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string(36638) "ppIC [ 1 ] Most observers believe that the model legislature should be competent, bipartisan, and efficient, but many feel that the California legislature falls shor t on all three dimensions. Legislators are reportedly inexperienced, the parties seem unable to get along, and the budget is usually late. In the September 2007 pp IC Statewide Survey, only 34 percent of the California public approved of the legislature, and trust in state government neared the lows reached just before Governor Davis was recalled in 2003. Three reforms have frequently been proposed to address those shortcomings: relaxing term limits for legislators, transferring the redistricting process to an independent commission, and reducing the supermajority requirement for the budget. In this AT ISSUE, we provide a simple, objective introduction to each reform and offer some recommendations for actual policy design. Legis Lative Refo Rm Eric mcgh EE a DysfunctionaL LegisLatu Re? Three concerns are driving the calls for reform. First is a perceived decline in competence , something often blamed on the inexperience of legislators. Since term limits put a cap on ever y legislator’s experience, the discussion of competence often fig ures large in calls to reform term limits. The second concern is waning bipartisanship . Fig ure 1 charts the ideolog y of the average Democrat and Republican in the Assembly, using a measure that takes all the votes in the Assembly into account. 1 In the last 40 years, Democrats in the Assembly have clearly become more liberal and Republicans more conser vative. These and other measures confirm that differences between the parties have grown while differences within each party have shrunk. 2 Obser vers worr y that this polarization degrades public debate and makes policy more responsive to party activists than to public opinion. The third concern is a loss of legislative efficiency : the feeling that the legislature has difficulty getting things done. It seems odd to worr y about party polarization and efficiency at the same time, since polarization should make it easier for members of the majority party to agree and thus push their agenda for ward. However, polarization can create gridlock when both parties must compromise on policy. This is most common when control of the governorship and the legislature is divided between the parties. 3 It is also a problem for the budget, which requires at least some minority party votes for passage. As Fig ure 2 makes clear, it has become harder to pass the budget on time in recent years. This chronic delay is highly visible and threatens the legislature’s reputation, even if ever y other bill passes without incident. In the September 2007 PPIC sur vey, approval of the legislature’s handling of the budget was almost ten points lower than its overall approval and was down six points from May 2007. These are the general concerns. Each of the three reforms discussed below is meant to address some aspect of these perceived shortcomings. Term-limit reform strives mostly to improve competence, redistricting reform to increase bipartisanship, and budget reform to improve efficiency. These three reforms are not necessarily the best or the only avenues for change, but they have received the most discussion. Some alternatives are discussed in “The Future of Reform” at the end of this AT ISSUE. AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 2 Conservative Liberal Average Republican ideology Average Democratic ideology ppIC [ 03 ] figu Re 1. P aR t y P oLa R iZ ation in t He ca Lifo Rnia assem BLy, 1963-2003 Source: Seth Masket, University of Denver. Conservative Liberal Average Republican ideology Average Democratic ideology California’s 1990 term-limit law is one of the strictest in the country. June 15th deadline* Days early/late figuRe 2. ca Lifo Rnia B uD get : Days P ast ne W fisca L yeaR, 1950 –2007 Source: California’s Legislature, Chief Clerk of the Assembly, Sacramento, California, 2006. *The June 15 deadline did not apply to the legislature until 1972. ATissue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 4 ppIC [ 05 ] Resto Ring c omPetence : t eR m-Limit Refo Rm Fifteen states currently have limits on ser vice in the state legislature. The limits differ on three dimensions: how long members can ser ve in each chamber, how long they can ser ve in the legislature as a whole, and whether these limits apply only to consecutive terms or constitute a lifetime maximum. On all three dimensions, California’s 1990 term-limit law is one of the strictest in the countr y. In their lifetimes, California legislators may ser ve a maximum of six years in the Assembly and eight in the Senate, for a total of 14 overall. This matches A rkansas and Michigan for the shortest limits on lifetime ser vice within each chamber, and only Oklahoma limits total ser vice to a shorter amount of time. 4 Reformers arg ue that term limits make legislators too inexperienced and too focused on their next position to perform competently. There is certainly evidence for this arg ument. Term- limited legislators jump frequently from one committee to another to climb the hierarchy as quickly as possible, they pass fewer bills, and they are less effective at reviewing the budget and monitoring the bureaucracy. 5 Term-limited legislators also rely somewhat more on unelected staff, and their short time horizons encourage them to spend less time on constituent ser vice and to miss more roll-call votes. 6 A ll these trends tend to be magnified in the Assembly, with its higher concentration of new legislators.7 Nevertheless, there is some evidence to the contrar y. California is so large that it has no shortage of potential legislators who have experience in elected office. This may explain why the state’s term- limited legislators pass bills comparable in breadth and complexity to those passed before term limits. 8 Moreover, although many reform advocates arg ue that term limits have discouraged legislators from taking the long view, leading to partisanship and gridlock, neither partisan polarization nor party leadership is clearly stronger under term limits. 9 In fact, Fig ure 1 shows that the parties grew apart in California well before the passage of term limits. The same holds for the budget process: It became more protracted in the 1990s (see Fig ure 2), but most of this development occurred before term limits forced any member from the legislature. In 2002, California voters considered Proposition 45, which would have allowed legislators to ser ve up to four years past their ser vice limit, provided they could collect enough signatures from their constituents to put the option on the ballot. The measure was defeated 58 percent to 42 percent and lost in ever y county but one. Advocates of reform have now proposed a different measure that will be on the Februar y 2008 ballot. It would reduce the total ser vice limit from 14 years to 12 but would let that ser vice occur entirely within one chamber. In the September 2007 Statewide Sur vey, 55 percent of likely voters approved of this (Fig ure 3). California is not alone in proposing changes. At least 70 proposals to relax term limits have been offered around the countr y since 1999. However, none has become law. A ll the successful changes have been outright repeals: by the state legislature in Idaho and Utah and by the state Supreme Court in Massachusetts, Oregon, Washing ton, and Wyom ing. 10 Thus, if the latest reform proposal is successful, it might ser ve as a model for other states. If it does succeed, what effect might it have? Members might ser ve longer on committees and develop greater expertise within a given issue area, leading to tougher oversight of the governor and bureaucracy. They might also pay more attention to their districts, since they would be tied to the same voters (allowing for redistricting) for more than a decade. And the law would go far toward restoring parity between the two chambers, by filling the Assembly with more experienced representatives. On the other hand, incumbents would ser ve longer in their seats, and turnover would suffer. Moreover, the reform would likely have little effect on the partisanship of recent years. Unfortunately, the principles of competence and frequent turnover are at odds, because an experienced legislature is one whose members usually win reelection. Reform is therefore a balancing act rather than an unqualified drawback or benefit: It depends on one’s feelings about these competing principles. AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 6 figuRe 3. ca Lifo Rnian s’ su PPoRt fo R Legis Lative R efoRm, s eP tem BeR 2007 Source: PPIC Statewide Survey, September 2007. Don’t know 6% No 39%Ye s 55% 12-Year Term Limit, All in One c hamber independent citizen redistricting commission Don’t know 12% Oppose 22% Favor 66% 55 Percent Vote for Budget Don’t know 5% Bad idea 56% Good idea 39% ppIC [ 07 ] Source : California State Asse mbly, Commit te e on Ele ctions and Re districting, http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/committee/c7/2001pdfs/.Los Angeles Area Assembly Districts AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 8 RestoRing Bi Pa R tisans HiP : Re Dist Ricting Refo Rm The California state legislature bears primar y responsibility for drawing new state legislative and congressional districts after ever y census. Many obser vers arg ue that this creates an incentive to draw safe districts ensuring each member’s reelection and that such districts elect legislators with extreme points of view and little incentive to compromise. In terms of partisan competition, redistricting plans can fall into one of three general types. Bipartisan plans protect incumbents of both parties and so tend to produce the largest number of uncompetitive seats. Partisan plans give the majority party an advantage by filling each of its districts with just enough supporters to win and “wasting” the minority party’s supporters by packing them in a smaller number of districts. Partisan plans can be modestly competitive, since the majority wants to spread its supporters across as many districts as possible. Neutral plans avoid packing partisan voters any where and so tend to produce the largest number of competitive districts. Redistricting reform is often seen as a way to produce neutral plans and so to reduce partisan wrangling in the legislature. Reforms generally empower an independent commission to make some or all of the redistricting decisions. Twenty states have a law of this type. On average, commissions do seem to draft plans that are more neutral than the plans drafted by legislatures, but a commission’s composition and rules might affect the sort of plans it produces. 11 Hard evidence is limited, but key considerations seem to include the partisan membership of the commission, the number of votes required to pass a plan, and whether the commission is required to elevate certain redistricting criteria above others. If the goal is to produce a neutral plan, a commission with non- legislators in equal numbers from each major party and a neutral tie-breaking vote is generally considered the best approach. 12 The partisan members might still come together to produce a bipartisan plan, but requiring the tie-breaking vote to support the winning plan could alleviate that concern. The commission also needs the information and incentive to produce a competitive plan, so it should be allowed to see partisan registration and voting data and be required to produce the most competitive plan possible. ppIC [ 9 ] How difficult is it to draw competitive districts? Nationwide, the practice of partisan clustering—where Democrats live near Democrats and Republicans near Republicans—has produced more uncompetitive seats than redistricting has. 13 It is difficult to overcome this clustering without running afoul of other objectives. Drawing Democrats and Republicans into the same districts will violate compactness and cross city and county lines. It will also tend to commingle communities of interest and undermine efforts at racial and ethnic minority representation. 14 That said, California’s current set of districts is uncompetitive enough that it would be possible to make some districts more competitive without doing serious violence to these other goals. 15 Districting is not destiny: Partisan tides, political scandal, and changing demography can alter a district’s voting habits over time. 16 In addition, district composition is only one of many factors that influence a legislator’s sense of electoral security and willingness to compromise. Incumbent legislators tend to be reelected safely, even when their districts are competitive. 17 Partly as a result, the link between district composition and representation is surprisingly loose and leaves room for many other influences. 18 Fig ure 1 shows that polarization has mostly been a gradual process in the Assembly, without sudden changes at the beginning of each decade when the new district lines are put in place. Thus, redistricting reform would probably soften partisanship only at the margins, 19 although that might be enough to alter the way the legislature does business. In 2005, California voters considered Proposition 77, which would have assigned redistricting to a commission of retired judges. Three judges would have ser ved on the panel, and would have been required to agree on any plan. The judges would have been selected mostly at random, with at least one from each major party and with no allowance for a neutral, nonpartisan tiebreaker. The measure also barred the commission from consulting partisan voting and registration data and required it to honor city and county lines wherever possible. Given California’s geographical clustering by party, this last requirement might easily have produced an uncompetitive, bipartisan plan, the opposite of the measure’s intention. At any rate, voters rejected the measure, 60 percent to AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 10 Partisan tides, political scandal, and changing demography can alter a district’s voting habits over time. ppIC [ 11 ] Reforming California’s redistricting process has national implications. AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 12 40 percent, so future efforts at reform will almost certainly look different. In that spirit, four reform proposals were introduced in the last legislative session. None passed. A ll four would have established bipartisan commissions with some form of neutral tie-breaking vote. They differed mostly in the way they appointed the members to the commission. The two Democratic plans, ACA 1 and SCA 10, gave the legislative leaders of the two parties a larger role. The two Republican plans, ACA 4 and SCA 9, introduced more randomness into the appointment process. The bills all required a commitment to compactness, communities of interest and the like, but only ACA 4 and SCA 9 would have prevented the commission from using partisan registration and voting data. Despite pressure from national Democrats to exclude congressional districts from reform, all but SCA 9 would have applied the commission process to these districts as well. Nonetheless, this pressure makes clear that reforming California’s redistricting process has national implications. In the fall of 2007, an initiative circulated for signatures that would have established a commission of randomly selected citizens for redistricting. The initiative failed to qualify for the Februar y 2008 primar y ballot, but the idea received strong support from likely voters in the September 2007 PPIC Statewide Sur vey (Fig ure 3). At this stage it is unclear whether voters approve of the independent nature of the commission, the use of randomly selected citizens, or both. RestoRing e fficiency: Bu Dget P Rocess Refo Rm The California legislature must pass the state budget by a two- thirds margin. Among the states, only Arkansas and Rhode Island require a similar supermajority to enact spending. 20 A lthough this supermajority requirement is aimed at holding the line on spending, it does not seem to have much effect. 21 Does it contribute to budget gridlock and legislative inefficiency instead? ppIC [ 13 ] Budgets have been late in recent years (see Fig ure 2). Yet, the two- thirds requirement has been in place since 1933, so other factors must be involved. The size of the budget and the demands placed on it certainly matter. The four other states with late budgets in 2007 (Illinois, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) are also large and diverse. Party politics interact with the supermajority requirement as well. Minority party votes are almost always required to reach the two-thirds threshold, so a disciplined minority can force changes to the budget or even extract concessions on other matters. 22 Such leverage is less important if the governor defends the minority’s interests, but it ensures the minority a fallback position in case he does not. As the parties in the legislature have polarized, it has become harder to build the cross-party coalition necessar y to pass the budget. Majority Democrats have been remarkably unified on budget votes. On average since 1993, only three Democrats in the Assembly and one in the Senate have voted against the budget. A lthough Republicans have been more divided, in recent years a majority of them has usually held together against the Democratic budget. 23 Proposition 56 in 2004 would have lowered the budget threshold from two-thirds in each chamber to 55 percent. It failed by a two- to-one margin, and the same change fared poorly with likely voters in the September 2007 PPIC Statewide Sur vey (Fig ure 3). Making this change would effectively end the need for cross-party coalitions, because Democratic votes alone have cleared the 55 percent threshold in 11 of the last 15 budget years. No surprise, then, that the Statewide Sur vey found opinions on a threshold change far more negative among Republicans than among Democrats or Independents. 24 Would reforming the budget process matter? Compared with other reforms, its effects would be narrow. Still, the budget is the most important bill the legislature passes each year, and it has become a potent and visible symbol of gridlock. Moreover, lowering the threshold would almost certainly make it easier to pass a budget, even if financial constraints and the governor’s veto continued to make protracted budget debates a part of political life in Sacramento. AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 14 As the parties in the legislature have polarized, it has become harder to pass the budget. ppIC [ 15 ] Ironically, the cost of this efficiency would be a loss of bipartisanship, since the two-thirds requirement forces the parties to work together to pass a budget. More than term limits or redistricting, the two- thirds threshold magnifies tradeoffs between the different goals of reform. tHe f utu Re of Refo Rm The options considered above represent just a fraction of the alternatives. Even if reform is limited to term limits, redistricting, or the budget process, there are countless ways to reform each one, and the specifics of the reform often matter more than the act of reform itself. Moreover, many other reforms might be just as effective at encouraging legislators to work together but would take too much space to describe in detail here. These are just a few of many possibilities: • Limits on campaign donations —Tightening existing limits might reduce the influence of interest groups in the legislature. Proposition 34 in 2000 imposed some caps on donations, but these are generally more relaxed than similar limits on U.S. congressional candidates. Public financing of campaigns might ser ve a similar purpose. • Open primaries —Opening party primaries to Independents, and even to opposing partisans, might encourage bipartisanship by forcing candidates to respond to a broader range of voices. 25 California experimented with radically open primaries in the late 1990s, but the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this approach in 2000. It was replaced by a more limited system, but that system could be opened further and still pass constitutional muster. • C ro s s-filin g —From 1914 to 1959, California allowed candidates to run in more than one party’s primar y. Recent evidence AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 16 suggests this system significantly reduced party polarization in the legislature.26 • Non-partisan elections —Nebraska elects its legislators on a non-partisan ballot. The result is a near absence of partisanship among legislators. However, this system might go too far by making it difficult to hold legislators accountable. 27 W hatever the reform, it should probably be as politically neutral as possible. Voters seem sensitive to the charge that a reform simply drapes the interests of one political party, or of politicians as a class, in the sheep’s clothing of good government. This may give “no” arg uments an advantage, since they can always accuse the “yes” vote of ulterior motives. As a result, without some bipartisan support, even well- meaning reforms will probably have a harder time at the ballot box. ppIC [ 17 ] notes 1 Seth E. m asket, “it Takes an Outsider: Extralegislative Organization and Par tisanship in the c alifornia Assembly, 1849 –2006,” American Journal of Political Science , Vo l . 51, N o . 3 , 2 0 07. N u m b e r s i n F i g u r e 1 w e r e g e n e r o u s l y p r o v i d e d b y S e t h ma s k e t o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f D e n v e r, u s i n g t h e D W - N O m iN AT E a l g o r i t h m d e v e l o p e d b y P o o l e a n d ro s e n t h a l ( N o l a n m. m cc a r t y, Ke i t h T. P o o l e , a n d ho w a r d rosenthal, Income Redistribution and the Realignment of American Politics, AE i Press, Washington, D.c., 1997). This algorithm extracts e s t i m a t e s o f i d e o l o g y f r o m a l l c o n t e s t e d r o l l c a l l v o t e s i n t h e c h a m b e r. 2 g ar y c . Jacobson, “Par tisan and i deological Polarization in the c alifornia Electorate,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2004. 3 Thad Kousser, “Par tisan Polarization and Policy g ridlock in california,” unpublished manuscript, University of c alifornia, San Diego. 4 Jennifer Drage Bowser, Keon S. c hi, and Thomas h. Little, Coping with Term Limits: A Practical Guide National c onference of State Legislatures, Denver, c olorado, 2006. Nebraska has an eight-year limit on ser vice, but it has only one chamber. 5 Bowser, c hi, and Little, see note 4; Bruce E. c ain and Thad Kousser, Adapting to Term Limits: Recent Experiences and New Directions, P u b l i c P o l i c y in s t i t u t e o f ca l i f o r n i a , S a n Fr a n c i s c o , ca l i f o r n i a , 2 0 0 4 ; J o h n m. c a r e y, ri c h a r d g. N i e m i , a n d Ly n d a W. P o w e l l , “ T h e E f f e c t s of Term Limits on State Legislatures,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vo l . 2 3 , N o . 2, 19 9 8 ; T h a d Ko u s s e r, “ D e c l a r a t i o n o f P r o f e s s o r T h a d Kousser in Suppor t of Plaintiffs’ Declarator y r elief Action to Find Proposition 140 revised the constitution,” 2007; Thad Kousser, Te r m Limits and the Dismantling of State Legislative Professionalism, ca m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , ca m b r i d g e , U K , 2 0 0 5 ; ga r y mo n c r i e f a n d Joel A. Thompson, “On the Outside Looking i n: Lobbyists’ Perspectives on the Effects of State Legislative Term Limits,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2001; Neal D. Woods and m ichael Baranowski, “Legislative Professionalism and influence on State Agencies: The Effects of r esources and careerism,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2006. 6 c a i n a n d Ko u s s e r, s e e n o t e 5 ; ca r e y, N i e m i , a n d P o w e l l , s e e n o t e 5 ; ch r i s t o p h e r A . co o p e r a n d L i l l i a r d E . ri c h a r d s o n , J r., “ in s t i t u t i o n s and r epresentational r oles in American State Legislatures,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2006; g erald c. Wright, “Do Term Limits Affect Legislative r oll call Voting? r epresentation, Polarization, and Par ticipation,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2007. 7 c a i n a n d Ko u s s e r, s e e n o t e 5 ; ga r y F. mo n c r i e f, ri c h a r d g. N i e m i , a n d Ly n d a W. P o w e l l , “ T i m e , Te r m L i m i t s , a n d Tu r n o v e r : Tr e n d s i n m embership Stability in U.S. State Legislatures,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2004. 8 c a i n a n d Ko u s s e r, s e e n o t e 5 ; T h a d Ko u s s e r, “ T h e L i m i t e d im p a c t o f Te r m L i m i t s : co n t i n g e n t E f f e c t s o n t h e co m p l e x i t y a n d B r e a d t h of Laws,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2006. Peverill Squire ( “ membership Turnover and the Efficient Processing of Legislation,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vo l . 2 3 , N o . 1, 19 9 8 ) m a k e s a s i m i l a r p o i n t a b o u t t h e e f f e c t o f t u r n o v e r g e n e r a l l y, w h e t h e r through term limits or not. h is evidence suggests that legislative “efficiency” (the number and percentage of bills passed) is more a f u n c t i o n o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e’s r e s o u r c e s a n d t h e p r e s s u r e s i t f e e l s f r o m i n t e r e s t g r o u p s . B y c o n t r a s t , T h a d Ko u s s e r s h o w s t h a t l e s s innovative legislatures are term-limited, when measured in a variety of ways, and pass fewer bills; Term Limits, “Dedication,” see note 5. 9 D. E . A p o l l o n i o a n d ra y m o n d J . L a ra j a , “ Te r m L i m i t s , ca m p a i g n co n t r i b u t i o n s , a n d t h e D i s t r i b u t i o n o f P o w e r i n S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e s ,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vo l . 31, N o . 2, 2 0 0 6 ; B o w s e r, ch i , a n d L i t t l e , s e e n o t e 4 ; ca i n a n d Ko u s s e r, s e e n o t e 5 ; ca r e y, N i e m i , a n d Powell, see note 5; John m . carey et al., “The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Sur vey of the 50 States,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2006; Thad Kousser, Term Limits, see note 5; Wright, see note 6; m arjorie Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. ( “Democracy among Strangers: Term Limits’ Effects on r elationships between State Legislators in michigan,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2006 ) do find evidence of deteriorating relationships in the m ichigan legislature after term limits, but it is difficult to say whether this applies to other states as well. 10 Bowser, c hi, and Little, see note 4. 11 J a m i e L . ca r s o n a n d mi c h a e l h. c r e s p i n , “ T h e E f f e c t o f S t a t e re d i s t r i c t i n g me t h o d s o n E l e c t o r a l co m p e t i t i o n i n U n i t e d S t a t e s ho u s e o f rep resentatives r aces,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vo l . 4 , N o . 4 , 2 0 0 4 ; T h o m a s E . ma n n , “ re d i s t r i c t i n g re f o r m : W h a t is D e s i r a b l e ? Possible? ” in Thomas E. m ann and Bruce E. cain, eds., Party Lines: Competition, Partisanship, and Congressional Redistricting, B r o o k i n g s Press, Washington, D. c., 2005; m ichael P. m cDonald, “A c omparative Analysis of r edistricting institutions in the United States, 2001– 0 2,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2004. 12 r ober t g . Dixon Jr., “Fair c riteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative Districts,” in Bernard g rofman et al., eds., Representation and Redistricting Issues, Lexington Books, Lexington, m assachusetts, 1982; mann, see note 11. ATissue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 18 13 Alan Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, and m atthew gunning, “Don’t Blame r edistricting for Uncompetitive Elections,” PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2006; Bruce E. c ain, Karin mac Donald, and m ichael P. mcDonald, “From Equality to Fairness: The Path of Political r eform since Baker v. Carr,” in Thomas E. m ann and Bruce E. cain, Party Lines: Competition, Partisanship, and Congressional Redistricting,Brookings Press, Washington, D. c., 2005. 14 Bruce E. c ain, The Reapportionment Puzzle, University of c alifornia Press, Berkeley, california, 1984; Bruce E. cain, Karin mac Donald, and i ris hui, “competition and r edistricting in california: Lessons for r eform,” institute for g overnmental Studies, Berkeley, c alifornia, 2006. 15 c ain, m ac Donald, and h ui, see note 14. 16 c ain, see note 14; c ain, mac Donald, and h ui, see note 14; Scott W. Desposato and John r . Petrocik, “The Variable incumbency Advantage: New Voters, r edistricting, and the Personal Vote,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47. No. 1, 2003; Andrew g elman and g ar y King, “Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative r edistricting,” The American Political Science Review, Vo l . 8 8 , N o . 3 , 19 9 4 . J. m organ Kousser ( “Estimating the Par tisan c onsequences of redistricting Plans— Simply,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1996 ) offers a dissenting view: that par tisan control of a district can be predicted with up to 90 percent accuracy using par tisan registration data alone, at least in c alifornia. Nonetheless, a few seats can determine control of the legislature, and Kousser does not deny that seats can change significantly over the course of a decade. 17 Bruce E. c ain, “Assessing the Par tisan Effects of r edistricting,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 2, 1985. 18 Stephen Ansolabehere, James m . Snyder Jr., and charles Stewar t iii, “candidate Positioning in U.S. h ouse Elections,” American Jour nal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2001; m asket, see note 1; Nolan m. mcc ar ty, Keith T. Poole, and h oward rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, mi T Press, cambridge, m assachusetts, 2006. 19 c ain, m ac Donald, and m cDonald, see note 13. 20 The Book of the States, The c ouncil of State governments, Lexington, m assachusetts, 2003. 21 B r u c e E . ca i n a n d ge o r g e A . ma c Ke n z i e , “ S q u e e z i n g t h e F i s c a l B a l l o o n : ho w S u p e r- ma j o r i t y ru l e s a n d O t h e r P r o v i s i o n s ha v e U n i q u e l y Shaped c alifornia’s Fiscal Policy,” unpublished manuscript, University of c alifornia, Berkeley. 22 Dan Dunmoyer, “You’ve Already Won, g OP,” Los Angeles Times, August 10, 2007. 23 r epublican suppor t was higher in the 1990s, but since 2000, a majority of r epublicans has voted against the budget in all but two years. 24 Proposition 56 also would have withheld legislator and governor salaries each day the budget was late, and a similar proposal was par t of S cA 9, one of the redistricting reform bills. The effect of this change is unclear. i n the shor t term, legislators are probably more sensitive to political pressures than financial ones. 25 Elizabeth r . gerber and r ebecca B. m or ton, “Primar y Election Systems and r epresentation,” The Journal Law, Economics, and Organization, Vo l . 14 , N o . 2, 19 9 8 ; K r i s t i n K a n t h a k a n d re b e c c a mo r t o n , “ T h e E f f e c t s o f E l e c t o r a l ru l e s o n co n g r e s s i o n a l P r i m a r i e s ,” in Peter F. g alderisi, marni Ezra, and m ichael Lyons, eds., Congressional Primaries and the Politics of Representation, r ow man and L i t t l e f i e l d , L a n h a m , ma r y l a n d , 2 0 01; K a r e n m. K a u f m a n n , J a m e s g. g i m p e l , a n d A d a m h. h o f f m a n , “A P r o m i s e Fu l f i l l e d ? O p e n P r i m a r i e s and r epresentation,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 65, No. 2, 2003. 26 m asket, see note 1. 27 g erald c . Wright and Brian F. Schaffner, “The i nfluence of Par ty: Evidence from the State Legislatures,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, 2002. ppIC [ 19 ] eric m cg hee Research Fellow, 415.291.4439, mcghee @ ppic.org Expertise • Elections – California redistricting reform – State and local voter initiatives – Voting behavior • Legislative behavior – Legislative organization – Responsiveness to public opinion – State term limits • p olitical participation • p olitical parties and party polarization • p olling and public opinion Education ph.D. (2003) and M.A. (1998 ), political science, University of California, Berkeley PPic e XPe Rts m ark Baldassare President and Chief Executive Officer, 415.291.4427, baldassare @ ppic.org Expertise • p ublic opinion • p ublic policy preferences • Elections • State initiatives • State and local government relations • p olitical participation • Demographics Education ph.D. (1976 ), sociology, University of California, Berkeley M.A. (1973), sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara max n eiman Associate Director, Senior Fellow, 415.291.4441, neiman@ ppic.org Expertise • Local government – Government structure – Population growth – Regional and metropolitan governance – U r b a n a n d s u b u r b a n p o l i t i c s – Local taxation and spending – Evaluation of local government performance – Lo c a l e l e c t i o n s – Effect of local government on state and national policy • Local economic development • Urban development Education ph.D. (1973) and M.A. (1968 ), political science, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee ATissue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 20 ReLate D PP ic PuBL ications Adapting to Term Limits: Recent Experiences and New Directions Bruce E. c ain and Thad Kousser November 2004 The Effect of Minority Districts and Minority Representation on Political Participation in California claudine g ay June 2001 J u s t t h e F a c t s This publication series provides detailed statistics on a wide range of current issues. Please see http://www.ppic.org/main/allpubs.asp?sort=type#a14 for JTFs relevant to legislative reform. PPIC Statewide Sur vey This survey series provides timely and comprehensive public opinion data on the urgent social, economic, and political issues facing all c alifornians. Please see http://www.ppic.org/main/allpubs.asp?sort=type#a12 for information about the survey and complete text of all surveys. ppIC [ 21 ] PPic B oaRD of D iR ecto Rs Thomas C. Sutton, Chair r etired c hairman & c hief Executive Officer Pacific Life i nsurance company Mark Baldassare President and c hief Executive Officer Public Policy i nstitute of california Ruben Barrales President and c hief Executive Officer San Diego r egional chamber of c ommerce Linda Griego President and c hief Executive Officer g riego Enterprises, i nc. Edward K. Hamilton chairman h amilton, r abinovitz & Alschuler, i nc. Gar y K. Har t Former State Senator and Secretary of Education State of c alifornia Walter B. Hewlett Director c enter for c omputer Assisted r esearch in the h umanities D o n n a L u c a s c hief Executive Officer Lucas Public Affairs L e o n E . P a n e t t a Director The Leon & Sylvia Panetta i nstitute for Public Policy K i S u h P a r k Design and m anaging Partner gruen Associates C o n s t a n c e L . R i c e co-Director The Advancement Project R a y m o n d L . Wa t s o n Vice c hairman of the Board Emeritus The i rvine c ompany C a r o l W h i t e s i d e President g reat Valley c enter ATissue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 22 © December 2007 by public policy Institute of California. All rights reser ved. San Francisco, CA S h o r t s e c ti o n s of tex t, n ot to exc e e d th re e p a r a g r a p h s, m ay b e q u ote d w i th o u t w r i t te n p e r m i s s i o n provided that full attribution is given to the source and the above copyright notice is included. pp IC does not take or support positions on any ballot measure or on any local, state, or federal legislation, nor does it endorse, support, or oppose any political parties or candidates for public office. Research publications reflect the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or Board of Directors of the p ublic policy Institute of California. This publication was funded in part by a grant from The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. ppIC [ 23 ] PuBLic Po Licy i nstitute of California • 500 Was Hington s tR eet, s uite 600 • San f r anCiSC o, C a 9 4111 P 415.291.4 400 • f 415. 291.4 4 01 • www.ppic.org DOWNLOAD T hiS PUBL icAT iON Fr EE OF ch Arg E AT WWW .PP ic.Org"
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string(36638) "ppIC [ 1 ] Most observers believe that the model legislature should be competent, bipartisan, and efficient, but many feel that the California legislature falls shor t on all three dimensions. Legislators are reportedly inexperienced, the parties seem unable to get along, and the budget is usually late. In the September 2007 pp IC Statewide Survey, only 34 percent of the California public approved of the legislature, and trust in state government neared the lows reached just before Governor Davis was recalled in 2003. Three reforms have frequently been proposed to address those shortcomings: relaxing term limits for legislators, transferring the redistricting process to an independent commission, and reducing the supermajority requirement for the budget. In this AT ISSUE, we provide a simple, objective introduction to each reform and offer some recommendations for actual policy design. Legis Lative Refo Rm Eric mcgh EE a DysfunctionaL LegisLatu Re? Three concerns are driving the calls for reform. First is a perceived decline in competence , something often blamed on the inexperience of legislators. Since term limits put a cap on ever y legislator’s experience, the discussion of competence often fig ures large in calls to reform term limits. The second concern is waning bipartisanship . Fig ure 1 charts the ideolog y of the average Democrat and Republican in the Assembly, using a measure that takes all the votes in the Assembly into account. 1 In the last 40 years, Democrats in the Assembly have clearly become more liberal and Republicans more conser vative. These and other measures confirm that differences between the parties have grown while differences within each party have shrunk. 2 Obser vers worr y that this polarization degrades public debate and makes policy more responsive to party activists than to public opinion. The third concern is a loss of legislative efficiency : the feeling that the legislature has difficulty getting things done. It seems odd to worr y about party polarization and efficiency at the same time, since polarization should make it easier for members of the majority party to agree and thus push their agenda for ward. However, polarization can create gridlock when both parties must compromise on policy. This is most common when control of the governorship and the legislature is divided between the parties. 3 It is also a problem for the budget, which requires at least some minority party votes for passage. As Fig ure 2 makes clear, it has become harder to pass the budget on time in recent years. This chronic delay is highly visible and threatens the legislature’s reputation, even if ever y other bill passes without incident. In the September 2007 PPIC sur vey, approval of the legislature’s handling of the budget was almost ten points lower than its overall approval and was down six points from May 2007. These are the general concerns. Each of the three reforms discussed below is meant to address some aspect of these perceived shortcomings. Term-limit reform strives mostly to improve competence, redistricting reform to increase bipartisanship, and budget reform to improve efficiency. These three reforms are not necessarily the best or the only avenues for change, but they have received the most discussion. Some alternatives are discussed in “The Future of Reform” at the end of this AT ISSUE. AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 2 Conservative Liberal Average Republican ideology Average Democratic ideology ppIC [ 03 ] figu Re 1. P aR t y P oLa R iZ ation in t He ca Lifo Rnia assem BLy, 1963-2003 Source: Seth Masket, University of Denver. Conservative Liberal Average Republican ideology Average Democratic ideology California’s 1990 term-limit law is one of the strictest in the country. June 15th deadline* Days early/late figuRe 2. ca Lifo Rnia B uD get : Days P ast ne W fisca L yeaR, 1950 –2007 Source: California’s Legislature, Chief Clerk of the Assembly, Sacramento, California, 2006. *The June 15 deadline did not apply to the legislature until 1972. ATissue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 4 ppIC [ 05 ] Resto Ring c omPetence : t eR m-Limit Refo Rm Fifteen states currently have limits on ser vice in the state legislature. The limits differ on three dimensions: how long members can ser ve in each chamber, how long they can ser ve in the legislature as a whole, and whether these limits apply only to consecutive terms or constitute a lifetime maximum. On all three dimensions, California’s 1990 term-limit law is one of the strictest in the countr y. In their lifetimes, California legislators may ser ve a maximum of six years in the Assembly and eight in the Senate, for a total of 14 overall. This matches A rkansas and Michigan for the shortest limits on lifetime ser vice within each chamber, and only Oklahoma limits total ser vice to a shorter amount of time. 4 Reformers arg ue that term limits make legislators too inexperienced and too focused on their next position to perform competently. There is certainly evidence for this arg ument. Term- limited legislators jump frequently from one committee to another to climb the hierarchy as quickly as possible, they pass fewer bills, and they are less effective at reviewing the budget and monitoring the bureaucracy. 5 Term-limited legislators also rely somewhat more on unelected staff, and their short time horizons encourage them to spend less time on constituent ser vice and to miss more roll-call votes. 6 A ll these trends tend to be magnified in the Assembly, with its higher concentration of new legislators.7 Nevertheless, there is some evidence to the contrar y. California is so large that it has no shortage of potential legislators who have experience in elected office. This may explain why the state’s term- limited legislators pass bills comparable in breadth and complexity to those passed before term limits. 8 Moreover, although many reform advocates arg ue that term limits have discouraged legislators from taking the long view, leading to partisanship and gridlock, neither partisan polarization nor party leadership is clearly stronger under term limits. 9 In fact, Fig ure 1 shows that the parties grew apart in California well before the passage of term limits. The same holds for the budget process: It became more protracted in the 1990s (see Fig ure 2), but most of this development occurred before term limits forced any member from the legislature. In 2002, California voters considered Proposition 45, which would have allowed legislators to ser ve up to four years past their ser vice limit, provided they could collect enough signatures from their constituents to put the option on the ballot. The measure was defeated 58 percent to 42 percent and lost in ever y county but one. Advocates of reform have now proposed a different measure that will be on the Februar y 2008 ballot. It would reduce the total ser vice limit from 14 years to 12 but would let that ser vice occur entirely within one chamber. In the September 2007 Statewide Sur vey, 55 percent of likely voters approved of this (Fig ure 3). California is not alone in proposing changes. At least 70 proposals to relax term limits have been offered around the countr y since 1999. However, none has become law. A ll the successful changes have been outright repeals: by the state legislature in Idaho and Utah and by the state Supreme Court in Massachusetts, Oregon, Washing ton, and Wyom ing. 10 Thus, if the latest reform proposal is successful, it might ser ve as a model for other states. If it does succeed, what effect might it have? Members might ser ve longer on committees and develop greater expertise within a given issue area, leading to tougher oversight of the governor and bureaucracy. They might also pay more attention to their districts, since they would be tied to the same voters (allowing for redistricting) for more than a decade. And the law would go far toward restoring parity between the two chambers, by filling the Assembly with more experienced representatives. On the other hand, incumbents would ser ve longer in their seats, and turnover would suffer. Moreover, the reform would likely have little effect on the partisanship of recent years. Unfortunately, the principles of competence and frequent turnover are at odds, because an experienced legislature is one whose members usually win reelection. Reform is therefore a balancing act rather than an unqualified drawback or benefit: It depends on one’s feelings about these competing principles. AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 6 figuRe 3. ca Lifo Rnian s’ su PPoRt fo R Legis Lative R efoRm, s eP tem BeR 2007 Source: PPIC Statewide Survey, September 2007. Don’t know 6% No 39%Ye s 55% 12-Year Term Limit, All in One c hamber independent citizen redistricting commission Don’t know 12% Oppose 22% Favor 66% 55 Percent Vote for Budget Don’t know 5% Bad idea 56% Good idea 39% ppIC [ 07 ] Source : California State Asse mbly, Commit te e on Ele ctions and Re districting, http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/committee/c7/2001pdfs/.Los Angeles Area Assembly Districts AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 8 RestoRing Bi Pa R tisans HiP : Re Dist Ricting Refo Rm The California state legislature bears primar y responsibility for drawing new state legislative and congressional districts after ever y census. Many obser vers arg ue that this creates an incentive to draw safe districts ensuring each member’s reelection and that such districts elect legislators with extreme points of view and little incentive to compromise. In terms of partisan competition, redistricting plans can fall into one of three general types. Bipartisan plans protect incumbents of both parties and so tend to produce the largest number of uncompetitive seats. Partisan plans give the majority party an advantage by filling each of its districts with just enough supporters to win and “wasting” the minority party’s supporters by packing them in a smaller number of districts. Partisan plans can be modestly competitive, since the majority wants to spread its supporters across as many districts as possible. Neutral plans avoid packing partisan voters any where and so tend to produce the largest number of competitive districts. Redistricting reform is often seen as a way to produce neutral plans and so to reduce partisan wrangling in the legislature. Reforms generally empower an independent commission to make some or all of the redistricting decisions. Twenty states have a law of this type. On average, commissions do seem to draft plans that are more neutral than the plans drafted by legislatures, but a commission’s composition and rules might affect the sort of plans it produces. 11 Hard evidence is limited, but key considerations seem to include the partisan membership of the commission, the number of votes required to pass a plan, and whether the commission is required to elevate certain redistricting criteria above others. If the goal is to produce a neutral plan, a commission with non- legislators in equal numbers from each major party and a neutral tie-breaking vote is generally considered the best approach. 12 The partisan members might still come together to produce a bipartisan plan, but requiring the tie-breaking vote to support the winning plan could alleviate that concern. The commission also needs the information and incentive to produce a competitive plan, so it should be allowed to see partisan registration and voting data and be required to produce the most competitive plan possible. ppIC [ 9 ] How difficult is it to draw competitive districts? Nationwide, the practice of partisan clustering—where Democrats live near Democrats and Republicans near Republicans—has produced more uncompetitive seats than redistricting has. 13 It is difficult to overcome this clustering without running afoul of other objectives. Drawing Democrats and Republicans into the same districts will violate compactness and cross city and county lines. It will also tend to commingle communities of interest and undermine efforts at racial and ethnic minority representation. 14 That said, California’s current set of districts is uncompetitive enough that it would be possible to make some districts more competitive without doing serious violence to these other goals. 15 Districting is not destiny: Partisan tides, political scandal, and changing demography can alter a district’s voting habits over time. 16 In addition, district composition is only one of many factors that influence a legislator’s sense of electoral security and willingness to compromise. Incumbent legislators tend to be reelected safely, even when their districts are competitive. 17 Partly as a result, the link between district composition and representation is surprisingly loose and leaves room for many other influences. 18 Fig ure 1 shows that polarization has mostly been a gradual process in the Assembly, without sudden changes at the beginning of each decade when the new district lines are put in place. Thus, redistricting reform would probably soften partisanship only at the margins, 19 although that might be enough to alter the way the legislature does business. In 2005, California voters considered Proposition 77, which would have assigned redistricting to a commission of retired judges. Three judges would have ser ved on the panel, and would have been required to agree on any plan. The judges would have been selected mostly at random, with at least one from each major party and with no allowance for a neutral, nonpartisan tiebreaker. The measure also barred the commission from consulting partisan voting and registration data and required it to honor city and county lines wherever possible. Given California’s geographical clustering by party, this last requirement might easily have produced an uncompetitive, bipartisan plan, the opposite of the measure’s intention. At any rate, voters rejected the measure, 60 percent to AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 10 Partisan tides, political scandal, and changing demography can alter a district’s voting habits over time. ppIC [ 11 ] Reforming California’s redistricting process has national implications. AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 12 40 percent, so future efforts at reform will almost certainly look different. In that spirit, four reform proposals were introduced in the last legislative session. None passed. A ll four would have established bipartisan commissions with some form of neutral tie-breaking vote. They differed mostly in the way they appointed the members to the commission. The two Democratic plans, ACA 1 and SCA 10, gave the legislative leaders of the two parties a larger role. The two Republican plans, ACA 4 and SCA 9, introduced more randomness into the appointment process. The bills all required a commitment to compactness, communities of interest and the like, but only ACA 4 and SCA 9 would have prevented the commission from using partisan registration and voting data. Despite pressure from national Democrats to exclude congressional districts from reform, all but SCA 9 would have applied the commission process to these districts as well. Nonetheless, this pressure makes clear that reforming California’s redistricting process has national implications. In the fall of 2007, an initiative circulated for signatures that would have established a commission of randomly selected citizens for redistricting. The initiative failed to qualify for the Februar y 2008 primar y ballot, but the idea received strong support from likely voters in the September 2007 PPIC Statewide Sur vey (Fig ure 3). At this stage it is unclear whether voters approve of the independent nature of the commission, the use of randomly selected citizens, or both. RestoRing e fficiency: Bu Dget P Rocess Refo Rm The California legislature must pass the state budget by a two- thirds margin. Among the states, only Arkansas and Rhode Island require a similar supermajority to enact spending. 20 A lthough this supermajority requirement is aimed at holding the line on spending, it does not seem to have much effect. 21 Does it contribute to budget gridlock and legislative inefficiency instead? ppIC [ 13 ] Budgets have been late in recent years (see Fig ure 2). Yet, the two- thirds requirement has been in place since 1933, so other factors must be involved. The size of the budget and the demands placed on it certainly matter. The four other states with late budgets in 2007 (Illinois, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) are also large and diverse. Party politics interact with the supermajority requirement as well. Minority party votes are almost always required to reach the two-thirds threshold, so a disciplined minority can force changes to the budget or even extract concessions on other matters. 22 Such leverage is less important if the governor defends the minority’s interests, but it ensures the minority a fallback position in case he does not. As the parties in the legislature have polarized, it has become harder to build the cross-party coalition necessar y to pass the budget. Majority Democrats have been remarkably unified on budget votes. On average since 1993, only three Democrats in the Assembly and one in the Senate have voted against the budget. A lthough Republicans have been more divided, in recent years a majority of them has usually held together against the Democratic budget. 23 Proposition 56 in 2004 would have lowered the budget threshold from two-thirds in each chamber to 55 percent. It failed by a two- to-one margin, and the same change fared poorly with likely voters in the September 2007 PPIC Statewide Sur vey (Fig ure 3). Making this change would effectively end the need for cross-party coalitions, because Democratic votes alone have cleared the 55 percent threshold in 11 of the last 15 budget years. No surprise, then, that the Statewide Sur vey found opinions on a threshold change far more negative among Republicans than among Democrats or Independents. 24 Would reforming the budget process matter? Compared with other reforms, its effects would be narrow. Still, the budget is the most important bill the legislature passes each year, and it has become a potent and visible symbol of gridlock. Moreover, lowering the threshold would almost certainly make it easier to pass a budget, even if financial constraints and the governor’s veto continued to make protracted budget debates a part of political life in Sacramento. AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 14 As the parties in the legislature have polarized, it has become harder to pass the budget. ppIC [ 15 ] Ironically, the cost of this efficiency would be a loss of bipartisanship, since the two-thirds requirement forces the parties to work together to pass a budget. More than term limits or redistricting, the two- thirds threshold magnifies tradeoffs between the different goals of reform. tHe f utu Re of Refo Rm The options considered above represent just a fraction of the alternatives. Even if reform is limited to term limits, redistricting, or the budget process, there are countless ways to reform each one, and the specifics of the reform often matter more than the act of reform itself. Moreover, many other reforms might be just as effective at encouraging legislators to work together but would take too much space to describe in detail here. These are just a few of many possibilities: • Limits on campaign donations —Tightening existing limits might reduce the influence of interest groups in the legislature. Proposition 34 in 2000 imposed some caps on donations, but these are generally more relaxed than similar limits on U.S. congressional candidates. Public financing of campaigns might ser ve a similar purpose. • Open primaries —Opening party primaries to Independents, and even to opposing partisans, might encourage bipartisanship by forcing candidates to respond to a broader range of voices. 25 California experimented with radically open primaries in the late 1990s, but the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this approach in 2000. It was replaced by a more limited system, but that system could be opened further and still pass constitutional muster. • C ro s s-filin g —From 1914 to 1959, California allowed candidates to run in more than one party’s primar y. Recent evidence AT issue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 16 suggests this system significantly reduced party polarization in the legislature.26 • Non-partisan elections —Nebraska elects its legislators on a non-partisan ballot. The result is a near absence of partisanship among legislators. However, this system might go too far by making it difficult to hold legislators accountable. 27 W hatever the reform, it should probably be as politically neutral as possible. Voters seem sensitive to the charge that a reform simply drapes the interests of one political party, or of politicians as a class, in the sheep’s clothing of good government. This may give “no” arg uments an advantage, since they can always accuse the “yes” vote of ulterior motives. As a result, without some bipartisan support, even well- meaning reforms will probably have a harder time at the ballot box. ppIC [ 17 ] notes 1 Seth E. m asket, “it Takes an Outsider: Extralegislative Organization and Par tisanship in the c alifornia Assembly, 1849 –2006,” American Journal of Political Science , Vo l . 51, N o . 3 , 2 0 07. N u m b e r s i n F i g u r e 1 w e r e g e n e r o u s l y p r o v i d e d b y S e t h ma s k e t o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f D e n v e r, u s i n g t h e D W - N O m iN AT E a l g o r i t h m d e v e l o p e d b y P o o l e a n d ro s e n t h a l ( N o l a n m. m cc a r t y, Ke i t h T. P o o l e , a n d ho w a r d rosenthal, Income Redistribution and the Realignment of American Politics, AE i Press, Washington, D.c., 1997). This algorithm extracts e s t i m a t e s o f i d e o l o g y f r o m a l l c o n t e s t e d r o l l c a l l v o t e s i n t h e c h a m b e r. 2 g ar y c . Jacobson, “Par tisan and i deological Polarization in the c alifornia Electorate,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2004. 3 Thad Kousser, “Par tisan Polarization and Policy g ridlock in california,” unpublished manuscript, University of c alifornia, San Diego. 4 Jennifer Drage Bowser, Keon S. c hi, and Thomas h. Little, Coping with Term Limits: A Practical Guide National c onference of State Legislatures, Denver, c olorado, 2006. Nebraska has an eight-year limit on ser vice, but it has only one chamber. 5 Bowser, c hi, and Little, see note 4; Bruce E. c ain and Thad Kousser, Adapting to Term Limits: Recent Experiences and New Directions, P u b l i c P o l i c y in s t i t u t e o f ca l i f o r n i a , S a n Fr a n c i s c o , ca l i f o r n i a , 2 0 0 4 ; J o h n m. c a r e y, ri c h a r d g. N i e m i , a n d Ly n d a W. P o w e l l , “ T h e E f f e c t s of Term Limits on State Legislatures,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vo l . 2 3 , N o . 2, 19 9 8 ; T h a d Ko u s s e r, “ D e c l a r a t i o n o f P r o f e s s o r T h a d Kousser in Suppor t of Plaintiffs’ Declarator y r elief Action to Find Proposition 140 revised the constitution,” 2007; Thad Kousser, Te r m Limits and the Dismantling of State Legislative Professionalism, ca m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , ca m b r i d g e , U K , 2 0 0 5 ; ga r y mo n c r i e f a n d Joel A. Thompson, “On the Outside Looking i n: Lobbyists’ Perspectives on the Effects of State Legislative Term Limits,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2001; Neal D. Woods and m ichael Baranowski, “Legislative Professionalism and influence on State Agencies: The Effects of r esources and careerism,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2006. 6 c a i n a n d Ko u s s e r, s e e n o t e 5 ; ca r e y, N i e m i , a n d P o w e l l , s e e n o t e 5 ; ch r i s t o p h e r A . co o p e r a n d L i l l i a r d E . ri c h a r d s o n , J r., “ in s t i t u t i o n s and r epresentational r oles in American State Legislatures,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2006; g erald c. Wright, “Do Term Limits Affect Legislative r oll call Voting? r epresentation, Polarization, and Par ticipation,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2007. 7 c a i n a n d Ko u s s e r, s e e n o t e 5 ; ga r y F. mo n c r i e f, ri c h a r d g. N i e m i , a n d Ly n d a W. P o w e l l , “ T i m e , Te r m L i m i t s , a n d Tu r n o v e r : Tr e n d s i n m embership Stability in U.S. State Legislatures,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2004. 8 c a i n a n d Ko u s s e r, s e e n o t e 5 ; T h a d Ko u s s e r, “ T h e L i m i t e d im p a c t o f Te r m L i m i t s : co n t i n g e n t E f f e c t s o n t h e co m p l e x i t y a n d B r e a d t h of Laws,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2006. Peverill Squire ( “ membership Turnover and the Efficient Processing of Legislation,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vo l . 2 3 , N o . 1, 19 9 8 ) m a k e s a s i m i l a r p o i n t a b o u t t h e e f f e c t o f t u r n o v e r g e n e r a l l y, w h e t h e r through term limits or not. h is evidence suggests that legislative “efficiency” (the number and percentage of bills passed) is more a f u n c t i o n o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e’s r e s o u r c e s a n d t h e p r e s s u r e s i t f e e l s f r o m i n t e r e s t g r o u p s . B y c o n t r a s t , T h a d Ko u s s e r s h o w s t h a t l e s s innovative legislatures are term-limited, when measured in a variety of ways, and pass fewer bills; Term Limits, “Dedication,” see note 5. 9 D. E . A p o l l o n i o a n d ra y m o n d J . L a ra j a , “ Te r m L i m i t s , ca m p a i g n co n t r i b u t i o n s , a n d t h e D i s t r i b u t i o n o f P o w e r i n S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e s ,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vo l . 31, N o . 2, 2 0 0 6 ; B o w s e r, ch i , a n d L i t t l e , s e e n o t e 4 ; ca i n a n d Ko u s s e r, s e e n o t e 5 ; ca r e y, N i e m i , a n d Powell, see note 5; John m . carey et al., “The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Sur vey of the 50 States,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2006; Thad Kousser, Term Limits, see note 5; Wright, see note 6; m arjorie Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. ( “Democracy among Strangers: Term Limits’ Effects on r elationships between State Legislators in michigan,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2006 ) do find evidence of deteriorating relationships in the m ichigan legislature after term limits, but it is difficult to say whether this applies to other states as well. 10 Bowser, c hi, and Little, see note 4. 11 J a m i e L . ca r s o n a n d mi c h a e l h. c r e s p i n , “ T h e E f f e c t o f S t a t e re d i s t r i c t i n g me t h o d s o n E l e c t o r a l co m p e t i t i o n i n U n i t e d S t a t e s ho u s e o f rep resentatives r aces,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vo l . 4 , N o . 4 , 2 0 0 4 ; T h o m a s E . ma n n , “ re d i s t r i c t i n g re f o r m : W h a t is D e s i r a b l e ? Possible? ” in Thomas E. m ann and Bruce E. cain, eds., Party Lines: Competition, Partisanship, and Congressional Redistricting, B r o o k i n g s Press, Washington, D. c., 2005; m ichael P. m cDonald, “A c omparative Analysis of r edistricting institutions in the United States, 2001– 0 2,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2004. 12 r ober t g . Dixon Jr., “Fair c riteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative Districts,” in Bernard g rofman et al., eds., Representation and Redistricting Issues, Lexington Books, Lexington, m assachusetts, 1982; mann, see note 11. ATissue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 18 13 Alan Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, and m atthew gunning, “Don’t Blame r edistricting for Uncompetitive Elections,” PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2006; Bruce E. c ain, Karin mac Donald, and m ichael P. mcDonald, “From Equality to Fairness: The Path of Political r eform since Baker v. Carr,” in Thomas E. m ann and Bruce E. cain, Party Lines: Competition, Partisanship, and Congressional Redistricting,Brookings Press, Washington, D. c., 2005. 14 Bruce E. c ain, The Reapportionment Puzzle, University of c alifornia Press, Berkeley, california, 1984; Bruce E. cain, Karin mac Donald, and i ris hui, “competition and r edistricting in california: Lessons for r eform,” institute for g overnmental Studies, Berkeley, c alifornia, 2006. 15 c ain, m ac Donald, and h ui, see note 14. 16 c ain, see note 14; c ain, mac Donald, and h ui, see note 14; Scott W. Desposato and John r . Petrocik, “The Variable incumbency Advantage: New Voters, r edistricting, and the Personal Vote,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47. No. 1, 2003; Andrew g elman and g ar y King, “Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative r edistricting,” The American Political Science Review, Vo l . 8 8 , N o . 3 , 19 9 4 . J. m organ Kousser ( “Estimating the Par tisan c onsequences of redistricting Plans— Simply,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1996 ) offers a dissenting view: that par tisan control of a district can be predicted with up to 90 percent accuracy using par tisan registration data alone, at least in c alifornia. Nonetheless, a few seats can determine control of the legislature, and Kousser does not deny that seats can change significantly over the course of a decade. 17 Bruce E. c ain, “Assessing the Par tisan Effects of r edistricting,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 2, 1985. 18 Stephen Ansolabehere, James m . Snyder Jr., and charles Stewar t iii, “candidate Positioning in U.S. h ouse Elections,” American Jour nal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2001; m asket, see note 1; Nolan m. mcc ar ty, Keith T. Poole, and h oward rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, mi T Press, cambridge, m assachusetts, 2006. 19 c ain, m ac Donald, and m cDonald, see note 13. 20 The Book of the States, The c ouncil of State governments, Lexington, m assachusetts, 2003. 21 B r u c e E . ca i n a n d ge o r g e A . ma c Ke n z i e , “ S q u e e z i n g t h e F i s c a l B a l l o o n : ho w S u p e r- ma j o r i t y ru l e s a n d O t h e r P r o v i s i o n s ha v e U n i q u e l y Shaped c alifornia’s Fiscal Policy,” unpublished manuscript, University of c alifornia, Berkeley. 22 Dan Dunmoyer, “You’ve Already Won, g OP,” Los Angeles Times, August 10, 2007. 23 r epublican suppor t was higher in the 1990s, but since 2000, a majority of r epublicans has voted against the budget in all but two years. 24 Proposition 56 also would have withheld legislator and governor salaries each day the budget was late, and a similar proposal was par t of S cA 9, one of the redistricting reform bills. The effect of this change is unclear. i n the shor t term, legislators are probably more sensitive to political pressures than financial ones. 25 Elizabeth r . gerber and r ebecca B. m or ton, “Primar y Election Systems and r epresentation,” The Journal Law, Economics, and Organization, Vo l . 14 , N o . 2, 19 9 8 ; K r i s t i n K a n t h a k a n d re b e c c a mo r t o n , “ T h e E f f e c t s o f E l e c t o r a l ru l e s o n co n g r e s s i o n a l P r i m a r i e s ,” in Peter F. g alderisi, marni Ezra, and m ichael Lyons, eds., Congressional Primaries and the Politics of Representation, r ow man and L i t t l e f i e l d , L a n h a m , ma r y l a n d , 2 0 01; K a r e n m. K a u f m a n n , J a m e s g. g i m p e l , a n d A d a m h. h o f f m a n , “A P r o m i s e Fu l f i l l e d ? O p e n P r i m a r i e s and r epresentation,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 65, No. 2, 2003. 26 m asket, see note 1. 27 g erald c . Wright and Brian F. Schaffner, “The i nfluence of Par ty: Evidence from the State Legislatures,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, 2002. ppIC [ 19 ] eric m cg hee Research Fellow, 415.291.4439, mcghee @ ppic.org Expertise • Elections – California redistricting reform – State and local voter initiatives – Voting behavior • Legislative behavior – Legislative organization – Responsiveness to public opinion – State term limits • p olitical participation • p olitical parties and party polarization • p olling and public opinion Education ph.D. (2003) and M.A. (1998 ), political science, University of California, Berkeley PPic e XPe Rts m ark Baldassare President and Chief Executive Officer, 415.291.4427, baldassare @ ppic.org Expertise • p ublic opinion • p ublic policy preferences • Elections • State initiatives • State and local government relations • p olitical participation • Demographics Education ph.D. (1976 ), sociology, University of California, Berkeley M.A. (1973), sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara max n eiman Associate Director, Senior Fellow, 415.291.4441, neiman@ ppic.org Expertise • Local government – Government structure – Population growth – Regional and metropolitan governance – U r b a n a n d s u b u r b a n p o l i t i c s – Local taxation and spending – Evaluation of local government performance – Lo c a l e l e c t i o n s – Effect of local government on state and national policy • Local economic development • Urban development Education ph.D. (1973) and M.A. (1968 ), political science, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee ATissue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 20 ReLate D PP ic PuBL ications Adapting to Term Limits: Recent Experiences and New Directions Bruce E. c ain and Thad Kousser November 2004 The Effect of Minority Districts and Minority Representation on Political Participation in California claudine g ay June 2001 J u s t t h e F a c t s This publication series provides detailed statistics on a wide range of current issues. Please see http://www.ppic.org/main/allpubs.asp?sort=type#a14 for JTFs relevant to legislative reform. PPIC Statewide Sur vey This survey series provides timely and comprehensive public opinion data on the urgent social, economic, and political issues facing all c alifornians. Please see http://www.ppic.org/main/allpubs.asp?sort=type#a12 for information about the survey and complete text of all surveys. ppIC [ 21 ] PPic B oaRD of D iR ecto Rs Thomas C. Sutton, Chair r etired c hairman & c hief Executive Officer Pacific Life i nsurance company Mark Baldassare President and c hief Executive Officer Public Policy i nstitute of california Ruben Barrales President and c hief Executive Officer San Diego r egional chamber of c ommerce Linda Griego President and c hief Executive Officer g riego Enterprises, i nc. Edward K. Hamilton chairman h amilton, r abinovitz & Alschuler, i nc. Gar y K. Har t Former State Senator and Secretary of Education State of c alifornia Walter B. Hewlett Director c enter for c omputer Assisted r esearch in the h umanities D o n n a L u c a s c hief Executive Officer Lucas Public Affairs L e o n E . P a n e t t a Director The Leon & Sylvia Panetta i nstitute for Public Policy K i S u h P a r k Design and m anaging Partner gruen Associates C o n s t a n c e L . R i c e co-Director The Advancement Project R a y m o n d L . Wa t s o n Vice c hairman of the Board Emeritus The i rvine c ompany C a r o l W h i t e s i d e President g reat Valley c enter ATissue [ LEGISL ATIVE REFORM ] 22 © December 2007 by public policy Institute of California. All rights reser ved. San Francisco, CA S h o r t s e c ti o n s of tex t, n ot to exc e e d th re e p a r a g r a p h s, m ay b e q u ote d w i th o u t w r i t te n p e r m i s s i o n provided that full attribution is given to the source and the above copyright notice is included. pp IC does not take or support positions on any ballot measure or on any local, state, or federal legislation, nor does it endorse, support, or oppose any political parties or candidates for public office. Research publications reflect the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or Board of Directors of the p ublic policy Institute of California. This publication was funded in part by a grant from The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. ppIC [ 23 ] PuBLic Po Licy i nstitute of California • 500 Was Hington s tR eet, s uite 600 • San f r anCiSC o, C a 9 4111 P 415.291.4 400 • f 415. 291.4 4 01 • www.ppic.org DOWNLOAD T hiS PUBL icAT iON Fr EE OF ch Arg E AT WWW .PP ic.Org"
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