources and the ease with which county economies can absorb th eir realignment population s. Similarly, geographic characteristics, such as the share of the population residing in rural areas, may indicate the feasibility and cost associated with providing supervision and servic es to this population . Cons idering these factors in allocating funding may improve county perceptions of fairness. Our proposed model also reflects the s tate’s interest in improving recidivism outcomes . Low recidivism rates among realigned offenders mean that fewer low-level offenders will be return ing to prison, directly affect ing the state’s ability to reduce crowding to a level acceptable under the current c ourt ruling. In addition, recidivism rates reflect the degree to which counties are able to mitigate the effects of realignment on public safety. Given these interests, the state may want to include rewards for recidivism reduction in the funding allocation model . The ideal permanent allocation model would include many of the features of our proposed Year 4 model but wou ld replace the base allocation with an accurate measure of the realignment population. Although the state has not yet identified the full realignment population, it may be feasible to d o so using state- or county - level data sources . It may also be fea sible to use th ese data to capture recidivism outcomes for the full realignment population . However, i n the meantime the c ommittee will need to arrive at a Year 4 allocation model using available data. The cost of realignment is one of the fundamental challenges facing every one of California ’s 58 counties. Our work here focuses on how the s tate might improve the funding allocation model to compensate counties for their additional burden, while also enabl ing them to achieve recidivism and public safety goals . However, funding is only one of the resources the state may provide to counties . T he state is also in a position to assist http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 27 counties in identifying cost -effective practices , and it has created a Board of State and Community Corrections to channel this kind of implementation assistance to counties. Through the BSCC, the s tate has the opportunity to support data collection, research , and evaluation efforts that will help counties draw upon each other’s early experiences under realignment to identify best practices . The BSCC can then serve as a medium through which these best practices can be shared statewide , encouraging and enabl ing counties to prioritize cost -effective strategies, thereby reduc ing overall costs and improv ing recidivism and public sa fety outcomes. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 28 References Bohn, Sarah, Caroline Danielson, Matt Levin, Marybeth Mattingly, and Christopher Wimer. 2013. The California Poverty Measure: A New Look at the Social Safety Net. Public Policy Institute of California. Available at www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=1070 . California Budget Project . 2012 a. “What Would Proposition 30 Mean for California?” Budget Brief . Available at www.cbp.org/pdfs/2012/120911_Proposition_30_BB.pdf . California Budget Project. 2012 b. “Finishing the Job: Moving Realignment toward Completion in 2012.” Budget Brief. Available at www.cbp.org/pdfs/2012/120607_Realignment_BB.pdf . California Budget Project. 2013. “A Mixed Picture: State Corrections Spending after the 2011 Realignment.” Budget Brief . Available at www.cbp.org/pdfs/2013/130625_A_Mixed_Picture_Corrections.pdf . California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 2012 . The Future of California Corrections: A Blueprint to Save Billions of Dollars, End Federal Oversight, and Improve the Prison System . Available at www.cdcr.ca.gov/2012plan/docs/plan/complete.pdf . California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 2013. Realignment Report. Available at www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/Realignment6MonthReportFinal_51613v1.pdf . California Department of Fi nance. 2010. Projections of the Realignment Population. Available at www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/Realignment -Population-Projections-Final.pdf. Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. 2010. Adult Sentencing Statistics, Calendar Year 2010 . Data available at http://casi.cjcj.org/Adult/2010 . Jett, Kathryn, and Joan Hancock . 2013. “Realignment in the Counties .” Federal Sentencing Reporter 25 (4 ): 236 –240 . Available at www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/fsr.2013.25.4.236 . Laub, John, and Robert Sampson. 2001. “Understanding Desistance from Crime.” Crime and Justice, 28, 1– 69. Lofstrom, Magnus, and Steven Raphael . 2013. Impact of Realignment on County Jail Populations . Public Policy Institute of California . Available at www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=1063 . McIntosh, Paul . 2011. “Allocation/Caseload Information on AB 109/AB 117, ” CSAC memo to Chairs of the County Boards of Supervisors and County Admini strative Officers. Available at www.cmhda.org/go/portals/0/cmhdafiles/committees/forensics/1107_forensics/csac_memo_re_allocation - caseload_info_on_ab_109_% 287-8-11.pdf . McIntosh, Paul . 2012. “Updat e on Realignment Fiscal Matters, ” CSAC memo to County Administrative Officers and Auditor Controllers. Available at www.csac.counties.org/sites/main/files/file -attachments/12.02.06_memo_to_caoa- cs_on_realignment_fiscal_matters_020812_final.pdf . Misczynski, Dean. 2011. Rethinking the State -Local Relationship: Correc tions. Public Policy Institute of California . Available at www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_811DMR.pdf . Piquero, Alex, David Farrington, and Alfred Blumstein. 2003. “The Criminal Career Paradigm.” Crime and Justice , 30, 83– 142. Taylor, Mac. 2012. The 2012 –13 Budget: The 2011 Realignment of Adult Offenders —An Update . California Legislative Analyst’s Office . Available at www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports/docs/External -Reports/2011-realignment -of-adult -offenders -022212.pdf . United States Department of Agriculture, Economi c Research Service. 2011. Poverty Rates by County . Available at www.ers.usda.gov/data -products/county-level-data-sets/poverty.aspx#.UejP56wQMkg . http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 29 About the Author s Mia Bird is a research fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California, where she focuses on corrections and health and human services policy. Her current projects evaluate the effects of public safety realignment on reentry and reci divism outcomes and develop models to allocate realignment funding. Before joining PPIC, Mia served as a research and evaluation consultant with the San Francisco Office of the Public Defender and the San Francisco Superior Court. She holds a Ph.D. in publ ic policy and an M.A. in demography from the University of California, Berkeley. Joseph Hayes is a research associate at the Public Policy Institute of California, where he studies population change and corrections issues. Recent projects have focused on inter -regional migration, estimates of the undocumented immigrant population, and the changing composition of the prison population. He holds an M.S. in agricultural economics from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Acknowledgments The authors would lik e to acknowledge and thank our external reviewers, Drew Soderborg ( Legislative A nalyst’s Office ) and Steve Raphael (University of California, Berkeley) , who enhanced this report with their comments and constructive feedback. The author s would also like to extend their appreciation to our internal reviewers, Magnus Lofstrom and Laurel Beck , for their support of this p roject and very helpful comments . We would like t o especially thank Diane Cummin s (California Department of Finance), who graciously shared inf ormation relevant to this report . This project also required communication with government staff, and we thank Dave Lesher, our director of g overnmental affairs, for facilitating those communications. This report greatly benefited from the editorial expertise o f our communications staff, Lynette Ubois and Gary Bjork. Any errors in this work are the authors’ responsibility alone. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA Board of Directors Donna Lucas, Chair Chief Executive Officer Lucas Public Affairs Mark Baldassare President and CEO Public Policy Institute of California Ruben Barrales President and CEO GROW Elect María Blanco Vice President, Civic Engagement California Community Foundation Brigitte Bren Attorney Walter B. Hewlett Chair, Board of Directors William and Flora Hewlett Foundation Phil Isenberg Chair Delta Stewardship Council Mas Masumoto Author and farmer Steven A. Merksamer Senior Partner Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Gross & Leoni, LLP Kim Polese Chairman ClearStreet, Inc. Thomas C. Sutton Retired Chairman and CEO Pacific Life Insurance Company The Public Policy Institute of California is dedicated to informing and improving public policy in California through independent, objective, nonpartisan research on major economic, social, and political issues. The institute’s goal is to raise public awar eness and to give elected representatives and other decisionmakers a more informed basis for developing policies and programs. The institute’s research focuses on the underlying forces shaping California’s future, cutting across a wide range of public poli cy concerns, including economic development, education, environment and resources, governance, population, public finance, and social and health policy. PPIC is a public charity. It does not take or support positions on any ballot measures or on any local, state, or federal legislation, nor does it endorse, support, or oppose any political parties or candidates for public office. PPIC was established in 1994 with an endowment from William R. Hewlett. Mark Baldassare is President and Chief Executive Officer of PPIC. Donna Lucas is Chair of the Board of Directors. Short sections of text, not to exceed three paragraphs, may be quoted without written permission provided that full attribution is given to the source. Research publications reflect the views of t he authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or Board of Directors of the Public Policy Institute of California. Copyright © 2013 Public Policy Institute of California All rights reserved. San Francisco, CA PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA 500 Washington Street, Suite 600 San Francisco, California 94111 phone: 415.291.4400 fax: 415.291.4401 www.ppic.org PPIC SACRAMENTO CENT ER Senator Office Building 1121 L Street, Suite 801 Sacramento, California 95814 phone: 916.440.1120 fax: 916.440.1121" } ["___content":protected]=> string(104) "

R 1113MBR

" ["_permalink":protected]=> string(77) "https://www.ppic.org/publication/funding-public-safety-realignment/r_1113mbr/" ["_next":protected]=> array(0) { } ["_prev":protected]=> array(0) { } ["_css_class":protected]=> NULL ["id"]=> int(8890) ["ID"]=> int(8890) ["post_author"]=> string(1) "1" ["post_content"]=> string(0) "" ["post_date"]=> string(19) "2017-05-20 02:41:50" ["post_excerpt"]=> string(0) "" ["post_parent"]=> int(4320) ["post_status"]=> string(7) "inherit" ["post_title"]=> string(9) "R 1113MBR" ["post_type"]=> string(10) "attachment" ["slug"]=> string(9) "r_1113mbr" ["__type":protected]=> NULL ["_wp_attached_file"]=> string(13) "R_1113MBR.pdf" ["wpmf_size"]=> string(6) "441603" ["wpmf_filetype"]=> string(3) "pdf" ["wpmf_order"]=> string(1) "0" ["searchwp_content"]=> string(74695) "Funding Public Safety Realignment November 2013 Mia Bird and Joseph Hayes http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 2 Summary California’s recent p ublic safety realignment transferred substantial authority and funds from the state to the counties to manage lower -level felon populations. The success or failure of this experiment will have profound implications throughout the state, beyond just the realm of public safety. If counties are able to handle these new populations and improve upon the state’s record of reducing recidivism, the results could include dec lining crime rates, lower- cost supervision of offenders, and the liberation of state resources to devote t o other concerns. If the counties’ efforts are insufficient or misdirected, crime rates could stagnate or grow worse, prompting more costly measures such as jail capacity expansion or more intensive supervision, while also shifting the prison overcrowding problem from the state to the county level with all of the attendant implications for county budget priorities. Each county’s experience with realignment will depend, in part, on whether it has sufficient resources to carry out its plan. That is the subjec t of this report : the state’s provision of realignment funds to the counties, the changing allocations of those funds among the counties, and our own proposal for a funding allocation model to use in the future. Our aim is to illuminate the development of the initial and current funding models, to carefully consider their key elements and th eir shortcomings, and to propose a new model that addresses these shortcomings . We begin with a n examination of the state’s mechanism for funding public safety realignment, including the overall funding level , state revenue sources, and the categories of state funding streams . We then turn to our main topic —the allocation of realignment funds across counties. We expla in the initial model developed by the Realignment Allocation Committee to determine the share of total funding for realignment that each county would receive. The Year 1 model allocated funding based primarily on the projected increase in counties’ offender populat ions that realignment would induce. T he committee balanced the model somewhat by also considering each count y’s estimated overall adult population and the county’s success in reducing returns to prison for probation revocations under SB 678. However, concerns emerged among some county officials that th is model rewarded counties with high pre-realignment prison use. In the Year 2 –3 model , the committee attempted to address that concern by introducing great er flexibility into the formula —as a result, cou nties with low levels of state prison us e prior to realignment received relatively large increases in their allocations. Nonetheless , questions about the fairness and efficacy of the allocation persist as the c ommittee continues to work on the development of a permanent allocation model . W e argue that the ideal components of such a model must include differences ac ross counties in the burden of realignment, differences in the capacities of counties to manage their realignment populations , and the inclusion of recidivism reduction bonu ses to incentivize state goals. Finally, as a practical consideration, w e recognize that developing and using such a funding model requires access to app ropriate, high -quality data. To this end, we identify publicly available d ata to measure these components and use them to calculate recommended allocation shares , which we compare with the allocations from previous years’ models . Our proposed Year 4 model consists of a base allocation, adjustments fo r county characteristics, and incentive bonuses for reductions in recidivism. We believe that our model will prove useful to policymakers— not only as they de velop their Year 4 strategies for distributing realignment allocations to the counties , but also as a sound foundation for building a permanent allocation model. Contents Summary 2 Figures 4 Tables 4 Glossary 5 Introduction 6 Overview of Realignment Funding 8 How was Funding Allocated to Counties in Year 1? 10 How Did the County Allocation Model Change in Year 2? 14 Year 3 Allocation Shares 16 Criteria for the Development of a Permanent Funding Allocation Model 17 Key Components of a Permanent Funding Allocation Model 18 Capturing Differences in the Realignment Burden 18 Capturing Differences in County Capacities 19 Incentivizing State Goals 19 Proposed Year 4 Model 21 Realignment Burden: The Base Allocation 21 Capacity Adjustments: Differences in County Characteristics 22 Incentive Bonuses: Recidivism Reduction 23 County Allocations Under Our Proposed Year 4 Model 23 Conclusion 26 References 28 About the Authors 29 Acknowledgments 29 A technical appendi x to this paper is available on the PPIC website: www.ppic.org/content/pubs/other/1113MBR_ appendix.pdf http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 4 Figures 1. Prison incarceration rates by county 13 2. Average change in funding share by model type 16 3. Scatterplot of poverty rates and pre -realignment state prison incarceration rates, 2011 22 Tables 1. Statewide initial realignment funding levels, Years 1– 3 (in millions) 9 2. Year 1 realignment allocations by funding category 11 3. Changes in share of programmatic funding allocations from Year 1 to Year 2 14 4. Proposed Year 4 model: County allocation shares compared with past allocation shares 24 http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 5 Glossary 1170(h) The penal code designation for felony offenders convicted of non-violent, non-serious, non-sexual crimes . Under realignment, these offenders will serve their sentences in county jails rather than state prison. The term “1170(h)s” is often used colloqu ially to refer to these offenders . AB 109 The California state law passed in 2011 mandating the implementation of public safety realignment beginning on October 1, 2011 ADP Average Daily Population BSCC Board of State and Community Corrections CAOAC County Administrative Officers Association of California CBP California Budget Project CCP Community Corrections Partnership CDCR California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation CPOC Chief Probation Officers of California CSAC California State Association of Counties DOF (California) Department of Finance DOJ (California) Department of Justice LAO Legislative Analyst’s Office PRCS Post-Release Community Supervision, the county-based supervision of offenders released from state prison that, under realignment, replaces the state-based parole program for a majority of released prisoners SB 678 The law passed in 2009 encouraging counties to reduce the number of offenders returned to state prison for violation of probation rules http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 6 Introducti on On October 1, 2011, California began to implement the most significant change in its correction s policy in a generation. Months earlier, the U .S. Supreme Court had upheld a federal court order that California reduce its prison population to 137.5 percen t of design capacity within two years. The state’s most significant response to this directive was Assembly Bill 109, or as it has become known colloquially, “public safety realignment.” The state’s realignment efforts began with reduc ing the prison population by transferring authority and supervision over lower- level felons from the state to the counties. Specifically, realignment made the following three changes to the way lower -level felons are managed in the criminal justice system: 1. Individuals newly co nvicted of felonies deemed “ non-serious , non- violent , and non -sexual ” (and who have no prior convictions for a serious, violent, or sexual offense) are now sent to county jail rather than state prison. 2. Parole violators are now returned to county jurisdiction rather than state prison for detention following a revocation . 3. Individuals sent to prison for non- violent, non- serious, and non- sexual offen ses are now released to county probation departments (rather than to the state parole system) f or supervision under a program known as post -release community supervision (PRCS) . 1 Each of these elements has clear implications for the state’s 58 counties. First, counties are now responsible for housing new populations of felony offenders, potentially for much longer terms than the counties are accustomed to . The responsibility for these offenders (known colloquially as 1170(h) s after the penal code section that governs their sentencing) will pose a particular challenge for counties experiencing capacit y constraints (Lofstrom and Raphael , 2013). Second, under PRCS, counties are responsible for monitoring newly released prisoners and guiding them through the battery of available county -level rehabilitation programs. And finally, county resources will be f urther stretched by the need to house released offenders whose state parole term is revoked or who violate the terms of their PRCS (Lofstrom and Raphael , 2013) . T he rationale espoused by proponents of realignment is that counties are better positioned tha n the state to manage these populations. The realignment program also encourages the use of alternatives to incarceration , including “evidence- based practices” designed to improve rehabilitative efforts and reduce recidivism. Proponents argue that b y keepi ng offenders in their own communities and leveraging county -level programs (e.g. , drug treatment, job training, and other social services), the counties will be able to better address the needs of current and former prisoners and will also be able to achieve better community reentry outcomes ( and at a lower cost ) than the state. The state provides funding to compensate counties for these new responsibilities : T he legislature provided nearly $400 million to be distributed among the counties during the f irst nine months of realignment and more than doubled that figure for the following full year. Proposition 30, approved by the voters in the November 2012 election, guarantees the counties a continuing source of realignment funding. However, realignment co sts will vary across counties, given differences in the size and composition of the realigned population and differences in the demographic, economic , and geographic characteristics of the 1 Individuals assessed as High Risk Sex Offenders, Mentally Disordered Offenders, or who are convicted of a “third strike” —even if their third offense is non -serious or non -violent —are still released to state parole instead of PRCS. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 7 counties . The degree to which counties utilize traditional incarceration, alternative sanctioning , or rehabilitative programming tools to manage this population may also affect costs. Now well into the third funding year of realignment, debate persists about the inter -county allocation of available fund ing, and that is t he subject of this report . Wh at was the rationale behind the allocation of realignment fund ing in the first year? How has that rationale changed as the allocation formula was amended for the second and third years? And f inally, how might we arrive at a long-term funding allocation model that is efficacious , reliable, transparent, politically feasible , and responsive to changes in county circumstances over time? The centerpiece of this paper is a proposed allocation funding model that satisfies these crit eria. This new model considers both realignment and general populations, makes adjustments for county characteristics, and includes incentives for reductions in recidivism. Our model uses publicly available data and could be used to generate allocations fo r the fourth funding year and beyond. We begin with an overview of the sources of state funding and the categories of realignment funding streams, including a discussion of the initial funding level, subsequent increases, and the measures designed to guara ntee counties’ access to funding. We then look more closely at the first year’s formula for allocating funding among the counties : its rationale and composition, the resulting allocations, and the counties’ responses to their allotment. This leads us into a discussion of the changes implemented in the second and third years’ formula and an examination of the results of the most recent formula. Finally, we propose a fourth -year model that addresses some of the perceived shortcomings of the early formulas , di scuss the results of th e new model , and consider the challenges confronting its implementation a s a permanent allocation formula. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 8 Overview of Realignment Funding At the outset of realignment, the California State Legislature directed a portion of the state sales tax to the counties to help them implement public safety realignment (Misczynski , 2011). This arrangement provided nearly $400 millio n to the counties during the first nine months of realignment ( referred to in this report as the Year 1 allocat ion). However, c ounty officials worried that while realignment was here to stay, a future g overnor or l egislature might amend or rescind the associated revenue stream, leaving the responsibility for realignment in place while cutting off the funding necess ary to support it. Proposition 30 , passed by the voters in November 2012 , addressed th is concern . It created a constitutional amendment that ensured the state -to - county funding for corrections realignment would continue; and to support this objective, it temporarily increas ed the state sales tax and the income tax on high- income Californians (California Budget Project , 2012 a) . In addition to these dedicated funding sources, Prop 30 provided protections for the counties against future changes in realignment funding (California Budget Project , 2012 b). Because realignment began three months into fiscal year 2011 –12, the Year 1 allocation only covered nine months. The allocations for Year 2 (July 2012– June 2013) and Year 3 (July 2013 –June 2014) cover 12- month p eriods. The state’s realignment funding model anticipates natural caseload growth as counties incrementally assume the corrections responsibilities transferred under realignment. U ndistributed growth is projected for the program for at least the next three fiscal years. The state is currently in the process of finalizing the growth fund allocation for Years 2 and 3. Although the state has dedicated substantial amounts of funding to its counties ( nearly $2.3 billion over the first three years of realignment ), a comparison of this funding level to annual spending prior to realignment reveals net savings in each year of realignment ( California Budget Project, 2013). The CBP estimates that state spending on adult corrections in FY 2013–14 will be approximately $500 million less than in FY 2010– 11, the year prior to realignment. 2 The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) uses projections of state spending in the absence of realignment, rather than pre -realignment spending levels, to calc ulate its budget comparison s. Using this method, CDCR finds general fund savings of more than $1 billion in Year 2 of realignment and $1.3 billion in Year 3. When compared with realignment expenditures during those years (see Table 1), these projections s uggest ongoing annual net savings in the hundreds of millions of dollars under realignment ( California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2012). Table 1 summarizes funding levels by category for the first three years of realignment. The Realign ment Allocation Committee (the decisionmaking body responsible for determining the initial allocation of realignment funding among counties) divide s funding across four categories: 1. Programmatic costs associated with managing the realigned adult offender populations 2. Revocation costs due to hearings for offenders violating the terms of their prison release (these funds are split between the public defender and district attorney offices in each county) 3. Start -up costs involved in building the necessary capac ity for implementing realignment in each county (these were conceived of as one- time costs associated with activities such as hiring, training, staff retention, improving data capacity, contracting, and capacity planning) 4. Community Corrections Partnership (CCP) grants to develop plans for implementing realignment 2 See “A Mixed Picture: State Corrections Spending After the 2011 Realignment,” California Budget Project, 2013. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 9 TABLE 1 Statewide i nitial realignment f unding levels, Years 1– 3 (in millions) Programmatic funding ($) Revocation funding ($) Start- up funding ($) CCP grants ($) Total ($) Year 1 ( Oct . 2011– June 2012) 354.3 12.7 25.0 7.9 399.9 Year 2 ( July 2012– June 2013) 842.9 14.6 – 7.9 865.4 Year 3 ( July 2013– June 2014) 998.9 17.1 – 7.9 1,023.9 SOURCE: Funding amounts provided by CSAC . The committee allocated CCP planning grants according to a simple formula based on county population size. Large counties ( more than 750,000 residents) received $200,000; medium -sized counties received $150,000 ; and small counties (up to 200,000 residents) received $100,00 0 (McIntosh, 2011). Small counties typic ally received a large share of their total funding through th e CCP funding stream to support planning efforts . In larger counties, the CCP funding stream represented a relatively small share of funding when compared to the allocations received through the other three funding streams —programmatic, revocation, 3 and start -up funds. In the first year, the c ommittee allocated these three funding streams based on the Year 1 fu nding allo cation model, as we explain in more detail in the following section. 3 In the first year, the committee allocated revocation funds using the same formula as used for the programmatic funds. For the second and third years, it employed a different formula for the revocation funds than for the programmatic funds. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 10 How Was Funding Allocated to Counties in Year 1? At the request of the governor, the task of determining the initial allocation of programmatic funding among the counties fell to the California State Association of Counties (CSAC). CSAC requested that the Cou nty Administrative Officers Association of California (CAOAC) convene a Realignment Allocation Committee, which consisted of three urban, three suburban, and three rural county administrative off icers (Jett and Hancock , 2013). A CSAC memo det ails the follo wing principles established by the Realignment Allocation Committee to guide the development of the first year model :  The Year 1 allocation for 2011 –12 would apply only for the first year of the AB 109 population shift, given the significance of realignme nt policy changes and the sense of “ unknown.”  The Year 2 and subsequent year allocation formula(s) would be open for discussion and would be informed by additional data and actual programmatic experience.  The allocation formula should be simple in its app roach. (McIntosh, 2012: p.2) At the outset, the c ommittee recognized the f irst-year model would be temporary. Over time, as realignment rolled out, the committee would have access to more information about realignment populations and their outcomes across counties. Under the constraints of limited experience and data , the committee arrived at the model they used to produce the allocation share of each county (Table 2) . The model was composed of the following three key components, weighted to reflect the relative importance of each component: 1. A county’s projected full roll -out realignment population (weighted at 60%) 4 2. A county’s adult pop ulation, ages 18–64 (weighted at 30% ) 3. A county’s performan ce under the implementation of SB 678 ( weighted at 10% ) 5 In a ddition, the c ommittee established a minimum funding level of $76,833 for the three least populous counties —Alpine, Sierra , and Modoc. The c ommittee also enhanced the funding level for the largest county, Los Angeles. As explained in the previous section, the committee used a different model for the CCP planning allocations. 4 The full roll-out reali gnment population, as projected by the Department of Finance, was an estimate of the population counties would need to manage at full implementation of realignment. Implementation was assumed to be complete at the end of Year 4. 5 The California Community Corrections Performance Incentives Act of 2009, or SB 678, established a system that rewarded county probation offices with funding tied to measured decreases in recidivism —specifically, the number of commitments to prison for probation violations. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 11 TABLE 2 Year 1 realignment a llocations by funding c ategory County Programmatic ($) Revocation (PD /DA )* ($) Start- up funding ($) CCP planning ($) Total ($) Alameda 9,221,012 330,530 650,650 200,000 10,402,192 Alpine 76,883 2,756 5,425 100,000 185,064 Amador 543,496 19,482 38,350 100,000 701,328 Butte 2,735,905 98,069 193,050 150,000 3,177,024 Calaveras 350,757 12,573 24,750 100,000 488,080 Colusa 214,352 7,684 15,125 100,000 337,160 Contra Costa 4,572,950 163,919 322,675 200,000 5,259,544 Del Norte 221,438 7,938 15,625 100,000 345,000 El Dorado 1,210,643 43,396 85,425 100,000 1,439,464 Fresno 8,838,368 316,814 623,650 200,000 9,978,832 Glenn 331,271 11,875 23,375 100,000 466,520 Humboldt 1,526,679 54,724 107,725 100,000 1,789,128 Imperial 1,296,384 46,469 91,475 100,000 1,534,328 Inyo 190,968 6,845 13,475 100,000 311,288 Kern 10,834,140 388,353 764,475 200,000 12,186,968 Kings 2,862,035 102,591 201,950 100,000 3,266,576 Lake 820,913 29,426 57,925 100,000 1,008,264 Lassen 384,770 13,792 27,150 100,000 525,712 Los Angeles 112,558,276 4,034,688 7,942,300 200,000 124,735,264 Madera 1,688,240 60,516 119,125 100,000 1,967,880 Marin 1,304,178 46,749 92,025 150,000 1,592,952 Mariposa 165,458 5,931 11,675 100,000 283,064 Mendocino 993,812 35,624 70,125 100,000 1,199,560 Merced 2,498,524 89,560 176,300 150,000 2,914,384 Modoc 76,883 2,756 5,425 100,000 185,064 Mono 100,267 3,594 7,075 100,000 210,936 Monterey 3,846,989 137,897 271,450 150,000 4,406,336 Napa 1,051,917 37,706 74,225 100,000 1,263,848 Nevada 515,152 18,466 36,350 100,000 669,968 Orange 23,078,393 827,253 1,628,450 200,000 25,734,096 Placer 2,986,395 107,048 210,725 150,000 3,454,168 Plumas 153,766 5,512 10,850 100,000 270,128 Riverside 21,074,473 755,421 1,487,050 200,000 23,516,944 Sacramento 13,140,278 471,018 927,200 200,000 14,738,496 San Benito 547,748 19,634 38,650 100,000 706,032 San Bernardino 25,785,600 924,293 1,819,475 200,000 28,729,368 San Diego 25,105,698 899,922 1,771,500 200,000 27,977,120 San Francisco 5,049,838 181,013 356,325 200,000 5,787,176 San Joaquin 6,785,908 243,243 478,825 150,000 7,657,976 San Luis Obispo 2,200,557 78,880 155,275 150,000 2,584,712 San Mateo 4,222,902 151,371 297,975 150,000 4,822,248 Santa Barbara 3,878,876 139,040 273,700 150,000 4,441,616 Santa Clara 12,566,312 450,444 886,700 200,000 14,103,456 Santa Cruz 1,662,730 59,601 117,325 150,000 1,989,656 Shasta 2,988,875 107,137 210,900 100,000 3,406,912 Sierra 76,883 2,756 5,425 100,000 185,064 http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 12 County Programmatic ($) Revocation (PD /DA )* ($) Start- up funding ($) CCP planning ($) Total ($) Siskiyou 445,001 15,951 31,400 100,000 592,352 Solano 3,807,662 136,487 268,675 150,000 4,362,824 Sonoma 3,240,428 116,154 228,650 150,000 3,735,232 Stanislaus 6,010,700 215,456 424,125 150,000 6,800,280 Sutter 1,167,419 41,847 82,375 100,000 1,391,640 Tehama 1,212,415 43,459 85,550 100,000 1,441,424 Trinity 144,554 5,182 10,200 100,000 259,936 Tulare 5,657,817 202,806 399,225 150,000 6,409,848 Tulare 5,657,817 202,806 399,225 150,000 6,409,848 Tuolumne 598,767 21,463 42,250 100,000 762,480 Ventura 5,696,790 204,203 401,975 200,000 6,502,968 Yolo 2,974,703 106,629 209,900 150,000 3,441,232 Yuba 1,005,858 36,055 70,975 100,000 1,212,888 Total 354,300,000 12,700,000 25,000,000 7,850,000 399,850,000 *Revocation funds are split between the public defender and district attorney offices in each county. SOURCE: Funding allocations provided by CSAC . The Year 1 funding allocation model has a number of advantages, including its transparency and simplicity. The rationale behind the Year 1 approach is straightforward: T he model primarily allocates funding among counties based on project ed differences in expected growth of the populations they manage, with a substantial adjustment for county population size and a slight adjustment for efforts on the part of counties to reduce prison incarceration prior to realignment. In the first year ( i.e., nine months) of realignment, the c ommittee emphasized the new burden counties would experience in allocating funding. County responses to the Year 1 funding were mixed. In general, counties expressed concerns about whether the total funding available for the first year of realignment would be adequat e to effectively manage realignment . Counties were also concerned abo ut the stability of funding over time. In Year 2, the total funding level would be increased to reflect the longer funding period (12 months) and to recognize the expected caseload growth stemming from the implementation of realignment sentencing changes. To some extent, this increase in total funding eased concerns about funding adequacy. Furth er, Proposition 30, approved by voters in November 2012, would solidify the funding source for public safety realignment, largely putt ing this concern to rest. In addition to these shared concerns, a select group of counties questioned the fairness of the init ial allocation. T hose counties with low pre -realignment state prison incarceration rates made the case that the Year 1 model unfairly disadvantaged them by tying funding to the relative size of pre -realignment prison populations. Figure 1 shows the va riation across counties in prison incarceration rates prior to realignment. We see a wide range, with some counties sending relatively few offenders to state prison. These counties, the argument goes, had taken the initiative and borne the cost of reducing their contributions to the state prison population prior to realignment and, as a result, received less funding due to the heavy weight on realignment population projections in the Year 1 model . Table 2 (continued) http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 13 FIGURE 1 Prison i ncarceration r ates by c ounty SOURCE : Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice (201 0). The argument made by counties with low prison incarceration rates rested on the method used by the Department of Finance (DOF) to project rea lignment populations. A few words about the construction of this co mponent of the Year 1 model are in order. First, the realignment population projections are expressed in terms of an Average Daily Population (ADP). Instead of estimating counts of low er-level felony offenders entering (and exiting) the county system, the ADP captures the equivalent of one inmate in one jail space for one year (McIntosh, 2011) . Second, the DOF , relying on available data, made these projection s based on the population of offenders housed in state prison in 2010. As a result, those counties that had sent a high share of their felony convictions to state prison were projected to have large realignment populations, while those counties that had retained a high share of their felony convictions at the local level were projected to have relatively small realignment populations. Calculated as such, the DOF projections capture the shift in the burden from the state to counties at the time of realignment , rather than the total b urden counties bear in managing the lower -lev el felon population . As a result, allocations made based on the projected realignment population would be widely divergent from allocations based on the county adult population, a challenge recognized by the c ommittee at the outset (McIntosh, 2012). In cra fting the Year 2 allocation model, the c ommittee attempted to address this concern by introducing greater flexibility into the model components . http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 14 How Did the County Allocation Model Change in Year 2? Given the speed with which realignment l egislation was passed and implemented, the Realignment Allocation Committee had limited time to determine the initial allocation model, but committed to revisit the iss ue in the second funding year (McIntosh , 2012) . Partly i n response t o concerns about the fairness of the initial allocation, the c ommittee introduced flexibility in to the Year 2 allocation model for the largest funding component, the programmatic funding . The Year 2 model ensured that each county would receive a minimum programmatic- funding level equal to twice its Year 1 allocation. An increase this large was possible because the total statewide allocation had more than double d due to the lo nger coverage period in Year 2 (12 months compared to 9 months in Year 1) as well as stronger revenue and stabilized revenue sources. The Year 2 model allow ed each county to receive the best programmatic allocation from the following four possible models : 1. A model that doubled the Year 1 allocation 2. A model that applied the Year 1 formula to updated population and SB 678 data 3. A model based entirely on the size of the projected realignment population 6 or 4. A model based entirely on the size of the county adul t population Table 3 summarizes the resulting changes in the programmatic funding shares from Year 1 to Year 2 by count y. 7 While the dollar value of the allocation incr eased for all counties in Year 2 due to the increase in total funding for realignment, counties experienced substantial shifts in the share of the total funding they received. Some counties received a greater share than they had in Year 1 (as much as a 77% greater share) and other counties received a smaller share (as much as 16 % smaller ). Table 3 shows the percent change in th e share received resulting from the change in the allocation formula in Year 2 and indicates the model used to arrive at the Year 2 allocation for each county . Counties that received their best allocation under m odel 4 (the model based entirely on adult population size) experienced, on average, a relative increase in the share of total programmatic funding they received. In contrast, counties that received their best allocation under one of the other models experienced relative declines in their programmatic shares. TABLE 3 Change s in share of programmatic funding a llocations from Year 1 to Year 2 County Year 1 programmatic share (%) Year 2 programmatic share (%) Change in share (%) Year 2 allocation model Alameda 2.60 3.47 33.20 County adult population Alpine 0.02 0.02 -16.13 Double Year 1 allocation Amador 0.15 0.13 -12.58 Year 1 m odel Butte 0.77 0.66 -13.93 Year 1 m odel Calaveras 0.10 0.09 -4.75 County adult population Colusa 0.06 0.05 -15.21 Year 1 m odel 6 The committee drew on DOF realignment population projections but made slight adjustments to these projections for counties with e xtremely high state prison incarceration rates prior to realignment. 7 Elizabeth Howard Espinosa (CSAC) provided allocation and model information to the authors. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 15 County Year 1 programmatic share (%) Year 2 programmatic share (%) Change in share (%) Year 2 allocation model Contra Costa 1.29 2.29 77.27 County adult population Del Norte 0.06 0.06 3.52 County adult population El Dorado 0.34 0.40 15.60 County adult population Fresno 2.49 2.47 -1.15 Realignment population projection Glenn 0.09 0.08 -15.94 Double Year 1 allocation Humboldt 0.43 0.40 -8.01 Realignment population projection Imperial 0.37 0.37 1.37 County adult population Inyo 0.05 0.05 -12.99 Realignment population projection Kern 3.06 2.78 -9.01 Realignment population projection Kings 0.81 0.72 -11.28 Year 1 m odel Lake 0.23 0.21 -11.35 Realignment population projection Lassen 0.11 0.09 -15.01 Realignment population projection Los Angeles 31.77 31.77 0.00 Special allocation Madera 0.48 0.41 -14.31 Year 1 m odel Marin 0.37 0.54 47.08 County adult population Mariposa 0.05 0.04 -13.92 Year 1 m odel Mendocino 0.28 0.24 -12.73 Year 1 m odel Merced 0.71 0.62 -12.38 Realignment population projection Modoc 0.02 0.02 -8.76 County adult population Mono 0.03 0.03 21.20 County adult population Monterey 1.09 0.94 -13.34 Realignment population projection Napa 0.30 0.29 -1.41 County adult population Nevada 0.15 0.21 44.43 County adult population Orange 6.51 6.68 2.55 County adult population Placer 0.84 0.73 -12.92 County adult population Plumas 0.04 0.04 -2.76 County adult population Riverside 5.95 5.12 -13.87 Realignment population projection Sacramento 3.71 3.33 -10.19 Realignment population projection San Benito 0.15 0.13 -15.91 Double Year 1 a llocation San Bernardino 7.28 6.63 -8.97 Realignment population projection San Diego 7.09 7.02 -0.99 County adult population San Francisco 1.43 2.03 42.16 County adult population San Joaquin 1.92 1.75 -8.45 Realignment population projection San Luis Obispo 0.62 0.61 -1.06 County adult population San Mateo 1.19 1.60 33.91 County adult population Santa Barbara 1.09 0.95 -13.62 Year 1 m odel Santa Clara 3.55 4.00 12.88 County adult population Santa Cruz 0.47 0.61 30.81 County adult population Shasta 0.84 0.74 -12.06 Year 1 model Sierra 0.02 0.02 -16.13 Double Year 1 a llocation Siskiyou 0.13 0.11 -15.21 Year 1 m odel Solano 1.07 1.00 -6.73 Realignment population projection Sonoma 0.91 1.07 17.10 County adult population Stanislaus 1.70 1.45 -14.38 Year 1 m odel Sutter 0.33 0.30 -9.62 Realignment population projection Table 3 (continued) http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 16 County Year 1 programmatic share (%) Year 2 programmatic share (%) Change in share (%) Year 2 allocation model Tehama 0.34 0.30 -11.40 Year 1 m odel Trinity 0.04 0.04 -13.48 Year 1 m odel Tulare 1.60 1.39 -12.96 Year 1 m odel Tuolumne 0.17 0.14 -15.86 Year 1 model Ventura 1.61 1.79 11.20 County adult population Yolo 0.84 0.72 -14.70 Double Year 1 a llocation Yuba 0.28 0.25 -12.40 Realignment population projection SOURCE: Information provided by CSAC . Figure 2 summarizes the average change in county allocation shares by model type for the Year 2 allocation. Note that Los Angeles County continued to receive a special allocation and thus experienced no change in its share of programmatic funding between Year 1 and Year 2. FIGURE 2 Average c hange in funding share by model type SOURCE: Information provided by CSAC (see Table 3) . Year 3 Allocation Shares The Realignment Allocation Committee recommended that the Year 2 (FY 2012–13) allocation shares remain in plac e for Year 3 (FY 2013 –14) to provide counti es with stability and certainty for planning p urposes. As a result, counties are receiving the same relative share of programmatic funding in the current year as they received in FY 2012– 13. Howe ver, the c ommittee is in the process of developing a new, and potentially permanent, program matic funding model and will recommend a model for Year 4 funding allocations to t he governor for consideration during the FY 2014–15 budget process. As the c ommittee develops these recommendations , we, along with other outside groups, hope to provide analysis to infor m the process. The remaining sections of this report offer criteria for the development of a permanent model , outline key model components that flow from those criteria, and propose a Year 4 funding allocation model based on those components . 16.4% -10.2% -13.5% -15.8% 0.0% -20% -15% -10% -5%0% 5% 10% 15% 20% County adult population Realignment population projection Year 1 model Double Year 1 allocation Special allocation (Los Angeles) Percent change Table 3 (continued) http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 17 Permanent Funding Allocation Model We use the term “criteria” here to refer to the principles that we believe should guide the development of the funding allocation model. Before presenting our m odel, we review the criteria we used to guide our analysis. 1. Efficacy . The overriding goal of a funding allocation model is efficacy: T he resulting allocation of funds should incentivize and empower counties to successfully implement their plans for realignment . The additional criteria listed below are largely in the service of this goal. As defined here, an efficacious allocation of funds would en able counties to take on the burden of realignment, while accounting for differences in the counties’ capacities to manag e the realigned population and incorporat e further incentives for reducing recidivism . 2. Reliability . The permanent funding allocation model should produce allocations that are reliable over time. S wings in year -to -year allocations impede the ability of counties to plan and commit res ources to poli cy goals. There are two primary reasons for funding instability : chang es in the underlying model and poor quality data, which can lead to measurement error that produces year -to -year swings in key model components . To achieve reliability, the underlying model must be consistent over time , an d the model must be able to rely upon high- quality data. 3. Responsive ness. T he permanent funding allocation model should be responsive to genuine changes in the burden of real ignment over time and in county capacities to manage that burden. Th us, the data underlying our model need to be selected to reflect both current circumstances and changes over time. Currently, the projected realignment population —the estimate of the burden of realignment —is based on 2010 prison i ncarceration levels and is therefore un responsive to changes in the burden over time. 4. Transparency . The permanent funding allocation model should be public ly accessible and easily understood . The complexity of past models, along with challenges to accessing model documentation, has limited transparency. 5. Political Feasibility . The permanent funding allocation model must be politically feasible. Currently, the Realignment All ocation Committee consists of county representatives . This group must arrive at an alloc ation model that is perceived as fair and acc eptable to committee members . However, the c ommittee must also strive to maintain the trust of other stakeholders —the governor, legislat ors, and the public —in order to continue in this role. In the next section, we highlight t he key components of a permanent funding model that meet the criteria outlined here. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 18 Key Components of a Permanent Funding Allocation Model If a permanent funding mode l is to satisfy the criteria outlined in the pr evious section, it must include certain key c omponents. We highlight those components here and describe how the Realignment Allocation Committee might incorporate them into a n allocation model. Capturing Differences in the Realignment Burden A permanent funding model needs to resolve past controversies over how the model captures the realignment burden . Changes in how the burden is measured have driven the swings we have seen in funding allocations . I nitia lly, the committee emphasized DOF projections of the full roll -out realignment population. These projections varied by county , based on the extent to which counties sent lower -level felons to prison prior to realignment. In the early years of realignment, the re was a clear rationale for measuring the burden of realignment in this way —counties that sent high share s of their lower- level felon population to state prison would experience large increases in the ir locally managed population s relative to counties that had retained large shares of lower -level felons prior to realignment . This realignment-induced change in the locally managed population in the early years may have been particularly difficult to cope wit h and may have required additional resourc es. However, in a permanent funding model , the overall size and composition of the counties ’ lower -level felon populations becomes more importan t than the changes they experienced in the early stages of realignment . An accurate assessment of differences in the realignment burden across counties is essential to producing a n effective and responsive allocation. While the c ommittee emphasized realignment projections by weighting them at 60 percent in the Year 1 model, they also gave some weight (half as much) to an alternative measure —the size of the county adult population. T he committee used these measures together to approximate the size of the realignment population and the burden the counties were undertaking in managing this group . In the face of controversy, the Year 2 allocation s based the entire allocation for some counties on realignment projections and the entire allocation for other counties on adult population, resulting in large swings in the share of total funding received by counties. Furthermore , while the adult population varies over time, the original 2010 realignment projections are fixed in time and unresponsive to changes in the size of lower- level felon populations. Appropriately capturing differences in the realignment burden across counties sh ould be an essential component of a permanent funding model. The key challenge s in capturing the realignment population are the availability and quality of data. In the ideal case, a permanent funding allocation model would include prior year counts of 11 70(h), PRCS, and p arole violator populations. 8 In addition, information on the risk compositions of these populations would be helpful in understanding how the burden of realignment varies across counties. The CDCR currently tracks prison releases, capturing both the PRCS and p arole populations returning to counties; and the DOJ receives data from counties ca pturing convictions, which may allow for the identification of the 1170(h) population. Taken together, these data would allow for an improvement on current projections of the size 8 The distinction between offender counts and jail ADP is important here. A model that captured jail ADP, rather than offender counts, would privilege (and thus incentivize) the incarceration response relative to the use o f alternative sanctions and rehabilitative interventions. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 19 of the realignmen t population by county, dispelling some of the controversy surrounding the weighting of realignment projections and county population size in the allocation model. While it is theoretically possible to identify the realignment population through s tate data sources, the state ma y need to rely on county data collection efforts. Counties individually track these populations through various data collection systems. If counties could be motivated and supported in integrat ing these systems so as to provide stand ardized collection s of essential data, the state could draw on county data to determine the burden of realignment. Some efforts in this direction are currently under way. For example, the BSCC is working to collect population counts through the AB 109 supp lement to the Jail Profile Survey. CPOC is engaging in complementary efforts to collect realignment population data by county. With increased resources to ensure the quality and improve the timeliness and consistency of reporting, these efforts could provi de estimates of the size of the realigned population over time that are free of ties to the state prison incarceration histories of counties. Captur ing Differences in County Capacities In addition to differences in the realignment burden across counties, differences in the demographic, economic , and geographic charact eristics of counties should also be considered in determining the equitable allocation of funding. These characteristics reflect differences across counties in their capacity to manage realig nment and the relative costs associated with this responsibility . C onsider ation of these differences may also improve perceptions of fairness on the part of the counties, which may lead to easier acceptance of the resulting allocation s. Data describing co unty demographic, economic , and geographic characteristics are typically high quality, reliable, and public ly available through state and national data sources . The key challenge to capturing differences in county capacities will be to select a limited num ber of relevant characteristics. Measures within categories are often correla ted, allowing for simplification without much loss of information . Incentivizing State Goals The state has a particular interest in recidivism outcomes, both in terms of how ma ny realigned offenders end up back in state prison and in terms of how realignment affects public safety. Given these interests, the permanent funding model should incentivize reduction s in recidivism . We recommend that such reductions be rewarded in two ways. First, the funding model could reward those counties that achieve relatively low levels of returns to prison. Additional rewards for reductions in the rates at which counties return offenders to state prison would allow even high -recidivism c ounties to respond to this incentive. Second, the funding model could reward counties for reducing the reconviction rates of realigned offenders who commit new crimes. While realignment significantly enhanced the incentive each county faced to reduce the recidivism level of the locally managed population, tying f unding to the size of the realigned population (as proposed above ) may diminish this incentive because funding will increase proportionally with 1170(h) convictions. A recidivism reduction bonus wo uld balance these incentives by rewarding counties for the reductions in convictions they are able to achieve among this population. This recidivism bonus could reward both counties that achieve low levels of reconvictions and counties that show significan t improvement over time in their reconviction rates. While the Realignment Allocation Committee expressed an early interest in rewarding counties based on recidivism outcomes, high -quality recidivism data ha ve only recently become available because of the http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 20 timeframe required to allow for recidivism outcomes to unfold. R ecidivism data, much like the population count and composition data described above, are theoretically available for the full realignment population through state data sources . CDCR collects data on returns to prison custody for all PRCS and p arole releases, and the DOJ collects data on all convictions and thus may be able to identify the reconviction rates of realigned offenders. If CDCR data wer e combined with DOJ data, we could potentially achieve a full picture of county recidivism levels and improvements over time under realignment. Alternatively, the state may need to rely on recidivism data collected at the county level to capture the impact of realignment . While we approach the possibil ities of these new data sources with optimism, the fact remains that the Realignment Allocation Committee will likely need to offer recommendation s for the Year 4 allocation model before new data sources become available. Given these constraints, we apply the key components described here to the Year 4 allocation using currently available public data. The next section describes our proposed model in detail. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 21 Proposed Year 4 Model As the Realignment Allocation Committee works toward a recommendation for a Year 4 funding model, it will be challenging to balance the range of perspectives and concerns brought to the table by state, coun ty, and community stakeholders. This section d escribes our proposed Year 4 allocation model. In develo ping this model, we drew up on the key components presented in the previous section and evaluated the model based on the criteria outlined earlier in the report . We also drew up on recommendations from our colleagues. The Legislative Analyst’s Office ( LAO) has mentioned its concerns about past allocations and offered a possible model for the future (Taylor, 2012) . The LAO is particularly concerned with establishing a model that appropriately estimates the realignment population and changes over time with changes in the bu rden of realignment . The LAO suggests the best approach would be to base funding allocations on two factors: the size of the at -risk (age s 18– 35) county population and the number of felony dispositions within a county, adjusting for dispos itions that result in prison incarceration. This proposal is promising because it would simplify the current (Year 2) allocation model and apply the same model to all counties. While obtaining reliable felony disposition data may be challenging in the near term, resulting in less transparent allocations, it may become easier in the long term. While t he LAO model is better than the current method at capturing the realignment burden , the trade -off to its simplicity is that it omit s consideration of county dif ferences in the capacity to manage real ignment and offers only limited incentive s for county performance . Using the LAO model as a starting point, we propose a possible Year 4 model that uses currently available data ( rather than the ideal data described in the previous section ) to estimate the burden of realignment and construct a base funding allocation. We then adjust this base allocation for relevant differences in county characteristics and introduce bonuses to the base allocation for county reduction s in recidivism . Finally, we assess the degree to which our proposed Year 4 model meets the criteria we have outlined for a permanent funding model. While this model has its limitations , due primarily to the availability of data, we recommend its adoption because it substant ially improves upon past models and provides a foundation for a permanent model . Realignment Burden: The Base Allocation We propose a Year 4 base allocation that capture s the burden counties bear in managing their lower -level felon population . The base allocation would consist of the following elements : 1. The county share of the total projected full roll -out realignment population ( weighted at 40% ) 2. The county share of the total high- risk population , males age s 18– 29 ( weighted at 60% ) The proposed base allocation reconciles the Year 1 and Year 2 –3 models by rebalancing the weighting of both the projected realignment population and the county adult population. In this case, however, we have refined the adult populatio n measure to capture only the high- risk population, identified in the literature as males age s 18– 29, rather than the full adult population (Laub and Sampson , 2001; Piquero et al. , 2003) . P rojected increases in this population vary across counties ove r time. As a result, the model is designed to adapt along with this indicator to changes in the underlying public safety risk. These changes provide a more accurate assessment of the realignment burden over time, improving the responsiveness of the allocat ion. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 22 While the approach outlined here balances and refines past measures, it still falls short of the ideal described in the previous section. Should data be come available that capture the full realigned population, the base allocation could be adjusted a ccordingly. We explain the proposed base allocation in more detail in the Technical Appendix . Capacity Adjustments: Differences in Count y Characteristics Our proposed model allows for adjustments to the base allocation to capture differences in county characteristics that may affect a county’s capacity to manage the realigned population. While no indicators will perfectly capture relevant differences in county characteristics, this model does bring key indicators of economic and geographic difference into the allocation decision. Because the most critical difference in county demographics —the relative size of the high -risk adult population —is included in the base allocat ion to capture the realignment burden, we have not included it here. We propose the following adjustments to capture relevant economic and geographic differences: 1. Poverty Rate . The poverty rate is a key indicator of the overall level of resou rces in a coun ty. 9 High - poverty counties typically have lower tax bases and serve higher- need populations than low-poverty counties. Local resource constraints likely played an important role in the tendency of relatively poor counties to shift their criminal justice pr oblems to the state prison system prior to realignment. Figure 3 demonstrates the positive relationship between county poverty rates and pre- realignment prison inc arceration rates. Poverty rates are also correlated with other common indicators of local eco nomic status, such as the unemployment rate and median income. 10 In our model, c ounties receive adjustments of up to 10 percent of their base allocation depending on their level of poverty. This adjustment is explained in more detail in the Technical Appendix . FIGURE 3 Scatterplot of poverty r ates and pre -realignment s tate prison i ncarceration r ates, 2011 SOURCE S: Poverty rates are from the United States Department of Agriculture (2011); state prison incarceration rates are from the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice (201 0). 9 We recognize that the federal poverty measure is not ideal because there exist substantial differences in the cost of living across the state. Alternative poverty measures are available for Calif ornia (see Bohn et al. 2013), but we have elected to use the federal poverty measure because it is available for all counties and updated annually. 10 County poverty rates are positively correlated with county unemployment rates (r = 0.62) and negatively correlated with county median income (r = - 0.76). 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 0.0% 5.0.0% 15.0.0.0.0% Pre-realignment state prison incarceration rate per 100,000 adult population (ages 18– 69) Percent of total population in poverty (2011) http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 23 2. Rural Population . The percent of the county population living in rural areas is a key indicator of the challenge of managing and supervising the realigned population. Counties with significant rural populations may be limited in their capacity to reach these populations with services and supervision. Residents of rural areas may also face b arriers to accessing services because service providers are concentrated in urban areas and transportation options are more limited in rural areas. Given these additional barriers to actualizing the community supervision and rehabilitation vision of realig nment, we increase the base allocation of sparsely populated counties by u p to 10 percent , depending on the share of the population living in rural areas . Th is adjustment is explained in more detail in the Technical Appendix . The inclusion of adjustments for differences in county characteristics expands the model to include additional factors, as well as allowing allocation shares to adapt along with changes in the circumstances counties face over time. Incentive Bonuses: Recidivism Reduction Achieving lower rates of recidivism is a key goal for the state because the share of individuals returning to crime has a direct bearing on the state’s ability to reduce prison crowding. It is equally important at the county level because it reflect s the degree to which counties are able to mitigate the effects of realignment on public safety. Our proposed Year 4 model includes two types of incent ive bonuses: 1. Low Rates of Return to Prison. Our proposed model offers a 5 percent bonus to the base allocation of counties that achieve low levels of recidivism , as measured by the share of realigned offenders return ed to prison. Counties also receive a 5 percent bonus if they achieve a relatively high reduction in rates of recidivism , as measured by the year -over -year change in the share of realigned offenders return ed to prison. 2. Low Rates of Conviction . Our proposed model also offers a 5 percent bonus to the base allocation of counties that achieve low levels of recidivism, as measu red by the reconviction levels of realigned offenders . Counties that achieve relatively high recidivism reduction rates, as measured by the year- over -year chan ge in the share of realigned offenders who are convicted of new crimes, also receive a 5 percent bonus. Bonuses for counties with low recidivism levels reward high -performing counties, while bonuses for counties that show strong reductions in their recidiv ism rates allow for counties that begin realignment with relatively high level s of recidivism to receive rewards for improvement over time. These incentive bonuses are explained in more detail in the Technical Appendix . County Allocations under Our Proposed Year 4 Model Under our Year 4 model, the majority of counties would receive an allocation share that falls somewhere between their Year 1 and Year 2–3 share. For those counties that would receive a lower allocation share under this model than in past years, we include a minimum allocation rule to ensure they receive at least their minimum past year allocation. We include this rule because it improves th e political feasibility of the model and because we recognize we have made a strong case for the importance of additional data to appropriately capture the burden of realignment. While we view the proposed Year 4 model as an improvement on past models, it is still an incremental step toward a permanent allocation model. Given the history of shifting allocations over time and the less- than-ideal data available for some of the key components in the model, it seems reasonable to provide the stability of a mini mum allocation in Year 4. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 24 Table 4 indicates where the proposed allocation is based on our Year 4 model , as presented above, and where the share relies on the minimum allocation rule. TABLE 4 Proposed Y ear 4 model : County allocation s hares compared with past a llocation s hares County Year 1 allocation share ( %) Year 2– 3 a llocation share ( %) Proposed year 4 a llocation share ( %) Year 4 allocation model Alameda 2.60 3.47 2.86 Proposed model Alpine 0.02 0.02 0.02 Minimum rule Amador 0.15 0.13 0.13 Minimum rule Butte 0.77 0.66 0.85 Proposed model Calaveras 0.10 0.09 0.09 Minimum rule Colusa 0.06 0.05 0.07 Proposed model Contra Costa 1.29 2.29 1.50 Proposed model Del Norte 0.06 0.06 0.08 Proposed model El Dorado 0.34 0.40 0.34 Minimum rule Fresno 2.49 2.47 2.62 Proposed model Glenn 0.09 0.08 0.09 Proposed model Humboldt 0.43 0.40 0.42 Proposed model Imperial 0.37 0.37 0.43 Proposed model Inyo 0.05 0.05 0.05 Minimum rule Kern 3.06 2.78 2.85 Proposed model Kings 0.81 0.72 0.72 Proposed model Lake 0.23 0.21 0.22 Proposed model Lassen 0.11 0.09 0.17 Proposed model Los Angeles 31.77 31.77 31.77 Minimum rule Madera 0.48 0.41 0.46 Proposed model Marin 0.37 0.54 0.37 Minimum rule Mariposa 0.05 0.04 0.04 Proposed model Mendocino 0.28 0.24 0.24 Proposed model Merced 0.71 0.62 0.76 Proposed model Modoc 0.02 0.02 0.02 Proposed model Mono 0.03 0.03 0.03 Proposed model Monterey 1.09 0.94 1.11 Proposed model Napa 0.30 0.29 0.29 Minimum rule Nevada 0.15 0.21 0.15 Minimum rule Orange 6.51 6.68 6.51 Minimum rule Placer 0.84 0.73 0.79 Proposed model Plumas 0.04 0.04 0.04 Proposed model Riverside 5.95 5.12 5.36 Proposed model Sacramento 3.71 3.33 3.57 Proposed model San Benito 0.15 0.13 0.15 Proposed model San Bernardino 7.28 6.63 6.74 Proposed model San Diego 7.09 7.02 7.90 Proposed model San Francisco 1.43 2.03 1.71 Proposed model San Joaquin 1.92 1.75 1.75 Minimum rule San Luis Obispo 0.62 0.61 0.76 Proposed model San Mateo 1.19 1.60 1.23 Proposed model http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 25 County Year 1 allocation share ( %) Year 2– 3 a llocation share ( %) Proposed year 4 a llocation share ( %) Year 4 allocation model Santa Barbara 1.09 0.95 1.27 Proposed model Santa Clara 3.55 4.00 3.80 Proposed model Santa Cruz 0.47 0.61 0.57 Proposed model Shasta 0.84 0.74 0.74 Proposed model Sierra 0.02 0.02 0.02 Minimum rule Siskiyou 0.13 0.11 0.11 Proposed model Solano 1.07 1.00 1.00 Proposed model Sonoma 0.91 1.07 1.01 Proposed model Stanislaus 1.70 1.45 1.50 Proposed model Sutter 0.33 0.30 0.30 Minimum rule Tehama 0.34 0.30 0.31 Proposed model Trinity 0.04 0.04 0.04 Minimum rule Tulare 1.60 1.39 1.40 Proposed model Tuolumne 0.17 0.14 0.16 Proposed model Ventura 1.61 1.79 1.61 Proposed model Yolo 0.84 0.72 0.89 Proposed model Yuba 0.28 0.25 0.27 Proposed model SOURCES: Years 1 –3: information provided by CSAC; Year 4: allocations resulting from the proposed model . In some cases, counties receive their minimum allocation under this model, but there is no need to impose this minimum allocation level. This is particularly true of counties with the same allocation share under all model years. Table 4 (continued) http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 26 Conclusion As the Realign ment Allocation Committee works on its recommendations for the Year 4 model, it faces the challenge of incorporating the range of perspectives and concerns brought to the table by state, county , and community stakeholders. We offer one possible allocation model as a demonstration of how past models could be reconciled and h ow additional factors could be incorporated into future allocations. Our propos ed model starts with a base allocation that takes into account both the projected realignment population an d the county high- risk adult population to capture the realignment burden . The model then allows for capacity adjustments to this base to capture differences in county economic and geographic characteristics. Finally, the model incorporates incentive bonus es to reward counties for working toward state recidivism goals. The inclusion of these capacity adjustments and incentive bonuses enrich the model to reflect genuine variation in the circumstances and achievements of counties over time. Under our proposed Year 4 model, t he majority of counties would receive an allocation share that falls somewhere between their Year 1 and Year 2 –3 shares. For those counties that would receive a lower allocation share under the proposed model than in past years, we impose a “ minimum past allocation” rule. Although f unding allocation processes are notoriously contentious , reconciling the Year 1 and Year 2–3 approaches may go a long way toward improving perceptions o f fairness across counties. In addition to the question of how realignment population projections should be balanced against co unty population size, counties have also pointed to differences in economic and geographic characteristics as relevant factors in the allocation decision. Economic characteristics , such as the poverty rate, may signal differences in the underlying level of available resources and the ease with which county economies can absorb th eir realignment population s. Similarly, geographic characteristics, such as the share of the population residing in rural areas, may indicate the feasibility and cost associated with providing supervision and servic es to this population . Cons idering these factors in allocating funding may improve county perceptions of fairness. Our proposed model also reflects the s tate’s interest in improving recidivism outcomes . Low recidivism rates among realigned offenders mean that fewer low-level offenders will be return ing to prison, directly affect ing the state’s ability to reduce crowding to a level acceptable under the current c ourt ruling. In addition, recidivism rates reflect the degree to which counties are able to mitigate the effects of realignment on public safety. Given these interests, the state may want to include rewards for recidivism reduction in the funding allocation model . The ideal permanent allocation model would include many of the features of our proposed Year 4 model but wou ld replace the base allocation with an accurate measure of the realignment population. Although the state has not yet identified the full realignment population, it may be feasible to d o so using state- or county - level data sources . It may also be fea sible to use th ese data to capture recidivism outcomes for the full realignment population . However, i n the meantime the c ommittee will need to arrive at a Year 4 allocation model using available data. The cost of realignment is one of the fundamental challenges facing every one of California ’s 58 counties. Our work here focuses on how the s tate might improve the funding allocation model to compensate counties for their additional burden, while also enabl ing them to achieve recidivism and public safety goals . However, funding is only one of the resources the state may provide to counties . T he state is also in a position to assist http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 27 counties in identifying cost -effective practices , and it has created a Board of State and Community Corrections to channel this kind of implementation assistance to counties. Through the BSCC, the s tate has the opportunity to support data collection, research , and evaluation efforts that will help counties draw upon each other’s early experiences under realignment to identify best practices . The BSCC can then serve as a medium through which these best practices can be shared statewide , encouraging and enabl ing counties to prioritize cost -effective strategies, thereby reduc ing overall costs and improv ing recidivism and public sa fety outcomes. http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 28 References Bohn, Sarah, Caroline Danielson, Matt Levin, Marybeth Mattingly, and Christopher Wimer. 2013. The California Poverty Measure: A New Look at the Social Safety Net. Public Policy Institute of California. Available at www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=1070 . California Budget Project . 2012 a. “What Would Proposition 30 Mean for California?” Budget Brief . Available at www.cbp.org/pdfs/2012/120911_Proposition_30_BB.pdf . California Budget Project. 2012 b. “Finishing the Job: Moving Realignment toward Completion in 2012.” Budget Brief. Available at www.cbp.org/pdfs/2012/120607_Realignment_BB.pdf . California Budget Project. 2013. “A Mixed Picture: State Corrections Spending after the 2011 Realignment.” Budget Brief . Available at www.cbp.org/pdfs/2013/130625_A_Mixed_Picture_Corrections.pdf . California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 2012 . The Future of California Corrections: A Blueprint to Save Billions of Dollars, End Federal Oversight, and Improve the Prison System . Available at www.cdcr.ca.gov/2012plan/docs/plan/complete.pdf . California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 2013. Realignment Report. Available at www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/Realignment6MonthReportFinal_51613v1.pdf . California Department of Fi nance. 2010. Projections of the Realignment Population. Available at www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/Realignment -Population-Projections-Final.pdf. Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. 2010. Adult Sentencing Statistics, Calendar Year 2010 . Data available at http://casi.cjcj.org/Adult/2010 . Jett, Kathryn, and Joan Hancock . 2013. “Realignment in the Counties .” Federal Sentencing Reporter 25 (4 ): 236 –240 . Available at www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/fsr.2013.25.4.236 . Laub, John, and Robert Sampson. 2001. “Understanding Desistance from Crime.” Crime and Justice, 28, 1– 69. Lofstrom, Magnus, and Steven Raphael . 2013. Impact of Realignment on County Jail Populations . Public Policy Institute of California . Available at www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=1063 . McIntosh, Paul . 2011. “Allocation/Caseload Information on AB 109/AB 117, ” CSAC memo to Chairs of the County Boards of Supervisors and County Admini strative Officers. Available at www.cmhda.org/go/portals/0/cmhdafiles/committees/forensics/1107_forensics/csac_memo_re_allocation - caseload_info_on_ab_109_% 287-8-11.pdf . McIntosh, Paul . 2012. “Updat e on Realignment Fiscal Matters, ” CSAC memo to County Administrative Officers and Auditor Controllers. Available at www.csac.counties.org/sites/main/files/file -attachments/12.02.06_memo_to_caoa- cs_on_realignment_fiscal_matters_020812_final.pdf . Misczynski, Dean. 2011. Rethinking the State -Local Relationship: Correc tions. Public Policy Institute of California . Available at www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_811DMR.pdf . Piquero, Alex, David Farrington, and Alfred Blumstein. 2003. “The Criminal Career Paradigm.” Crime and Justice , 30, 83– 142. Taylor, Mac. 2012. The 2012 –13 Budget: The 2011 Realignment of Adult Offenders —An Update . California Legislative Analyst’s Office . Available at www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports/docs/External -Reports/2011-realignment -of-adult -offenders -022212.pdf . United States Department of Agriculture, Economi c Research Service. 2011. Poverty Rates by County . Available at www.ers.usda.gov/data -products/county-level-data-sets/poverty.aspx#.UejP56wQMkg . http://www.ppic.org Funding Public Safety Realignment 29 About the Author s Mia Bird is a research fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California, where she focuses on corrections and health and human services policy. Her current projects evaluate the effects of public safety realignment on reentry and reci divism outcomes and develop models to allocate realignment funding. Before joining PPIC, Mia served as a research and evaluation consultant with the San Francisco Office of the Public Defender and the San Francisco Superior Court. She holds a Ph.D. in publ ic policy and an M.A. in demography from the University of California, Berkeley. Joseph Hayes is a research associate at the Public Policy Institute of California, where he studies population change and corrections issues. Recent projects have focused on inter -regional migration, estimates of the undocumented immigrant population, and the changing composition of the prison population. He holds an M.S. in agricultural economics from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Acknowledgments The authors would lik e to acknowledge and thank our external reviewers, Drew Soderborg ( Legislative A nalyst’s Office ) and Steve Raphael (University of California, Berkeley) , who enhanced this report with their comments and constructive feedback. The author s would also like to extend their appreciation to our internal reviewers, Magnus Lofstrom and Laurel Beck , for their support of this p roject and very helpful comments . We would like t o especially thank Diane Cummin s (California Department of Finance), who graciously shared inf ormation relevant to this report . This project also required communication with government staff, and we thank Dave Lesher, our director of g overnmental affairs, for facilitating those communications. This report greatly benefited from the editorial expertise o f our communications staff, Lynette Ubois and Gary Bjork. Any errors in this work are the authors’ responsibility alone. PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA Board of Directors Donna Lucas, Chair Chief Executive Officer Lucas Public Affairs Mark Baldassare President and CEO Public Policy Institute of California Ruben Barrales President and CEO GROW Elect María Blanco Vice President, Civic Engagement California Community Foundation Brigitte Bren Attorney Walter B. Hewlett Chair, Board of Directors William and Flora Hewlett Foundation Phil Isenberg Chair Delta Stewardship Council Mas Masumoto Author and farmer Steven A. Merksamer Senior Partner Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Gross & Leoni, LLP Kim Polese Chairman ClearStreet, Inc. Thomas C. Sutton Retired Chairman and CEO Pacific Life Insurance Company The Public Policy Institute of California is dedicated to informing and improving public policy in California through independent, objective, nonpartisan research on major economic, social, and political issues. The institute’s goal is to raise public awar eness and to give elected representatives and other decisionmakers a more informed basis for developing policies and programs. The institute’s research focuses on the underlying forces shaping California’s future, cutting across a wide range of public poli cy concerns, including economic development, education, environment and resources, governance, population, public finance, and social and health policy. PPIC is a public charity. It does not take or support positions on any ballot measures or on any local, state, or federal legislation, nor does it endorse, support, or oppose any political parties or candidates for public office. PPIC was established in 1994 with an endowment from William R. Hewlett. Mark Baldassare is President and Chief Executive Officer of PPIC. Donna Lucas is Chair of the Board of Directors. Short sections of text, not to exceed three paragraphs, may be quoted without written permission provided that full attribution is given to the source. Research publications reflect the views of t he authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or Board of Directors of the Public Policy Institute of California. Copyright © 2013 Public Policy Institute of California All rights reserved. San Francisco, CA PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA 500 Washington Street, Suite 600 San Francisco, California 94111 phone: 415.291.4400 fax: 415.291.4401 www.ppic.org PPIC SACRAMENTO CENT ER Senator Office Building 1121 L Street, Suite 801 Sacramento, California 95814 phone: 916.440.1120 fax: 916.440.1121" ["post_date_gmt"]=> string(19) "2017-05-20 09:41:50" ["comment_status"]=> string(4) "open" ["ping_status"]=> string(6) "closed" ["post_password"]=> string(0) "" ["post_name"]=> string(9) "r_1113mbr" ["to_ping"]=> string(0) "" ["pinged"]=> string(0) "" ["post_modified"]=> string(19) "2017-05-20 02:41:50" ["post_modified_gmt"]=> string(19) "2017-05-20 09:41:50" ["post_content_filtered"]=> string(0) "" ["guid"]=> string(51) "http://148.62.4.17/wp-content/uploads/R_1113MBR.pdf" ["menu_order"]=> int(0) ["post_mime_type"]=> string(15) "application/pdf" ["comment_count"]=> string(1) "0" ["filter"]=> string(3) "raw" ["status"]=> string(7) "inherit" ["attachment_authors"]=> bool(false) }