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object(Timber\Post)#3711 (44) { ["ImageClass"]=> string(12) "Timber\Image" ["PostClass"]=> string(11) "Timber\Post" ["TermClass"]=> string(11) "Timber\Term" ["object_type"]=> string(4) "post" ["custom"]=> array(5) { ["_wp_attached_file"]=> string(13) "R_1202EBR.pdf" ["wpmf_size"]=> string(6) "487304" ["wpmf_filetype"]=> string(3) "pdf" ["wpmf_order"]=> string(1) "0" ["searchwp_content"]=> string(461475) "Metropolitan Growth Planning in California, 1900–2000 ••• Elisa Barbour 2002 PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Barbour, Elisa, 1961- Metropolitan growth planning in California, 1900-2000 / Elisa Barbour. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN: 1-58213-063-9 1. Regional planning—California—History. 2. Cities and towns—California—Growth. 3. Land use—California—Planning. I. Title. HT393.C2 B37 2002 307.1'2'09794—dc21 2002151729 Copyright © 2002 by Public Policy Institute of California All rights reserved San Francisco, CA Short sections of text, not to exceed three paragraphs, may be quoted without written permission provided that full attribution is given to the source and the above copyright notice is included. Research publications reflect the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or Board of Directors of the Public Policy Institute of California. Foreword This report grew out of research assistance that PPIC provided to the Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism beginning in 2000. It also fills an important research need by tracing the historical development of regional planning in California and then assessing the latest reform efforts and their prospects. The report’s historical perspective is helpful, for it highlights some themes and variations that have informed California growth-management policy over the last century. For example, the report recounts how Progressive Era reforms that enabled the expansion of California’s cities hindered subsequent efforts to coordinate and manage growth at the metropolitan level. Many would argue that these home rule powers favored by earlier reformers must now be balanced against the myriad of regional transportation, land use, and environmental issues. Yet it is helpful to note that the latest round of reforms, not to mention the reformers themselves, bear an uncanny resemblance to their Progressive Era counterparts insofar as both sought to stretch government to the dimensions of the planning problems they faced. It is also useful to acknowledge that these recent reform efforts face formidable obstacles. As Barbour notes, cities have been reluctant to cede their home rule powers to regional Councils of Governments, which therefore lack the clout to craft and implement regional solutions to regional problems. She also notes that single-purpose agencies, such as Caltrans, do have the power to shape policy but only in their respective arenas. Furthermore, many of these single-purpose agencies are reluctant to challenge land use policies, traditionally a local prerogative but essential to effective growth-management planning at the metropolitan iii level. This fractured planning system has rendered certain problems less tractable than they would be under a governance system that included integrated planning somewhere between the municipal and state levels. After scanning the current landscape, Barbour finds that “bottomup” efforts are complementing “top-down” reforms to address regional growth concerns. Much like their Progressive Era precursors, today’s public and private leaders throughout the state are favoring regional solutions to regional problems. Riverside and San Diego Counties, for example, have innovative planning activities under way that could strike new balances between land use, transportation, and environmental planning. Barbour suggests that these collaborative approaches may help deflect the local resentment and resistance that often accompany “topdown” interventions. Although this project was launched in response to the needs of the Speaker’s Commission, Elisa Barbour saw the need for an extended study and, by undertaking it, she has made an important contribution to a long-standing and critically important issue David W. Lyon President and CEO Public Policy Institute of California iv Summary During the 1990s, policy responses to major issues in California— including economic development, housing, traffic congestion, and open space preservation—were increasingly framed in regional terms. Statelevel reports called for regional planning reform, and innovative collaborations between government agencies and civic groups were launched. Planners sought coordination across jurisdictions and levels of government and across policy areas that had traditionally been treated separately. By the late 1990s, California had become a laboratory for regional planning reform, and state policymakers were considering ways to sustain and extend the efforts made in these areas. Although these policy responses represented a new phase in California growth management, they also reflected a continuous tradition of metropolitan planning stretching back to the Progressive Era. Throughout the past century, reformers worked to create stronger planning institutions at the metropolitan level. This report traces the history of regional planning for growth management in California throughout the past century. It tracks three key elements— transportation, land use, and environmental planning—and notes their consolidation under city government control during the Progressive Era at the turn of the last century, their subsequent fragmentation at the metropolitan scale once the process of suburban development gained momentum, and recent attempts to reintegrate them without changing the fundamental structures of political authority. Although the history of regional reform efforts—which, for analytical purposes, the report divides into three distinct waves—is illuminating in its own right, the overarching purpose of the analysis is to better understand the origins and prospects of current growth-management reforms at the regional level. v The First Wave: Home Rule Power and Urban Consolidation Modern urban planning in California traces back to the Progressive Era at the turn of the 20th century, when business leaders and other reformers worked to consolidate “home rule,” or the ability of city governments to conduct their affairs without interference from the state government. Progressive Era reforms allowed cities to raise taxes, issue bonds, and build large-scale infrastructure needed for urban expansion, including such projects as the Los Angeles Aqueduct and the Hetch Hetchy Dam. The strengthening of growth-management tools and methods at the city level during this period represented a kind of metropolitan planning. Because a majority of the state’s urban population lived within the boundaries of relatively isolated central cities, these cities were, for all practical purposes, metropolitan regions. Progressive Era civic leaders also attempted to extend the political power of the central cities by annexing developing areas or by consolidating local governments. Ironically, Progressive reforms made such attempts at regional political consolidation more difficult. Even as home rule power helped cities marshal the financial and planning resources for urban expansion, it undermined the political domination of central cities by encouraging the creation and growth of suburban cities and investing them with significant decisionmaking power. By doing so, home rule power helped transform California’s metropolitan areas into clusters of independent cities often differentiated by wealth, race, and function. Although metropolitan areas began to expand beyond the borders of their original central cities, government functions were still organized as if each city were an isolated and sovereign island. The result was political fragmentation of the state’s major metropolitan areas. The Second Wave: Fractured Regionalism During California’s postwar economic and population boom, the state and federal governments stepped in to ameliorate many effects of that fragmentation. Metropolitan planning was increasingly dominated by “vertical regionalism,” as single-purpose state agencies (such as Caltrans), often aided by federal funds and policy mandates, took charge vi of specific policy areas—at first resource management and infrastructure planning and eventually environmental protection as well. Local governments accepted this intrusion because cities usually lacked the resources to provide large-scale infrastructure and to coordinate environmental mandates across multiple jurisdictions. Like home rule power, vertical regionalism also promoted urban development by providing a functional service framework for urban and suburban expansion. Furthermore, single-purpose state agencies continued to respect local control over land use decisions. However, vertical regionalism codified a new form of fragmentation in the planning system. Control over the policy areas that constitute growth management—infrastructure, environmental, and land use planning—was dispersed among different levels of government, none of them organized at the metropolitan scale in most cases. The policy areas under state control were fractured vertically because single-purpose state agencies generally were not required to match plans to those of other state agencies or to an integrated set of state policy objectives. The system was also fractured horizontally because state agencies had no control over general local land use policy. Land use planning was also divided among the multiple local governments that now constituted metropolitan areas. Concerns about the negative aspects of suburbanization— environmental degradation and racial and social disparities in particular—prompted reformers to attempt to extend the state and federal role to land use and environmental planning in addition to infrastructure. Reformers were most successful in the area of environmental protection; the “vertical regional” model was extended to this planning area during the 1970s. However, efforts to centralize land use authority and create strong multipurpose regional planning institutions were rebuffed. Instead, federal and state measures prompted the emergence of a second dominant form of regional planning— voluntary horizontal regionalism. This approach emphasized procedural coordination across local jurisdictions and levels of government. New institutions were established, such as Councils of Governments (COGs), which coordinate planning across a broad range of policy areas in most metropolitan areas. However, because of their voluntary nature and vii governance structures—usually a one-city, one-vote arrangement— COGs were rarely able to forge, implement, and enforce multipurpose plans with a strong focus on regional needs. Thus, as metropolitan regions became more complex, growth management came under the guidance of an ever more complicated and fractured set of institutions and arrangements. The agencies with the strongest policy mandates tended to be narrowly focused, whereas those with broader policy purview tended to be organizationally weak. “Bottom-up” reform efforts within California regions provided further evidence of this dichotomy, as the outcomes often reflected a tradeoff between policy breadth on the one hand and regional focus and accountability on the other. Although reformers were sometimes able to strengthen regional agencies even over the objections of local governments, it was far easier in practice to strengthen the mandates of single-purpose than multipurpose agencies. The Planning System Under Stress During the 1980s and 1990s, the stresses on the fragmented planning system were various but collectively powerful. They included rapid population growth, the decentralization of jobs and housing, environmental and fiscal constraints, and government gridlock. At the same time, the rise of a global economy emphasized the importance of regional economic development. Together, these factors drew greater attention to the regional consequences of policymaking. Rapid population growth exacerbated urban sprawl and blurred traditional distinctions between central cities and suburbs. With more jobs located in the suburbs, Californians depended increasingly on their automobiles. Therefore, suburb-to-suburb transportation systems were strained. As housing production failed to keep up with demand especially in coastal areas, workers sought affordable housing farther from central cities, and suburb-to-central city commutes also worsened. Government’s response to these development pressures was a kind of “policy by neglect” (Fulton, 1992a, p. 23). Federal cutbacks and voter initiatives such as Proposition 13 constrained revenues, and spending on infrastructure plummeted. Fiscal constraint also contributed to housing problems by pushing local governments to favor certain types of viii development, such as retail projects, and to disfavor others, such as multiunit housing, based on their fiscal costs and benefits. Local infrastructure costs were increasingly met through fees imposed on new development projects, adding to housing prices. Fiscal constraint reframed transportation and housing as regional concerns requiring coordinated solutions. As housing affordability problems began to affect the state’s middle-class residents, the negative consequences of fragmented local fiscal and land use choices—longstanding concerns of regional reformers—became a much broader policy topic. State policymakers considered how to reorient local land use policy to meet regional housing needs. Local governments countered that without fiscal reforms to restore revenue stability and alignment of state mandates affecting land use, housing problems would be difficult to solve. Thus, the housing issue mushroomed into a broader discussion about coordinating state and local land use and fiscal policies. Transportation planners—stymied by basic questions about viable systems—considered methods to reorient local land use toward regional transportation needs rather than the reverse, which has been the traditional model. Given current projections about growing demand and limited funding, transportation planners questioned the ability of either highway or transit expansion to prevent rising congestion. The pressure for cost-effective investment and efficient use of existing systems drew attention to land use policy as a potential means for helping maximize transportation investments. A third policy area—environmental protection—also highlighted the need for more integrated regional planning. Rapid population growth strained natural resources, bringing economic and environmental goals into direct conflict in many parts of the state. For example, laws protecting endangered species placed land developers and water users on a collision course with environmental activists. Threats to air and water quality were increasingly traced to urban residents and their automobiles, and policy solutions required extensive local government involvement. Meanwhile, the state and federal government’s centralized, bureaucratic, and piecemeal approach to environmental regulation came under fire for being ineffective and inefficient. Environmental regulators began to seek means to integrate environmental, transportation, and land use policy at ix a bioregional scale and to promote regulatory strategies that use positive incentives and planning coordination to avoid conflicts. Thus, the affordable housing crisis, fiscal gridlock, the need to reconcile environmental and economic goals, and the need for more strategic infrastructure investment form a nexus of policy concerns in California today for which better regional planning coordination could offer a potential remedy. To complement these public sector issues, business leaders have increasingly advocated regional planning as a response to changing economic conditions. In particular, they maintain that integrated regional planning could help protect the high quality of life needed to attract and retain high-wage industries in an increasingly competitive and global economy. The Third Wave: Reintegrating Regional GrowthManagement Policy Taken together, these challenges prompted a third wave of regional planning reforms beginning in the 1990s. Ironically, many reformers resemble Progressive Era precursors. Where earlier Progressives sought to empower city governments to meet the challenges of the industrial age, many third-wave reformers advocate a kind of regional home rule, which would allow metropolitan areas to respond to the rise of global economic competition. Third-wave reform ideas take a variety of forms, but they share two features: policy integration across functional areas and an emphasis on collaborative decisionmaking among existing institutions. The reform wave was launched by new programs in transportation and environmental protection during the 1990s that devolved authority to the regional or county level and called for a greater link between these planning areas and land use policy. In 1991, the passage of the federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) by Congress redirected more authority and resources to regional transportation planning agencies. Under that law, transportation plans were required to make realistic funding assessments, which worked against the tendency to collate project wish lists and dub the result a regional plan. Furthermore, that x legislation required that regional transportation plans meet regional air quality goals. In 1997, the state passed SB 45, which also devolved decisionmaking authority, but favored county-level agencies more than the federal approach did. More than other forms of metropolitan planning, environmental programs during the 1990s extended collaborative planning techniques and approached land use policy in an explicitly regional way. Examples of this collaboration include the formation of CALFED, a joint effort among federal, state, and local agencies to reconcile economic and environmental water uses in the San Joaquin Delta region. Another notable example is the Natural Communities Conservation Planning program, a program in which state and federal agencies, local governments, landowners, developers, and others reconcile species preservation with urban development at an explicitly bioregional scale. These programs rely on stiff policy mandates to provide a focus for planning, but they employ flexible, collaborative decisionmaking techniques for devising implementation methods. The new transportation and environmental programs helped create a planning framework that encourages greater regional policy integration. In some parts of the state, local governments, regional agencies, and civic leaders have taken steps to fill in and extend this new framework. For example, business, civic, and public sector leaders have organized 21 “collaborative regional initiatives” across the state to promote economic competitiveness, social equity, and environmental quality through collaborative techniques. In other cases, local governments spearheaded the reforms. For example, Riverside County is combining an update of its general plan with development of transportation and habitat preservation plans. The effort could serve as a model for county-based integrated planning in California. The San Diego area COG is attempting to develop a comprehensive regional plan that incorporates local plans and uses infrastructure funds to promote “smart-growth” land use goals. Assessing the Third Wave and Its Prospects In comparison with past reform efforts, the current wave places greater emphasis on developing regional consensus on integrated xi planning goals and lesser emphasis on new institutions or procedural requirements, calling instead for collaboration among existing institutions. This approach is well suited to California’s planning traditions—in particular, the strength of the home rule tradition and the state’s well-developed local planning capacity. Collaborative models allow for institutional flexibility and experimentation that can be useful in a state composed of diverse, complex regions. Collaborative efforts generally have worked best at a subregional level—for example, within counties—where they often benefit from existing relationships among local government officials. They also have been effective in cases in which clear objectives were defined, either via policy mandates (as in the case of the new environmental programs) or when participants sought mutual benefits in relation to a shared resource such as a transportation corridor. However, voluntary collaborative planning has been less well suited for solving complex problems in multicounty metropolitan areas. Nor has this approach been especially successful where planning hinges on the resolution of deep conflicts or where the parties have not established a basis for cooperation. Third-wave reforms generally have encouraged but not mandated planning integration across jurisdictions and multiple policy areas. As a result, many reform ideas have yet to overcome longstanding political obstacles to integrated policy planning. For example, land use remains a local prerogative, transportation funding is still allocated largely on the basis of “geographic equity” rather than regional need, and fiscal stalemate continues between the state and local governments. To ensure effective regional planning, the state government will need to take a more active role. The state defines the regulatory environment within which planning occurs, and today many incentives still work against regional cooperation. Furthermore, state programs and investments affect regional outcomes. What steps should the state government take? First, it should seek to eliminate barriers to cooperation, for example, by enacting fiscal reforms to ensure local revenue stability and minimize damaging competition among local governments and between state and local governments. Second, it should seek to reorient local planning toward regional needs, for xii example, by rewarding jurisdictions that develop transit-oriented multiunit housing. Third, it should strengthen regional planning mechanisms more directly. In doing this, the state should simultaneously improve policy comprehensiveness, regional focus, and accountability. Historically, regional planning institutions have been forced to trade off at least one of these elements. One possible framework would extend collaborative models of the 1990s more systematically and comprehensively. Regions might form the organizational scale at which state, regional, and local agencies— through a collaborative process—devise plans integrating infrastructure, land use, and environmental objectives. Realignment of state policies in this manner could promote more strategic infrastructure investment and environmental planning. Coordination of state, regional, and local needs could help overcome policy gridlock regarding fiscal and land use issues. Furthermore, if the state government uses its own investments as a lever to promote collaboration, the reforms might avoid pitfalls of past efforts. In particular, they may not fall flat somewhere between providing bigger “carrots” and stronger “sticks.” In the past, proposals for financial incentives to encourage local compliance with state planning objectives often failed due to budget shortfalls, and stiffer regulatory mandates were rejected as too interventionist. Aligning state programs and policies with the outcomes of a collaborative regional process offers a possible third way for the state to promote regionalism through the promise of mutual gains. However, this approach would need to be grounded in a coherent and accountable policy framework. One way to insert public accountability would be to provide a greater measure of “regional home rule” by providing some fiscal authority on a regional basis—for example, the power to raise bonds for infrastructure purposes outlined in collaboratively devised plans. This would introduce an element of voter accountability in relation to functions for which voters have been more willing to support multijurisdictional approaches. Another way to strengthen public accountability would be for the state government to define and enforce regional growth-management objectives for both state and local agencies to achieve. The objectives could be designed as outcome-oriented performance measures rather xiii than detailed program requirements. If flexible institutional arrangements are desirable, clear objectives and measurable standards may be essential to help ground program choices, provide regional focus, and ensure accountability. An approach that emphasizes policy objectives would turn the state’s traditional planning model upside down. California’s functionally fragmented, process-oriented planning system made more sense at a time when there was broader consensus on the social goals of planning, and when the needs of cities formed the starting place for growthmanagement policy. Today, changes in the nature of economic competition and urban development patterns have brought regional needs to the fore and presented fundamental questions about how governments should manage urban growth. Today’s reformers, just like their Progressive Era predecessors, seek to strengthen metropolitan governance in response. However, the current reform wave shifts attention from the need for new regional institutions to the need for more focused dialogue and comprehensive planning. The state government has an essential role to play in this process by helping provide policy focus and public accountability while also encouraging institutional flexibility and innovation. xiv Contents Foreword..................................... iii Summary..................................... v Figures ...................................... xix Tables ....................................... xxi Acknowledgments ............................... xxiii Acronyms .................................... xxv 1. INTRODUCTION ........................... 1 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE REGIONAL GROWTHMANAGEMENT SYSTEM: PLANNING BEFORE WORLD WAR II ............................ The First Reform Wave: The Progressive Era ........... Progressive Reforms Promote Suburbanization .......... Conclusion ................................. 7 7 11 14 3. POSTWAR PLANNING: THE SECOND REFORM WAVE ................................... Functional Regionalism ......................... The American Dream or a Nightmare of Numbers: Views on Suburbanization ........................ Local Agency Formation Commissions: State Reforms Reinforce Localism ........................ The Federal Government Promotes Voluntary Regionalism ............................. Regionalism in the Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay, and San Diego Areas ............................. The Rise of Environmentalism .................... Conclusion ................................. 15 15 20 26 27 32 38 41 4. THE PLANNING SYSTEM UNDER STRESS ......... Rapid Growth, New Development Patterns, and Fiscal Constraint .............................. Voter Revolt Prompts State-Level Debate ............. 45 46 50 xv Business Leaders and “Smart Growth” ............... Infrastructure, Housing, and Fiscal Issues ............. Policy Responses: The Battle over RHNA ............. Conclusion ................................. 54 57 62 66 5. DEVOLUTION IN TRANSPORTATION ........... Motives for Devolution ......................... Transportation Programs of the 1990s ............... The Congestion Management Program ............. ISTEA .................................. SB 45 Shifts the Power Balance .................. County Sales Tax Measures ..................... Assessing Devolution .......................... Scale and Accountability: What Is “Regional” About Transportation Planning in California?............ Policy Breadth: Making the Connection Between Transportation, Land Use, and the Environment ..... What Makes Integrated Planning Work? .............. Conclusion ................................. 69 69 75 75 76 80 82 84 84 85 89 91 6. DEVOLUTION IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ............................. 93 Air Quality Management ........................ 94 Water Quality Management ...................... 99 CALFED .................................. 105 Natural Communities Conservation Planning........... 108 Hazardous Waste Management .................... 113 Conclusion................................. 116 7. “BOTTOM-UP” THIRD-WAVE REFORMS ......... 119 Civic Entrepreneurs ........................... 120 Local Government Planning Coordination ............. 123 Regional Reform in the Major Metropolitan Areas ........ 126 The San Francisco Bay Area: A Shift in Approach ...... 127 The Los Angeles Area: Centrifugal Forces ........... 128 The Riverside County Integrated Plan: A Model for County-Based Planning Integration .............. 130 The San Diego Area: Testing the Limits of Collaboration ............................ 132 xvi State-Level Reform Efforts ....................... 139 Conclusion................................. 140 8. ASSESSING THE THIRD WAVE ................. 143 Collaborative Regional Planning: The Future of Regionalism in California? ............................ 145 The State’s Role in Regional Planning................ 149 Appendix A. Geographic Jurisdictions and Governance Structures of California Councils of Governments ................ 157 B. Councils of Governments in California ............... 159 C. Key to Functional Responsibilities of California Councils of Governments.............................. 165 D. Transportation Planning Agencies in California ......... 171 E. Statutes and Definitions Regarding Transportation Planning Agencies in California .......................... 181 F. Existing Regional Arrangements ................... 185 Bibliography .................................. 187 About the Author ............................... 217 Related PPIC Publications .......................... 219 xvii Figures 3.1. Share of State Population Growth by City Type, 1940–1970 .............................. 4.1. Population Increase in Selected Areas in California, 1970–2000 .............................. 4.2. Land Use Measures on Local Ballots in California, 1971–2000 .............................. 16 46 50 xix Tables 3.1. City Incorporations and Populations in California, 1900–2000 .............................. 23 3.2. Characteristics of California Cities in Urbanized Areas, 1970 .................................. 24 4.1. Residential Population Growth in California Metropolitan Area Cities, 1970–2000 ............. 47 4.2. California Metropolitan Area City Characteristics, 1970–2000 .............................. 48 B.1. Councils of Governments in California ............ 160 C.1. Key to Functional Responsibilities of California Councils of Governments Listed in Appendix Table C.2 ................................... 165 C.2. Functions of Councils of Governments, Metropolitan Planning Organizations, and Regional Transportation Planning Agencies in California Metropolitan Areas .... 166 D.1. Transportation Planning Agencies in California ....... 172 xxi Acknowledgments I wish to thank Michael Teitz, Paul Lewis, and Fred Silva at PPIC for their support and insight throughout this project. Peter Richardson, also at PPIC, lent expert editorial assistance. Two external reviewers— William Fulton and Peter Detwiler—provided thoughtful comments on a draft of the manuscript. Paul King at the Institute for Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, provided unflagging library support, and Maida Barbour helped keep the project on track. Any errors of fact or interpretation are my own. xxiii Acronyms ABAG BAC BART BCDC CEQA CMA CMAQ CMSA COG CTC DHCD DHS ERAF ESA HCP ISTEA JHB JPA JVSV LAFCO LULU LUTRAQ Association of Bay Area Governments Bay Area Council Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission Bay Conservation and Development Commission California Environmental Quality Act Congestion Management Agency Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area Council of Governments California Transportation Commission Department of Housing and Community Development (California) Department of Health Services (California) Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund Endangered Species Act Habitat Conservation Plan Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act Jobs-Housing Balance Joint Powers Authorities Joint Venture Silicon Valley Network Local Agency Formation Commission Locally Unwanted Land Use Making the Land Use, Transportation, and Air Quality Connection xxv MIS MPO MSA MTA MTC NCCP NIMBY RCIP RCRA RECLAIM RGEC RHNA RTP RTPA SACOG SANDAG SCAG SCAQMD SOAR STP TDA TMDL TOD UGB Major Investment Study Metropolitan Planning Organization Metropolitan Statistical Area Metropolitan Transportation Authority Metropolitan Transportation Commission Natural Communities Conservation Planning Not In My Back Yard Riverside County Integrated Plan Resources, Conservation, and Recovery Act Regional Clean Air Incentives Market Regional Government Efficiency Commission Regional Housing Needs Assessment Regional Transportation Plan Regional Transportation Planning Agency Sacramento Area Council of Governments San Diego Area Association of Governments Southern California Association of Governments South Coast Air Quality Management District Save Open Space and Agricultural Resources Surface Transportation Program Transportation Development Act Total Maximum Daily Load Transit-Oriented Development Urban Growth Boundary xxvi 1. Introduction Today, regional planning coordination is being considered as a means to resolve some of the most pressing policy concerns in California, from affordable housing to infrastructure needs to environmental degradation. A major goal of current reform efforts is to integrate planning across policy areas that have traditionally been treated separately, such as land use, infrastructure planning, environmental protection, economic development, and social welfare policy. The call for policy integration is a response to a set of mounting pressures over the past two decades that revealed weaknesses in the state’s system for managing growth and development. These pressures included fiscal and environmental constraints, more complex development patterns, and the rise of global economic competition. However, current political institutions are not built to facilitate regional policy integration very easily. It is not that regional planning institutions do not exist; most metropolitan regions have many. For example, the federal, state, and local governments have long histories of building and maintaining large-scale infrastructure on a regional basis, from water and power facilities to highways, transit systems, ports, and bridges. Local governments have established numerous interjurisdictional planning and administrative entities to address specific concerns. Business and community leaders also have a history of coordinating policies at the metropolitan level, through chambers of commerce and other groups. However, existing regional institutions have often found it difficult to define and implement comprehensive policies. Specifically, they have been unable to combine three key elements: (1) policy coherence—the ability to integrate and trade off goals and objectives across different functional planning areas, (2) regional focus—a clear articulation of regional rather than local or state-level needs and concerns, and (3) accountability—“teeth” to ensure that policy objectives are implemented. 1 Numerous regional plans and institutions have achieved one or two of these objectives but rarely all three. This report explores some of the reasons why this is so. It employs two main analytical frameworks to provide a context for understanding and assessing current reform efforts. The first framework is historical. Today’s reform proposals and initiatives are only the latest round in a century-long history of efforts to create effective institutions to help guide metropolitan growth and development. In some ways, the goals and practices of regional planners and reformers have remained unchanged throughout that time. Metropolitan planning and governing institutions aim to promote economic growth and social welfare in urban regions, the scale at which many of the primary social and economic relationships that define people’s lives are played out. Reformers seek to ensure that regional institutions and policies are democratic and efficient even as they contend with the fact that those goals sometimes conflict. In seeking to achieve these goals, regional planners and policymakers have faced a set of endemic challenges related to scale. One is how to devise planning institutions to address issues at the scale best suited to the problems at hand, without sacrificing the ability to integrate policies across different functional concerns. For example, the geographic scale of air basins may not correspond to that of transportation systems or to any existing governmental jurisdictions, yet air quality and transportation planning are fundamentally linked and they require coordinated approaches. Therefore, regional planning has long required mechanisms for intergovernmental coordination. Questions about functional scale are connected to somewhat different concerns about political scale—how best to reconcile the values of local control over community character with government action taken for wider purposes. It may not be clear which level of government is best suited to regulate certain functions, such as land use, when significant tradeoffs are associated with both centralized and decentralized approaches. All these challenges are compounded by the rapid rate of change and growing complexity in urban regions today.1 ____________ 1For assessments of metropolitan planning challenges in the American federalist system and in an age of growing complexity, see Christensen (1999) and Innes and Booher (1999). 2 The primary democratic governmental model for integrating policy objectives has been general-purpose government, the type of government that has been established at the state, county, and city levels. Generalpurpose governments rely on voter preferences to help balance policy objectives and provide a range of services funded by voters themselves. However, the boundaries of general-purpose governmental jurisdictions may not match today’s regional systems. For example, 78 percent of the state’s population lives within multicounty metropolitan areas, but no general-purpose governments exist at the same scale.2 Furthermore, even in metropolitan areas encompassed within single county borders, county governments do not act as regional governments because key planning responsibilities are fragmented among different levels of government, jurisdictions, and functional agencies. The challenge of metropolitan governance is to address interrelated metropolitan-wide concerns although the scale of many functional problems does not match, and although general-purpose governments are generally absent at the metropolitan level. Because regional governance tests government’s ability to adapt to rapid change and complexity, it is not surprising that reform activity has followed periods of substantial shifts in basic urban development patterns. In a series of articles, Allan Wallis distinguished three regional reform “waves” in the United States during the 20th century (1994a, 1994b). This report employs and extends his typology, which generally matches California’s experience.3 The first regional reform wave occurred during the early decades of the 20th century, a period often called the Progressive Era. Major reforms unleashed the power of cities to facilitate urban growth in response to the rise of industrial economies. The basis of the state’s system of local government was consolidated at this time. However, Progressive reforms contained elements that would eventually hamper regional coordination. The second reform wave responded to these ____________ 2Population figures are from the California Department of Finance for 2001, and definitions for Metropolitan Statistical Areas are from the 1997 U.S. Census. 3For another historical overview of regional governance in the United States, see Foster (2001). 3 emerging problems during the period of rapid growth that followed World War II. This reform wave filled in the framework of the planning system that exists today. However, although new regional institutions aimed to overcome growing fragmentation in the planning system, in some ways they only served to exacerbate it. The state is currently experiencing its third wave of reform in response to even greater decentralization and more complex development patterns that have accompanied the rise of a global economy during recent decades. Today, reformers seek to overcome the policy fragmentation that has characterized the planning system, without fundamentally restructuring governmental authority. The historical context provides cause for both optimism and pessimism regarding current proposals. On the one hand, today’s reformers can be seen as tackling challenges not dissimilar to those in the past. Also in response to changing economic and social conditions, earlier reform movements were able to achieve far-reaching measures to adapt the state’s planning system to new conditions. However, optimism may also be tempered by a hard look at past failures and the obstinacy of basic challenges. The second analytical framework this report employs is institutional: The state’s experience with various regional planning models is used as a basis for drawing conclusions about what approaches are most effective and under what conditions.4 Special attention is paid to collaborative arrangements—planning models that do not require alterations of existing political authority or even necessarily the establishment of new institutions or administrative authority. Collaborative models are scrutinized because if integration across functional concerns can be seen as the main policy goal of the current reform wave, collaborative decisionmaking can be viewed as its method of choice. However, although current reform initiatives are extending collaborative models in new directions, collaboration has in fact been the default method for decades for multipurpose regional planning in California. This report considers a variety of planning experiences—old and new, collaborative ____________ 4One institutional analysis of regional governance in the Los Angeles area, by Fulton et al. (2000b), was especially helpful for this project. 4 and otherwise—to evaluate which elements are necessary for effective regional planning. The scope of the report is limited to those regional institutions and policies related to land use, transportation, and environmental planning. It ignores a number of planning areas that have been—or could be— addressed in a regional framework. For example, it does not assess regional planning for power and water supply (although it does consider water quality) or waste management (except toxic waste). In addition, the report does not focus on regional economic development and social equity planning—policy areas of growing importance among reformers today—except as they relate to growth management issues. Thus, the report does not provide a full picture of regional concerns or institutions. However, there are good reasons for limiting the report to the three policy areas of transportation, land use, and environmental protection. They are interrelated, helping to define our built environment in relation to our natural environment. They are among the policy areas with the longest tradition of strong government planning power. Transportation and environmental planning have been called the big carrot and the big stick of federal policy affecting regional planning (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). Land use decisionmaking is largely dominated by local governments and yet is inextricably connected to transportation and the environment. Studying the nexus among these planning areas affords insight into the dynamics of intergovernmental coordination in relation to regional growth and development. These are policy areas in which systematic metropolitan planning institutions and policies have long been established. Systematic institutions are those established through law and statute for all metropolitan areas across the state. Studying such institutions across time and in different settings helps elucidate strengths and weaknesses in the state’s approach to regional planning and steps that might be taken to expand regional governance in a systematic way. The agencies created in these areas have been structured quite differently; some are centralized and others decentralized; some are multipurpose, others single-purpose; some rely on stiff regulatory mandates, others on incentives to local governments or voluntary collaboration among participating agencies. Because of these differences, alternative state approaches to achieving 5 regional policy goals can be compared. We can consider how standardized models are implemented in different metropolitan areas, gaining insight about the differences among regions, functional approaches, and the general feasibility of standardized requirements.5 Finally, existing regional agencies are likely to influence and be influenced by any future reforms aimed at broadening regional planning in California, so it is useful to consider their characteristics and history. Chapter 2 describes the first regional reform wave during the 20th century, when the basis for today’s planning structures—and dilemmas—was laid. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the second reform period, after World War II. The evolution of regional institutions in the state’s three largest metropolitan areas is compared. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 describe economic and political trends during the 1980s and 1990s that placed the state’s planning system under increasing stress. Chapter 4 considers the emergence of new development patterns and the consequences of government fiscal constraint. Chapters 5 and 6 describe problems in transportation and environmental planning that prompted a major shift in approach by the state and federal governments in these core regional planning areas. The new programs constituted the beginning of the third wave of regional reform in the state. Chapter 7 describes the further development of the new reform wave by the end of the 1990s through programs developed within regions themselves. The concluding chapter evaluates the prospects for current programs and proposals. It assesses the strengths and weaknesses of collaborative models as a basis for expanding regionalism in California and considers what steps the state government might take to enhance regional planning in a collaborative framework. ____________ 5The report compares the evolution of regional institutions in the state’s three largest metropolitan areas—the Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay, and San Diego areas. Thus, another significant limitation is that it touches only briefly on planning developments elsewhere in the state. However, regional planning history in other areas has been less well documented, making a historical comparison more difficult. 6 2. The Foundation of the Regional Growth-Management System: Planning Before World War II The First Reform Wave: The Progressive Era Regionalism in California is not a new issue. The current attention policymakers are paying to regional governance hearkens back to the Progressive Era during the first decades of the 20th century. Progressive reformers sought to modernize government to make it more effective for the industrial age. The reforms they enacted reshaped state-local government relations profoundly, establishing the basis of today’s planning structure.1 Today’s regional reformers are addressing a similar challenge, seeking to reshape governmental institutions to address modern social and economic concerns more effectively. Ironically, the reforms being discussed today challenge some Progressive Era traditions that are now seen as hampering regional planning. Progressives, many who were professionals and business leaders, sought to professionalize local governments and expand their capacity to build the infrastructure needed for metropolitan growth. Progressives gained control of city councils in Los Angeles and San Francisco in the 1900s and the state legislature and the governor’s office in 1910. To make governments more efficient and businesslike, they introduced reforms including the civil service, nonpartisan local elections, and the use of appointed boards and commissions to oversee many areas of policymaking. They extended “direct democracy” by instituting the ____________ 1Stephanie Pincetl's historical overview of the influence of Progressive Era policies on land use in the state was an important resource for this project (Pincetl, 1999). 7 procedures of public initiative, referendum, and recall. They also sought to expand cities’ borrowing power to enable construction of new facilities, such as water, power, port, sewer, and transportation systems, needed by such rapidly growing central cities as San Francisco and Los Angeles. These major projects required financing beyond the ability of private business to provide (Pincetl, 1999). To achieve these goals, Progressives sought to strengthen “home rule,” or the power of local governments to determine their own affairs without interference from the state government. California’s 1879 Constitution contained the seeds of one of the strongest home rule traditions of all states in the nation. Counties and cities were officially granted “police” and “corporate” powers to permit a wide array of legislative and programmatic functions. Among these powers was considerable local discretion over land use decisions. Also important was the delegation of authority for the building and operation of local public works. During the 1880s and 1890s, cities gained the right to draw up and establish charters to govern their own affairs. Autonomy from state oversight was solidified in 1914 when charter cities were authorized to “make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs subject only to the restrictions and limitations in their charters.”2 Local functions inferred from police and corporate powers became so extensive during later decades that little distinction now remains between generallaw and charter status for both cities and counties (Silva and Barbour, 1999). Over time, county governments would come to perform a dual role, on the one hand serving as agents of the state government, providing an array of countywide social services, and on the other hand acting like city governments for the unincorporated portions of counties, providing basic services such as police and fire protection. County power over land use extends only to the unincorporated territory within county boundaries. This limitation has important consequences for regional planning, as ____________ 2Article 11, Section 6, as amended 1914. For more on establishment of home rule authority, see Meeker (1996) and Sokolow and Detwiler (2001). 8 county governments cannot impose land use policies on cities within their borders. A 1910 ballot measure known as the Separation of Sources reinforced local autonomy by providing local governments with control over the property tax, which provided the bulk of their revenue. Charter status enabled cities to create municipal bond referenda. Thus, growing cities were empowered to mobilize resources to build the infrastructure necessary to accommodate further expansion (Silva and Barbour, 1999; Pincetl, 1999). Progressive reforms transformed the role of local governments, enabling them to undertake major new public works projects. The Los Angeles Aqueduct, completed in 1913, and San Francisco’s Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct, approved in 1913 and completed in 1934, were among the most ambitious projects accomplished with the help of city charter power. Over the 1910s and 1920s, local governments municipalized harbors, water systems, and sometimes power plants. As automobile use began to rise starting in the 1920s, local governments also began to construct extensive networks of roads and streets. Progressive reforms also professionalized city planning. San Francisco established a City Planning Commission in 1917, Los Angeles in 1920, and Los Angeles County created a Regional Planning Commission three years later (Scott, 1985; Dear, 1996). These local reforms were soon strengthened by a state mandate. In 1927, cities and counties were authorized, and in 1937 required, to adopt comprehensive plans. This requirement was far ahead of its time. Even today, many states do not require that local governments adopt plans for growth (Fulton, 1999a). Thus, Progressives centralized and professionalized municipal planning power within the political framework of home rule. This can be viewed as the century’s first set of major metropolitan growthmanagement reforms—and an effective means to centralize metropolitan planning—because at the time, the central cities functioned to a large degree as metropolitan regions (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). In 1910, 71 percent of the total population—and 83 percent of the population living in cities—in the major urban counties (Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Mateo, Alameda, Santa Clara, San Diego, and Sacramento) lived in 9 the central cities (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, San Diego, Sacramento, and San Jose).3 Under those conditions, the boundaries of metropolitan economies and their governing structures roughly matched. However, civic and business leaders in the central cities attempted to extend the influence of their cities even further. Among the most ambitious efforts were campaigns to consolidate local governments during the 1910s and 1920s in the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas. The San Francisco Chamber of Commerce led a campaign in the 1910s to consolidate many Bay Area cities into a “Greater San Francisco” modeled on New York’s borough system. The city’s leaders believed that consolidation would appeal to outlying areas as a means to solve common problems, particularly those related to water supply. San Francisco was exploring the possibility of building an aqueduct from the headwaters of the Tuolumne River in Hetch Hetchy Valley that could have formed the basis of a unified water system for the entire region. A constitutional amendment for Bay Area metropolitan consolidation was taken to the legislature in 1912. However, East Bay cities—Oakland in particular—opposed the measure as a threat to home rule, and it lost in all but three counties statewide. The conflict had the effect of souring negotiations on joint water planning, bridge building, and other regional concerns for decades afterward. Other Bay Area consolidation efforts that followed during the 1910s and 1920s—including proposals to consolidate Alameda County cities and to consolidate San Francisco and San Mateo Counties—also failed (Scott, 1985; Pincetl, 1999). Attempts to consolidate the City and County of Los Angeles were undertaken from the 1890s through the 1910s. As in the Bay Area, outlying cities objected strenuously. The City of Los Angeles expanded rapidly through annexation, however, reaching a size of 442 square miles by 1930. The pattern changed sharply after that, however, as the services that prompted unincorporated areas to join the growing metropolis were increasingly being provided by the county government or special assessment districts (Fogelson, 1967; Teaford, 1979). ____________ 3Calculations are from data in Historical Census Populations of California State and Counties, 1850–1990, and Historical Census Populations of Places, Towns, and Cities in California, 1850–1990, California Department of Finance, Sacramento. 10 The consolidation campaigns highlighted certain contradictions in Progressive goals and policies that would become even more visible in later decades. By promoting home rule, Progressives had helped make it more difficult to centralize authority within metropolitan areas containing multiple jurisdictions. Thus, Progressive Era reforms helped pave the way for regional planning divisions that persist to this day. To provide the infrastructure necessary for urban growth, Progressives centralized municipal planning authority along functional lines. The state’s vertical, systems-oriented regional planning model would develop from these reforms. However, Progressives also promoted local control and professionalism in planning. This laid the groundwork for horizontal regionalism based on voluntary cooperation among local governments. Home rule helped ensure that joint land use planning by local governments would be undertaken only on a voluntary basis, and professional planning gave local governments tools to do so. California’s tradition of regionalist reform seeks to reintegrate vertical and horizontal planning into a more comprehensive approach. It can also be traced back to the Progressive Era. The consolidation campaigns during the period represent the first wave of unsuccessful regional reforms in the 20th century that attempted to consolidate regional planning across jurisdictions within metropolitan areas. Their failure reflects the emergence of a planning system with divisions of planning authority that still persist. Progressive Reforms Promote Suburbanization Progressive reforms helped unleash a new pattern of suburban development. During the boom years of the 1920s, industry expanded and decentralized in response to public investments in transportation and utilities. Mass production of automobiles and new public roadway systems enabled middle class families to move to suburban areas. New planning techniques, such as special-purpose metropolitan service districts, improved provision of services in outlying areas. Suburban interests were increasingly able to override the expansionary plans of central cities. One hundred and sixty new cities were incorporated during the first three decades of the century, a third of all the cities in the state today. 11 Although the Progressive Era ideal of a unified regional vision for growth continued to inspire reformers, long-range planning was increasingly overtaken by practical considerations related to rapid urban expansion. Although many industries expanded, “the biggest industry was the business of growth itself: land speculation and house building based on the great expectations for the future” (Fishman, 1987, p. 162). Especially in Los Angeles, suburban development defined growth patterns. As Greg Hise has demonstrated, modern community planning emerged as a mutual adjustment process between public service providers and private developers based on comprehensive, integrated, and replicable design standards (Hise, 1997). City and county traffic and roadway plans formed the basis for land subdivision, and building standards encouraged developers to repeat traditional patterns. The most essential planning technique for modern community building was zoning power. The Los Angeles City Council implemented one of the nation’s first wide-ranging zoning ordinances in 1909. Zoning became increasingly popular across the state after a Zoning Enabling Act was passed in 1917 (Dear, 1996; Hise, 1997; Pincetl, 1999). “Concern over zoning had now become so great throughout California that people interested in city planning gave little thought to anything else. Zoning was city planning to many officials” (Scott, 1985, p. 166). The primary goal of most zoning ordinances was to preserve singlefamily neighborhoods from encroachment by other land uses through strict segregation of uses. Zoning helped reinforce the deed restrictions imposed by many developers to help maintain property values. The restrictions, usually lasting 10 to 20 years, aimed to create homogeneous populations and compatible land uses. Occupancy by African Americans and Asians was prohibited in most tracts, and sometimes, minimum costs for houses were established. New transportation infrastructure helped to accomplish in practice what advocates of metropolitan consolidation had failed to do—create cohesive metropolitan regions. With car ownership increasing dramatically, transportation became a major public issue demanding government attention during the 1920s. Thus, transportation planning shifted from private to public control just at the time that the preferred 12 travel mode was shifting from public transit to the automobile. Government policy helped ensure that automobiles became the dominant form of transportation, shaping metropolitan development into a less-monocentric configuration. The first state gas tax was passed in 1923, creating an ongoing source of funding. Bridges and roads were constructed to connect the disparate cities in the San Francisco Bay region. In 1926, Los Angeles voters overwhelmingly endorsed a massive bond issue for a new road system to address the growing problem of traffic congestion and at the same time, defeated a proposal to expand mass transit (Fishman, 1987). Suburbanization also was enhanced by federal action in the midst of the Depression to save homeowners threatened by foreclosure. The National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), authorizing it to ensure mortgages up to 90 percent of a home’s value, thereby reducing down payments. Selfamortizing long-term mortgages with equal payments spread over 20 or 30 years became standard. These innovations revolutionized conditions for purchasing and owning a home, creating a stable network of savings and loan institutions, and enhancing economies of scale and speed in the homebuilding industry (Fishman, 1987). They also reinforced racial segregation. Until the 1950s, FHA explicitly endorsed segregation in the award of home loans (Ross and Levine, 1996). Thus, the basic conditions facilitating suburban growth were in place before World War II, and many were prompted by Progressive Era reforms. Improved planning techniques enabled smaller suburban jurisdictions to compete with central cities in providing services. Construction of new roads and highways opened up suburban areas for development. Federal housing policy reinforced the trend to build single-family homes, as loans were insured for that purpose. This trend was especially pronounced in Los Angeles, with fewer multifamily homes than any comparable metropolis (Fishman, 1987). Ambitious regional planning proposals were overwhelmed by the practical details of coordinating suburban development. San Francisco civic leaders launched an effort to establish a Regional Planning Association in the mid-1920s, but it soon fizzled (Scott, 1985). The Los Angeles County Regional Planning Association, the first regional 13 planning association in the country, viewed its mission conservatively. Its activities, such as the development of a set of uniform subdivision regulations in 1929, helped to reinforce existing development patterns rather than redirect them (Fogelson, 1967; Dear, 1996; Hise, 1997; Pincetl, 1999). Its attempt to establish a general plan to guide development during the 1920s “was overwhelmed . . . by the tenacity of impatient private developers and the proliferation of new municipalities in the basin, each with its own planning authority, which it exercised independently” (Pincetl, 1999, p. 124). Conclusion Progressive reforms established home rule authority as the framework for public efforts to manage growth. This was a coherent strategy for facilitating metropolitan growth and development at a time when most of the population in urban areas lived within the borders of the central cities. However, the reforms carried the seeds of a contradiction. They helped promote urban—and eventually suburban—expansion, which changed the basic conditions on which the original reforms had been premised. At the local scale, the development process was well coordinated. But although many neighborhoods were planned in a comprehensive fashion, regional development was not. Both suburban development and the large-scale infrastructure needed to support it were organized on a piecemeal basis. “Well-planned neighborhoods were islands of rationality in a pragmatist sea” (Hise, 1997, p. 52). Especially after World War II, the suburbanization process would reshape metropolitan areas into aggregates of multiple, diverse, and yet interconnected cities. Whereas in 1910, 71 percent of the total population—and 83 percent of the population living in cities—in the major urban counties (Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Mateo, Alameda, Santa Clara, San Diego, and Sacramento) lived in the major central cities (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, San Diego, Sacramento, and San Jose), by 1960, the shares had dropped to 44 percent and 54 percent, respectively. 14 3. Postwar Planning: The Second Reform Wave Suburban development exploded in California after World War II. The unitary Progressive Era approach to metropolitan growth management—consolidation of authority at the city level—became fractured once metropolitan areas expanded well beyond the borders of the original central cities, and planning problems arose that city and county governments were unable to solve on their own. The state and federal governments stepped in to extend the Progressive model of centralized planning authority to the regional scale to provide large-scale infrastructure. This vertical model of regional planning was later extended to environmental planning as well. Local governments also arranged to provide services across borders, for example, through new single-purpose service districts. Together, these developments constituted a functional approach to regionalism that allowed suburban development to flourish but that also created a more fragmented system of governance. Concerns about governmental fragmentation, social inequities, and environmental damage from suburban development gave rise to a further set of reform efforts in the 1960s and 1970s. Reformers attempted to consolidate growth management—including land use policy—at the state and regional levels, but suburban opposition prevailed. Reform efforts highlighted an unfortunate tradeoff between strengthening regional planning focus and accountability, on the one hand, or policy breadth, on the other. Functional Regionalism Postwar suburbanization was propelled by population growth and the decentralization of industry. California industries had secured over 10 percent of total federal war production contracts and wartime growth 15 helped fuel the boom that followed (Hise, 1997). The state’s population nearly doubled from 1945 to 1965.1 Job decentralization was promoted by construction of new roads that allowed goods to be shipped by trucks, ending dependence on rail transportation. Postwar prosperity also enabled large numbers of workers to take advantage of federal homeownership programs. Southern California led the nation in largescale residential development (Pincetl, 1999). Although the Los Angeles area experienced the most rapid growth before the war, other parts of the state, particularly the Bay Area and suburban counties near Los Angeles, grew rapidly afterward. One hundred new cities were incorporated over the 1950s and 1960s, and most new growth was located in suburban communities, as Figure 3.1 indicates. Planning problems arose that local jurisdictions were unable to solve on their own. The state and federal governments took on a larger role in regional planning for large-scale infrastructure, resource management, and environmental protection—planning areas that were inherently regional in scale and required massive investments or intrusive regulation 60 Central cities Suburbs 40 Percentage 20 0 1940–1950 1950–1960 1960–1970 SOURCES: Population data are from California Department of Finance, Historical Census Populations. Central city, urbanized, and metropolitan area definitions are from the 1970 U.S. Census. NOTE: Suburbs are defined as cities other than central cities in urbanized parts of metropolitan areas. Figure 3.1—Share of State Population Growth by City Type, 1940–1970 ____________ 1Calculated based on data from the California Department of Finance, Historical State Population Estimates. 16 of local land use. Thus, the Progressive model of centralized municipal planning was reshaped into a vertical, state-dominated form. The state government took on a larger planning role especially after Governor Edmund “Pat” Brown was elected in 1958. With a Democratic legislature behind him, Brown passed ambitious programs for roads and highways, mass transit, a university system, and a state water project, among other things (Pincetl, 1999). The California Water Plan, approved in the form of a bond issue under Brown’s administration, has been called the single most significant policy decision in the state’s history (Mocine, 1983). An ambitious program of freeway construction was launched with passage of the 1947 State Highway Act and the 1956 and 1962 Federal Highway Acts. California’s current freeway and expressway system, most of which was completed by the 1970s, was the largest public works project ever built by a single organization (Taylor, 1992). State agencies created during the period, such as the California Division of Highways (later renamed Caltrans), played critical roles in shaping development patterns. However, these agencies were provided narrow substantive authority. The plans of separate state departments were rarely well coordinated. Sometimes the permit requirements of one agency even conflicted with those of another. Thus, although the state government did establish powerful planning mechanisms during the postwar period, they were not integrated into a larger framework of coordinated goals and policies (Detwiler, 1980; Mocine, 1983; Kirlin, 1989; Sanders, 1989, 1991; Glickfeld and Levine, 1992; Bradshaw, 1992; Pincetl, 1999). The state government’s influence sometimes overrode local and regional preferences. An example was the development of the Los Angeles freeway system. City and county planners devised a plan before World War II calling for high-capacity boulevards or expressways tightly integrated with existing and planned land development, as well as bus and transit systems (Taylor, 1992; Wachs and Dill, 1999). But implementation lagged because of funding constraints. In exchange for external funding support after the war, Los Angeles area officials agreed to forgo their own plan and to accept highway design standards associated with state and federal programs. The basic character of the 17 regional network was reoriented to facilitate long-distance intercity travel with higher design speeds and degrees of grade separation than originally envisioned. The Los Angeles case indicates that at an important stage in the evolution of transportation programs, the region was able to articulate a unique, possibly appropriate concept for regional transportation investment. The absence of a region-wide body having authority to implement this concept and the absence of fiscal independence at the regional level, however, caused compromises that substantially changed the nature of the plans (Wachs and Dill, 1999, p. 300). The Los Angeles experience was repeated to varying degrees in other metropolitan areas. To secure the funding needed for large-scale systems, cities were forced to relinquish control over the planning, development, and operation of urban freeways. Urban highway funding shifted from local property taxes to state and later federal gasoline taxes, disconnecting urban transportation finance from its effects on local land uses. Planning for freeways was divorced from planning for other modes such as mass transit (Taylor, 1992). Ironically, federal and state highway building actually helped to ensure that local land use patterns were accommodated, rather than redirected. A goal of many early metropolitan expressway plans had been to help stem the decline of downtown areas by directing suburban traffic toward city centers. State highway planners rejected such objectives, preferring to accommodate the rise in suburban traffic by distributing it around regions and in general to “interfere as little as possible with metropolitan land uses” (Taylor, 1992, p. 69). It was easier to implement regionally defined plans for mass transit. The San Francisco Bay Area did so in response to a severe imbalance between jobs and housing that arose during the war years. The Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission, created by the legislature in 1951, advocated a system for all nine Bay Area counties. However, only three counties elected to join the BART District when it was established in 1957. BART, which began construction in the 1960s, was the first large-scale mass transit system to be built in the country for nearly half a century (Scott, 1985; Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). The single-purpose, functional approach adopted by the state government in relation to transportation was also applied to 18 environmental planning in the postwar years, although strong regulatory structures would not be developed until the 1970s. Local governments and business leaders pressured the state to define a systematic approach to air and water quality management to solve problems that local governments could not resolve on their own. Just as for large-scale transportation investments, the costs of necessary environmental technology, personnel, equipment, and facilities were beyond the reach of individual local governments. Furthermore, locally controlled programs had caused conflicts in some areas because pollution inevitably crossed local borders, and neighboring jurisdictions could not always agree on standards or methods for abatement (Wachs and Dill, 1999). After smog problems reached crisis levels in Los Angeles, the legislature authorized counties to regulate air pollution in 1947. Los Angeles County established the first county air pollution control agency in the nation the same year. A five-county agency was established for the San Francisco Bay Area in 1955 (Wachs and Dill, 1999). In contrast to the county-based approach to air quality management, the state government established nine regional water quality control boards in 1949 primarily along hydrologic lines. A State Water Pollution Control Board was also established, but primary responsibility was vested in the regional boards (Robie, 1972). At the local level, cities and counties also pursued a form of functional planning to support suburban expansion. They created numerous “special districts” to provide services such as water, sewers, utilities, and public transit. California used them more often and for a wider variety of services than other states (Eigerman, 1998). From 1952 to 1967, 778 independent special districts were created across California, increasing the total number to over 2,100. The average rate of increase of independent special districts during this period was nearly three times as high as it would be from 1967 to 1997.2 Special districts and other cost-sharing arrangements among local governments helped to facilitate city incorporations. For example, the 1954 Lakewood Plan allowed smaller cities in Los Angeles County to contract with the county government for basic services such as police and ____________ 2Based on data from U.S. Census Bureau (1997), Table 5. 19 fire protection. By showing that smaller cities could be economically viable, the Lakewood Plan put a stop to annexation efforts by larger cities. Over the next 15 years, 32 new cities incorporated, 31 of which contracted with the county for services. The new jurisdictions followed class and racial lines. Thus, functional planning helped provide the means for wealthier white suburbanites to exit from the broader political arena (Fulton, 1997a; Weir, 2000b). The American Dream or a Nightmare of Numbers: Views on Suburbanization The regional growth-management framework that arose during the postwar years—based on functional, single-purpose planning—facilitated rapid suburban development. However, this approach evolved largely in the absence of a clearly articulated policy framework at the state or federal level, especially in relation to land use (Weir, 2000a). By the 1960s, a series of growth-related concerns had gained attention, including disorderly planning, deterioration of inner-city communities, and environmental degradation. These concerns prompted new reform proposals to address the emerging consequences of suburbanization. State policymakers worried about growing fragmentation and disorder in the governmental system. Local governments had engaged in “boundary wars” over incorporations (Eigerman, 1998). Governor Pat Brown’s Commission on Metropolitan Area Problems issued a report in 1960 complaining about rapid population growth, which it described as a “nightmare of numbers,” “jigsaw governments,” “city incorporations to promote special economic interests,” and vast numbers of special districts operating “substantially without democratic control” (pp. 6, 10, 11). The commission also worried about the social equity consequences of governmental fragmentation. These concerns reflected profound changes reshaping the relationship between the economy and government in metropolitan regions. In multicity metropolitan areas, economic decisions were increasingly made at a regional scale. For example, real estate developers, industrial firms, and workers seeking housing and jobs now made location decisions in a regional context. However, the governance system 20 still adhered to an older model of development. No new general-purpose governmental entities had emerged to correspond to the new spatial pattern of development created by new economic and technological forces. Central city neighborhoods had long reflected distinctions by race, class, and function. However, suburbanization permitted cities themselves to splinter into different functional and social types: wealthy bedroom communities, working class suburbs, industrial districts, and central cities, for example. Debates about the consequences of this fragmentation have continued for decades. On the one hand, Americans value local control and governments that are close to the people. Some argue that our system of small local governments is more efficient, accountable, and responsive. Others question the efficiency of the system and argue that it encourages parochialism, fiscal competition, and exclusionary practices, such as zoning, that reinforce racial and economic segregation (Baldassare et al., 1996; Lewis, 1998; Altshuler et al., 1999). As John Kirlin (1993) notes, conflicts over regionalism relate to fundamental values about the purpose of government. Those who view government as an instrument for collective choice are likely to support regionalism; those who see it as a mechanism to support individual choice are not. The fragmentation debate raises questions about the proper scale at which to make government decisions. Metropolitan fragmentation produces a mismatch between the levels of government most commonly associated with the regulation of growth—cities and counties (in unincorporated areas)—and the level at which many effects are felt, the metropolitan region. Because local governments finance services primarily from their own tax base, and they control land use, they have both the means and incentive to implement policies that serve their fiscal interests, even if those policies produce negative effects for the region as a whole (Altshuler et al., 1999). When there is solely local regulation, local jurisdictions can ignore the costs of development with primarily local benefits, such as lowdensity housing, but primarily regional costs, such as traffic congestion or environmental damage. The reverse also occurs; local jurisdictions avoid developments with regional benefits but primarily local costs, such as 21 siting of toxic waste dumps, regional airports, or affordable housing complexes (Bollens, 1992; Lewis, 1998). If policies are employed for local benefit but they produce negative outcomes when viewed at a broader scale—for example, inefficient use of regional resources or unequal tax burdens and service levels across communities— responsibility to address the consequences may then default to higher levels of government. Gregory Weiher has argued that local government fragmentation reshaped the nature of racial segregation and discrimination in the United States. He noted that civil rights policy substantially dismantled neighborhood-level mechanisms of segregation, but that parallel to that process the federal courts exhibited a consistent tendency to reinforce the integrity of local jurisdictional boundaries and land use policies with potential exclusionary effects. “The collective significance of these parallel developments is that segregation by various characteristics within jurisdictions is subject to change through legal action, but that segregation at jurisdictional boundaries is relatively secure against legal attack” (1991, pp. 94–95). Thus, even as the federal and state roles in civil rights and social welfare policy grew more active during the 1960s, steps were taken to reinforce local home rule authority over land use that may have helped produce contradictory outcomes. How fragmented and dissimilar had cities become by the 1960s? Table 3.1 reveals that concerns about fragmentation were not the result of a decline in the average population of California cities. Only during the Progressive Era did the growth rate in city incorporations actually exceed the population growth rate in the state. Rapid population growth ensured that average city population size increased steadily throughout the century in the two largest metropolitan areas—the Los Angeles region and San Francisco Bay Area—even when the major central cities are excluded from the analysis. However, the size of newly incorporated cities was considerably smaller in terms of both population and land area, as Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicate. Even by the year 2000, suburban cities incorporated during the postwar period tended to have smaller populations. During the postwar years, newer cities were not necessarily less densely settled than older ones, however. 22 23 Table 3.1 City Incorporations and Populations in California, 1900–2000 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 Number of cities by beginning of year 112 184 244 273 282 303 359 Number of incorporations during prior decade 23 72 60 29 9 21 55 Growth rate of state population during prior decade, % 22 60 44 66 22 53 48 Growth rate of incorporations during prior decade, % 26 64 33 12 3 7 18 Average city population in the Los Angeles region and San Francisco Bay Area, excluding Los Angeles, Long Beach, San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose 2,868 3,756 4,666 8,278 9,582 15,112 24,139 Average city population in the Los Angeles region and San Francisco Bay Area for cities incorporated during the prior decade 1,151 1,504 1,664 4,035 2,639 6,182 20,866 Average city population in 2000 in the Los Angeles and San Francisco Bay Areas for cities incorporated during the prior decade 78,399 52,688 41,976 48,805 28,743 23,321 49,954 1970 403 45 27 13 1980 422 19 19 5 32,041 36,907 16,683 23,436 36,256 46,511 SOURCE: Calculated using data from California Department of Finance, Historical Census Populations. 1990 456 34 26 8 45,142 37,539 47,763 2000 473 17 14 4 50,821 27,813 27,813 24 Table 3.2 Characteristics of California Cities in Urbanized Areas, 1970 Incorporation Date No. of Cities Average No. Average Land of Residents Area, Sq. Mi. per Sq. Mi.a Average % Nonwhite Average Family Income, $a Los Angeles County Before 1900 1900–1919 1920–1949 1950–1959 1960–1969 11 22 11 21 10 56 7 7 7 6 6,283 6,249 7,172 6,261 7,433 15 3 6 3 5 12,326 15,120 13,145 12,292 10,713 San Francisco Bay Area (9 counties) Before 1900 1900–1919 1920–1949 1950–1959 1960–1969 21 21 8 11 8 22 9 5 15 8 4,727 4,324 4,856 2,749 1,722 11 6 5 4 2 15,185 16,603 17,229 16,550 16,212 Cities in Other Urbanized Areas Before 1900 1900–1919 1920–1949 1950–1959 1960–1969 24 16 5 15 9 38 13 6 8 14 3,382 3,265 4,052 4,473 1,846 8 3 3 5 2 11,071 12,500 12,162 12,415 14,240 SOURCE: U.S. Census. NOTE: Values are calculated for cities, i.e., not weighted for population. aIncome statistics are for cities with populations of 2,500 or more. Average % of Population Under Age 18 31 29 31 38 40 29 32 31 41 37 33 34 37 39 40 Average Home Value, $ 26,771 30,524 27,055 26,677 27,003 31,252 33,904 33,955 34,261 34,996 22,724 26,283 25,990 26,168 28,818 Suburbanization reflected racial distinctions, as Table 3.2 indicates. In 1970, racial minorities were far more likely to be living in California’s older central cities. Newer cities were disproportionately white and tended to have higher proportions of children in the population. The pattern of class distinctions was a little more complicated. In the largest metropolitan areas, older suburbs were populated on average by wealthier residents. In Los Angeles County, new suburbs were particularly affordable in terms of average home values. However, this pattern was less evident elsewhere in California, where the newest suburbs had more valuable homes on average. Thus, although racial distinctions between newer and older cities were quite sharp across the state, economic distinctions were less prominent in some areas. In The Fractured Metropolis (1991), Gregory Weiher analyzed segregation by race and class at the neighborhood and city level in Los Angeles County in 1960, 1970, and 1980. He assessed neighborhoodlevel (census-tract-level) variance in racial composition and socioeconomic status, determining that the proportion explained by municipal boundaries increased substantially over the years tested, whereas the proportion explained by neighborhood composition declined. Furthermore, municipal distinctions accounted for the majority of variance in neighborhood composition by 1980. These findings lend support to the concerns of regional reformers that local government fragmentation exacerbated social inequalities during the period, and that segregation had been altered from a process relying on overt use of discriminatory mechanisms to one more dependent on intermunicipal distinctions. However, most voters and local government officials did not share such concerns about governmental fragmentation. On the contrary, they were generally wary of attempts to create new regional planning structures. For example, the state association of county boards of supervisors distributed hundreds of pens during the 1950s that read “home rule is the golden rule in the golden state” (MacDougall, 1983; also see Carpenter, 1983). Suburban areas were particularly suspicious of regional government, and suburban voters were increasingly influential in state politics, especially after the U.S. Supreme Court ordered that the state Senate be reapportioned on the basis of population in 1964. 25 Two main hypotheses have been advanced to explain why suburban voters tend to oppose regional governance: lifestyle differences and loss of control (Bollens, 1990). Williams (1967) argued that suburban voters wish to preserve the physical and social character of their communities and therefore oppose integration of “lifestyle” services such as land use, schools, police protection, and health and welfare. However, they are far more likely to accept integration of “systems-maintenance” functions, such as transportation and utilities, because of potential cost savings. California’s planning history confirms this view, as most regional planning entities were established to address infrastructure and service needs (Baldassare et al., 1996). The other explanation for suburban distrust of regional government emphasizes fear of losing access to government decisionmaking (Bollens, 1990). Surveys of Orange County voters consistently found limited support for regional governance among voters, and many respondents expressed fear that a regional government would take away too much local power. However, most were also favorable to a regional agency taking responsibility for air quality (Baldassare et al., 1996). Local Agency Formation Commissions: State Reforms Reinforce Localism During the 1960s, far-reaching reforms were proposed to address mounting concerns about the consequences of the suburban development process. For example, state legislators considered a more centralized approach to local governance and land use policy. However, these proposals provoked strong resistance. As suburban voters came to dominate state politics, they ensured that planning reforms did not undermine their authority. In its 1960 report, Governor Brown’s Commission on Metropolitan Area Problems called for a more centralized approach to governmental formation and planning. More coordinated metropolitan planning was advocated for land use, transportation, air pollution, and water supply, among other things. The commission made three specific recommendations: first, to improve laws concerning incorporations, annexations, and special districts; second, to establish metropolitan area 26 multipurpose districts with planning functions; and third, to establish a State Metropolitan Area Commission to evaluate local boundary changes (Governor’s Commission on Metropolitan Area Problems, 1960). However, local governments opposed this centralized model. The County Supervisors Association supported an alternative, the KnoxNisbet Act, which passed in 1963. The act required that each county create a Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) to regulate incorporations, annexations, special district formations, and other structural changes. LAFCO governing boards included representatives from both cities and the county board of supervisors. However, since they relied on county governments for funding, LAFCOs sometimes represented county interests more heavily. LAFCOs reinforced the home rule framework. They provided a means for better policy coordination among local governments, but with relatively loose policy guidance from the state, approaches to jurisdictional arrangements have varied. Each county developed its own model of city building, with some channeling urban growth into cities and others permitting substantial amounts of development in unincorporated areas. Some observers argue that LAFCOs have often been highly politicized and primarily reactive, exerting little independent control over land use decisions. Nevertheless, city incorporations in California did decline after 1963 (Mocine, 1983; Lewis, 1998; Pincetl, 1999; Fulton, 1999a; Weir, 2000b; Commission on Local Governance for the 21st Century, 2000). The Federal Government Promotes Voluntary Regionalism The federal government also worked to strengthen planning coordination during the 1960s, and federal reforms helped propel and reinforce state efforts. Federal and state reform goals were similar: to promote more coherent metropolitan decisionmaking and address the social equity and environmental consequences of suburbanization. The outcome was also similar. Although a national land use planning act was considered by Congress during the early 1970s, the main result of federal action during the period was the establishment of new institutions to 27 increase procedural coordination among local governments. However, federal reforms went further than LAFCOs in that they produced institutions at the scale of metropolitan regions, rather than at the county level, and they promoted planning coordination across multiple program areas. Early federal urban programs had supported local rather than regional planning. The Federal Housing Act of 1954 made money available to cities for planning through the so-called “701 Program.” Hundreds of general plans in California cities were prepared during the postwar years under the 701 aegis (Johnson, 1976; Mocine, 1983; Jones, 1983; Pincetl, 1999). The state reinforced this federal objective by reorganizing local planning requirements during the 1960s, culminating with a 1971 amendment to the state’s Planning, Zoning, and Development Law that required that local zoning ordinances be consistent with general plans. This turned general plans into true “constitutions” for growth and development rather than simply advisory documents (Fulton, 1999a). However, local planning was not directed toward substantive goals. Thus, the planning goals of adjacent jurisdictions might work at cross-purposes. State planning law therefore reinforced the Progressive Era legacy; comprehensive planning was strengthened within but not among local jurisdictions. Starting in the 1960s, the federal government began to require regional planning as a condition for funding for highways, mass transit, airports, sewage treatment plants, housing, health facilities, and open space. The Federal Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 consolidated regional review of grant applications. Implemented by the Bureau of the Budget (now Office of Management and Budget) Circular A-95 a year later, the law applied regional review requirements to numerous federal programs. By 1973, about 150 programs were covered (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). The California legislature had enacted laws permitting regional planning as early as 1929, with few results (Douglas, 1968). This changed in 1963, when the state legislature passed the Regional Planning Act. It provided for the division of California into regional planning areas and for the establishment of planning districts with limited taxing powers to be governed by local elected officials, if two-thirds of the cities 28 and counties in the areas agreed upon the need for such a district. However, the County Supervisors Association obtained an amendment creating an escape clause. It provided that if a voluntary association was already in existence, no new planning district would be activated (Douglas, 1968; Johnson, 1976). Through this series of events, federal policies helped create the broadest systematic form of cross-jurisdictional regionalism in California, which still persists today. Twenty-six interjurisdictional planning organizations called Councils of Governments (COGs) were established in California during the 1960s and early 1970s. Local governments took advantage of the “escape clause” in the state’s Regional Planning Act and structured COGs as voluntary organizations of local governments, instead of the limited regional governments permitted by the statute. The geographic boundaries of California’s metropolitan area COGs generally coincide with U.S. Census Bureau definitions of the state’s metropolitan areas. Only four are multicounty: the COGs for the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Monterey Bay areas. The most common governing structure used by COGs is apportionment on a one-government, one-vote basis, regardless of the population or economic influence of the municipalities. However, some California COGs have implemented weighted voting schemes that better address their particular political circumstances.3 During the period, a new system of regional transportation planning was also established in response to federal mandates, a system that persists today. The new transportation structure was interwoven with the COG structure. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 denied federal highway funds to projects not considered in a comprehensive regional planning process. The 1964 Federal Mass Transportation Act provided funds for mass transit systems for the first time and also called for regional planning. The 1970, 1973, and 1978 Highway Acts strengthened the requirements, calling for regional review by “metropolitan planning organizations” (MPOs) in urban areas with a population of 50,000 or more and earmarking funds for planning. ____________ 3See Appendices A, B, and C for more about geographic jurisdictions, governing structures, dates of establishment, and current responsibilities of California COGs. 29 MPOs are responsible for “continuing, comprehensive, and cooperative” planning for transportation (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). In California, most MPOs were designated to coincide with existing COGs.4 The state government took its own steps to establish a framework for regional transportation planning. In a pattern that has continued, the state directed greater authority to county-level (rather than metropolitan) agencies than did the federal approach. The California Transportation Development Act (TDA), passed in 1971, gave each county the proceeds of a quarter-cent increase in the state sales tax earmarked mainly for transit. This represented a major shift in state funding priorities. To win support from Republicans and rural legislators, the TDA tax increase was designated as a local tax to be returned to the county in which it was collected. Within counties (with the exception of Los Angeles), revenues were apportioned to transit operators on the basis of service area population. Because per capita transit ridership varies greatly from central city to suburb, the program has been called an “extraordinary windfall for suburban transit operators” (Taylor, 1991). The TDA designated “regional transportation planning agencies” (RTPAs) to allocate the new funds. In 1972, RTPAs were also required to submit comprehensive, long-range transportation plans to the state. The designation of RTPAs undermined somewhat the multicounty character of the federal COG/MPO structure. RTPAs are almost all organized at the county level. In two of the state’s four multicounty regions—the San Francisco Bay and Los Angeles areas—RTPA designations match the federal structure. However, in the Sacramento and Monterey Bay areas, RTPAs were also designated at the county level. Furthermore, “county transportation commissions” (CTCs) were established for four (later five) of the counties under the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles regional COG to give them a greater voice in the preparation of the regional plan. In general, the RTPA designations “suited the regions’ political context” (Wilshusen, 1992, p. 4; also see Bollens, 1993b). ____________ 4See Appendices A, C, D, and E for more about the jurisdictions, functions, and statutes governing federal and state transportation planning agencies in California. See Lewis and Sprague (1997) for more information on governing structures of the state’s MPOs. 30 By the mid-1970s, COGs and MPOs were at the height of their influence. Federally mandated “A-95 review” quickly became their major activity, entailing review of local grant applications for projects totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. COGs also served as forums for discussion, conducted research and hearings, and made advisory policy recommendations (Johnson, 1976; Grigsby, 1996; Pincetl, 1999). However, critics charged that COG regional plans tended to be weak or unenforceable and that their review role amounted to a veto power seldom used. Occasionally, a local project might fail to receive approval if it was egregiously inconsistent with regional goals. However, COGs rarely undertook systematic deliberation and implementation of regional priorities and objectives.5 A survey of local officials in the Los Angeles area in the early 1970s found that few consulted the regional plan when preparing grant applications (Johnson, 1976, p. 190). Johnson also noted that federal officials interviewed paid scant attention to COG comments (p. 182). The structure of COGs has produced an inherent conflict that can undermine their effectiveness. Created largely in response to federal mandates, they are nevertheless run by local elected officials, who find themselves in the position of being asked to impose regional policies on themselves. From this perspective, the COG A-95 review role was flawed because those reviewed were doing the reviewing (Schmandt, 1973). Voluntary membership can encourage COGs/MPOs to adopt a lowest-common-denominator approach, since maintaining membership is the key to their power. This can be especially problematic in diverse, multicentered regions. This exchange, recorded during a 1998 meeting of local government officials in the San Francisco Bay Area attempting to define regional criteria for transportation funding, exemplifies the weakness: We have to agree that every change creates winners and losers. But we can navigate. We can make a change so that everyone wins in the region as a whole, not just each fiefdom. ____________ 5For more on COG processes, see Johnson (1976); Heitman (1982); Jones (1983); Mocine (1983); LeGrant (1984); Fulton (1992b, 1993, 1999a); Lewis and Sprague (1997); Pincetl (1999); and Weir (2000a). 31 We’d all love to do that. But we report to the fiefdoms (Innes and Gruber, 2001, p. 301). Regionalism in the Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay, and San Diego Areas Federal and state reform measures produced new regional institutions in the state’s major metropolitan areas during the 1960s and 1970s. But in only one—the San Francisco Bay Area—did a concerted debate emerge about how to structure the institutions. Conditions in the Bay Area gave rise to protracted conflicts over regional governance that continue today. Regionalism in California’s two other most populous metropolitan areas—the Greater Los Angeles and San Diego areas— evolved without the same degree of conflict. Regional planning in the Los Angeles area emerged largely in response to federal mandates and the threat of state action. That regionalism was not more vigorously promoted from the bottom up reflects the decentralized fashion in which the region had developed. “City and regional planning was adopted earlier, implemented more thoroughly, but undermined more insidiously [in Los Angeles] than elsewhere” (Fogelson, 1967, p. 2). By 1970, 10 million people lived in more than 150 jurisdictions in a six-county area the size of Ohio.6 Given the size of the counties, their governments had acted to some degree as regional planning entities, but they tended to oppose planning integration across their borders. Although city governments cooperated on an ad hoc basis to provide services, they rarely felt the need to coordinate broad regional policies. The City of Los Angeles was huge, containing 28 percent of the sixcounty region’s population. However, deeper social divisions had emerged between Los Angeles and its suburbs than had developed elsewhere in the state (Davis, 1992; Saltzstein, 1996; Fulton, 1992b, 1997a; Innes et al., 1994; and Fulton et al., 2000b). ____________ 6The five-county region as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau includes Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura, San Bernardino, and Riverside Counties. The Southern California Association of Governments also includes Imperial County in its jurisdiction. 32 The Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG), the COG for the six-county Los Angeles region, was established in 1965 to avoid state designation of a more authoritative regional planning entity (Douglas, 1968; Johnson, 1976). During the early 1970s, SCAG considered reorganization in response to state and federal reform proposals that were gaining momentum. However, the main outcome was to promote establishment of “mini-COGs” in five subregional areas mostly coinciding with county boundaries (Johnson, 1976). Thus, subregional, rather than regional planning, was affirmed. In contrast to the Los Angeles region, the San Diego area is relatively coherent politically and geographically. This has influenced its regional planning history by making voluntary cooperation seem more viable. The San Diego area is encompassed by a single county and includes only 18 cities. The San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) developed along classic COG lines as a voluntary association of local governments. During the 1970s, the major focus of growth management reform was in the City of San Diego itself. The second-largest city in California, San Diego dominates its region. In 1970, the City of San Diego held 51 percent of the county’s residents, a share that would drop to 44 percent by 2000. In 1979, the city adopted a general plan that linked development decisions to a set of three tiered areas—urban, suburban, and rural. It pioneered the combination of growth management with the financing of infrastructure through imposition of developer fees in rural areas and waiver of fees in urban areas (Fulton, 1999a). The San Francisco Bay Area has greater political coherence than the Los Angeles region, but less than the San Diego area. The San Francisco Bay itself helps explain why; it both promotes and retards cooperation among the cities that surround it. The region as commonly conceived comprises nine counties that touch the bay, covering an area of about 7,000 square miles. As a common resource, the bay helps to define the region, and poses a common planning challenge. Yet the bay also separates the communities around it. Oakland in particular viewed itself as a potential competitor to San Francisco from early on (Scott, 1985; Pincetl, 1999). 33 In contrast to the Los Angeles area, the San Francisco Bay region did not suburbanize rapidly until after World War II. The region’s population nearly doubled over the 1950s and 1960s. By 1970, no single city dominated the region. The three largest—San Francisco, San Jose, and Oakland—were of medium size (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). In 1970, they contained 33 percent of the region’s population, a share that remained steady over the following decades. They are also located at some distance from one another. As a result, the Bay Area has been described as “a region of overlapping sub-regions” (Jones and Rothblatt, 1993). Whereas Los Angeles Progressive leaders had marshaled municipal power to expand outward, Bay Area civic leaders faced the challenge of persuading the cities around the bay to join forces to integrate the region inward. Early in the century, San Francisco had developed a strong tradition of “business associationalism” as the state’s first major financial and economic center. Civic leaders sought to direct the region’s growth, but their consolidation campaigns provoked such a hostile reaction that cooperation was hampered for decades afterward. As a result, regional integration remained an unresolved issue (Scott, 1985; Pincetl, 1999). Regional environmental and transportation problems became matters of pressing concern by the 1960s. In particular, the San Francisco Bay was becoming increasingly degraded, and the region lacked a coordinated mass transit network. The fact that these regional problems gained attention just as national and state reforms were enacted addressing the same issues helped provoke a struggle over regionalism. The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) was created in 1961 partly in reaction to growing impatience about these problems, but it proved unable to address them effectively. When ABAG members were unable to agree on a plan for measures to protect the bay, environmental groups pushed for the creation of an independent commission with regulatory powers (Scott and Bollens, 1968; Kent, 1983; Jones, 1983; Scott, 1985; Jones and Rothblatt, 1993). In 1965, the state legislature passed revolutionary legislation establishing the Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) as a state agency with overriding authority over land uses that affect the bay. It became the prototype for other such agencies both in California and elsewhere. 34 Disputes emerged over proposals to build bridges, airports, and other facilities. Business leaders from San Francisco and Oakland, concerned that political fragmentation in the region would damage economic competitiveness, became vocal advocates for stronger regional transportation planning. Thus, the historical business rivalry between San Francisco and Oakland was healed as both cities faced a similar challenge from suburban areas (Scott, 1985; Pincetl, 1999). The Bay Area Council, an organization of regional business leaders, was instrumental in creation of the BART District in 1957. Through the next decade, it pushed for a new regional transportation authority to manage roads, harbors, and airports. Many suburban cities and counties objected to what they viewed as an effort by the central cities to promote their own interests. ABAG’s transportation planning committee was unable to intervene in disputes between member governments over the question (Scott and Bollens, 1968; Kent, 1983; Jones, 1983; Scott, 1985; Jones and Rothblatt, 1993). The Federal Transit Administration became frustrated with ABAG’s inability to define a mechanism for coordination of regional mass transit systems. With construction of BART under way, it was felt that an areawide authority was needed to integrate different elements (Jones, 1974, 1983). In 1970, the Federal Transit Administration threatened to withhold all aid for the Bay Area if a transportation agency stronger than ABAG was not created. The state legislature complied, establishing the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) in 1970 to oversee transportation planning and funding for the nine-county Bay Area. It is the strongest regional transportation planning body in the state and the only one that is officially a legal subdivision of the state. The role of transportation planning is key to understanding the distinct development of regional institutions in the San Francisco Bay and Los Angeles areas during the period. Just at the time that state and federal funds were first made available for mass transit, the Bay Area finally reached a stage of development that made it necessary to define an integrated regional approach in this area. The BART system finally linked the region’s two historical central cities, although many suburban transit systems were also established on autonomous lines. 35 During the same period, proposals to organize a mass transit system in the Los Angeles area failed to win broad support because suburban areas objected to investments in systems that would primarily benefit central areas and that seemed unwarranted given the region’s low-density development pattern (Wachs, 1996). The perceived need to establish MTC as a separate agency emerged directly from its role in transit planning. In contrast, there was broad consensus that the basis of Los Angeles’s system was limited to roads and freeways, and much of that system was already complete when SCAG adopted the role of regional transportation planner. In addition to supporting efforts to strengthen regional planning in relation to specific functional concerns, some San Francisco Bay Area reformers mounted an even more ambitious campaign in the late 1960s to consolidate agencies. A reform coalition of concerned officials, environmentalists, regional business leaders, and good-government groups banded together to advocate establishment of a stronger multipurpose institution. The reformers had come to view local government resistance to regional planning as a major obstacle to achieving their goals. Local governments were forced to respond. By the end of the decade, local officials were even willing to establish a new regional government if they could thereby preempt the creation of stronger agencies viewed as threats to home rule (Kent, 1983; Jones, 1974, 1983). Between 1969 and 1975, dozens of bills were introduced in the state legislature to establish a new regional authority for the Bay Area. In a pattern that would be repeated elsewhere, controversy surrounded procedural issues more than policy matters. The major sticking points centered on governance issues: the size and composition of the governing board of the new regional authority, which regional agencies should come under its wing, and financing. Ultimately, the coalition fell apart in frustration. Although legislative votes reflected partisan lines, most negative votes came from outside the Bay Area. The most vocal opponents were Southern California officials, concerned about setting a precedent. Thus, the effort to establish regional home rule was effectively defeated by other regions (Knox, 1983; Jones, 1974, 1983; MacDougall, 1983; Jones and Rothblatt, 1993). 36 The evolution of regionalism in the three major California metropolitan areas suggests a number of conclusions. First, political conditions affected the way reforms were implemented. In particular, in the two regions in which the political balance between central and suburban cities was stable, COGs emerged along the classic voluntarist lines. However, in the Bay Area, tension between the major central cities had stalled development of regional planning mechanisms that aligned with the political structure. A second, related matter is the history of economic development in the regions. Rapid postwar development in the Bay Area brought regional problems to the fore—especially in the key areas of environmental and transportation planning. This coincided with a rise in federal and state environmental regulation and involvement in these areas. The combination helped produce a thoroughgoing discussion about governance institutions. This pattern would also be repeated elsewhere: When transportation or environmental problems overwhelm regional decisionmaking mechanisms, and this coincides with broader reforms in these policy areas, homegrown efforts to strengthen regional institutions are more likely to emerge. Business and environmental leaders usually play a key role in such reform efforts because their interests are often inherently regional. The outcome of the Bay Area struggle is important to note, because it also would come to be repeated. Reformers faced an unfortunate tradeoff between regional focus and accountability on the one hand and breadth of policy authority on the other. Reformers were able to strengthen regional planning authorities, even over the objections of local governments, but only along narrow functional lines. Strengthening regional multipurpose planning institutions has proved much harder, especially when their purview includes land use. This tradeoff sets up an ironic challenge for COGs. The local government members of COGs may view the establishment of singlepurpose agencies as a threat to home rule, but these agencies may be more acceptable to local governments than a regional multipurpose authority with an independent role in land use policy. Once singlepurpose agencies are established, they may in turn form an obstacle to 37 planning integration because they often oppose efforts to merge their functions with those of other agencies. Finally, it is useful to note the role that the state legislature played in the Bay Area struggles. The lack of bipartisan, broad-based support in the legislature helped spell the demise of Bay Area reforms. Thus, the very strength and diversity of California’s regions can pose an obstacle to reform because objections from other regions may undermine the ability of a single region to go its own way. By the same token, the strength of the state’s regions also helps explain why the state government has not mandated establishment of stronger regional authorities. Not only does regional diversity make any uniform set of regional policies difficult to enact, but also regional governments might pose a threat to state prerogatives. The Rise of Environmentalism Environmental concerns slowly gained attention during the postwar expansion as air and water quality began to deteriorate. By the late 1960s, a broad environmental movement had emerged, galvanized by catastrophes such as the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill (Pincetl, 1999). Reformers primarily called for regulation to control pollution and preserve natural resources; environmental regulation followed the singlepurpose functional approach to regional planning in areas beyond the ability of local governments to control. Water management in California evolved into a state-directed process organized on a bioregional basis. In 1967, the legislature created the State Water Resources Control Board to oversee water rights and quality through the nine regional water control boards established in 1949 (Robie, 1972). The 1969 Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act and the 1972 federal Clean Water Act placed the state board at the center of a comprehensive system to grant, review, and enforce permits to appropriate water in the state, and to govern quality standards (Young and Congdon, 1994). The Clean Water Act created the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System program, which established permit requirements for surface discharges from “point sources,” the specific, primarily industrial, sources of pollutants into water pipes. 38 Other regulations required that large developers obtain federal permits for draining or filling wetlands. The nine regional water boards are governed by members appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state senate. In setting standards, the regional boards must balance environmental characteristics, beneficial uses, and economic considerations. This blend of goals contrasts somewhat with other environmental programs. The greater intrusion of water policy into local land use decisions, and the need to balance multiple policy goals, may help explain why the state government adopted a centralized institutional approach in this area. Federal and state legislation also established the basic framework for air pollution control that persists today. The legislature created the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board in 1960 to control auto emissions. The State Air Resources Board was established in 1967 to define emission and quality standards, air basins, and regional pollution control districts that would regulate stationary sources such as industrial and commercial establishments. The federal Clean Air Act of 1970 established emissions standards and gave states authority for implementation and enforcement. In spite of efforts to establish air pollution control districts based on air basins, the institutional structure of air quality management retained its tradition of county control. Although 15 air basins have been defined in California based on objective standards, 35 air pollution control districts have been designated. Twenty-five are at the county or subcounty level. Most of the multicounty agencies were created through consolidation agreements among existing districts, but three required special legislation.7 Governing boards are generally composed of county supervisors.8 In some air basins, the existence of numerous county-level ____________ 7These are the Bay Area Air Quality Management District for the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area, the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) for the portions of four Los Angeles area counties included in the South Coast Air Basin, and the Mojave Desert Air Quality Management District for portions of San Bernardino and Riverside Counties. 8The South Coast Air Quality Management District, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, and San Joaquin Unified District also provide representation to cities. SCAQMD’s governing board includes the further addition of three members 39 districts reveals a lack of policy consensus (Wachs and Dill, 1999; Denney et al., 1999). In a few unique cases, the state created regional governance structures during the 1970s with significant land use authority. They were special cases calling for protection of valued and endangered natural resources, with significant effects on local government land use policy. In these instances, public concern was sufficient to overcome the objections of local governments to the establishment of strong regional authorities. In response to pressure from citizen activists, the state legislature established the Bay Conservation and Development Commission in 1965 to regulate land uses that affect the San Francisco Bay. As noted, it became the prototype for other agencies, including the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, established in 1967, and the California Coastal Commission, approved by voters in 1972. As Madelyn Glickfeld and Ned Levine note, these three bodies represent California’s strongest efforts to promote comprehensive planning and regulate land use at the regional level. The California Coastal Commission and BCDC are among the few California agencies given the ability to coordinate and approve the plans of local, state, and federal agencies. However, these agencies have limits as models for regional growth management, since all have been defined around cherished natural resources rather than economic regions. In addition, they do not fund capital improvements or services, unlike general-purpose governments (Glickfeld and Levine, 1992). Perhaps the most important piece of land use legislation during the period addressed environmental concerns. The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), passed in 1970, requires that state and local agencies assess the potential environmental impacts of development projects and adopt all “feasible” measures to mitigate adverse effects. The state provides for no administrative review of CEQA decisions, however. As a result, enforcement is up to citizens and the courts (Fulton, 1999a). ________________________________________________________ appointed by the governor, the speaker of the state assembly, and the Senate Rules Committee. 40 Thus, CEQA repeated the state’s historical pattern of strengthening local planning requirements in a fashion more procedural than substantive. Because its requirements relate to specific development projects rather than the overall general plans of local jurisdictions, CEQA has been called a “paper tiger,” generating tremendous amounts of procedural material and litigation but not necessarily protecting the environment because of its piecemeal approach. CEQA requirements have been amended to require assessment of the cumulative effects of development, but this has proved difficult for local governments to evaluate (Fulton, 1999a). Another outcome of the environmental movement was legislation passed in 1970 calling on the governor’s planning office to develop a comprehensive state land use policy and to prepare a periodic “Environmental Goals and Policy Report” for submission to the legislature (Simpson, 1983; Pincetl, 1999). However, the Urban Strategy for California produced by Governor Jerry Brown’s administration is considered the sole instance when the provisions of the legislation were met. Brown’s Strategy called for an intergovernmental planning process among state agencies and COGs to prepare joint work programs to be submitted to the governor and the legislature. Brown issued an executive order (B-41-78) requiring that all state agencies, boards, and commissions follow the Strategy’s three priorities for development: to renew and maintain existing urban and suburban areas, to develop vacant and underutilized land within those areas, and when urban development was deemed necessary outside them, to use immediately adjacent land. This has been considered the only instance in which a California state administration developed an integrated set of policy objectives to guide growth management. However, Brown’s program was largely ignored (Fulton, 1992a; Pincetl, 1999). Conclusion By the mid-1970s, the main components of today’s regional planning system had been established.9 The postwar reform wave ____________ 9Appendix F lists the major regional arrangements as identified by the state senate in 1988. Most of the arrangements have been described in this report. With the addition of 41 reconfigured the Progressive Era growth management framework, fracturing metropolitan planning in the process. Metropolitan governance became more fragmented not only in terms of the sheer numbers of new cities, single-purpose planning agencies, and special districts but also in terms of the division of responsibility for functional areas. A division was introduced between planning areas dominated by the state and federal governments—regional transportation and environmental concerns—and land use, which remained a local prerogative. Not only was control of these policy areas placed under different levels of government, but also none were organized at the scale of metropolitan regions as they had come to be constituted by then. Vertical regionalism—state-dominated regional planning for largescale infrastructure and environmental planning—ensured that adequate public resources and accountability could be applied to regional policy problems with inherently regional scale and that local governments were unable to solve alone. However, the regional planning system became vertically fractured because single-purpose state agencies were organized along narrow functional lines. State and federal policy could be quite interventionist in these areas, as the history of highway planning indicates. However, in relation to land use, state policy was far less intrusive. In fact, it worked to facilitate local control by helping provide a regional infrastructure and service framework for suburban incorporation and development. Thus, the system also became horizontally fractured because state agencies have no direct control over local land use, although their policies are often directly related to land use patterns. This helped to ensure that local land use decisions would come to drive regional growth planning because local plans and projections were taken as given. A distinction emerged between federal and state growth management policy, one that would be reinforced in later decades. Federal reforms were more likely to promote metropolitan area planning, whereas state policies tended to strengthen the existing governmental structure, either by directing more planning authority to city or county agencies, as in the ________________________________________________________ the Delta Protection Commission, discussed in Chapter 6, the list in Appendix F can be considered up-to-date. 42 case of LAFCOs, air pollution management districts, and RTPAs, or by defining a more dominant role for state agencies, as in the case of water quality regulation. In response to growing fragmentation, the second reform wave also established the second major regional institutional model in California— the voluntary, horizontal form. This had first emerged on a smaller scale through numerous cross-jurisdictional special districts and service arrangements among local governments. Federal reforms extended this model both geographically and in functional scope. However, COGs served primarily as an interface rather than as independent decisionmaking bodies. With COG authority entirely derived from other levels of government, and without a reassertion of state land use policy objectives, the fundamental structure of accountability had not been altered. As a result, COGs were unable to overcome the planning divisions that had emerged. The main reforms related to land use governance during the period all displayed the same characteristic: They emphasized procedural rather than policy change. This is true of COGs, LAFCOs, local general planning requirements, and CEQA. The reforms protected home rule control of land use while attempting to establish a more orderly decision process. The outcome of the Bay Area struggle supports the argument that regionalism in California had developed into a tradeoff between regional focus and accountability on the one hand and breadth of policy authority on the other. Reformers were able to strengthen regional planning authorities, even over the objections of local governments, but generally only along narrow functional lines, and not over land use policy except in rare cases when a precious natural resource was in imminent danger. 43 4. The Planning System Under Stress The next three chapters describe strains on the regional planning system that arose during the 1980s and 1990s, making it increasingly difficult for the system to achieve its own objectives. A number of factors caused stress, including rapid population growth, decentralization of jobs and housing, fiscal and environmental constraints, and government gridlock. By the end of the 1990s, certain growth issues had gained prominence—in particular, housing needs, infrastructure deficiencies (especially transportation), and natural resource constraints (especially water). These issues highlighted regional consequences of fragmented policymaking, providing justification for integrating land use, transportation, and environmental planning. At the same time, the rise of a global economy reinforced the importance of regional approaches to economic development. This chapter describes how rapid growth and more complex development patterns created new planning challenges, while fiscal constraint limited government’s ability to respond. Fiscal constraint has been a double-edged sword for regional planning, at once highlighting the need for cooperation but also making it more difficult. Fiscal constraint is considered in relation to its effect on two growth management issues: infrastructure and affordable housing. Chapters 5 and 6 describe how regional planners in the two functional areas that have been approached systematically through a regional framework—transportation and environmental protection— began to perceive basic faults in the planning system by the late 1980s. In response, they developed new programs to try to overcome weaknesses in the traditional model. 45 Rapid Growth, New Development Patterns, and Fiscal Constraint The 1980s was a decade of unprecedented population growth in California. Growth spilled inland from coastal areas, especially to Sacramento County in the north and San Bernardino and Riverside Counties in the south.1 Figure 4.1 shows population gains by region. The rate of job growth was even higher than population growth, and it was highest in suburban areas. By 1990, less than half of all jobs in California metropolitan areas were located in the state’s 49 central cities, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.2 As employment moved to outlying areas, new “edge cities”—characterized by office parks, lowdensity housing, and automobiles—grew up. This pattern of development strained transportation systems not designed for suburb-tosuburb commutes. 16 1970–1980 1980–1990 12 1990–2000 8 Population increase (100,000s) 4 0 Los Angeles and Ventura Counties Orange County San Bernardino and Riverside Counties San Francisco Bay Area San Diego County SOURCE: U.S. Census. Central Valley Other Figure 4.1—Population Increase in Selected Areas in California, 1970–2000 ____________ 1This section draws from Landis (1992), Glickfeld and Levine (1992), and Fulton (1993a). 2Calculations are based on data from the 1990 U.S. Census Transportation Planning Package. 46 People and jobs spread farther out, but they also filled in older areas, so many communities underwent rapid change. By 1990, about half the state’s metropolitan area population lived in central cities, and another quarter lived in older suburbs incorporated before 1950. Central cities and older suburbs captured the largest share of overall growth during the 1980s and 1990s. Central city growth rates nearly matched suburban rates, contrasting with trends in many other parts of the country, where central cities were more apt to be abandoned. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show characteristics of California cities by age. Densification and racial change have been cited as factors prompting concern about growth in Southern California by the late 1980s (Landis, 1992; Davis, 1992). Older and middle-aged suburbs were the most densely populated areas by 1990, even more than central cities, and they had experienced high density gains over previous decades. The demographic composition of cities was also changing rapidly, as minorities increased in share. As the state’s population boomed, the government’s ability to respond to growth was sharply curtailed. A number of factors limited government spending. In particular, frustrated voters passed Proposition Table 4.1 Residential Population Growth in California Metropolitan Area Cities, 1970–2000 Incorporation Date Central cities Suburbs Before 1950 1950–1969 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–2000 No. of Cities, 2000 59 % Share of Total Metro Growth Rate (% Change) Area Population 1970– 1980– 1990– in Cities, 2000 1980 1990 2000 49 16 26 12 % Share of Metro Area (City) Population Growth 1970– 1980– 1990– 1980 1990 2000 46 43 38 250 29 100 14 14 1 33 5 18 2 18 25 16 29 24 29 24 26 15 18 12 13 38 14 8 2 1 21 19 6 13 SOURCE: U.S. Census. 47 Table 4.2 California Metropolitan Area City Characteristics, 1970–2000 Incorporation Date Central cities Suburbs Before 1950 1950–1969 1970–1999 Residents per Sq. Mi. for Cities with Population > 2,500 % Change Avg., 1970– 1980– 1990– 2000 1980 1990 2000 4,417 3 16 10 % Growth Rates for Cities with Population > 25,000a Residents, Jobs, 1980– 1990– 1990 2000 35 30 % of Population Not White-non-Hispanicb % Point Change Avg., 1980– 1990– 2000 1990 2000 47 9 11 4,590 4,837 2,995 8 30 15 5 23 14 20 10 24 46 50 9 25 63 50 10 49 147 34 9 10 11 10 SOURCE: U.S. Census. Values are calculated across cities (i.e., not weighted for population) in metropolitan areas; central city and metropolitan area definitions are as of 2000. aJourney-to-work data for 2000 were not available at the time of publication. bIn 2000, the Census Bureau permitted respondents to select multiple race categories. The share of the population considered “not white-non-Hispanic” in 2000 includes non-Hispanic respondents who selected more than one race. In previous Census years, a share of these respondents was coded as “white non-Hispanic.” Thus, the categories are not exactly comparable across Census years. The average share of the 2000 resident population that was mixed-race non-Hispanic, for the cities in this analysis, was 2.5 percent. 13 in 1978.3 Property tax revenue to city and county governments declined by half in the year after its passage, leaving them with fewer resources to address the costs of growth. Local governments lost a quarter of their total own-source, nonenterprise revenue (Silva and Barbour, 1999). Subsequent voter initiatives further constrained state and local revenue. Federal assistance to states and localities also was cut sharply starting in the late 1970s. Federal subventions to California cities declined by over three-quarters in inflation-adjusted per capita dollars from 1978 to 1992, and by about one-quarter to counties (Silva and Barbour, 1999). Fiscal constraint directly undermined regional planning by reducing resources for councils of governments. Two weeks after the passage of Proposition 13, ABAG members voted to cut dues by 70 percent, for ____________ 3This landmark initiative reduced property tax rates to 1 percent of the full value of the property and limited reassessment of the property to no more than 2 percent annually, except for cases of a change in ownership or new construction. 48 example (LeGrant, 1984). The further decline of COGs was ensured by federal government cutbacks. Among the first programs eliminated after President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 were domestic urban ones including those that had bolstered regional planning. Most federal requirements for regional review of local projects were rescinded by 1982 (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). Since the state government did not share the same commitment to regional planning that the federal government had exhibited over the past decades, regional planning suffered. ABAG’s budget and staff declined by two-thirds over the six-year period from 1977 to 1982, for example (LeGrant, 1984). As fiscal constraint reduced resources for planning, it also exacerbated planning problems. The state’s response to rapid growth during the 1980s was largely “policy by neglect” (Fulton, 1992a, p. 23). During the late 1960s, capital outlays for upgrading basic infrastructure had exceeded 15 percent of the state budget. By 1975, the share had dropped to less than 4 percent, and it remained below 3 percent throughout the following two decades. Routine maintenance also was severely cut back for many programs (Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy, 1999). Traffic congestion is often cited as a major cause of rising antigrowth sentiment by the late 1980s (Landis and Kroll, 1989). During the decade, state highway system capacity expanded only 4 percent, whereas the number of motor vehicles in California increased by more than 50 percent (Rawls and Bean, 1998). Three of the four U.S. metropolitan areas experiencing the nation’s greatest increases in commute durations over the 1980s were in California (Bernick and Cervero, 1997). Housing production failed to keep up with demand, especially in coastal areas. From 1980 to 1989, statewide housing demand exceeded supply by more than 660,000 units, equivalent to 6 percent of the state’s housing inventory (California Department of Housing and Community Development, 2000). Workers were forced to look for housing at increasing distances from their jobs, adding to traffic congestion. The rise in Californians’ commute times during the 1980s was highest among first-time homebuyers (California Department of Housing and Community Development, 2000). These “jobs-housing imbalances” 49 drew attention to the relationship between commercial and residential land use, on the one hand, and access to transportation, on the other. Voter Revolt Prompts State-Level Debate By the late 1980s, Californians increasingly associated growth with a deteriorating quality of life. Frustrated by growth-related problems that seemed to be going out of control, voters also viewed policies and expenditures to accommodate new growth with suspicion. Conservatives opposed higher taxes and services, and environmentalists opposed development that threatened natural resources (Landis and Kroll, 1989; Glickfeld and Levine, 1992; Fulton, 1993a; Pincetl, 1999). Such concerns helped ignite a growth-control “revolution” in the form of hundreds of local ballot-box measures passed across the state in the mid-1980s. Figure 4.2 shows the explosion of activity. Ballot-box planning had started in the late 1970s in Northern California, but by 1988, two-thirds of growth-related initiatives were on Southern California ballots. Not all measures were placed on ballots by citizen groups; many were initiated by local governments. By 1989, there were more than 850 growth-control or growth-management measures in place. California pioneered many techniques including development restrictions, requirements for concurrency with infrastructure, and 120 No. of measures 80 40 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 SOURCES: Data for 1971 to 1986 are from Glickfeld et al. (1987); data for 1986 to 2000 are from Fulton et al. (2000a). Figure 4.2—Land Use Measures on Local Ballots in California, 1971–2000 50 competitions among developers (Landis and Kroll, 1989; Landis, 1992; Fulton, 1993a; Pincetl, 1999). The ballot initiatives brought conflicts over growth into public view but also suggested that certain compromises might be required (Landis and Kroll, 1989). Support for growth control crossed traditional demographic and political lines (Glickfeld and Levine, 1992; Baldassare, 1994). But even growth-control advocates did not always share the same goals. One observer noted, “You really have two groups with diametrically opposed points of view in this movement. One has the traditional American dream of a single-family house in the suburbs. . . . They’re concerned about too much density, too much traffic congestion. . . . The environmental solution to that suburban concern is more density. . . . It’s not at all clear that these groups can agree” (Lucy Blake, Executive Director of the California League of Conservation Voters, quoted in Trombley, 1988; also see Boyarsky, 1988, and Davis, 1992). Madelyn Glickfeld and Ned Levine assessed the relationship of local growth-control measures and regional growth patterns during the 1980s and early 1990s in their 1992 report, Regional Growth—Local Reaction. The authors hypothesized that growth-control measures are a political response to regional growth, noting that although no simple relationship could be demonstrated between the number of growth-control measures enacted at the local level and actual growth rates at that level, a very strong relationship existed between the number of measures enacted locally and state-level measures of growth. They hypothesized that local growth measures might constitute a reaction to regional growth trends. However, they concluded that local measures are an uncoordinated response that only exacerbates problems if housing and jobs are displaced farther toward the suburban fringe. Paul Lewis and Max Neiman assessed the possible influence of local growth measures on housing production during the late 1990s, employing a variety of data on city characteristics and survey responses from California city managers and planning directors (Lewis and Neiman, 2002). They concluded that since only a small share of cities 51 had adopted policies that might actually restrict development, the effect of such measures on housing production must be minimal compared to other factors such as zoning policies, market forces, federal and state tax incentives, fiscal rules, and legal constraints. However, they also noted that local conditions, such as commute times and jobs-housing balances, help determine cities’ orientations toward housing and growth. “It is the real consequences of growth ‘on the ground,’ rather than merely local snobbery, that provoke citizen opposition. In relatively stable and settled local communities without other overriding issues, this citizen unease contributes to the passage of policies that attempt to increase public control of the rate and character of housing development” (Lewis and Neiman, 2002, p. 72). The rise in local ballot activity pushed government leaders to act. Nearly 70 bills related to growth-management planning were introduced in the state legislature in the late 1980s and most included an enhanced regional governance component (Innes et al., 1994). Many bills called for more comprehensive state growth policies, development of comprehensive regional plans, and methods to encourage or mandate local consistency. As the legislative process wore on, bills tended to emphasize incentives rather than mandates (Landis, 1992; Trombley, 1992; California Planning and Development Report, 1992, 1996; Innes et al., 1994). Broad consensus-building efforts were organized behind the scenes, and a historic compromise seemed possible.4 Developers wanted CEQA reform. They were frustrated by the lengthy and cumbersome permit review process and sought to streamline requirements and reduce bureaucratic delays. Environmentalists seemed open to such measures in ____________ 4An eight-month-long process, known as the Growth Management Consensus Project, was organized behind the scenes in 1991 by the Center for California Studies at California State University, Sacramento, and the Senate and Assembly Offices of Research. It brought together representatives from large businesses, environmental and social equity groups, local government associations, and the development and real estate lobbies. Participants reached agreement on the following points: The state should coordinate its policies, any growth-management system had to provide certainty for all interests, compact growth would be important and would require some land designation system, and both environmental protection and economic development were equally important (Innes et al., 1994; Bradshaw, 1992). 52 exchange for strong commitments from the state to preserve natural resource areas. Environmentalists wanted urban growth boundaries— firm borders delineating growth and no-growth zones—an approach that has been employed in other states as a way to integrate environmental and economic planning at a regional scale. However, environmentalists seemed receptive to compromise if the state designated significant lands and funding to acquire them. All sides expressed the desire to address development matters at the level of general plans rather than specific projects (California Planning and Development Report, 1992; Fulton, 1993b). Governor Pete Wilson’s administration weighed in on the issue in 1993, when his appointed commission on growth management released Strategic Growth: Taking Charge of the Future. The report emphasized CEQA reform but also contained elements attractive to environmentalists. It called for statewide standards on growth and conservation and a new mechanism to coordinate and finance state infrastructure investment. Local government compliance with state development goals would be encouraged through incentives such as preferential access to state loans and grants. Every city and county would be required to develop a comprehensive plan that would facilitate a “master environmental impact report.” Projects determined to be consistent with the plan would be exempt from detailed environmental review. Councils of Governments would be reorganized to incorporate existing regional agencies and would perform a review role (Fulton, 1993b; Preston, 1993; Pincetl, 1999). After Wilson’s strategy was released, observers noted that the “the outlines of a political deal seem apparent” (Fulton, 1993b). However, the winds had begun to change. The state was experiencing the worst economic downturn since the Depression, diverting attention from growth concerns and making proposals that relied on spending increases appear to be unworkable. Furthermore, the recession prompted a souring of state-local relations. In fiscal year 1992–1993, the legislature and the governor called for a huge shift in property tax revenue away from local governments. The state government began transferring some $3.6 billion annually in property taxes, or about one-fifth of property taxes, from cities and counties to school districts. This enabled the state 53 to meet its statutory obligations to schools during a time of tight budgets, but local governments were outraged and demanded a reversal of this socalled “ERAF” shift (ERAF stands for Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund). By supporting both the property tax shift and the potential restriction of infrastructure funding to local governments that did not comply with state growth policies, Wilson angered local government lobbyists. Without an offer of fiscal reform, local governments had little incentive to accede to greater state control over their development policies (Trombley, 1992; Fulton, 1993b; Innes et al., 1994). By the end of 1994, most growth-management bills had fizzled out. Momentum for change could not withstand the recession and the impasse in state-local relations. California was not the only state to seriously consider growthmanagement reform during the 1980s and early 1990s. A number of states passed comprehensive growth management reforms during the period, including Florida (1985), New Jersey (1985), Vermont (1988), Georgia (1989), Washington (1990), and Maryland (1992). The reforms sought to balance growth-accommodating and growth-restricting policies within comprehensive state frameworks of land use and development policies. The bills proposed in Sacramento in the late 1980s reflected many of the prevalent characteristics: integration of infrastructure and land use planning; plan consistency at the state, regional, and local levels; and an enhanced role for regional agencies to help achieve that consistency (DeGrove, 1992; DeGrove and Metzger, 1993; Bollens, 1992, 1993a; Innes, 1993; Weitz, 1999). Business Leaders and “Smart Growth” Growth-related problems—in particular, traffic congestion and lack of affordable housing—only worsened after the California economy began booming again by the late 1990s. In 1998, approximately 40 percent of the state’s urban freeways were congested, up from 27 percent in 1988 (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000c). The Los Angeles, San Francisco-Oakland, and San Jose metropolitan areas were among the nation’s most congested (Surface Transportation Policy 54 Project, 2000). By then, housing affordability problems were also perceived to have reached crisis proportions in some areas. In 2000, 15 of the 25 most unaffordable metropolitan housing markets in the nation were in California (Fulton, 2000a). Problems were especially bad in high-growth areas such as Silicon Valley, where job growth outpaced housing growth nearly sevenfold from 1995 to 1999.5 Many business leaders became vocal advocates for planning reform by the late 1990s. Their activism reflected increasing concern about regional quality-of-life factors deemed essential for attracting and maintaining a high-quality workforce. As firms became more mobile over recent decades, and knowledge-based employment became critical to economic competitiveness, quality-of-life factors gained more attention as key determinants of regional economic health. These factors include affordable housing, good transportation, good schools and workforce training systems, cultural amenities, and attractive natural and built surroundings—elements that rely on adequate and coordinated public investment (Peirce, 1993; Barnes and Ledebur, 1998). Business activism today is reminiscent of the Progressive Era at the turn of the last century, when business leaders also pushed governments to manage growth more effectively in a new economic age. But although Progressive leaders marshaled resources for cities to become engines of economic productivity, today the focus has shifted to metropolitan regions. Business concerns with quality of life are evident in the following argument made by the president of the Bay Area Council, a group of 275 large employers in the San Francisco Bay Area: “The intensity of concern around transportation and housing suggests we’ve got this brewing collision. . . . We really view this as reaching crisis proportions and we’ve got to get these problems solved in the region, or it’s going to be a threat to the economy” (Hendrix, 2001). Similarly, in 2000 the president of the state Chamber of Commerce asserted that “housing shortages and high prices have begun to chase our work force to other states where housing is more affordable” (Herdt, 2000). ____________ 5Calculations for San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties are based on data from the California Employment Development Department (n.d.) and the California Department of Finance (2000). 55 A widely noted example of business advocacy for reform was the sponsorship by the Bank of America (along with the California Resources Agency, the Greenbelt Alliance, and the Low Income Housing Fund) of an influential report called Beyond Sprawl, released in 1995. According to the report, unchecked development had “shifted from an engine of California’s growth to a force that now threatens to inhibit growth and degrade the quality of our life.” The authors recommended policies to make more efficient use of land and provide more certainty in the development process. A number of reports and studies followed assessing the extent and alleged consequences of “sprawl” in California.6 These reports formed part of a growing national literature on the costs of sprawl and the potential for “smart growth” (also called “sustainable development”) as an alternative.7 Although smart growth has been defined many ways, it generally refers to policies to promote compact development, preserve open space, and discourage dependence on the automobile.8 Smart growth gained national attention in 1999 after Vice President Al Gore announced a Livability Agenda, with programs to preserve open space, ease traffic congestion, and pursue regional strategies. Additionally, a number of states passed new or modified legislation with smart growth themes during the 1990s, including Maryland, New Jersey, Tennessee, Oregon, and Florida. Sprawl-related studies often attempt to evaluate the costs— particularly for infrastructure—associated with land use and development patterns that have been taken for granted for decades. Assessments of alternative land use and transportation scenarios raised prospects of potential gains that might be achieved through regional coordination. In California, such studies of alternative scenarios have been undertaken by ____________ 6See for example Landis (1995); Hayward (1996); Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy (1998); Moss (1999); Wassmer (2001); Fulton et al. (2001a). 7For a review and discussion of nearly 500 studies on the costs and benefits of sprawl, see Burchell et al. (1998). 8Like smart growth, the definition of sprawl has also been open to interpretation, but it generally refers to low-density development that expands in a noncontiguous way from a built-up inner-city core. Land uses are often segregated and reliant on automobiles for transportation access (culled from Burchell et al., 1998). 56 the San Diego Association of Governments (1998), the Bay Area Transportation and Land Use Coalition (1998, 1999), and the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (described in Metro Investment Report, March, 2001b), among others. During the late1990s, business leaders helped organize regional and subregional smart growth initiatives. They are described in Chapter 7, which discusses grass-roots regional strategies. Business leaders also helped statewide reform coalitions, such as the California Futures Network, which helped organize a “Smart Growth Summit” in 1999 that drew 700 government officials and others. Similarly, the Job-Center Housing Coalition, a statewide group of about 50 business, development, labor, housing, and poverty groups, lobbied for environmental regulatory relief, local government finance reform, and reform of construction defect liability that obstructs financing for condominiums and townhouses. By the late 1990s, the public at large was also concerned about growth problems. A PPIC statewide poll conducted in 2001 revealed that, after the state’s dire electricity crisis, growth was viewed as the most important issue facing Californians (Baldassare, 2001). In the poll, the public reaffirmed its support for local control over growth management but also indicated that it was receptive to planning coordination. A large majority (89 percent) indicated that local governments should work together on growth issues rather than make decisions on their own. Infrastructure, Housing, and Fiscal Issues By the late 1990s, state policymakers again turned their attention to planning reform. Two problems in particular—infrastructure needs and affordable housing—brought regional consequences of development policy into sharper focus. With record state budget surpluses and population growth projected at 12 million by 2020, state legislators turned to the question of infrastructure needs after two decades of deferred investment and maintenance. A series of reports revealed a staggering level of need.9 For ____________ 9See California Legislative Analyst’s Office (1998c); California Business Roundtable (1998); California Department of Finance (1999); California State Treasurer (1999); 57 example, the Department of Finance’s 1999 Capital Outlay Infrastructure Report pegged unfunded infrastructure needs over the next decade at about $80 billion, with the largest categories being transportation and education. The California Transportation Commission estimated statewide ten-year unfunded needs in transportation alone at nearly $100 billion (the difference is due to inclusion of local, regional, and state funding needs in their report). California ranked well below average in state investment in key areas such as education and transportation (California Business Roundtable, 1998). The reports called not just for substantial new investment but also for better strategic planning to target it more wisely. For example, the California Legislative Analyst’s Office argued that the lack of clear goals and objectives in many state programs, and the lack of a broader context of statewide goals, objectives, and criteria for setting development priorities, had produced an ad hoc process of infrastructure planning and financing “that has not and will not meet either the requirements of an aging statewide infrastructure or the need for new infrastructure to sustain a growing economy and population” (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 1998c, p. 3). The report argued for a new, more comprehensive approach. A few reports specifically called for regional planning as a framework for more efficient investment.10 They advocated reintegration of state investment plans across functional areas and of state, regional, and local plans and objectives. One example is an unusual edition of the state’s annual debt affordability report issued by the California State Treasurer in 1999. It called for a comprehensive approach to state capital planning to promote sustainability goals, asserting that “any state capital outlay financing process must include a strong regional planning component, with state infrastructure investments made in accordance with and in support of credible regional plans which foster the state’s growth principles. Further, regions must be empowered to better finance ________________________________________________________ Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy (1999); Dowall (2000); Neuman and Whittington (2000) . 10See California State Treasurer (1999), and Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy (1999). 58 investments of regional significance” (California State Treasurer, 1999, p.18). Housing affordability problems also demanded the attention of lawmakers by the late 1990s, and this tested the limits of the traditional planning model, since control over land use traditionally had been delegated in large part to local governments. However, many policymakers had become convinced that the state’s housing shortage was more than just a reflection of cyclical trends. Research indicated that housing production, particularly for multiunit housing, had failed to keep up with demand in the state for over two decades (California Department of Housing and Community Development, 2000; California Budget Project, 2000). Among urban Californians, homeownership and rental cost burdens had been consistently higher than for residents of comparable metropolitan areas in the rest of the country, with the gap widening since the 1970s. With the state producing only about half the new units needed to meet projected demand over the next two decades, the studies predicted worsening conditions. A primary explanation offered to account for high prices and underproduction of housing was local government fiscal constraint. According to this argument, voter initiatives to limit local revenue— Proposition 13 in particular—prompted local governments to shift the burden of paying for infrastructure and services to support new growth onto fees exacted from new development projects, thereby adding to housing prices.11 In addition, local governments increasingly “fiscalized” land use choices in favor of development that could maximize revenue. By reducing property tax revenue, Proposition 13 skewed fiscal decisionmaking in favor of land uses able to generate sales tax revenue—a major remaining source of local discretionary revenue. Thus, competition for retail development increased and other land uses deemed too costly in terms of service provision, in particular multiunit housing, were discouraged. A 1999 PPIC report, California Cities and the Local Sales Tax, provided empirical support for the fiscalization claim, revealing an ____________ 11This issue was evaluated by Dresch and Sheffrin (1997). 59 overwhelming preference among California city managers for retail development and a lack of preference for multiunit housing as land use options (Lewis and Barbour, 1999). The report also pointed to possible negative consequences of local competition for retail development besides those related to housing provision. Despite intense competition among local governments for retail development, the overall geographic pattern and level of retail sales in the state did not change substantially from the early 1970s to the early 1990s. Therefore, efforts to entice retail development may have amounted to competition over a fixed pie, entailing a net transfer of resources from local government coffers to retailers or perhaps their customers. The chase for sales tax revenue was only one alleged consequence of Proposition 13. Other patterns attributed to the initiative include increased rates of city incorporation, increased use of redevelopment to capture property taxes, and greater conflict between cities and counties over incorporations and resulting tax allocations.12 According to William Fulton, these trends exemplify a “zero-sum culture” among government agencies that emerged after 1978 (Fulton, 1998). Others have argued that Proposition 13 reduced local government accountability and discretion by breaking the link between local property tax rates and local services, and by shifting the revenue base from community-wide taxes used for broad purposes to other more restrictive revenue sources (Sokolow, 1998; Silva and Barbour, 1999). However, in spite of the attention paid to Proposition 13’s effects, land use had been “fiscalized” long before its passage. For decades, regional reformers had voiced concerns about consequences of local fiscal decisionmaking and exclusionary land use policies. They argued that within multicentric metropolitan areas, home rule enables and encourages local governments to maximize local benefit and ignore regional costs. When viewed through a local government lens, policies to discourage unwanted land uses, such as multiunit housing, or to entice ____________ 12Paul G. Lewis, in 1998, analyzed local government fragmentation in California and concluded that after controlling for other factors, it had not increased substantially after Proposition 13. 60 preferred land uses, such as retail stores, may be quite rational, but these policies can appear less beneficial when viewed in regional terms. Although concerns about regional consequences of local land use decisionmaking were hardly new, it took the affordable housing crisis of the late 1990s to put them on the front burner. It was not until affordable housing grew into a problem affecting middle-class as well as poorer state residents that policymakers turned concerted attention to the negative effects of local fiscal planning. Local governments responded to the issue with calls for state fiscal reform. They had been pressing hard for fiscal relief since the ERAF shift of 1992, when the state government began transferring about $3.6 billion annually in property taxes from cities and counties to school districts. They saw the ERAF shift as another step in the erosion of home rule that followed the passage of Proposition 13. In addition to reducing property tax revenue, Proposition 13 transferred control over its allocation to the state government. This undermined the traditional doctrine of the “separation of sources” of state and local revenue, a basis for local fiscal stability and predictability. The ERAF shift turned the state-local fiscal relationship into a bitter stand-off, signaling to localities the state government’s willingness to shift remaining local revenues to suit its own purposes during times of recession (Silva and Barbour, 1999; Coleman, 1999). Any move to impose stricter requirements on local planning practices was likely to meet opposition if the fiscal concerns of local governments were not addressed (Ferraro, 2000; Perry, 2002). Thus, by the late 1990s, fiscal reform became a linchpin in planning reform efforts and it was intensely scrutinized.13 Reform proposals called for greater local control over revenue—especially property taxes—or at least a realignment of state and local functions and responsibilities. They also considered means to encourage housing production and reduce ____________ 13Proposals were issued by the Commission on Local Governance for the 21st Century (2000), the California State Controller (1999), the Speaker’s Commission on State and Local Government Finance (2000), the California Legislative Analyst’s Office (2000a), the League of California Cities (see McKenzie, 2000), and the California State Association of Counties (see Silva and Lewis, 2000), among others. For a comparison of the proposals, see Silva and Lewis (2000). 61 competition for retail development, such as a switch of sales tax for property tax revenue to local governments. Local governments argued that other state policies and actions besides fiscal rules also made housing production more difficult. Examples include inadequate funding for infrastructure and affordable housing, CEQA regulations, construction defect liability law, endangered species protection, open space preservation policies, water service requirements, and congestion management requirements (Carrigg, 2002; Little Hoover Commission, 2002). Thus, the affordable housing problem engendered a broader discussion about the context of state rules and regulations in which local governments operate. What may have started as a focus on housing production and fiscal issues quickly led to consideration of de facto state land use policy as it is manifested in numerous, sometimes conflicting, rules and regulations. Thus, by the late 1990s certain development issues called state policymakers’ attention to regional planning outcomes. The need for efficiency in infrastructure investment prompted consideration of regional planning as a framework for more strategic state investment, and housing problems forced the state government to consider regional consequences of fiscal and land use policy. Policy Responses: The Battle over RHNA Incremental steps were taken during the late 1990s and early 2000s to address these concerns. In 1999, a new requirement was established for the governor to submit an annual five-year capital improvement plan to promote more coordinated state investment planning. In 2000, LAFCOs were required to help stem sprawl by establishing policies to ensure efficient service provision and open space preservation, and funding was altered to require contributions by cities and special districts in addition to counties. However, the governor and the legislature found comprehensive fiscal reform too daunting a task. Steps were taken to promote housing production more directly through incentives and mandates on local governments. The 2000–2001 state budget included $570 million in support for housing programs— the largest state commitment ever (Shigley, 2000c). However, funding was cut the following year after the state’s electricity crisis and a 62 downturn in the economy constricted the state budget. Thus, this approach fell prey to a weakness of post-Proposition 13 reform efforts— spending increases to encourage local compliance with growth goals have often failed in the face of state budget constraints. The state also took steps to enforce housing mandates. Controversy in this area highlighted weaknesses in both the state’s housing policy and its regional planning system. Since 1980, the main “stick” of state housing policy has been its housing element law. Since then, housing elements in local general plans have been required to address the locality’s “fair share” contribution to meeting regional housing needs across a range of affordability levels during five-year time intervals. The fair share requirements represent one of California’s most active efforts to direct local planning—specifically, land use planning—toward a substantive policy goal, one that addresses unequal spatial opportunity in metropolitan areas. Housing elements are the only sections of local general plans that must be reviewed by the state. The Regional Housing Needs Assessment (RHNA) process is used to implement the state’s fair share requirements. Under RHNA, the California Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) provides a target production number of housing units to a planning agency in each region, generally the Council of Governments, to distribute among all jurisdictions. The jurisdictions are then required to use these “fair share” targets as the basis for the housing elements of their general plans. Enforcement of fair share housing requirements has long been a source of contention, however, since local governments have complained that state review is onerous, and housing advocates have complained about lax enforcement. The requirements are backed up by incentives to developers for low-income construction, and failure to implement the requirements can result in ineligibility for the incentives and greater vulnerability to lawsuits over development decisions. This may not be much of a deterrent for municipalities seeking to discourage such housing, however. According to DHCD, only 64 percent of jurisdictions were in compliance in May 2002, and these jurisdictions had produced 78 percent of single-family, and 91 percent of multifamily units in the state (Little Hoover Commission, 2002). 63 What is more, even if housing elements are deemed in compliance, this is no guarantee that the specified housing will actually get built. A study of fast-growing Bay Area jurisdictions found that from 1988 to 1998, only 34 percent of affordable housing goals were met in communities with certified housing elements, and only 9 percent in jurisdictions deemed noncompliant (Dodge, 2002). A study of development project approvals in Ventura County between 1996 and 2001 found that, on average, residential development was approved at 80 percent of zoning capacity and 54 percent of the capacity outlined in jurisdictions’ general plans (Fulton et al., 2001b). The housing element compliance process was suspended during the mid-1990s because of state budget constraints. In 1999, DHCD began a statewide RHNA update. The process became highly contentious in the Los Angeles area, in spite of the fact that the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG)—the regional COG—had devoted a lot of resources to it and devolved the process to the subregional level whenever possible. Forty-seven jurisdictions—most located in inland areas—appealed their RHNA target numbers. SCAG was caught in the middle, seeking to meet its responsibility to the state on the one hand, and to its member jurisdictions on the other. SCAG accepted 11 appeals and submitted a report to the state allocating 66,000 fewer units than had been mandated. DHCD rejected it, forcing the 11 jurisdictions to negotiate directly with the state. Most of the region’s jurisdictions did not complete housing plans by the deadline (Fulton, 2000c; Shigley, 2001a). Most jurisdictions that contested their fair share allocations were in inland areas. A DHCD spokesperson complained that this reflected SCAG’s failure to coordinate an effective regional approach to distributing jobs and housing, and that instead it had followed the traditional pattern of placing housing inland and jobs at the coast. “This is fundamentally a problem that the region needs to deal with,” said DHCD’s deputy director (Shigley, 2001a). However, SCAG officials retorted that if the state didn’t address fiscal reform, more infill housing would remain unrealistic. Similar controversies highlighting intraregional growth issues erupted elsewhere. For example, during the RHNA update process in 64 the San Francisco Bay Area in 2001, county officials from semirural areas questioned their allocations, arguing that residential development should be directed to cities instead of unincorporated areas with limited infrastructure (Shigley, 2002b). In one county, negotiations were undertaken between city and county officials about redistributing the numbers. However, a spokesperson for the Association of Bay Area Governments indicated that such tradeoffs would not be permitted across county lines. “The unincorporated planning issue is something we need to address, because more and more counties are moving to slow growth,” he noted (Shigley, 2002b, p. 14). However, he indicated that an underlying issue—denser city development—would need to be addressed to protect farmland and open space for the long term. Continuing controversy over the RHNA process is not surprising. Policies with regional benefits but primarily local costs are likely to provoke local resistance. Redistributive policies that affect spatial opportunity structures and interjurisdictional disparities are prime examples of this. Because of the controversy, such policies are “seldom dealt with effectively through metropolitan consensus-building efforts” (Altshuler et al., 1999, p. 37), and they are more likely to succeed at the state and national levels. California’s RHNA process supports this view, because it is imposed by the state. However, by the late 1990s, the conflict over RHNA had expanded well beyond traditional controversies about accommodating low-income housing. As housing affordability problems increasingly affected middle-class state residents, RHNA became a focal point for conflict about housing policy in general (Lewis, forthcoming). Although the state enforces the housing element law, it relies on COGs to make the process work. However, it may be unrealistic to expect COGs to reconcile conflicting state mandates and uncoordinated local growth-management policies to fashion well-coordinated strategies for regional development. The RHNA conflict reflects the lack of a coherent state approach to land use in general and in particular the lack of sufficient incentives and mandates to achieve local compliance with state housing goals. Without independent authority, regional agencies have little wherewithal to overcome fundamental conflicts between local and statewide interests. 65 In a 2002 report on the state’s affordable housing crisis, the Little Hoover Commission, an independent state oversight agency, acknowledged the weak position of COGs in resolving complex growth issues. The report argued that COGs should be “empowered” to help solve housing problems, because currently “there is little connection between [the RHNA] process and the allocation of funds to support the needs for affordable housing. If COGs were given the authority to influence performance, outcomes could be improved” (Little Hoover Commission, 2002, p. 27). Policies were recommended to align funding and planning processes for regional housing, transportation, and environmental needs. Conclusion By the late 1990s, housing shortages and infrastructure needs called state policymakers’ attention to regional planning outcomes. The reframing of planning considerations in terms of regional consequences is underscored in the growing popularity of “smart growth” policies. “Smart growth” fundamentally refers to growth policies that are smart from a regional perspective. State and local planning officials had not actually supported “dumb growth” in the past. Rather, what looks smart through the lens of a local elected leader or a single-purpose state planning bureaucracy may appear less so in terms of regional consequences. “Smart growth” reasserts an essential element of generalpurpose government at the metropolitan scale by promoting consideration of interconnections and tradeoffs among policy goals in different functional areas. By the late 1990s, the lack of integrated planning at the regional scale was increasingly viewed as a liability. Infrastructure, housing, and fiscal issues formed a nexus that might have prompted state planning reform by the late 1990s. In particular, the connection between the affordable housing problem and local fiscal complaints suggested that state and local governments might have found a basis for negotiation on a new approach to land use planning. However, state-level reform was stymied in the late 1990s—just as during the early 1990s—by the fiscal standoff between the state and local governments. 66 Thus, fiscal constraint has been a double-edged sword for regionalism. Although it has helped draw attention to regional planning needs, it also hampered intergovernmental cooperation to solve them. Competition among local governments exacerbated many growth problems, and fiscal gridlock between the state and local governments obstructed new planning solutions. Even as fiscal constraint helped provide justification for regional coordination, it also effectively disabled the planning system’s ability to respond. 67 5. Devolution in Transportation For the past half century, transportation and environmental protection have been dominated by state and federal agencies, constituting what this report has called a vertical, functional model of regional planning. Land use remained a local government prerogative. New programs of the 1990s began to break down that model because its basic premise was no longer workable. Power was devolved from the federal and state to the regional and county levels, and new programs called for stronger links among land use, transportation, and environmental planning. Thus, they began to overcome functional divisions that have obstructed comprehensive regional planning. The new programs constituted the beginning of a third wave of regional reform in California during the 20th century. This chapter evaluates transportation programs of the 1990s, and the next addresses environmental programs. Motives for Devolution No public infrastructure does more to shape urban development than transportation, and no regional planning area involves a larger expenditure of public funds or a longer planning horizon. In terms of the three attributes defined above as key to effective regional policymaking—policy breadth, regional scale, and program accountability—transportation has always been regional in scale (but also local and interregional). The expenditure of funds has provided a framework for accountability and coordination. However, because all levels of government invest in transportation and yet the projects are highly interconnected, transportation planning has reflected a tension about the scale at which policymaking should be held accountable. Because many transportation investments are costly, long-term, and regional or interregional in scope, the planning system has long accommodated a centralized approach. Yet transportation investments 69 have direct and disproportional effects on localities across metropolitan areas (and for that matter across regions or states). So, transportation planning has also respected the principle of “return to source,” in which funds are allocated based on population and political jurisdictions. Transportation planning has sought to strike a balance between maximizing efficiency across political jurisdictions and respecting distributional, or what is also called geographic, equity. As David Winstead described this tension, “transportation policy is inherently political, for it determines who gets what, when, and how— the classic definition of politics. Yet transportation decisions affect systems in which arbitrary political boundaries are meaningless, like markets and ecosystems. . . . Transportation decisions have a quality of permanence that requires a long-range view” (in Porter, 1997, p. 250). With the rise of vertical regionalism in the postwar era, the state and federal governments took major control of transportation planning, defining policy goals and programs. Somewhat ironically, however, transportation planning was also driven substantially by local land use choices, especially after the end of the highway-building era. Transportation agencies took local government projections for population growth and development largely as a given and asserted no direct control over local land use policy. Results from a survey of RTPAs—the state-defined regional transportation agencies—in the early 1990s confirmed this conclusion. “Most RTPAs identified coordination with land use planning as their least effective program area and cited lack of authority as the main reason” (Wilshusen, 1992, p. 15). Transportation planning also was largely disconnected from environmental planning because of the functional approach of state and federal programs. All this began to change during the 1990s. Transportation programs devolved programming authority from the federal and state levels to regional and county agencies, emphasized multimodalism—that is, the ability to transfer funds more flexibly across different types of projects— and attempted to integrate transportation, land use, and air quality planning more effectively. Two interrelated factors help account for this new approach. The first is that after the completion of the federal and 70 state highway systems, the policy focus that had driven centralized planning began to deteriorate. State and federal policy goals became more complex and contested as basic assumptions were thrown into doubt, in particular the notions that continued highway expansion could alleviate congestion and that long-term mobility could be increased without substantial changes to current tax and land use policies. The second factor is fiscal constraint. Starting in the 1960s, a gap emerged between revenues and demand for transportation, as measured by growth in vehicle miles traveled on the state’s highways. The revenue gap is the product of declining gas tax receipts, resulting from greater fuel efficiency and the failure of tax increases to match inflation, and increasing costs of maintenance and new construction (Taylor, 1995; California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 1998a; Brown et al., 1999; Haas et al., 2000). As a result of fiscal constraint, efficiency in transportation investment has become a prominent concern. These factors combined to shift policymaking to the local and regional levels, where programs could be devised to meet specific regional needs and priorities in a context of fiscal constraint and policy uncertainty. Starting in the 1970s, federal laws began to encourage multimodalism by requiring that highway and transit planning processes be merged. This merger reflected a national rail renaissance under way at the time. Like many others across the country, four California cities opened rail systems during the 1980s and 1990s: San Diego, Los Angeles, San Jose, and Sacramento (Bernick and Cervero, 1997). The resurgence of rail reflected growing discontent with highway expansion. Highways provoked popular protest for such negative effects as air pollution, community disruption, and sprawl. Transportation planners themselves also had come to question the logic of expanding road capacity as a means to increase mobility. A growing body of evidence on “induced demand” indicated that as long as drivers desired more mobility than could be accommodated by an existing roadway system, increases in capacity were quickly consumed. “Critics have often accused road building of being a process in which increased supply supports a reorganization of land-use patterns, which in turn increases demand for 71 transportation; ultimately, it can become impossible to build one’s way out of the problem” (Lewis and Sprague, 1997, p. 15).1 Planners called for policies to promote alternatives to solo automobile use to improve mobility or, in other words, policies to manage transportation demand rather than just to increase supply. One alternative to auto use is mass transit. But in spite of high subsidies, public transit ridership lost ground to automobile use over the 1980s for commute trips in most metropolitan areas. Decentralized development patterns and demographic shifts such as a rise in female employment outside the home increased solo driving, while at the same time lower gas prices and other factors helped place transit at an economic disadvantage relative to driving (Bernick and Cervero, 1997). Thus, by the late 1980s, transportation policy seemed to have lost its bearings. Although rising congestion provoked a public outcry for relief, the efficacy of investments in both roadways and mass transit had been called into question. Many observers argued that the underlying problem was a long-term pattern of public subsidy for private automobile use. They called for dramatic increases in taxes or other means of capturing the full social costs of automobile use. However, such policies were politically difficult to enact (Bernick and Cervero, 1997). Attention was also directed to the connection between land use and transportation behavior as another policy lever to promote more efficient investment and enhance mobility. Researchers explored the effect of land use patterns on transit use and other alternatives to solo driving. Numerous studies demonstrated that higher residential densities near transit stations are associated with substantially higher rates of transit use. ____________ 1See Bernick and Cervero (1997) for a discussion of the issue of “induced demand.” A study using 18 years of data from 14 California metropolitan areas found that every 10 percent increase in highway lane miles was associated with a 9 percent increase in vehicle miles traveled four years after road expansion, controlling for other factors (Hansen and Huang, 1997). The Surface Transportation Policy Project found that increasing highway capacity does not lead to a reduction in congestion, and that the presence of transit service makes a significant difference in the number of residents subject to congestion. The Los Angeles metropolitan area was ranked as having the nation’s worst congestion burden; the San Francisco Bay Area, with the second-worst rush-hour congestion, dropped to 29th in the Congestion Burden Index because of higher transit use (Surface Transportation Policy Project, 2001). 72 Others studies indicated that for transit to capture a significant share of commute trips, both home and work destinations must be close by (Bernick and Cervero, 1997). Others countered that even substantial increases in density near rail stations would change travel patterns only marginally—at least over the short term—in auto-oriented metropolitan areas such as those in California (Wachs, 1993). They concluded that other demandmanagement measures would be far more cost-effective than rail expansion, such as congestion pricing, parking charges, expansion of bus services, and adaptive improvements to street networks. To these critiques, rail advocates responded that mixed-use transit-oriented development forms only one part—although an essential one—of coordinated regional policies to create a “transit metropolis” (Bernick and Cervero, 1997). Policymakers sought means to reorient land use to regional transportation needs. Programs promoting “transit-oriented development” (TOD) gained attention in California and the nation. Effective implementation of TOD programs has been relatively rare in California, however. Commonly cited obstacles include “not in my back yard” (NIMBY) attitudes about high-density development, the general market aversion to multifamily development, and difficulty in assembling land parcels. Research by Marlon Boarnet and Randall Crane also points to a subtler problem, demonstrating that municipalities in Southern California tend to favor commercial rather than residential or office zoning near rail transit stations, at least in part to maximize fiscal returns (Boarnet and Crane, 1997, 1998). Boarnet and Crane conclude that when it comes to transit-oriented residential development, a discrepancy may exist between regional costs and benefits and local ones. “Recent research suggests that local institutional obstacles to TOD may be a greater problem than is generally understood. . . . One explanation is that while transit-based housing is possibly consistent with regional ridership goals, as the TOD literature tends to argue, it may well be at odds with local development goals” (Boarnet and Crane, 1998, p. 206). Thus, transit-oriented residential development may be underproduced because of the same discrepancy between regional and 73 local priorities that exacerbates the affordable housing problem. As in the case of affordable housing, TOD may not increase substantially in the absence of stronger and more systematic policy measures. Such measures would require that local land use planning be reoriented to the needs of regional transportation systems, rather than the reverse, which is the traditional model. Another approach to reorient land use to regional transportation needs touted by some scholars and policymakers is to promote the “jobshousing balance” (JHB), or closer proximity of employment and residential locations. Interest in this subject rose in response to the job decentralization of the 1980s. With suburbanization of jobs promoting greater solo automobile commuting, JHB appealed as a policy lever to help shorten commutes and reduce auto use. The concept drew fire from some scholars, however, who suggested that JHB might not be a useful tool because factors other than employment access exert strong influences on residential location choices. They also suggested that to the degree that they are mutually determined, jobs and housing should collocate over time so as to maintain equilibrium in commute times (Giuliano and Small, 1993). Other scholars retorted that average commute lengths and times increased in most large U.S. metropolitan areas over the 1980s, and that a systematic shortage of high-density affordable housing might be a primary cause. Carefully targeted JHB policies could be useful, they argued, in particular programs to add more housing for low-to-moderate-income singleworker households in or near job-rich cities (Cervero, 1996; Cervero and Wu, 1997). Thus, by the late 1980s, policymakers were dealing with fiscal constraint and policy confusion, and they were considering solutions requiring politically difficult measures such as tax increases and intrusion into local land use decisions. Scholars were uncertain about how to interpret shifting urban form and how to assess local and regional costs and benefits of policies that might influence it. In this context, federal and state programs pushed funding and programming authority downward to regional and local agencies. They also called for more integrated planning for land use, transportation, and environmental protection. 74 Transportation Programs of the 1990s Although the federal government had encouraged a multimodal approach to regional transportation planning since the 1970s, in reality MPOs were provided little real discretion. Most federal and state funds were still in the form of categorical grants for specific purposes and allocated according to geographical and functional divisions. Regional transportation agencies served as brokers more than policymakers, helping to adjust local preferences to take advantage of the likely availability of federal and state funds (Wachs and Dill, 1999). This began to change with new legislation passed at the state and federal levels in 1989 and 1991. The Congestion Management Program Facing a backlog of unfunded transportation projects, the legislature passed the Transportation Blueprint for the 21st Century in 1989. The measure, approved by the voters as Proposition 111 in 1990, doubled the state gas tax and authorized bond funding of rail transit projects. The revenue was dedicated to the Congestion Management Program to reduce congestion in the state’s 32 urbanized counties. The program strengthened the county role in transportation planning. Subventions were allocated to counties based on a 40/60 north-south split statewide, and a formula for county funding based on population and road-miles (Innes and Gruber, 2001). A countywide body, usually the existing transportation planning agency, was designated the “Congestion Management Agency” (CMA). In single-county metropolitan areas, the CMA responsibilities were generally subsumed under the prior MPO/RTPA functions and structures. However, in multicounty metropolitan areas, county congestion-management planning took on greater importance as the basis from which local projects were selected for inclusion in regional plans. Within counties, local governments determine the composition of the CMA governing boards, which are generally composed of sitting elected officials. The Congestion Management Program permitted flexible use of funds to make the most effective use of all modes—a shift from the historical use of the state gas tax for highways. A major goal of the 75 program was to improve the relationship among land use, transportation, and air quality. CMAs were responsible for organizing programs to analyze the transportation effects of local land use decisions, set congestion limits, develop a seven-year capital improvement program, and include projected costs of mitigation (Nash, 1992; Wilshusen, 1992). CMAs had to approve local growth-management plans before the governments could receive their share of funding. However, the law provided a significant degree of latitude in meeting its requirements, permitting a series of exclusions and alternatives to meeting standards for congestion reduction (Rothblatt and Colman, 1995). With no actual power over local land use, and often distant relationships with transit operators and other local transportation agencies, CMAs sometimes found it difficult to impose strict standards and integrate planning with other agencies. In practice, CMAs often emphasized road and highway improvements instead of taking a more multimodal approach (Nash, 1992; Innes and Gruber, 2001; Chen, 1996). The Congestion Management Program exemplifies the tradeoff between breadth and depth that has characterized regional planning efforts in California. To integrate land use, transportation, and air quality planning in a way that was politically acceptable across the entire state, the depth of the mandate was weakened. General goals were advanced but left largely up to local actors to interpret through a weak structure that reinforced local control. ISTEA In 1991, the federal government also adopted a new approach to transportation—one that was similar to California’s Congestion Management Program except that it attempted to empower regional rather than county agencies. The federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) and its sequel TEA-21, which passed in 1998, required that programming decisions conform to a number of policy goals including congestion management, energy conservation, and efficient use and maintenance of existing facilities. Federal transportation policy was redirected from highway building toward a more multimodal approach. ISTEA and TEA-21 permit about 76 half of all federal funds to be used across program categories, in other words, for projects in different transportation modes depending on regional needs (Innes and Gruber, 2001; California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 1998b). ISTEA significantly empowered regional transportation planning agencies. About one-fifth of the federal funds that California received from the federal government under ISTEA were directed to MPOs, the federally designated regional transportation planning agencies in urban areas with a population of 50,000 or more. More specifically, the state government was required to “suballocate” Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement (CMAQ) funds, and Surface Transportation Program (STP) funds for metropolitan areas with a population of 200,000 or more, to projects programmed by MPOs (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). ISTEA required that MPOs take the lead in preparing both longand short-range transportation plans. The regional plans were then to be used by the state in compiling its own plan. In practice, this meant that MPOs gained a stronger role in defining regional funding priorities, but the state still determined the final outcome. ISTEA’s greater emphasis on efficiency and multimodalism also strengthened the MPO role. Transportation plans were required to be “fiscally constrained” or, in other words, based on realistic prospects for funding. This requirement worked against simply stapling together local “wish lists” of projects and calling the product a regional plan (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). The MPO role was also strengthened by ISTEA’s attempt to establish a link between transportation and air quality planning. Under the program, regional transportation plans must conform to regional air quality goals, and MPOs must perform the “conformity reviews” for all transportation projects. Finally, regional transportation planning was strengthened by the promotion of a new planning approach—the Major Investment Study (MIS)—for high-cost proposals. An MIS is intended to be a comprehensive and collaborative planning effort that considers several project alternatives simultaneously across all modes and all levels of government (David Winstead, in Porter, 1997). The greater authority provided to regional agencies by ISTEA has been called “the most important expansion of power for regional 77 planning agencies in many years” (Fulton, 1999a, p. 96). However, state legislation undermined federal goals in California’s two largest regions, redirecting authority toward the county level instead of the region. Shortly after ISTEA’s passage, California Senate Bill 1435 mandated that the Southern California and Monterey Bay MPOs further suballocate their CMAQ and STP funds to the county transportation planning agencies in their area on the basis of population or, for CMAQ funds, on the basis of ozone nonattainment. In the San Francisco Bay Area, MTC had to suballocate half of STP funds to county congestion management agencies (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). This suballocation process contravened the federal goal of directing decisionmaking authority to MPOs. According to Department of Transportation guidance during this period, “Procedures or agreements that distribute suballocated STP or Section 9 funds to individual jurisdictions or modes . . . by predetermined percentages or formulas are inconsistent with the ISTEA provisions” (Innes and Gruber, 2001, p. 80). A few studies have assessed the implementation of ISTEA in the Los Angeles and San Francisco Bay regions, concluding that the degree of influence given to county-level agencies by the state’s implementing legislation tended to hinder a regional decisionmaking process. Paul Lewis and Mary Sprague concluded that in the Greater Los Angeles area, transportation plans continued to reflect the priorities of county officials, and thus road improvement projects were given more precedence than mass transit and other types of programs with a more regional effect. Since the county agencies serve areas with distinct needs and use different project criteria, there was also wide variation in the way they allocated ISTEA funds (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). An extensive study of decisionmaking within MTC during the mid1990s reached a similar conclusion and helps shed light on the motives of participants (Innes and Gruber, 2001). MTC leaders were aware that under ISTEA’s new balance of power, the strength and influence of their agency depended on its ability to forge a regional consensus. “MTC was acutely conscious of the potential for conflict, and the possibility that CMA directors or transit operators would take disagreements with programming proposals to the California Transportation Commission or 78 even the legislature. . . . Evidence of conflict could reduce MTC’s credibility” (Innes and Gruber, 2001, p. 54). Soon after ISTEA’s passage, MTC organized a new, collaborative approach to regional planning. It created the Partnership for Urban Transportation, composed of 36 regional transportation stakeholders, to define a new decisionmaking process. It adopted the dual goals of selecting projects that provided the greatest benefit to the regional transportation system, regardless of mode, but also provided for geographic equity (Innes and Gruber, 2001; Francois, 1994). Thus, the partnership sought to reconcile or at least split the difference between two competing planning models—one based on “geographic equity” and another maximizing regional benefit. MTC and the partnership developed an innovative set of criteria to score eligible projects for funding across different modes. Projects were scored on the basis of priority factors, including maintaining the regional system; improving its efficiency; expansion; and effects on air quality, energy conservation, land use, and accessibility to the disabled. Final programming decisions were to be based primarily, but not only, on the scores (Innes and Gruber, 2001). The scoring process was used for several years and was generally viewed favorably among stakeholders. Agreed-upon criteria greatly reduced conflicts. Funded projects were more likely to meet regionally defined criteria than otherwise. However, the tension between geographic equity and regional benefit was never resolved. The partners could not produce a working definition of a regional project, for example, because they could not agree on the criteria. Older, denser counties such as San Francisco and Alameda argued for using regional criteria such as cost-effectiveness in enhancing transit ridership, but more suburban counties unlikely to benefit from such decisions argued for a county-based system for defining priorities instead. Because of these disagreements, the scoring process “was ultimately a way of programming individual projects rather than planning for a region as a whole” (Innes and Gruber, 2001, p. 205). MTC and the partnership found it particularly difficult to address land use issues. Some partners, including those representing Santa Clara and San Francisco Counties and the air quality management district, felt 79 that sprawl development should not be rewarded. However, other partners and MTC staff insisted that the agency was not authorized to direct local land use policy, nor should it make local transportation funding subject to land use policy choices. Three land use criteria were included in the overall scoring but they were given relatively low weight. SB 45 Shifts the Power Balance In 1997, the state established a new framework for transportation policy with the passage of SB 45. Numerous funding categories were combined into more flexible block grants. SB 45 also changed the decisionmaking rules by devolving authority downward from the state to regional and county agencies.2 SB 45 had mixed effects for regional agencies. On the one hand, the role of regionally prepared plans was strengthened relative to the state plan in terms of project selection for metropolitan areas. Before, the California Transportation Commission (CTC) took heed of plans prepared by regional transportation planning agencies (RTPAs)—the state-designated regional transportation agencies that generally coincide with MPOs. However, the CTC could make final programming choices. With the passage of SB 45, the CTC must approve or reject RTPA plans in their entirety (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000c; Innes and Gruber, 2001). However, although SB 45 strengthened the role of regional plans relative to the state plan, it did not necessarily strengthen the role of regional planning agencies in developing those plans in multicounty areas. As noted above, most RTPAs in California are organized at the county level, but there are three multicounty RTPAs: the San Francisco Bay Area’s Metropolitan Transportation Commission, the Southern California Association of Governments in the Los Angeles area, and the Sacramento Association of Governments. Before SB 45, state transportation capital improvement funds for metropolitan areas were allocated based on a formula that balanced state ____________ 2The requirements of the Congestion Management Program were folded into the new law. However, since 1996, counties have been entitled to exempt themselves from preparing a Congestion Management Plan if a majority of local governments representing a majority of the population elected to do so. 80 control with geographic equity at the regional and county level. Funds were allocated on a 40–60 north-south split, and then further divided, with 70 percent allocated to county “minimums” and 30 percent allocated to projects at the discretion of the CTC.3 SB 45 replaced this with a model in which state control is maintained only over “interregional” projects, whereas regions control the rest of the funds. Now, 75 percent of the state’s transportation improvement funds are designated for the Regional Transportation Improvement Program (RTIP), for projects to be selected by RTPAs in the state’s urban areas. The remaining 25 percent of funds are designated for interregional projects to be selected by Caltrans.4 Theoretically, the new system gives RTPAs more power over funds for projects within their regions. However, the RTIP funds—those to be administered by the RTPAs—are now all allocated using a county-based formula, instead of just 70 percent of the funds programmed by RTPAs being allocated to county minimum shares (Innes and Gruber, 2001; California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000c).5 Thus, this attempt to devolve transportation planning authority repeated a traditional pattern; SB 45 strengthened county agencies more than multicounty ones. The Innes and Gruber study confirms that SB 45 undermined MTC’s power as RTPA relative to the county planning agencies. County proposals form the basis from which MTC selects local projects for inclusion in the regional plan. With all state funds to be programmed through the regional process now allocated on a county basis, and formerly restricted funds collapsed into broad block grants, the county plans submitted by congestion management agencies took on a new importance in the Bay Area, according to the study. The county ____________ 3The formula for allocating county minimums was based 75 percent on population and 25 percent on highway lane miles. 4Sixty percent of interregional funds are limited in use for interregional routes outside the urban areas and intercity rail. The remaining 40 percent are available for use anywhere on the state highway system, as well as for intercity rail, grade separations, and mass transit guides. 5The RTIP funds are geographically divided based on the same formula used in the past: a 40–60 north-south split, and then a further division into county shares based 75 percent on population and 25 percent on highway lane miles. 81 proposals reflected the CMAs’ traditional preference for improvement of highways, streets, and roads. Because the MTC partnership had never agreed on the definition of a regional project, it had no mechanism to support projects not initiated by counties, or to allocate costs for projects that crossed county lines. After SB 45, MTC was forced to look to federal funding to support projects it deemed to be of regional significance because they were considered less important by CMAs. These projects included transit expansion and system management. SB 45 therefore opened a divide among the interests of MTC, the transit agencies, and the county CMAs that had been less visible previously (Innes and Gruber, 2001). County Sales Tax Measures The new transportation programs of the 1990s altered the traditional planning model, in which powerful federal and state transportation agencies directed programs mostly from the top down. However, devolution was complicated by the difference between federal programs that strengthened regional planning agencies and state programs that were more likely to redirect power to the county level. County authority was enhanced not only by the state’s Congestion Management Program and SB 45 but also by optional “self-help” county sales taxes dedicated to voter-approved projects. Starting in the early 1980s, the California legislature had sought means to enable counties to increase local taxes for transportation. The legislature began to authorize individual counties to adopt half-cent sales tax increases for transportation programs, subject to voter approval. A blanket enabling law for all counties was passed in 1987. The ballot measures must outline a specific package of transportation improvements and contain expenditure plans. Upon approval, they are administered by county transportation authorities, governed by local elected officials (Goldman et al., 2001). Between 1984 and 1990, at least 34 of these “self-help” measures for half-cent sales tax increases for transportation purposes were placed on county ballots. Measures passed in 16 counties, providing them with a significant new source of transportation funding and a new programming role. The measures range in duration from 10 to 20 years. Most of the 82 programs emphasize improvements to highways, streets, and roads (Goldman et al., 2001). Over the 1990s, as transportation needs in the state increasingly outstripped available revenue, the “self-help” sales taxes took on considerable importance. Today, 85 percent of California’s population lives in a county in which an additional half-cent sales tax is levied for transportation.6 These taxes form the largest source of local transportation funds, which make up more than half of all transportation funding (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000c). Self-help measures strengthened the county role in transportation planning. Few large-scale transportation projects in the state rely on funding solely from a single level of government; most combine federal, state, and local contributions. Projects put forward for funding in county sales tax measures can influence the allocation of state and federal dollars, and thus a single county can reorient regional priorities. This occurred in 2000 in the San Francisco Bay Area when a Santa Clara County sales tax measure dedicated funds just to transit projects, including an extension of the regional BART system. The measure, however, raised only a portion of the necessary funds; more than $1 billion in additional state and federal funds was sought. “This money gives the extension a big leg up, no question. If you have a high percentage of local and state dollars on the table, you stand a far better chance of competing for scarce federal dollars,” said Steve Heminger, MTC’s deputy director (Vorderbrueggen, 2000; also see Gathright and Pimentel, 2000). Self-help measures enhance the role of voters in the planning process, and this has also provoked concern about effects on regional planning. For example, Martin Wachs has argued that growing reliance on local funding sources, in particular sales tax measures, for transit has produced a shift in funding from inner-city operations to suburban services, ____________ 6A 1995 court ruling (Santa Clara County Transportation Authority vs. Guardino) made the self-help sales tax measures harder to pass by establishing that a two-thirds vote of the electorate was required for approval of special-purpose sales taxes such as these. However, to the surprise of many observers, two measures scheduled for reauthorization in Alameda and Santa Clara Counties passed the two-thirds vote hurdle in the November 2000 elections. The other existing measures will all expire before 2012. 83 although inner-city systems are often more cost-effective. The reason for this, according to Wachs, is that transit funding packages have been designed to appeal to suburban voters. By reinforcing the principle of geographic equity within counties, the sales tax measures may further disconnect county transportation planning from regional priorities and processes (Wachs, 1997). Assessing Devolution To varying degrees, the new transportation programs of the 1990s aimed to strengthen regional transportation planning in relation to all three elements this report has argued are most important: regional scale, program accountability, and policy breadth. Have they succeeded? Scale and Accountability: What Is “Regional” About Transportation Planning in California? California’s current compromise between efficiency and return-tosource principles directs significant planning authority to the county level, thanks to programs such as SB 45 and county sales tax measures. This raises significant questions about what has come to constitute “regional” transportation planning in California. On the one hand, there are advantages to county-based transportation planning. Many argue that the scale and complexity of some California regions make a more centralized planning role problematic. In some parts of California, such as the Los Angeles area, counties themselves are so large that calling their governments “local” is somewhat misleading. In the Greater Los Angeles region, only 13 percent of workers worked outside their county of residence in 1990, compared to 27 percent in the San Francisco Bay Area (U.S. Census). However, the new system may not work as well in multicounty metropolitan areas. Issues that cross county borders may be neglected. MTC’s difficulty in ensuring funding after passage of SB 45 for projects it deemed to be regionally significant confirms this conclusion. Without independent authority and accountability for funding and programming at the regional level, there is no constituency for addressing regional goals. Overall, the level of cross-county commuting in the state’s metropolitan regions is significant; in 1990, 17 percent of employed 84 residents of counties contained in multicounty MPO regions in California commuted to work in other counties. A planning framework is needed in which to identify and address concerns that cross county borders, including the needs of these commuters (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). The new system centers greater programming authority close to local governments, and this may lead to greater local accountability. A collaborative decisionmaking process among local governments within counties to develop fiscally constrained transportation programs should produce more careful decisions than the traditional “wish lists” presented by many local governments to regional and state agencies in the past. Such a process may help induce more careful consideration of local land use choices. For local governments who wish to do so, the new structure provides tools to undertake more integrated planning to connect land use and transportation policies. But will that happen? It would require that MPOs and CMAs shift from their traditional role as brokers between state and local interests into more truly deliberative bodies. However, the governing structure of county and regional transportation agencies remains unchanged. An MPO or CMA is essentially a coalition of local governments, the state department of transportation, and local transit providers. A primary objective of participants is often to enhance their jurisdictions’ ability to get a larger piece of the pie. Today the pie is shrinking relative to need. In the absence of clear policy mandates from the state and federal levels, and as ballot measures gain importance in establishing transportation priorities, local agencies may become more competitive rather than more amenable to setting aside parochial concerns in favor of policies that benefit the region or even the county as a whole. Policy Breadth: Making the Connection Among Transportation, Land Use, and the Environment Programs during the 1990s devolved authority, but partly because of that, policy priorities still remained unclear. The attempt to link transportation, land use, and air quality planning at the regional level has so far only been moderately successful. 85 Air quality mandates prompted various transportation control measures, including high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, carpooling programs, and trip-reduction plans. These programs have shown little definitive effect on air quality, though. More dramatic measures such as congestion pricing or parking charges proved to be politically infeasible (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). Programs to promote jobs-housing balance and transit-oriented development were strengthened. For example, in 2000, the state legislature provided $100 million to support housing development through a new Jobs-Housing Improvement Program, with higher awards provided for affordable multifamily infill development in job-rich areas. The same year, $5 million was also provided for a more targeted program to support interregional collaborations to mitigate jobs-housing imbalances. Funding was slashed the following year, however, to help balance the state budget. MTC launched a TOD program in 1998 called Transportation for Livable Communities program, providing $9 million in federal funds annually to local governments to improve town centers and public transit hubs. The program was later modified to provide funds to reward production of high-density transit-oriented infill development (MTC website). More ambitious efforts were also undertaken within regions to consider land use and transportation planning in an explicitly regional framework. The efforts are still in preliminary stages, however, since they must build political support. Reformers in the San Francisco Bay Area organized the Bay Area Alliance for Sustainable Development, uniting five regional planning agencies and about 40 civic organizations. Through extensive public outreach during 2001 and 2002, the alliance developed smart growth alternative land use scenarios that could form the basis for regional planning for transportation, air quality, and other concerns. Regional agencies are pursuing their own “Smart Growth” project using federal TEA-21 funds, in coordination with the alliance (Bay Area Alliance for Sustainable Development, Association of Bay Area Governments websites; Innes and Gruber, 2001). SANDAG, the San Diego area COG, evaluated four alternative land use scenarios in preparing its 2000 Regional Transportation Plan (RTP). Three smart growth scenarios each demonstrated a significant 86 improvement over existing land use policies in relation to various mobility and environmental criteria. SANDAG incorporated one of these scenarios into its planning assumptions, which it considered to be consistent with its adopted Regional Growth Management Strategy. However, the RTP noted that current land use plans and policies in the region generally did not reflect the smart growth principles, and this contradiction remained unresolved (San Diego Association of Governments, 2000). These JHB and TOD programs and smart growth scenarios are still only tentative steps toward reintegrating planning for land use and transportation at a regional level. Without clearer state policy mandates or incentives, they may continue to develop quite slowly. However, there is one reason to expect that pressure for regional planning integration will continue to mount, and that is fiscal constraint. In fact, efficiency is emerging as an overriding policy concern. Recent regional plans across the state underscore the need for more strategic investment and planning. For example, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission’s 1998 Regional Transportation Plan proposed a 21 percent increase in freeway expansion between 1990 and 2020, at a cost of over $10 billion. Yet during the same period, congestion was projected to grow by 249 percent, the transit share to decline by 6 percent, and vehicle miles traveled to grow by 55 percent (Bay Area Transportation and Land Use Coalition, 1998). Similarly, the Southern California Association of Governments’ draft 2001 20-year Regional Transportation Plan estimated a potential shortfall of $10 billion just to keep existing systems in operation, and a shortfall of $40 billion for needed improvements. “The future transportation system is expected to be overwhelmed by new demand,” the plan stated (Shuit and Rabin, 2000). Faced with such seemingly unacceptable forecasts, state and regional agencies are paying more attention to strategic planning. At the regional level, conflicts about system priorities have become more visible. For example, proposals for rail and airport expansion in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas have been the subject of intense debates. Especially in the Los Angeles area, airport expansion provoked stiff local resistance—a case of local priorities trumping regional needs (Wachs, 1996; Nolte, 87 2000). The Southern California Association of Governments played an increasingly visible role in mediating a regionwide debate over “fair share” principles in relation to airport expansion (Pasco, 2001; Shuit and Rabin, 2000). Concern about the need for more strategic investment prompted some state policymakers to seek a recentralization of policy authority. For example, recent state-level reports called for new methods to determine state needs and priorities (California Commission on Building for the 21st Century, 1999, 2002; California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 1998a). Governor Gray Davis reasserted a state planning role in 2000 when he included $5.3 billion in the state budget over five years for specific transportation projects, with an emphasis on transit. However, the governor’s plan was widely criticized for failing to adhere to the MPO/RTPA regional process and for rewarding the governor’s political allies instead (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000d). The emphasis on efficiency is evident in steps taken to promote system performance measurement. ISTEA and SB 45 called for improved methods for evaluating multimodal tradeoffs in selection of projects for funding. The California Transportation Commission’s 2000 RTP Guidelines recommended that RTPAs define a set of “program level” system performance measures (California Transportation Commission, 1999). Caltrans is also considering system performance measures for interregional planning (Institute of Transportation Studies, 2001). However, system performance measurement is a challenging objective because “intermodalism represents a major paradigm shift for the profession” (Zoller and Capizzano, 1997, p. 17). Furthermore, as MTC’s experience demonstrates, technical methods for assessing system performance are useful only when planners understand and agree on the policy objectives the system is meant to achieve. However, given that policy accountability in the current system remains weak at the regional level, the tension between regional and local benefit is likely to remain unresolved. State policymakers still appear to be unsure how to balance policy objectives and accountability at the state, regional, and local levels. Even as steps are being taken to improve system performance measurement, other trends such as the increased reliance on 88 transportation ballot measures inject different criteria into the decisionmaking process. What Makes Integrated Planning Work? Certain planning experiences provide useful lessons about effective integration of planning for land use, transportation, and the environment. In California, one subregional planning effort in the mid1990s was called a “perfect example” of planning to enhance transitoriented development (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). Officials from Sonoma and Marin Counties and 18 cities developed a proposal to improve mobility along the single major transportation corridor that links the two counties to San Francisco via the Golden Gate Bridge. After comparing various strategies, the group approved a multimodal approach including land use changes. The proposal included investments in bikeways, bus feeder service, a new train system, HOV links, zoning changes to promote transit-oriented development, and even open space. The proposal was framed as a sales tax ballot initiative in 1998, but it failed to pass the two-thirds vote hurdle required (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). The Sonoma-Marin Corridor Study is a perfect example of strategic subregional planning because the conditions that prompted it are especially amenable to a collaborative approach. In this case, problems on a single transportation corridor focused attention on a common goal and policy options for achieving it. In contrast, planning problems such as the airport debates in the Los Angeles area or regionwide policies to reorient land use planning to transportation needs are far less amenable to technical solutions because participants do not start with common goals and perceptions of problems. Examples from other states of planning to integrate land use and transportation help clarify what is required for such efforts to succeed at a broader scale. Oregon passed a new transportation planning rule in 1991 requiring that local plans reconsider land use designations and densities to see if they support multiple transportation modes, infill development, and—for new communities in larger areas—the jobs-housing balance. The measure ensured that local governments would address regional needs in their own plans. The transportation planning rule also 89 mandated aggressive, specific goals and objectives for the state’s three MPOs to reduce congestion and per capita vehicle miles traveled, and to improve air quality (American Planning Association, 1999; Weitz, 1999; Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). By mandating that MPOs attain specific regional policy objectives, and that local governments address regional needs in their own plans, the stage was set for a reconsideration of the form of regional development. This was accomplished in the Portland area through a project called Making the Land Use, Transportation, and Air Quality Connection, or LUTRAQ. LUTRAQ was an alternative regional transportation and land use strategy proposed by environmentalists in 1992 to Metro, Portland’s elected regional planning body. LUTRAQ envisioned a new light-rail extension, increased feeder bus service, transit-oriented land use planning, and complementary improvements in local arterial roads. LUTRAQ performed better than an alternative highway expansion option being considered by all mobility and environmental criteria used for evaluation. It was adopted by the state’s transportation department in 1996 (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). LUTRAQ led to a reassessment of land use in the Portland area. Metro crafted a long-range land use plan in cooperation with local governments to meet the objectives of the new regional transportation plan and the state’s stiff growth-management requirements. The plan, adopted in 1996, calls for compact development at significantly higher densities in the urban core and at moderately higher densities in suburban areas. It focuses transportation-oriented development along the regional corridors (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). Another, less authoritative, example of integrated regional transportation planning is the U.S. 301 Corridor study in Maryland. After environmentalists stalled a proposal for a new highway in the early 1990s, a state-level task force studied alternatives. In 1996, it prepared a multimodal proposal including transportation management, transit and highway expansion, and land use plans emphasizing compact growth and jobs-housing balance. The governor approved the plan, and to gain local compliance, major state investments were conditioned on the strengthening of local land use policies to support the transportation improvements (Porter, 1997). 90 These examples suggest that certain components help promote effective regional planning integration. State leadership was required, especially in prompting local land use changes. But state planners did not impose specific final outcomes. Instead, the state government provided policy goals and outcome-oriented objectives that left room for local implementation and channeled its own investments to reward local compliance with its goals. The role of activists was also critical in prompting action. Conclusion Transportation is the planning area in which intergovernmental coordination traditionally has been most well developed. Planning trends in this arena tend to influence others. Currently, transportation planning in California—and the nation as a whole—is in transition. For decades, the federal and state governments provided the policy and planning coherence needed to implement large-scale long-term projects. Recently, authority was devolved downward as policy objectives became less certain. An underlying motivation for devolution was to establish a stronger connection between planning for transportation and land use. Increasingly, transportation planning is stymied by basic questions about how to build and operate viable transportation systems that correspond appropriately to the current form of urban development (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). With current assumptions about future growth, development patterns, and funding levels producing seemingly unacceptable mobility scenarios for the future, new strategies are needed to consider how to develop sustainable long-range transportation plans. This new framework will necessitate a consideration of how land use could be oriented to transportation needs rather than the reverse, which has been the traditional model. Devolution makes this possible by placing responsibility for transportation planning closer to the level of government at which land use decisions are made. However, devolution within the current decisionmaking structure may not accomplish regional policy reintegration effectively. Policy accountability for land use still lies with local governments. Similarly, transportation funding still adheres to 91 formulas based on geographic equity. Without clearer policy guidance from the state or federal level, it is not clear to what degree local governments—especially in multicounty metropolitan areas—will use their enhanced authority to develop and implement plans with a strong regional focus. 92 6. Devolution in Environmental Protection In environmental planning as in transportation, authority was devolved from the federal and state to the regional and local levels during the 1990s. However, devolution occurred for somewhat different reasons. Policy objectives for environmental protection were not thrown into doubt in the same way. Instead, the methods to achieve them were severely attacked. Environmental protection has been called the “big stick” of federal policy affecting regional planning (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). More than any other policy area, it relies on strong, scientifically based mandates to address problems that are inherently regional— bioregional—in scale. The basic approach established during the 1970s relied on centralized, bureaucratic regulation of specific, separate problems, through “end-of-the-pipe” controls of emissions and discharges from such sources as auto tailpipes, smokestacks, or sewer outflow pipes (Mazmanian and Kraft, 1999). During the 1980s, this approach met with a backlash from industry and state and local governments. Command-and-control techniques came to be viewed as too costly and ineffective, based on remedial rather than preventive action and cumbersome, adversarial processes. Because remaining pollution sources were increasingly traced to urban dwellers and their automobiles, further gains in environmental quality would rely on more extensive changes in local land use policy. As a result, environmentalists increasingly called for policies to promote “sustainability,” arguing that lasting gains in quality of life cannot be achieved without integrating environmental, social, and economic planning at the local and regional levels (Mazmanian and Kraft, 1999). These critiques prompted a new approach to environmental regulation in the 1990s, which formed a central element in a broader 93 movement by the Clinton administration to “reinvent government.” In 1995, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency announced a new institutional approach featuring stronger reliance on positive incentives, streamlined regulation, greater cross-media planning integration, greater coordination with states and localities, and partnership arrangements providing an enhanced role for local stakeholders in decisionmaking. Prominent tools include alternative dispute resolution and negotiated rule-making processes, the use of market mechanisms to establish or implement policy, and the use of collaborative groups as vehicles for policy development and problem-solving (Rosenbaum, 2000). More than any other programs undertaken by the state or federal government, new environmental programs reflect the approach to regional planning that this report characterizes as the “third wave” of reform during the 20th century. These programs call for greater coordination not only among different levels of government but among land use, transportation, and environmental planning. California has pioneered new collaborative models. Because such initiatives are among the most prominent examples of new regional governance arrangements, California has become a laboratory for redefining government. Air Quality Management Air quality regulation was strengthened during the 1990s to include new authority over land use and transportation. However, this approach proved difficult to administer, both technically and politically. This difficulty highlighted basic challenges in integrating environmental planning with other policy areas. By the late 1980s, many metropolitan areas, including in California, had failed repeatedly to achieve federal air quality standards on schedule. The EPA recognized growth in vehicle miles traveled as a major reason, attributable to suburban development, a larger workforce, and increased solo commuting. Amendments to the Federal Clean Air Act passed in 1977 had called for consistency between transportation and clean air plans. MPOs were required to assess conformity of their plans to regional air quality goals, but methods were not clearly defined and, in practice, the requirement was often ignored (Garrett and Wachs, 1996). 94 In 1989, Citizens for a Better Environment and the Sierra Club filed suit against a number of state and regional agencies in the San Francisco Bay Area, including the MTC and the Bay Area Air Quality Management District. The lawsuit would have national consequences. It challenged the adequacy of MTC’s conformity assessments and its failure to impose contingency measures outlined in the regional air quality attainment plan in the face of continuing noncompliance (Garrett and Wachs, 1996). The dispute brought out conflicts in fundamental assumptions that govern environmental and transportation planning, raising basic questions about the nature and purpose of planning. The plaintiffs believed that compliance should imply actual attainment of air quality standards, in spite of planners’ faulty estimates about growth in the region and its effects. The defendants argued that they should be held accountable only to the provisions in the attainment plan but not to unexpected growth or incorrect planning assumptions. In this view, planners’ models produce only estimates, which may be helpful as guidance but should not be taken as literal truth (Garrett and Wachs, 1996). The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in key respects. MTC’s conformity assessment practices were deemed deficient. The agency had to develop an improved quantitative process to assess the effects of programs and projects on air quality. Because of continuing failure to meet air standards in the region, MTC also had to impose contingency measures contained in the regional attainment plan. Thus, the provisions in the plan were deemed specific enough to be enforceable. However, regional agencies were not held accountable simply for failure to meet federal air standards. The decision had national consequences because it held defendants to a higher level of technical proficiency than most current modeling practice allowed. Travel forecasting models had been developed to achieve the aim of relieving traffic congestion, not reducing traffic levels or improving air quality. A major limitation of the models is the absence of feedback regarding the effects of transportation systems on the level and distribution of regional growth. During the Bay Area lawsuit, MTC argued that there was no practical way to model the 95 connection. The national Transportation Research Board concluded that “analytical methods in use are inadequate for addressing regulatory requirements. . . . Modeled estimates are imprecise and limited in their account of changes in traffic flow characteristics, trip making, and land use attributable to transportation systems” (quoted in Garrett and Wachs, 1996, p. 203). The case underscored the difficulty in reconciling environmental and other planning goals. Strict health-based standards provide a clearer regional policy focus for environmental planning than for other growthmanagement policy areas. However, the unbendable standards also make it hard to reconcile different planning objectives when the costs of uncertainty must be factored in. This uncertainty is hard to overcome technically and to negotiate politically. In no other planning area have practitioners become more convinced of the need for integrated planning than in environmental protection. However, the difficulty in integrating air quality and transportation planning highlights the practical limits of long-range planning in complex metropolitan regions. By 1990, Congress “finally recognized that it could not solve the air pollution crisis merely through stationary source controls or by making cars run cleaner” (Garrett and Wachs, 1996, p. 20). Amendments were passed to the Clean Air Act, toughening regulations and requiring a closer connection among air quality, transportation, and land use decisions. The passage of ISTEA in 1991 reflected the changes and took account of the issues raised in the Bay Area lawsuit. Transportation plans must conform to air quality plans, which now in effect establish a pollution budget for nonattainment areas. Mobile source emissions must be quantified, and local plans must be developed to achieve levels of vehicle use consistent with established targets. Expected emissions from all transportation plans and programs must be consistent with the pollution budget. The regulations significantly strengthened the role of air quality agencies in regional planning. The stricter provisions led some observers to argue that no new regional planning authority over land use need be established (Jones and Rothblatt, 1993). However, since state laws also expressly prohibit air agencies from making land use decisions, their statutory authority was somewhat unclear (Dohan, 1993). 96 Experience in the Los Angeles region, where the South Coast Air Quality Management District was coping with the nation’s worst air, is exemplary of the challenges air agencies faced in the new planning environment.1 In 1989, SCAQMD passed the most far-reaching air pollution cleanup plan in U.S. history. It was the first to enact a series of measures aimed at indirect sources of pollution, for example, pollution caused by land use choices. It required measures to relate land use and business activity to reductions in car traffic, making local governments partners in compliance. For example, regulations were adopted requiring large employers to impose trip reduction programs. By the early 1990s, SCAQMD had become a powerful organization, with an annual budget of over $100 million. Air quality concerns could slow down development projects in the region significantly. However, the more stringent policies provoked heated opposition. Businesses lobbied against the trip reduction policy, especially after SCAQMD imposed $1 million in fines. Local governments were wary of intrusion into their land use authority. SCAG adopted only one land use measure, related to jobs-housing balance, and it was only advisory (Grant, 1995). The stiffer regulatory approach to air pollution was reversed. More conservative appointments to SCAQMD after 1991 resulted in scaledback regulation and a shift to market-based approaches. As a result, SCAQMD’s long-term effect on the local development process was minimal. The experience was not unusual. In general, the attempt to link transportation and air quality planning has been only moderately successful (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). In particular, measures to regulate land use have proved to be politically infeasible without authority over local land use decisionmaking. In 1994, SCAQMD instituted a new approach based on incentives rather than penalties. It introduced the first smog market in the United States, the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market or RECLAIM, which became a model for others around the world. The program allowed operators of nearly 400 industrial facilities to buy and sell excess or ____________ 1For more on SCAQMD’s experience during the early 1990s, see Dohan (1993); Innes et al. (1994); Grant (1995); Saltzstein (1996); Mazmanian (1999); Wachs and Dill (1999); Fulton (1996a, 1999a). 97 unused emission permits, which provided the right to emit a certain amount of a specific pollutant. As an added incentive, participating companies were assured fast-track permitting (Mazmanian, 1999). It was thought that a market approach would reduce costs and allow greater flexibility and efficiency. However, by the end of the decade, the RECLAIM program was pronounced a disappointment by critics including the EPA, the state air board, and environmentalists. The state’s electricity shortages in 2000 threw the program into chaos when regional power producers operated far beyond pollution limits in response. Critics charged that the energy crisis merely allowed structural flaws in the program to surface, however. According to the state air board, for example, RECLAIM did not perform as well as the regulations it replaced (Polakovic, 2001). Participating companies had reduced emissions by much less than anticipated, and few technological upgrades had been initiated. The critics contended that the program was seeded with too many credits in relation to real emission levels, sending the wrong signals to participating companies. In 1999, SCAQMD announced yet another shift in direction, striking a compromise between stiffer regulation and the new market approach (Cone, 1999a). SCAQMD’s experience points to continuing confusion in air quality planning. Although air boards have accomplished much, many regions remain out of compliance, and pressure to improve continues. Although most of the new regulatory authority assigned to regional air boards a decade ago remains intact, they have grown wary of exercising it to its full extent (Wachs and Dill, 1999). This indicates that simply strengthening regional planning mandates—using a bigger “stick”—may not achieve better results. However, less intrusive methods such as market approaches are also proving to be problematic. Regional air agencies face more difficult challenges today than in the past. Most of the politically easiest mitigation measures have already been adopted, including controls on stationary sources and automobile emissions. If improvements in emissions technology keep ahead of growth in population and car use, the role of regional agencies in improving air quality could decline. But if the reverse occurs, regional policies could become more central in efforts to improve air quality. If 98 that happens, the conflicts that emerged in California in the 1990s are likely to resurface (Fulton, 1996a; Wachs and Dill, 1999). Water Quality Management Water quality was an important policy area for testing new collaborative regional planning models during the 1990s, including an ambitious one to establish a system to bridge state, regional, and local agencies. The results were mixed, however, providing insight about what makes collaborative planning work. By the 1990s, the need for better integration of water quality and land use planning at an explicitly bioregional scale had become pressing. This reflects two interrelated developments in water quality management: the growing importance of “nonpoint” source regulation and of regulations governing particular bodies of water, rather than technology-driven effluent standards that had characterized the traditional approach. After passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972, regulators had focused primarily on controlling “point” sources of water pollution such as effluents from factories. By the 1980s, this piecemeal “end-of-the-pipe” approach had reached the limit of its effectiveness. The worst point source problems had been addressed, but pollution levels remained high. The primary cause of continuing pollution is “nonpoint” sources such as runoff from agriculture, construction, forestry, and urban use. These sources are far more difficult to control without a major escalation in water quality regulation involving stringent controls on local governments and consumers and new industry practices (Ruffolo, 1999). California faces severe problems from urban runoff, with estimated cleanup costs as high as $14 billion (Cone, 1999a). Amendments to the federal Clean Water Act passed in 1987 strengthened programs to control nonpoint sources. States were required to develop control plans relying on nonregulatory techniques. Waste discharge requirements were issued for a few nonpoint sources, namely, storm water from communities with populations above 100,000 and large construction sites. In response, the State Water Resources Control Board developed a Nonpoint Source Management Plan in 1988. It was not a formal statewide program comparable to the permit system for 99 point sources. Instead, regional boards could decide among management options and generally relied on encouraging voluntary compliance (Ruffolo, 1999). During the late 1990s, the state stepped up enforcement measures. In 1999, the state began enforcing a permit system for local governments for stormwater runoff (Cone, 1999a). In 2000, the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board adopted numerical standards requiring that developers treat stormwater runoff in new developments (Sokoloff, 2000b). The San Diego regional board followed suit in 2001. Along with growing attention to nonpoint sources of water pollution has come a more explicitly bioregional approach to water quality standards, and the connection has driven a new approach to water quality management. Regulations that address the quality of particular bodies of water are gaining importance over the technology-driven effluent standards that govern the permit system for point sources. Environmental lawsuits starting in the 1980s prodded the U.S. EPA to enforce regulations requiring that states identify water bodies that do not meet quality standards. For those that are “impaired,” states are required to establish TMDLs, or total maximum daily loads, defining how much of a pollutant a body of water can tolerate on a daily basis and still meet standards (Ruffolo, 1999). TMDLs have been interpreted as setting regulatory limits on nonpoint as well as point sources, in the context of particular water bodies. There are more than 500 water bodies in California that fail to meet applicable standards, including numerous watersheds in metropolitan areas. However, without a clear set of statewide policies or regulations guiding TMDL development, regional boards have been “making them up,” and the process has been highly contested (Ruffolo, 1999). Many TMDLs have been developed without implementation plans. These trends in water quality management have substantial implications for planning. The indivisibility of natural systems, the diffuse nature of continuing sources of pollution, and the persistence of pollution in the face of urban development necessitate a new planning approach. It will require more extensive local regulatory measures and better planning coordination than in the past. The collaborative nature 100 of state programs during the 1980s reflected a desire to incorporate local governments and landowners in the planning process without directly undermining their land use authority. This is necessary not only because rising opposition to stiff regulation preempts stiffer mandates from the top down but also because planning coordination—particularly in relation to land use—is vital to success. Regulators have devoted increasing attention to promoting new institutional strategies, in particular local watershed management initiatives. Watershed management meshes point and nonpoint source control in the context of specific hydrologic and geologic regions. As it is currently being practiced, the approach relies on bringing public and private “stakeholders” together to develop programs through collaborative processes that reflect local conditions and needs. Thus, it blends regional planning with evolving concepts of governance associated with the current era of “alternative problem-solving.” Both aspects represent a significant departure from the technology-based state and federal regulatory framework that has characterized water pollution control in the past (Ruffolo, 1999). Watershed initiatives have increased dramatically throughout the western United States over the past decade, to the degree that they are now often characterized as a “movement.” The Natural Resources Law Center listed 85 California watershed initiatives in its year 2000 directory, most of them in urbanized areas (Kenney et al., 2000).2 The increase in watershed initiatives is partly the result of local efforts to respond to new nonpoint source and TMDL requirements as well as laws protecting endangered species. It is also the result of explicit support by federal and state agencies. The U.S. EPA and other federal agencies have given priority attention to promoting watershed-based approaches to water quality management (Kenney et al., 2000). In California, ____________ 2The criteria used for inclusion in the directory were that an initiative was focused on a water resource; defined geographically using the physical character of the resource; involved local citizens, stakeholders, and/or governments as well as one or more governmental regulatory bodies; and featured a collaborative decisionmaking process. Common objectives included water quality improvement and habitat restoration for rare and endangered species. Watershed size varied dramatically, from 2000 to over one million acres (Kenney et al., 2000). 101 watershed planning was boosted in 2000 with passage of a $1.97 billion bond measure for water projects including nearly $750 million for watershed restoration and management (Krist, 2002). The California Coastal Conservancy has also worked for more than a decade to fund projects to restore coastal watersheds under its Watershed Enhancement Program (Natural Resources Law Center, 1998). Because of the proliferation of watershed-management initiatives and the interest among state and federal regulators in promoting them, they may serve as a test case for emerging models of regional governance based on collaborative private-public partnerships. However, so far little empirical research has assessed their effectiveness. One small-scale study of on-the-ground outcomes concluded that about half the evaluated initiatives produced measurable ecological benefits (Kenney et al., 2000). The popularity of locally organized watershed initiatives indicates that self-organization on a multijurisdictional basis is possible. The collaborative decisionmaking process favored in these efforts appears to be well suited for such planning problems as watershed management, in which a clearly defined multijurisdictional planning problem exists and for which solutions require broad participation from a variety of public and private parties. Voluntary involvement by local governments is critical, since many mitigation measures call for restrictions on land use, and this remains the prerogative of local governments. One assessment of watershed initiatives concluded that “local government actions affecting land use and development and major infrastructure financing and development must be connected with watershed management. In many watersheds, this will be the determinant of success or failure” (River Network, 1999, p. 56). However, the regulatory “stick” has also played a key role in promoting watershed planning. Recent assessments of watershed initiatives concluded that far fewer would have been pursued in the absence of stepped-up nonpoint and TMDL regulation. The researchers argued that the initiatives appear to work best as a supplement to traditional regulatory approaches rather than as a replacement (River Network, 1999; Kenney et al., 2000). It is significant to note that watershed initiative participants overwhelmingly agree that formal authority should not be transferred to their groups (Kenney et al., 2000). 102 State and federal involvement may be especially important for plan implementation and monitoring; some mechanism to ensure consistency between local plans and state regulatory efforts will be needed. In California, attempts to develop a coherent state-level policy framework for watershed management have been under way for a decade. An ambitious experiment by the state in the early 1990s to improve water quality and protect biodiversity attempted to merge collaborative local watershed planning with state regulatory oversight—in other words, to mesh top-down and bottom-up planning. Scientific research and practical experience had convinced California’s resource managers that preservation of threatened and endangered species could not be approached in a piecemeal way—in other words, for one species at a time or one parcel of land at a time. Instead, entire natural habitats had to be protected (Jensen, 1994). In 1991, Governor Pete Wilson introduced a plan to improve resource conservation called Resourceful California. One of its main elements, a Memorandum of Understanding on Biological Diversity, was adopted by the directors of six state agencies and four federal agencies. The state wanted to establish bioregions as the theater of operations for species preservation. At the state level, an executive council composed of agency heads would develop a statewide biodiversity strategy and facilitate coordination. At the local level, organizations such as watershed groups would prepare habitat restoration and management plans. With many endangered species crossing local watersheds, however, an intermediate level of organization was deemed necessary between the state and local watershed and other conservation groups. Eleven bioregions were defined, which were further subdivided into landscape associations and subdivided again into watershed associations. The state would sponsor bioregional councils to ensure that local plans were complementary (Jensen, 1994; Thomas, 1999). However, in the seven years following the memorandum of understanding, no government-defined bioregional council emerged in any officially designated bioregion in the state. Many local groups protested the regional concept as a top-down imposition of control. Regional-level managers in state agencies also resisted implementing the plan because of concern about interference from outside groups (Jensen, 103 1994; Thomas, 1999). One study of the Klamath Bioregion noted that groups tended to emerge at the county level instead. “The parochial scale of existing social processes . . . was not breached easily by attempts to form a bioregional council” (Thomas, 1999, p. 560). Ultimately, the bioregional council concept was rejected and the state began to work directly with local watershed and other conservation groups instead. After a decade of experimentation and dialogue, a statewide framework for watershed management remains in the developmental stage. Devising a statewide system for watershed management has been a challenging task in large part because the collaborative, community-based governance model reflected in local initiatives—and advocated in theory by federal and state regulators—represents a radical departure from traditional regulatory and administrative practices. Few institutional models help prescribe how to strike the appropriate balance between accountability and local flexibility. The aborted attempt to establish bioregional councils in the state suggests that it will not be easy to mesh bottom-up voluntary planning with top-down administration and regulation. Collaborative approaches are more easily organized at a relatively small scale, where they benefit from established relationships among local governments. This helps explain why the regional administrative concept devolved to the county level in the Klamath case. The success of local watershed planning mirrors certain types of transportation planning, such as the Sonoma-Marin Corridor Study, that address shared goals for a major corridor. In these cases, the planning focus crosses jurisdictions but is still manageable and understandable. In the watershed case, regulatory mandates provide the policy coherence—the common objective—but implementation is addressed locally and flexibly. As with transportation planning, voluntarism proved largely unsuccessful in establishing strong planning capacity in the broader regional “middle ground” between the state and local levels. Although this middle level may correspond to objectively defined catchment areas for important regional systems such as river basins and metropolitan transportation networks, effective voluntarism appears to depend on local relationships and less-complex objectives. 104 CALFED The best-known watershed planning initiative in California is CALFED, a joint effort among state and federal agencies to address water-management concerns in the San Francisco Bay-San Joaquin Delta region. It was one of the most ambitious experiments in collaborative regional planning ever in California, testing the model at a wide scale, not just geographically but in terms of its ability to reconcile diverse interests. CALFED addressed water quality and water supply concerns simultaneously, attempting to reconcile environmental and economic needs. It revealed the power—and the limits—of the collaborative model. The San Francisco Bay–San Joaquin Delta is a 700-square-mile region where the San Francisco Bay meets the state’s two biggest rivers. It is the largest wetland habitat in the western United States, supporting more than 750 species of wildlife and plants. The Delta also forms the hub of California’s two largest water distribution systems and numerous smaller ones. It provides 40 percent of California’s drinking water and irrigation for 45 percent of the nation’s fruits and vegetables (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 1996; Landy et al., 1998). By the early 1990s, the different competing uses of Delta water appeared headed for a collision. Drought and diversion of water for human use had caused significant environmental damage. The 1992 Central Valley Project Improvement Act mandated a diversion of additional water for environmental uses. The following year, two fish species were listed as endangered, with other petitions pending. The U.S. EPA announced that it would issue its own quality standards for the Delta, after having warned the California State Water Resources Control Board for over ten years that it needed a stronger plan. However, any increase in freshwater flows for environmental purposes would entail a reduction for farms and drinking water. The Delta became the most contested area of water rights in the state (Landy et al., 1998). Four federal agencies organized themselves into a united front and began negotiations with state agencies, municipal and agricultural users, and environmental organizations. Therefore, the CALFED process was the direct result of federal laws and advocacy. According to the Betsy 105 Rieke, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, “absent the mandates of the Clean Water Act and the ESA [Endangered Species Act], there would be no Bay-Delta Agreement” (Landy et al., 1998, p. 48). All the parties had incentives to cooperate, however. With serious water shortages projected in coming years, the negotiations offered the chance to establish certainty in the face of increasing constraint (Brinkerhoff, 1999). Certainty became the major stumbling block in negotiations, however, as users demanded guaranteed future allocations and environmentalists argued that existing science could not adequately predict future habitat needs. In this respect, CALFED encountered the same planning challenge that made air quality planning difficult; even the best current scientific methods cannot provide airtight predictions about the effects of future growth and development. This makes negotiation among competing interest groups far more problematic. The federal government brokered a compromise, agreeing to absorb the cost of the uncertainty. In June 1994, less than six months from a federal court-imposed deadline for EPA issuance of final water quality standards, an unprecedented Framework Agreement was signed. The agreement provided for a voluntary reduction of allocations by San Joaquin Valley interests and increased freshwater flows for Delta environmental needs, but also that any additional allocations needed for new listings under the Endangered Species Act would be purchased with federal funds from willing sellers, not taken through regulatory action (Landy et al., 1998; Saxton, 2000).3 A three-year truce was proclaimed while an implementation plan could be hammered out. CALFED envisioned an ambitious 30-year program for the Bay-Delta projected to cost approximately $8.5 billion, making it one of the largest resource projects anywhere. This made it reminiscent of the extensive projects undertaken under Governor Pat Brown’s administration, prompted by similar concerns about ____________ 3Linked to the CALFED process was the establishment in 1993 of the Delta Protection Commission, a new state agency created to devise a land use plan for the area. The commission became the fourth such regional body in the state, similar to the Bay Conservation and Development Commission, the California Coastal Commission, and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. However, unlike the other agencies, the Delta Protection Commission does not have regulatory power. 106 infrastructure to accommodate growth. However, the planning landscape had changed substantially since the 1950s, and CALFED exemplified the change. Because of stricter regulation, environmental needs now demanded an equal place at the bargaining table alongside agricultural and urban users. Rapid urban growth had invoked its own constraints as well. There are few untapped rivers left in the state and those that remain are well protected by environmental laws. Finally, fiscal constraint—such as the prohibitive cost of building new dams— also precluded traditional planning solutions (Brinkerhoff, 1999). CALFED’s emphasis on consensus-building—not a hallmark of state infrastructure planning during earlier decades—exemplifies current regional planning challenges. Today, environmental and economic goals must be reconciled in a context of increasing constraint. CALFED announced a “preferred alternative” program in 1999 and a final version in 2000. Its proposals were intended to please all parties. The plan called for greater efficiency through conservation, better water transfer markets, and improved water storage. It deferred discussion on construction of a controversial new canal to divert water to Southern California. A central recommendation was a new environmental water account that would provide funding and a guaranteed block of water that could be stored against dry times for delivery where and when it was needed. This program would create a more integrated water supply system in which environmental needs were accorded water rights and funding along with other traditional users (Martin, 1999; Vogel, 1999; Lewis and Clemings, 1999). Although CALFED attempted to please all parties, by 2000 it was mired in controversy. Agricultural and metropolitan water users demanded new dam construction and environmentalists opposed even the storage facilities being proposed. Various competing lawsuits were filed (Krist, 2001). In 2001, the conflicts escalated to the national level as competing funding bills for CALFED were debated, some of which redirected priorities from the agreed-upon plan (Taugher, 2001; Doyle, 2001). By 2002, the program had run out of money. Because lawmakers in Sacramento and Washington failed to provide enough funding for it, CALFED officials were forced to rely heavily on the proceeds of water bonds (Taugher, 2002). 107 Thus, the hard-won consensus established through years of CALFED negotiations appeared to disintegrate along traditional lines of conflict. In part, this outcome merely reflects the limitations of the CALFED process. CALFED was not constructed as an agency with enforcement or regulatory authority but rather as a forum for debate and consensus-building. Political differences perhaps inevitably hardened as decisions were taken up by the authorizing and regulatory bodies. Simply by tracing the outlines of potential consensus in California’s fabled “water wars,” CALFED might be deemed a success. However, the current conflicts also suggest that consensus-building exercises alone are insufficient to produce lasting settlements. Traditional political divisions and tactics reemerge—and traditional political leadership is required—as the process shifts from debating policy to adopting it, especially in the context of fiscal and environmental constraint. Natural Communities Conservation Planning During the 1990s, California was at the center of controversy surrounding protection of endangered species. An innovative approach to habitat preservation became a national model for new regional governance techniques. The Federal Endangered Species Act was first passed in 1973. The ESA has been called the “pit bull” of environmental law, with some of the stiffest provisions especially in relation to land use. California’s current Endangered Species Act dates from 1984. It prohibits state agencies from approving activities that will jeopardize or adversely modify the habitat of threatened or endangered species when measures are available to avoid these effects. Once a species is “listed” as threatened or endangered, substantial limits may be placed on private land uses. However, since 1982 federal and state wildlife agencies have been authorized to issue incidental permits for the “taking”—or in other words the destruction—of endangered habitat or wildlife if a “Habitat Conservation Plan” (HCP) has been prepared to mitigate the effects. The process to obtain a take permit can be arduous, however (Murphy, 1999; Pollak, 2001a). 108 By the late 1980s, the Endangered Species Act was being criticized from all sides. Landowners and government regulators were frustrated by the cost and inconvenience of permitting. Environmentalists were frustrated that HCPs were initiated only after a species was in trouble, and only on a project-by-project basis. The piecemeal approach of preserving small, unconnected parcels of land for one species at a time was proving to be inadequate. To be biologically effective, habitat must be protected at an ecosystem scale for interrelated species and for the long term. ESA regulations, considered among the stiffest of environmental mandates, were proving incapable of preventing extinction (Thompson, 1994). California had become a hot spot for this sort of conflict. The framers of the ESA had not foreseen how much it would collide with urban development. California is one of the richest biological regions on the planet, and rapid development in the 1980s, especially in Southern California, had resulted in conversion of much habitat, causing precipitous drops in the populations of many species. By the early 1990s, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service had listed 320 threatened or endangered plant or animal species in the state, and 2,350 more were candidates (Pincetl, 1999). Listings were increasing on private property in urbanizing areas. A legal and political train wreck was looming as species protection collided with private land use decisions and the prerogatives of local governments. As in the Bay-Delta region, environmental and economic goals were coming into direct conflict (Thompson, 1994; Murphy, 1999). The impending listing of a bird called the gnatcatcher in Southern California in the early 1990s prompted the state government to adopt a new approach to habitat preservation. The gnatcatcher lives in the dwindling coastal sage scrub ecosystem of Southern California, a 6,000square-mile area in five counties—Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Diego, and San Bernardino—containing a human population of 18.5 million. Seventy-one percent of suitable vegetation for the gnatcatcher was on private land, and the bird’s listing would have affected some of the largest landowners and development interests in the state. A large developer, the Irvine Ranch Company, had developed a habitat preservation plan in cooperation with the California Resources Agency, 109 and this seemed a good test case for a new planning approach (Pincetl, 1999). Governor Wilson introduced the Natural Communities Conservation Planning (NCCP) program in 1991. It was designed as a voluntary program to create regional, multispecies conservation plans through collaboration among local governments, landowners, developers, and others. Its goal was to reconcile species preservation with increased demand for urban development by taking a preventive, long-term approach. If wildlife and habitat could be protected at a broad scale in advance of development, the likelihood of additional species listings would be reduced, thereby decreasing economic and environmental costs and conflicts. In exchange for setting aside land as wildlife habitat, development could be facilitated in other areas, thus reducing uncertainty in the regulatory process. Regulators could avoid trench warfare and share implementation responsibility with local governments (Murphy, 1999; Pollak, 2001a). The NCCP was envisioned as a voluntary process, and the enabling legislation that passed in 1991 imposed no new rules or regulations (Pollak, 2001a). Rather, it authorized the California Department of Fish and Game to enter into agreements with private parties, local governments, and federal agencies to prepare multispecies habitat conservation plans “through a collaborative consensual planning process.” The department was authorized to issue take permits based on approved plans. NCCP take authorizations could cover any species, including unlisted ones. This could form the basis for valuable assurances to landowners that they would avoid economic consequences from future listings, something that federal agencies had sanctioned through a policy called “no surprises.” Thus, just as in the case of CALFED, increased planning certainty formed the incentive to encourage stakeholder participation. The program was defined as a pilot project addressing the Southern California coastal scrub habitat. Three species were identified for initial study to serve as surrogates for others. The five-county habitat area was broken down into 11 subregions, because the larger area was thought to be administratively unmanageable. The subregions reflected political boundaries as much as the location of habitat, which concerned some 110 scientists (Pollak, 2001a, 2001b). This is similar to the state’s bioregional council initiative. The effort to establish voluntary planning mechanisms at a broad bioregional scale has devolved in practice to the county level in many cases. Scientists were also concerned that although conservation guidelines were adopted by the state’s Department of Fish and Game in 1993, no process was defined for review of NCCP plans by independent scientists (Thompson, 1994; Pollak, 2001a, 2001b). The NCCP process turned out to be far more time-consuming than originally anticipated. Although the entire plan was expected to be completed in 18 months, ten years later only two major subregional plans had been approved, and these built on prior efforts. The first was the Orange County Central-Coastal plan, approved in 1996. Negotiations with large Orange County landowners helped set the stage for the NCCP program as a whole, giving the Orange County plan a head start. The process also was greatly simplified by the small number of landowners involved. The approved plan reflects this, since the land reserves are based mainly on contributions from the landowners or public acquisition. It was followed a year later by the San Diego Multiple Species Conservation Program. The San Diego plan involves many more landowners and local jurisdictions than the Orange County plan. Because of its scale and the degree of local involvement, it has been praised as a remarkable attempt to fully integrate conservation with planning for new development (Rempel et al., 1999). It is an ambitious plan that aims to preserve more than 150,000 acres. Key to success was the ability to provide certainty for both developers and conservationists. Developers were reassured by the commitment to “no surprises,” while conservationists were swayed by state and federal commitments to land acquisition and ongoing management. Projected costs were allocated among state and federal wildlife agencies, local governments, and mitigation from new development (Rempel et al., 1999; Pollak, 2001a, 2001b). The program integrated conservation into local planning to an unprecedented degree. State and federal incidental take permits were issued to local jurisdictions, which were then responsible for overseeing local compliance. Conservation was integrated into local planning by 111 requiring that local ordinances and general plans include its provisions. The NCCP cannot actually compel local land use changes, but compliance may be assured through the potential revocation of take permits (Rempel et al., 1999; Pollak, 2001a, 2001b). The NCCP represents one of the most advanced efforts to develop a new model for collaborative regional planning in the state. It overcomes basic weaknesses in the traditional regional planning system. In particular, it reintegrates environmental and economic planning at a bioregional scale, in furtherance of explicitly regional objectives. It accomplishes this by meshing federal, state, and local policies and responsibilities. It demonstrates that a collaborative framework can succeed in producing integrated regional plans. Key to its success were clear state and federal mandates requiring action on an explicitly regional scale. Regulatory mandates alone were insufficient, though, because they had to be reconciled with private property rights and local land use authority. To accomplish this, the second key ingredient to success was the promise of mutual gains through coordinated planning. Such potential gains form the incentive needed for voluntary processes to succeed. Like CALFED, the NCCP brokers a deal on resource allocation among competing interests. Comprehensive negotiations offer the hope of efficiency gains by reducing conflicts on a piecemeal basis. Because of its voluntary approach, another ingredient in the success of the NCCP has been the strength of existing local planning practices. Both subregional plans completed so far relied on a prior history of cooperation. The NCCP has also suffered from certain weaknesses, however. Although most major environmental organizations supported its principles, some grew to distrust its process and results, complaining that scientific processes were sacrificed in favor of political ones (Pollak, 2001a, 2001b). The devolution of the program to politically defined subregions and the lack of explicit scientific standards and monitoring support this conclusion. Legislation passed in 2002 sought to resolve such complaints by requiring strict scientific standards as the basis for plans and rough proportionality between mitigation and effect on species (Shigley, 2002c). 112 Like the effort to mesh air quality and transportation planning, the NCCP’s attempt to reintegrate planning areas in a more comprehensive fashion proved more arduous than its framers anticipated. The central goal of reducing planning uncertainty for participant stakeholders has been hard to achieve, because it requires an assumption of future risk. The “no surprises” policy, essential for landowner participation, transfers the assumption of risk of future uncertainty in species preservation costs from developers and landowners to the federal and state governments or, possibly, even to the species themselves. For this reason, the NCCP program continues to divide the environmental community. Hazardous Waste Management Toxic waste became a major public and intergovernmental issue during the 1980s, and its disposal became an area of policy innovation in regional planning and governance. It is a useful case study because, in contrast to most of the other regional planning issues discussed in this report, toxic waste is not so much a public “good” as a public “bad.” Disposal sites are prime examples of “LULUs” or “locally unwanted land uses,” a source of contention among neighboring governments and a classic regional governance problem. Among the spate of federal environmental legislation passed during the 1970s were a number of laws affecting disposal of toxic wastes, including the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, the Resources, Conservation, and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, and the Superfund legislation, passed in 1980. RCRA called for regulation of existing toxic sites, construction of new safer facilities for disposal and treatment, and creation of a system for tracking and overall management. In the early 1980s, the hazardous waste issue became a major policy concern in California. The state’s toxic waste problem had become one of the worst in the nation. No new landfill had been opened for a decade because market-based efforts to obtain siting agreements had failed in the face of fierce local opposition. When new federal and state legislation prohibited land disposal of hazardous waste, the problem became a crisis. Most major landfills closed to avoid the higher standards. Better treatment options would necessitate an expansion of facilities (Asmus, 1990; Rabe, 1994). 113 In 1982, a state-level council was created to study options. A more effective decisionmaking process was clearly needed to solve the problems. Conflict over facility siting epitomized the tension that can arise between local and regional needs, and solutions would require some means to overcome local opposition. The council considered a more centralized framework. But although business leaders were strongly in favor, local governments were equally strongly opposed. A centralized, state-run model was also problematic because it might heighten local resistance and lead to further gridlock. The council devised an innovative new approach to address these concerns as well as the need for better information about future needs for facilities. In 1986, the legislature approved the Hazardous Waste Management Plans and Facility Siting Procedures, or the “Tanner bill.” The process was considered a national model because of its balance of local concerns and statewide priorities (Asmus, 1990; Mazmanian and Morell, 1992; Rabe, 1994). The new system was inspired by an experiment undertaken in the mid-1980s by local governments in Southern California. Representatives from local governments in seven counties had established the Southern California Hazardous Waste Management Project as a Joint Powers Authority to define a comprehensive equity-based policy for site evaluation at the regional level. Each county agreed to take responsibility for its “fair share” of waste disposal and management. The region was the first in the nation to adopt such a fair share approach. However, it proved easier to reach agreement on the concept than on implementation. The counties could not agree on how many facilities of what kind would be sited (Mazmanian and Morell, 1992). The Southern California process was eclipsed by the new state legislation. Under the Tanner bill, local governments were allowed to retain initial siting authority. Each county had two years to prepare a plan including an assessment of the volume and types of waste generated and the adequacy of existing facilities and a proposal for waste reduction and management. To address the matter of economies of scale, counties were encouraged to devise partnerships for managing waste. Thus, the process repeated the fair share approach while also accommodating efficiency through scale economies. The Department of Health Services 114 would develop guidelines, provide technical assistance, review and approve plans, and finally assemble the county plans into an overall state plan. Each county board of supervisors was asked to appoint an advisory committee to negotiate permit approvals. The locally based approach was balanced, however, by the establishment of a state-level appeals body with authority to override local decisions. The primary basis for such overrides would be inconsistency with approved county-devised plans (Asmus, 1990; Mazmanian and Morell, 1992; Rabe, 1994). Every county prepared a plan, because failure to do so would have made it vulnerable to decisions made by the state appeals board. The process forced the state to assess in concrete terms the scope of its hazardous waste problem and forced each county to reconcile its load with its capacity to manage it. The new state regulations banning land disposal quickly converted participants to the virtues of source reduction. County plans included proposed source reduction of between 30 percent and 75 percent by 2000 (Mazmanian and Morell, 1992). In spite of widespread support for the program, its provisions were undermined in 1987 when the Department of Health Services issued guidelines calling for each county to identify feasible sites for all types of new facilities, regardless of the county’s own requirements. The guidelines, a mandate from the executive branch, departed from agreements reached during the legislative process, according to some observers. This provision undermined equity or fair share as the fundamental basis for county plans, because it indicated that health, economic, and other technical considerations were to be given greater priority. Because the appeals board was given authority to override local rejection of a proposed facility, it could use the Tanner bill as a preemption tool (Mazmanian and Morell, 1992; Rabe, 1994). Local governments protested by refusing to accede to the requirement. Only three counties developed plans to accommodate more than their own waste (Mazmanian and Morell, 1992). DHS proposed a compromise. Industry was required to make significant strides toward source reduction as a condition for receiving permits for new facilities. In return, local governments accepted responsibility for defending plans before voters and approving siting decisions. However, 115 the attempt to develop a new basis for siting decisions was lost in the bargain. Subsequent siting efforts tended to follow the traditional market-based approach, and conflict prevailed in most (Rabe, 1994). In 1993, the state consolidated its hazardous waste management system and devolved enforcement authority to county-level agencies known as Certified Unified Program Agencies. Thus, the state established a system for hazardous waste similar to the model for air pollution control (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000b). California’s experience during the 1980s as a national model for a more cooperative state-local approach to facilities siting was short-lived. Nevertheless, the case carries lessons for other similarly contentious LULU issues such as the impasse over airport expansion in the Los Angeles area. It indicates that when faced with the threat of state intervention and the loss of local control, local governments are able to overcome classic NIMBY obstacles to regional cooperation. Regional cooperation based on fair share principles holds hope as a means to overcome these classic regional governance challenges without sacrificing state or local control. The state government’s more centralized approach may have helped overcome the impasse over LULU siting, but that came at the expense of its ability to develop cooperative relationships with local governments to explore options in a systematic way (Mazmanian and Morell, 1992). Conclusion Among all regional planning areas, environmental planning has the strongest accountability mechanisms. That is because ecosystems are inherently regional, and environmental standards are health-based. Within ecosystems, environmental problems and solutions are often indivisible among political jurisdictions (for example, air pollution does not recognize political boundaries). Thus, environmental planning suffers far less from the problems that plague transportation planning, where local and regional benefits can be traded off more easily. But if transportation planning has suffered, especially recently, from a lack of regional policy focus, environmental planning has suffered from a lack of effective regulatory techniques. The traditional piecemeal, procedural approach failed to address cumulative effects, and therefore it 116 failed in protecting the environment even as it provoked resentment among landowners and others whose activities were affected. The new approach to environmental planning stresses negotiation and compromise, because piecemeal skirmishes between environmental and economic interests have become too costly for all concerned. More comprehensive planning offers the possibility of efficiency gains and reduced conflict. More than any other programs, environmental ones are testing new governance models that exemplify what this report calls the “third wave” approach. First, they call for regional policy integration, requiring that land use and transportation policies be oriented to regional environmental needs. The NCCP, for example, essentially produces regional (or more accurately, subregional) land use plans to reconcile economic and environmental goals, a fundamental shift from the traditional planning model. Second, many of the programs promote collaborative decisionmaking, especially those programs seeking land use changes. Although this represents a kind of institution-building, the new programs do not try to alter the existing distribution of authority. Instead, collaborative programs aim to reconcile public and private interests, and federal, state, regional, and local interests, through the promise of mutual gains. They seek to incorporate landowners and local governments—and their land use authority—into a more comprehensive planning process. The new environmental programs have made progress in overcoming traditional weaknesses of the regional planning system—its lack of regional focus, comprehensiveness, and accountability. However, they also have weaknesses. The mutual gains on which they depend for success have not been easy to negotiate. To guarantee greater certainty in outcomes for some parties—the inducement for participation and compromise—others must assume the risk of future uncertainty. This may serve to weaken environmental mandates in favor of politically acceptable solutions. Trends in air quality management underscore this problem. Even the best science is unable to predict accurately the effect of complex changes in urban areas, making long-range integrated planning a difficult proposition. 117 Collaborative models have worked best in smaller areas, relying on existing political relationships to succeed. They have been much harder to foster across large areas. Thus, like transportation planning, environmental planning has been devolved to the county level in many cases, undermining the bioregional scale that the new programs seek to emphasize. Collaborative initiatives have served well as forums for dialogue that can be essential in devising new approaches to complex problems. But because they are not policymaking bodies, traditional conflicts have reemerged once the process shifted from plan development to plan adoption and implementation. Although collaboration may help resolve conflict and produce creative strategies, it is not a substitute for political decisionmaking through more traditional mechanisms. 118 7. “Bottom-Up” Third-Wave Reforms A new approach to regional reform emerged in California during the 1990s as a result of the planning pressures and new programs described in previous chapters. The current reform wave emphasizes economic development, efficient and equitable public investment in the face of fiscal constraint, and integration of environmental and economic goals. It relies on collaborative decisionmaking and public-private partnerships.1 It can be distinguished from the previous reform wave by its greater emphasis on developing regional consensus on integrated planning goals and its lesser emphasis on establishing new institutions or procedural requirements. The most important elements that account for the new reform wave are the transportation and environmental programs discussed in Chapters 5 and 6—because they changed the institutional framework for regional planning—and the rise of broad-based regional reform coalitions with strong support from business leaders—because they supply political pressure and policy focus for continuing reform. The transportation and environmental programs created a new framework for regional planning. Authority in these policy areas—what this report has termed “vertical regionalism”—was devolved downward. Increasingly, regions and more often counties now form the organizational scale at which local, state, and federal agencies meld plans to achieve interrelated policy goals. But this new framework only goes partway toward reintegrating regional growth-management planning. The new programs connect some of the dots—such as strengthening the connection between transportation and air quality planning and between ____________ 1This description of the third wave of regional governance reform in the United States during the 20th century is informed by Wallis (1994b). 119 subregional land use and species preservation planning—but gaps remain. Furthermore, many basic incentives remain unchanged. For example, although local governments and regional agencies now have much more control of transportation policy objectives, the funding process still reinforces “geographic equity” at the county more than at the regional scale. Land use is still a local government prerogative, and fiscal constraint and competition persist. Although the new framework encourages greater planning integration, it still remains up to local governments within metropolitan regions to choose how far to take it. This is where regional activists come in. Broad-based reform coalitions in metropolitan areas across the state are pushing governments to fill in the new regional framework. Thus, planning integration is currently gaining as much momentum from the bottom up as from the top down. Local governments also have experimented with new crossjurisdictional approaches to growth management. In some areas, local governments have combined the greater authority provided by devolution with greater interjurisdictional cooperation on a horizontal basis to begin to bridge the gaps that still characterize our regional planning system. These initiatives form models for ways to enhance regional planning in California. Civic Entrepreneurs Perhaps the most significant trend in bottom-up regional reform during the 1990s was the emergence of “collaborative regional initiatives” across the state. These efforts unite public officials, educators, and leaders from business, labor, environmental, social equity, and other organizations in developing regional growth-management strategies. Their work is assisted by foundations and support networks such as the California Center for Regional Leadership, which has organized five annual “Civic Entrepreneur Summits” to promote cross-learning among 21 collaborative regional initiatives across the state. The most well-developed collaborative public-private initiatives are in parts of the state in which growth pressures are intense and business leaders are well organized. The initiatives seek to define consensus across public, private, and nonprofit sector interests about a new approach to growth management. Reflecting what is called “new regionalism,” 120 collaborative regional initiatives “are creating a new type of governance for the twenty-first century—regional in scope, collaborative in nature, and based on an understanding of the interdependence between the economy, the environment, and social equity” (California Center for Regional Leadership, 2001, p. 9). The emphasis on broad consensus-building with business leaders at the forefront makes the “new regionalism” reminiscent of the Progressive Era, also a time when a broad reform coalition worked to adapt local governments to function more effectively in changed economic circumstances. The collaborative initiatives help provide a policy focus for expanding regional planning integration, one that will be essential if the apparatus of regional governance is to be systematically reformed. The vision must be compelling enough to overcome traditional suspicions among the public about expanding government’s role. The geographic scale of most of the state’s collaborative regional initiatives confirms that voluntary collaboration is more likely to emerge at a subregional or county scale than across wide metropolitan regions. Seventeen of the 21 collaborative regional initiatives participating in the California Center for Regional Leadership network operate at the county or subregional level (four of them work within single-county metropolitan areas). A well-known example of a collaborative initiative is the Joint Venture Silicon Valley Network, a coalition of public and private leaders in Santa Clara and San Mateo Counties that focuses primarily on education and smart-growth issues. The JVSV Network and another organization, the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group, have worked closely with local governments to address growth concerns. For example, JVSV persuaded 27 cities and two counties to adopt a uniform building code to speed up the permitting process and reduce intercity rivalry. The Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group—whose member firms employ one-quarter of Silicon Valley workers—led battles to increase taxes for highway and light-rail construction, established a multimillion-dollar affordable housing trust fund, and organized a broad coalition that advocates for infill development projects (Association of Bay Area Governments, 2000). These efforts by the Silicon Valley business community have been called the “greatest unsung land-use success story 121 in America” (Richmond, 2000; also see Pastor, 1997; Coleman, 1998; Shigley, 1999). The importance of economic development concerns is also evident in collaborative initiatives in the Los Angeles area. The recession of the early 1990s hit the region hard and accelerated a shift in the economic base toward service-related industries. A number of initiatives emerged in the mid-1990s, focusing especially on education and transportation. Some also embraced the idea of targeting assistance to specific industry “clusters” thought to be key to the region’s economy.2 An example is the Gateway Cities Partnership. The Gateway cities, to the southeast of Los Angeles, cover some of the poorest parts of metropolitan Southern California. Hard hit by aerospace declines in the early 1990s, the cities have coordinated economic analysis and common strategies to promote workforce development and assist manufacturing in the area. Participants also seek to ensure that benefits from the Alameda Corridor transportation project, which slices through the Gateway cities region, will accrue to all cities along the corridor (Fulton et al., 2000b; Pastor et al., 2000). Collaborative regional initiatives by no means have been limited to the largest urban areas in the state. Far-reaching initiatives have been organized in the Central Valley and Sierra foothills, for example. This activity reflects the rapid pace of change transforming the 450-mile-long, 50-mile-wide agricultural valley that runs down the center of the state. One of the nation’s premier agricultural regions for over a century, the Central Valley is being transformed by rapid population growth and residential development spilling over from the San Francisco Bay, Sacramento, and Los Angeles metropolitan areas. An example of a collaborative regional initiative in the Central Valley is the Growth Alternatives Alliance, called the “first agriculture-businesshomebuilder-conservation coalition of its kind in California” (Whiteside, 1999). It includes the American Farmland Trust, the Fresno County Farm Bureau, the Fresno Chamber of Commerce, the Building Industry Association of San Joaquin Valley, and the Fresno Business Council, among others. The alliance issued a far-reaching report in April 1998, ____________ 2See Pastor et al. (2000) for descriptions of these initiatives. 122 called A Landscape of Choice: Strategies for Improving Patterns of Growth. It promoted policies for revising local government general plans, advocating compact development, urban growth boundaries, farmland preservation, and multijurisdictional planning. Subsequently, all cities and the county government adopted the report’s statement of principles. The City and County of Fresno revised their General Plans along compact growth lines (Hopkins and Bottorff, 1998; Newman, 1996; Shigley, 2000a; California Planning and Development Report, 2001). Local Government Planning Coordination Regional planning also has been enhanced in recent years by coordinated activity among local governments. This activity has several aspects. Local governments have increased single-purpose interjurisdictional planning through joint powers authorities. JPAs are cooperative entities formed on a contractual basis by local governments, often to deal with single issues. They differ from independent special districts—often criticized as increasing governmental fragmentation rather than consolidation—because JPAs remain under the control of the general-purpose governments that establish and administer them. The number of JPAs in the state has risen rapidly, from 362 in fiscal year 1980–1981 to 675 in fiscal year 1998–1999.3 JPAs traditionally have been used to address concerns such as insurance, public finance, and public facilities such as parks. However, a number of recent high-profile JPAs have also dealt with transportation, land use, and environmental matters. These include JPAs established to administer NCCP plans in Riverside and Orange Counties, and the Alameda Corridor, a $2 billion truck-and-rail infrastructure project that will connect the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach with rail yards in downtown Los Angeles (Fulton et al., 2000b). According to Fulton Increasingly, local governments are finding ways to work together to solve common planning problems—essentially creating ad hoc regional planning policy. . . . Ad hoc regional planning is going on all over the place in the nooks and crannies of local government. The five Southern California governments didn’t wait for a state or regional agency to emerge to deal with transportation ____________ 3From California State Controller’s Office (1982 ). 123 issues; they created a joint-powers authority to run Metrolink, the region’s commuter rail system. Similarly, when Solano County and two of its cities wanted to deal with preservation of farmland and open space . . . they formed a joint-powers authority. . . . There are dozens, maybe hundreds of similar examples. . . . If there is to be a Post-Post-Proposition 13 Era in California planning, this ad hoc regional planning is probably what it will be about (Fulton, 1995, p. 3). The second trend is related to growth-management techniques adopted by local governments and voters. They have increasingly favored techniques to shape future growth and coordinate planning across communities, rather than adopting measures to stave off change. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the most popular growthmanagement techniques employed by local governments were measures to limit density or the size of buildings and to ensure provision of adequate public facilities concurrent with development. By contrast, during the late 1990s, general plan revisions, specific plans, and urban growth boundaries became popular (California Department of Housing and Community Development, 2000).4 By 1998, 95 cities claimed to have enacted an urban growth boundary (UGB), most after 1995 (Commission on Local Governance for the 21st Century, 2000). A well-known coordinated UGB campaign was the Save Open Space and Agricultural Resources (SOAR) initiative, passed by Ventura County voters in 1998. SOAR was the most comprehensive and coordinated set of countywide land use initiatives so far in California. It included a county ballot initiative requiring voter approval for any zoning change affecting agricultural land or other open space as well as urban growth boundary measures in six cities in the county. All the measures passed (Fulton and Sokoloff, 1998). Not all multijurisdictional growth planning has been as cooperative, however. In some cases, JPAs and growth boundaries were established as the outcome of intense conflict. For example, events during the 1990s in the Tri-Valley area on the eastern edge of the San Francisco Bay Area reflect prospects and pitfalls of subregional planning in California. The ____________ 4Specific plans are sets of development standards applied to specific geographical areas, giving cities and developers the ability to plan for large developments. 124 area has been among the fastest-growing parts of the region, with new office parks altering its formerly suburban and rural character. In 1993, four Tri-Valley cities approved the South Livermore Plan following seven years of negotiations. The plan, called “a model of regional cooperation,” covered 400 square miles in the eastern portion of Alameda County. It coordinated urban growth boundaries, directed development away from agricultural land, and required one-to-one mitigation of open space acres preserved for land turned over to new development (Schilling, 1993; also see California Planning and Development Report, 1994). However, disagreements remained. A series of lawsuits led to further negotiations and also the establishment of an innovative cross-county JPA to fund traffic improvements (California Planning and Development Report, 1994; Sokoloff, 1999a; Shigley, 2000b). In 1999, voters defeated three coordinated ballot measures that would have imposed extremely strict voter approval requirements for development decisions. The following year, voters passed a countywide measure—Measure D—that overturned the results of a carefully crafted compromise between Alameda County and the City of Livermore on the city’s expansion plans. The initiative established a tighter growth boundary for the city, preserving at least temporarily as open space the area slated for new development. Environmental groups, dissatisfied with the densities proposed for new development, had placed the measure on the ballot (Shigley, 2000b; Transportation Choices Forum and Urban Ecology, 2000). The series of negotiations, lawsuits, and ballot-box battles that has constituted growth planning for the Tri-Valley area highlights prospects and challenges in today’s planning environment. On the one hand, collaborative planning bore fruit. Today, local governments are increasingly forced to negotiate across jurisdictional borders to retain local control over growth—a reformulation of home rule. However, at various points discontented stakeholders also turned to other mechanisms—the courts and the ballot box in particular—to overturn outcomes they disliked. But even that route could provide only partial 125 victories. For example, Measure D provided only the potential for the environmentalists’ smart-growth alternative to be realized. It is up to governing officials and residents of the City of Livermore—not the environmentalists who fought for Measure D—to decide if higherdensity infill development will actually be built. If it is not, and another community builds the replacement housing at even lower densities than those proposed for Livermore, proponents of Measure D may have won a Pyrrhic victory. The case highlights a fundamental weakness in subregional growthmanagement strategies in the state today. Such efforts cannot substitute for land use planning at a metropolitan scale. For example, regionwide urban growth boundaries such as those established in Portland, Oregon, in 1979 worked to funnel development into the urban core because no alternative was possible. However, that is not the case for urban growth boundaries passed on a piecemeal basis within California metropolitan areas. Without a regional growth boundary and local commitments to build denser infill housing, development may simply be diverted to other parts of the region more willing to accept it. As John Landis noted, The Portland experiment may have succeeded, but the failing of most cities that attempt urban growth boundaries is that they haven’t taken the steps Portland implemented to encourage more development and revitalization within the inner core. . . . There is no evidence that growth will move from rural areas to urban areas because of growth boundaries. . . . If you want to encourage inner-city development, you do things to get people back into the city, like reducing traffic congestion and improving the school system. Portland has done all these things. This [urban growth boundaries] is a new gimmick, and most of these proposals are not going to work because they’re not sufficiently well thought out in the California context (quoted in Weisberg, 1998). Regional Reform in the Major Metropolitan Areas Momentum for reform during the late 1980s and 1990s led to campaigns within regions to strengthen regional agencies. In some ways, the efforts paralleled those two decades earlier, showing that regional reform follows an internal logic reflecting each area’s political and economic character. However, events also reflected a transition from second- to third-wave approaches. 126 The San Francisco Bay Area: A Shift in Approach During the early 1990s, Bay Area reformers led a campaign that was strikingly similar to the one two decades earlier. The similarity reveals the persistence of an uneasy power balance in the region between proregionalist and antiregionalist forces. The sense of regional identity is strong enough to produce repeated calls for stronger institutions, but the area is too diverse and multicentered to facilitate simple solutions. In 1990, a coalition of reform groups convened a blue-ribbon commission called Bay Vision 2020 to study regional governance. Principal conveners were the Bay Area Council (or BAC, an organization of regional businesses such as Chevron and Bank of America), the Greenbelt Alliance, and an informal group of locally elected officials, many from Santa Clara County (Lydon, 1993; Innes et al., 1994). Although the coalition was similar to the one organized during the 1970s, the motives of reformers had changed somewhat since then. By the 1990s, they had become much more deeply involved in local land use planning. Environmentalists were pushing for urban growth boundaries to protect open space, and regional business elites were concerned about affordable housing and other quality-of-life issues affecting their employees. Although during the 1970s many reformers favored establishing strong single-purpose agencies to address particular regional concerns such as mass transit expansion and bay preservation, by the 1990s, they sought to reintegrate the same agencies. The commission produced a report in 1991, which was cast as a legislative bill. It called for merger of three regional agencies (ABAG, MTC, and the air district), more compact development, and the establishment of another commission to develop a long-term plan for presentation to the legislature. Each regional agency that would have been integrated announced its opposition to the merger. Echoing debates two decades earlier, the composition of the proposed temporary body was also highly contentious. The bill was narrowly defeated in 1992. ABAG sponsored a counterproposal, calling for the development of a regional governance proposal with direction limited to sitting officials. This action paralleled ABAG’s response two decades earlier, as it sought to stave off more radical proposals. In efforts to reach compromise, the Bay Vision coalition fell apart. In particular, the BAC 127 and South Bay elected officials opposed compromise because ABAG’s bill envisioned no agency consolidation and retained a form of representation that appeared to favor sparsely populated areas. As the Bay Vision coalition fragmented, support for ABAG’s bill also faded in Sacramento (Lydon, 1993; Innes et al., 1994; Weinstein, 1994). The Bay Vision campaign was a reiteration of the second-wave approach to reform, and it met with the same fate in the 1990s as it had in the 1970s. This time, opposition from Southern California could not be blamed. Rather, the effort failed because of continuing resistance to reforms calling for institutional change. After Bay Vision’s failure, the reformers altered their tactics, shifting to a third-wave approach. They attempted to achieve reform goals through existing institutions, rather than by altering them. This made reform goals the focus, rather than political power struggles. For example, the Greenbelt Alliance helped organize UGB campaigns in neighboring cities, efforts that were especially successful in Santa Clara, Sonoma, and Contra Costa Counties (Fulton, 1996b). The Bay Area Council helped organize the Bay Area Alliance for Sustainable Development, an ambitious “collaborative regional initiative” that is developing regional smart-growth land use scenarios through public outreach. In addition, the alliance is developing a Community Capital Investment Initiative to link economic development in poor neighborhoods with smart-growth planning (Wegener, 2001). The Los Angeles Area: Centrifugal Forces Events in the Los Angeles area during the early 1990s also repeated earlier patterns: Regionalism at the metropolitan scale was strengthened more by external mandates than from within. Single-purpose regional planning agencies were strengthened more than multipurpose ones. The third-wave approach emerged at the subregional level, reflecting the region’s decentralized character. The Southern California Association of Governments has been a prime example of the governance dilemmas faced by many COGs. By the early 1990s, the organization had been boycotted at one time or another by about 20 percent of its potential local government members (Feldman, 1991). Powerful Orange County was a particularly vocal 128 opponent, having tried a number of times to secede (Fulton, 1992b, 1993a, 1997a). By the early 1990s, the negative consequences of growth— particularly environmental problems—began to catch up with the region. Stiffer air quality mandates turned the Southern California Air Quality Management District into a powerful organization, and they also should have strengthened SCAG. As the region’s designated MPO, SCAG was responsible for ensuring conformity of transportation and air quality plans. However, efforts to coordinate land use, transportation, and air planning led to a “difficult negotiating relationship” between the two agencies (Grant, 1995, p. 89). SCAQMD’s attempt to enforce local government compliance with traffic reduction measures was curtailed after it met stiff resistance. ISTEA also should have strengthened SCAG, but that outcome was undermined when state enabling legislation required suballocation of federal funds to the county transportation commissions. SCAG’s power therefore still amounted primarily to its ability to veto local projects, which was rarely exercised (Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 1993; Lewis and Sprague, 1997). County transportation agencies grew far more powerful, bolstered by new ISTEA funding and local sales tax revenue earmarked for construction of rail transit and other projects. For example, the budget of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) grew to over $1 billion a year by the early 1990s, making it the region’s biggest player in terms of autonomy and resources (Fulton, 1992b; Innes et al., 1994). SCAG leaders made the most of the policy window that opened statewide in the late 1980s for enhanced regional planning, attempting to strengthen the mandate of the organization. A proposal was put forward in the spring of 1990 to merge SCAG, the air district, and other planning agencies. The new agency would be run by a legislative-style council, with half its members elected by the public. It would develop a regional comprehensive plan that all local governments would have to follow. SCAG’s membership approved the concept in 1991 (Saltzstein, 1996; Fulton, 1997a; Innes et al., 1994). Soon after, the political winds began to shift. As state-level growthmanagement reform proposals withered in the face of the worsening 129 recession, Orange County remounted efforts to secede from SCAG. SCAG’s leadership retreated from its proposal, calling instead for a tripling of the size of the board of directors to 70 members and for new subregional planning bodies. The planning structure was formally devolved to 14 subregional councils.5 A regional comprehensive plan was approved in 1994, but local opposition ensured that the sections not mandated by law would not be binding (Fulton, 1997a). Thus, centrifugal forces proved too powerful to overcome. This repeated events two decades earlier. The main result of the reform phase was to strengthen single-purpose agencies and subregional planning within SCAG. As William Fulton noted, While SCAG has struggled to define itself, a regional planning structure has grown up around it. . . . The truth is that regional planning in Southern California has become a floating crap game. It’s not controlled by SCAG or any other single agency. Rather it is centered—if that is the word—in scattered meetings and negotiations and skirmishes that occur over this 100 square mile region. It’s not quite what the advocates of metropolitan planning had in mind back in the sixties but in the long run this free-floating system may prove workable for such a fragmented region (Fulton, 1992b, p. 13). The Riverside County Integrated Plan: A Model for CountyBased Planning Integration Third-wave reforms emerged in the Los Angeles area at the subregional level. One particularly strong example is the Riverside County Integrated Plan (RCIP). This three-year county-led local planning process, estimated to be the most expensive in California history, is considered a national model for integrated planning. Begun in 1999, the RCIP integrates an update of the county’s general plan for land use with development of an NCCP plan and a long-term transportation corridor investment plan. The RCIP probably would never have happened if not for the NCCP. Habitat preservation, in particular for the kangaroo rat, had been the subject of costly legal battles in the county during the 1980s and 1990s. One of the fastestgrowing counties in the nation, Riverside County is expected to double ____________ 5Four of the subregional councils are coterminous with county boundaries, whereas Riverside County is divided into two parts and Los Angeles County into nine. 130 in population over the next 20 years as development continues to spill from neighboring Orange and Los Angeles Counties. The pressure to develop a preemptive approach to habitat preservation prompted the extensive new effort to combine long-term land use, transportation, and habitat planning into one unified blueprint for growth (Fulton, 2000b; Verdin, 2000; Soto, 1999, 2000; Drummer, 1999). A strength of the model is that it builds on and integrates existing planning capacity at the county level, especially the devolution of authority in transportation and environmental planning. “The way land use planning and habitat planning occurred in the past is, you come up with the land use plan. And after that, oh, by the way, we’ll need to do some transportation planning. And everything left over is open space, so that’s habitat,” according to the head of the county’s transportation and land management agency (Shigley, 2002a). The RCIP, by contrast, starts by considering how land use can be oriented to the county’s transportation and environmental needs. Through use of incentives such as waiver of development fees and permission to build at higher densities, the program aims to steer high-density growth to designated transitoriented areas, while at the same time setting other land aside as open space or habitat (Sanchez, 2002). The RCIP is a model for planning integration using counties as the framework. The county forms the organizational scale in which the goals and commitments of various levels of government and planning agencies coalesce. The RCIP is an alliance of ten local, state, and federal agencies and involves environmental groups, property owners, business associations, farmers, and local officials. It engages residents through community meetings, surveys, focus groups, and public hearings. Given the state’s political traditions, this may be one of the most viable ways to strengthen subregional comprehensive planning. The director of the state’s Housing and Community Development Department voiced this viewpoint, noting that “Riverside County has brought the development community, the public, the transportation and the environmental communities to the table. . . . That process . . . should have enormous potential for becoming a model for the state” (The Planning Report, 2001a). 131 The RCIP could be a model for other counties even where the NCCP “stick” hasn’t forced action. For example, local governments in Santa Clara and Ventura Counties have also developed more coordinated transportation, land use, and open space policies. Furthermore, as urban growth puts pressure on natural habitat in areas such as the Central Valley and the Sierra foothills, habitat planning—and the broader imperative to reconcile environmental and economic development goals—has become necessary there as well. However, there are also weaknesses in the RCIP model. In particular, the county-led RCIP process cannot force city governments to comply with its goals. In Riverside County, where there is still a lot of unincorporated land, the county government plays a critical role in land use planning. This helps explain why the RCIP process was organized in the first place. However, in more fully developed urbanized counties, city land use planning decisions are far more influential relative to the county’s role. The governance challenge is different as a result; it depends primarily on establishing agreement among separate, independent cities. Another weakness of the RCIP model is the arbitrariness of county boundaries in relation to regional planning concerns. Many regional systems do not conform to existing political boundaries. This is evident in Riverside County itself, where concerns among communities on the western side are quite different from those in the less-developed eastern portion, and where many growth-related problems reflect larger regional issues. Thus, the very strength of the RCIP—that it relies on existing political institutions—is also a weakness. The San Diego Area: Testing the Limits of Collaboration No metropolitan area in the state has gone further than the San Diego area in attempting to implement fundamental reforms to its regional planning system. Political coherence has promoted collaboration, making the voluntary model more viable as a basis for reform than elsewhere in the state. However, growth problems have become so acute that reformers have sought more far-reaching changes. Because it works within a single-county metropolitan area, SANDAG combines the functions of COG, MPO, county congestion 132 management agency, and RTPA, among others. In addition, SANDAG oversees allocation of revenue from a county transportation sales tax measure passed in 1987. Therefore, SANDAG was the sole beneficiary of the new authority over transportation funding provided by state and federal programs in the early 1990s. The tension that has emerged elsewhere between county and regional planning needs does not surface in the San Diego area. By the late 1980s, the region faced severe growth pressures. Unlike other regions in the state, the San Diego area has inflexible borders on all sides (both natural and political), which make it more difficult for growth to sprawl in all directions. The county population had grown by 34 percent during the decade. Local governments were becoming concerned that the state government on the one hand, or angry citizens on the other, would force inflexible regional planning requirements on them (Innes et al., 1994). In response, local governments organized a voluntary process to develop a comprehensive regional development plan, a process that continued to evolve throughout the following decade. The county board of supervisors placed Proposition C on the ballot in 1988, calling for establishment of a Regional Planning and Growth Management Review Board to develop and manage a regional plan and program. The measure passed, and a blue ribbon panel designated SANDAG as the review board. SANDAG members agreed to “selfcertify” the consistency of pertinent elements of their general plans with the goals of the regional plan. Through a kind of cross-acceptance policy, they would present their plans to the regional board for comment and approval (Porter, 1997). The SANDAG board ratified the Regional Growth Management Strategy in 1993. However, self-certification with plan elements proved difficult in practice. In 1998, SANDAG called instead for a periodic staff-produced regional “report card” to assess progress. The growthmanagement plan was consolidated into five elements. Although some were passed by the SANDAG board, housing and land use policies proved problematic. A smart-growth land use scenario, considered consistent with the 1993 Regional Growth Management Strategy, was incorporated into planning assumptions for SANDAG’s 2000 long-range transportation plan. However, current land use plans and policies in the 133 region were characterized as generally inconsistent because of the low density of planned development. They were predicted to result in all developable land in the region being consumed within 20 years. This inconsistency between SANDAG planning assumptions and local land use policies was not resolved (San Diego Association of Governments, 1998, 1999, 2000; Weisberg, 1999; Arner, 1999; Downey, 2001a). By the late 1990s, growth problems had worsened in the region. Fewer than one-quarter of households in San Diego county could afford to purchase the median-priced home, and rush hour congestion ranked fifth worst in the nation (San Diego Union-Tribune, 2001). The San Diego Airport was projected to run out of capacity within a decade. These concerns raised a set of interrelated questions about expanding an integrated multimodal transportation system through greater reliance on rail. But in turn, rail expansion was viewed as inefficient without changes in local land use practices to encourage more transit-oriented development (Gallegos, 1999; Peace, 1999a, 1999b). Governance arrangements were criticized. For example, San Diego Dialogue, a binational consortium of political, academic, and business leaders, released an influential report in 1999 that blamed inadequate infrastructure—particularly the lack of a regional airport—for the loss of billions of dollars in trade annually. It also blamed governmental fragmentation on both sides of the border for undermining economic competitiveness (Erie, 1999). Work by San Diego Dialogue over the 1990s reinforced the idea that San Diego and Tijuana are strategically placed, if they unite, to become “one of the first truly international information regions, a city-state of the future” (Gross, 1995). Increasing media recognition of binational economic interdependency promoted awareness of metropolitan planning concerns—rather than a focus on existing political boundaries. With the City and County of San Diego embarking on updates of their general plans, the time was ripe for an “explosion” of the regional planning issue into the political arena (Morgan, 1999). As in the Bay Area during the 1960s, the need to establish a more coordinated regional transportation system sparked a broader debate about regional governance. As one local news commentator put it, “San Diego is being 134 studied now from inside and out; many sense an exquisite moment at hand for a city that hasn’t lost its chance to get it right” (Morgan, 1999). In 1999, State Senator Steve Peace launched an intensive three-year debate on regional governance when he introduced a bill in the state legislature to create a new regional agency that would subsume six existing agencies and be governed by a directly elected board. Many of the agencies that would have been merged protested the proposal. In 2000, state legislation created the Regional Government Efficiency Commission, or RGEC, to draft a plan for improving regional coordination.6 The most contentious issues in RGEC deliberations concerned agency consolidation, the governing structure of the new regional agency, and land use authority. The governance issues echoed earlier debates in the San Francisco Bay Area: Should regional planning be placed under the authority of an agency with directly elected representatives or should it remain under the COG governing model of one-city, one-vote? The pressure for land use reform had reached a higher pitch in the San Diego area, however, because of the pressing need to expand the airport and pending proposals for transit and accompanying residential development. San Diego’s mayor advocated a stronger regional transportation authority to help implement the city’s proposed new general plan calling for a “city of villages” based on compact, transit-oriented development. The city’s plan depends on new transit investment and residential development connected to it (LaVelle, 2001; The Planning Report, 2001b; Parks, 2001). The process also reflected factors that prompted the Riverside County Integrated Plan. In both cases, the need for substantial new transportation investment, combined with pressure to reconcile habitat preservation and residential development, created momentum for planning integration within the framework of enhanced county-level authority. San Diego area leaders have considered using an extension of the local half-cent transportation sales tax as a source not only for ____________ 6For more on the evolution of regional proposals during the period, see San Diego Dialogue (2000a, 2000b); Zion (2000); Lavelle (2000); LaVelle (2001); Downey (2001c, 2002a, 2002c); and Zion (2001). 135 transportation improvements but also for habitat and stormwater programs. This would present voters with an integrated set of regional environmental, transportation, and land use objectives (California Center for Regional Leadership, 2000; Downey, 2002b). The RGEC debates revealed dissatisfaction with voluntary arrangements. According to one RGEC consultant, “There is a feeling that SANDAG may be the best COG in the country, but we deserve better. We need something with some teeth” (Shigley, 2001b). However, they also reflected SANDAG’s success. According to Charles Nathanson, executive director of San Diego Dialogue, “We might be able to demonstrate that tying regional transportation planning and land use together isn’t such a scary thing for local jurisdictions. I think SANDAG has established a pattern of negotiation with local jurisdictions over the last 15 years that has laid the basis for a real bottoms-up conversation . . . without having to sacrifice a strong regional perspective” (The Planning Report, 2001b). The RGEC process highlighted classic tensions about democracy and home rule. News coverage contrasted arguments for “one-person, onevote” legal principles with arguments for home rule, especially from smaller cities that feared they would be overwhelmed by a “nonresponsive mega-government” (Emery, 2001). The traditional tension in transportation planning between regional objectives and geographic equity was also evident. For example, officials from northern cities in the county objected that a stronger agency might abuse authority over transportation funds currently allocated on a geographic basis. “This is our pot of money,” said one (Downey, 2001). The final RGEC proposal, released in 2001, called for two new authorities. One would govern airport expansion and operation, with an appointed board given the ability to override local objections. The state legislature and the governor approved this proposal, but the second one raised more protest. It called for establishment of a new transportation and land use agency, to assume SANDAG’s role and new powers including eminent domain over “regionally significant” transportation projects, and the ability to manipulate distribution of transportation funds to promote compliance with a regional transportation, housing, 136 and land use plan. It would be run by an 11-member board, eight of whom would be elected from proportional districts. Fierce debates continued through 2002 as bills to implement the RGEC proposal made their way through the state legislature. North county cities objected to ceding local land use authority to an agency with a directly elected board, and the county board of supervisors fought equally hard for a transportation agency with an elected board. Ultimately, an acceptable compromise boiled down to two options: agreement to hold a public election on what form the board structure would take or agreement to scale back the consolidation of agencies (Downey, 2002d). In the end, participants agreed to scale back the proposal. The elements that would have given SANDAG the ability to override local opposition to unwanted transportation projects, to implement a regional comprehensive plan, and to merge with a border infrastructure agency were eliminated. The final bill, signed by the governor in September 2002, was considerably less ambitious than the original vision. It transferred planning responsibilities from the county’s two transit agencies to SANDAG and altered its governing arrangements, providing an additional vote to the City of San Diego and requiring populationweighted votes in addition to the traditional jurisdiction-based voting scheme (Downey, 2002d, 2002e). Meanwhile, SANDAG began formulating a Regional Comprehensive Plan to include an integrated regional infrastructure financing strategy that would identify regional priorities and could serve as the basis for allocating funds to jurisdictions that complied with its provisions (San Diego Association of Governments, 2002). Throughout the past decade, SANDAG evolved a third-wave approach to regional reform, seeking to integrate not only disparate functional regional plans but also the goals and policies of its member local governments, without undermining their authority. However, many were unsatisfied with the results. As in the Bay Area during the 1970s, transportation concerns provoked a broader dialogue about regional multipurpose planning. Reformers launched an effort to create a stronger multipurpose authority, an approach this report has characterized as second-wave. 137 The three-year debate in the San Diego region repeated patterns seen elsewhere. Reformers faced a similar tradeoff between strengthening planning scope and accountability. San Diego’s new airport authority— like MTC in the Bay Area—was established along single-purpose lines so that more concerted authority could be applied to pressing concerns. The broader goal of reorienting general land use policy to regional transportation and environmental needs was much harder to accomplish, however. The RGEC proposals tested whether planning conflicts could be resolved within the framework of the voluntary model—whether SANDAG could evolve into a more authoritative agency. A new approach was envisioned in which SANDAG would use transportation funding—the “big carrot” of regional planning—as leverage to encourage greater coordination across functional planning areas and among local jurisdictions. However, as with Bay Vision 2020, negotiations broke down over governance arrangements. Participants were unable to strike an acceptable balance between two fundamentally different notions of regional governance—a one-government, one-vote basis or a one-person, one-vote basis. A comparison of the RGEC process and Riverside County’s Integrated Plan process is useful in considering models for strengthening regionalism in California. In both cases, more integrated planning has evolved in the framework of enhanced planning authority at the county level. At first blush, the comparative success of the RCIP process might suggest that it is a better model for strengthening regionalism in a systematic way. However, the RCIP reflects the importance of the county government’s role in an area where much land remains unincorporated and no city dominates. It employs existing county authority in a more coordinated way to produce a more integrated county plan. The RCIP may be a good model for planning in parts of the state where county responsibilities are predominant, and perhaps as a building block for planning in multicounty areas, but it does not fully resolve how to coordinate governance among disparate jurisdictions in well-developed metropolitan regions. The RGEC process tackled that question head on, and in that respect it was a better test of methods for solving 138 metropolitan regional problems today. RGEC failed to hammer out a new set of governance arrangements acceptable to all parties, but its attempt to clarify how the COG might use transportation funds as leverage to promote more coordinated planning could serve as a model for other regions. State-Level Reform Efforts By 2000, momentum for planning reform had reached a high pitch in the state legislature. Groups such as the Smart Growth Caucus, organized by 37 assembly and senate members, and the Job-Center Housing Coalition, a statewide coalition of business, development, labor, poverty, and housing groups, promoted bills encouraging infill development, transit-oriented housing, regulatory relief for infill projects, adequate provision of infrastructure for new development, planning law revision, protection of farmland, open space, and natural habitat, and better planning coordination. A legislator-stakeholder working group began meeting in 2001 to hammer out revisions to housing element law. Arguments for smart growth and better regional planning made their way into a number of state-level policy proposals, cutting across seemingly distinct areas from affordable housing to state infrastructure planning and fiscal reform.7 In 2000, the speaker of the California State Assembly, Robert Hertzberg, appointed a Commission on Regionalism to develop “innovative state government policies and strategies that will encourage and support regional collaboration among local governments; and to encourage regional collaboration among local governments and civic, business, and other community organizations, to better enable our governments and our citizens to address California’s major economic, social, and environmental challenges in the years ahead.”8 In early 2002, the commission released its final report. It advocated a long-term ____________ 7See, for example, California State Treasurer (1999), Commission on Local Governance for the 21st Century (2000), Speaker’s Commission on State and Local Government Finance (2000), California Commission on Building for the 21st Century (2002), and Little Hoover Commission (2002). 8Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism (2000). 139 realignment of state programs and policies in a number of areas—from education, economic, and workforce development to environmental, infrastructure, and fiscal policies—to support regional coordination. For example, it called for integration of school and university construction with local planning. The report addressed fiscal issues, recommending a return of ERAF funds and a constitutional amendment to prevent the state from reallocating local property tax revenue for its own purposes. On a regional basis, local governments would be encouraged to adopt tax base sharing and redistribution measures. The report advocated adoption, through a consultation process with regional and local agencies, of clear state planning goals and performance standards. Alignment of state, regional, and local investments and programs was proposed through collaboratively designed regional plans. Adopted regional plans should then enable voters to approve general bonds for capital purposes, and tax increases for specific purposes, by a 55 percent majority. This mechanism would establish a regional finance base—a measure of “regional home rule”—for infrastructure purposes and to reallocate unequally shared cost burdens. Flexible support for performance-based regional planning compacts was also advocated to address various concerns. Conclusion By the time the Commission on Regionalism’s report was released, the state’s electricity crisis, security concerns, and an economic downturn had diverted attention and produced a severe budget shortfall. It appeared that the commission’s proposals might fall prey to the same cycle of boom and bust that spelled defeat a decade earlier. However, some things had changed since the last reform cycle. During the early 2000s, lawmakers were not reacting to a surge of local ballot-box measures. Rather, there was a convergence of state and local concerns regarding infrastructure, housing, and fiscal reform that served to justify stronger regional coordination. Second, new collaborative planning models had emerged during the decade, such as the RCIP and the NCCP, which might provide a basis for further reform. The emergence of these models during the decade stood in 140 contrast to the continuing failure of second-wave efforts that attempted to alter governance structures. These factors help explain why the Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism promoted a range of policy measures and flexible support for collaborative regional compacts rather than a systematic set of new institutional mandates. The commission’s institutional approach—realignment of state, regional, and local policies through flexible, collaborative arrangements—reflected the emergence of the third wave at the state level. First, it reflected growing frustration with policy gridlock and fragmentation. Realignment could help resolve the state-local fiscal impasse while also addressing the need for more strategic infrastructure investment and environmental planning. Second, it took heed of pitfalls that had plagued earlier reform efforts. During the early 1990s, legislative proposals to impose stiff regional planning mandates had been rejected as too interventionist, but other proposals relying on increased spending for incentives to obtain local compliance with state planning goals also failed because of fiscal constraint. Reforms that realign existing programs and resources to benefit all parties have been more successful. The state gained experience with such models during the 1990s through programs such as the NCCP and the RCIP. Because of these new developments, the economic downturn of the early 2000s did not prevent the state from moving incrementally toward better planning coordination. Debates about growth-management issues—housing in particular—continued throughout the 2001–2002 legislative session. In September 2002, the governor signed a bill (AB 857) resurrecting the requirement passed in 1970 for the governor’s planning office to develop a comprehensive state land use policy and prepare a periodic “Environmental Goals and Policy Report” for submission to the legislature. The provisions were meshed with the mandate established in 1999 for the governor to submit an annual fiveyear capital improvement plan to promote more coordinated state investment planning. State agencies were required to develop consistent planning and spending priorities based on a set of smart-growth principles, including promoting infill development, protecting environmental and agricultural resources, and encouraging efficient development patterns. By beginning to reintegrate its own programs and 141 policies, the state government took a critical—though only preliminary—step toward reintegrating regional growth management planning in California. 142 8. Assessing the Third Wave The history of regional planning for growth management in California points to a few main conclusions. In spite of all the changes in California during the last century, the fundamental goals of regional reformers have remained unchanged. They have sought to achieve two sometimes interrelated goals: to make regional planning and governance both more efficient and more equitable. The most far-reaching reforms have attempted to establish decisionmaking institutions at the metropolitan scale that embody key aspects of general-purpose government—policy breadth and coherence, regional focus, and public accountability. However, the obstacles to regionalism have been as persistent as the goals. The recurrence of similar concerns and proposed reforms over decades of change reflects a set of continuing challenges. One is how to balance tradeoffs between local control and policy action at a wider scale, or as one author put it, how to reconcile “imperial dreams and parochial desires” (Teaford, 1979, p. 105). Another is how best to respond to complexity and change. Metropolitan areas change so rapidly, and their planning problems are so complex, that governments have a hard time keeping up. Although fundamental challenges persist, the solutions must always evolve. Regional planning tests government’s ability to adapt to economic and social change. As urban conditions change, so do policy strategies. California’s third wave of regional reform articulates a new variation on traditional themes in its approach. It emphasizes policy integration and consensus-building, and it de-emphasizes new procedural or regulatory requirements. What accounts for the shift? Weaknesses in the planning system have become more visible after two decades of fiscal constraint, rapid growth, and pressure on natural resources. Increasingly, planning problems spill across borders—both local government borders 143 and the functional policy borders of single-purpose planning agencies. Recognition of the inadequacy of fragmented, single-purpose regional planning has come from within the system itself; the new transportation and environmental programs of the 1990s seek better policy integration to achieve their own goals. Today’s reformers face challenges similar to those faced by Progressive Era leaders, who viewed their system of government as increasingly dysfunctional in its response to economic development needs. Whereas Progressives advocated that city governments be empowered, today’s reformers seek “regional home rule,” or the ability of metropolitan regions to marshal resources in a more coordinated way to respond to rising global economic competition. This goal explains why today’s reformers place so much emphasis on policy integration. They are attempting to change the scale at which policy coherence and accountability are framed. Smart-growth policies attempt to substitute a regional view for a local or even a statewide lens on policy outcomes. Continuing resistance to reforms that alter governmental arrangements also leads reformers to stress policy goals rather than new procedural requirements or a redistribution of authority. Traditionally, the opponents of strong regional planning capacity have outnumbered the constituencies that favor it. Today, however, a nexus of policy concerns may alter this equation. As momentum builds for action to address growth-related problems, reformers seek compromises that avoid traditional standoffs. New collaborative models such as the NCCP and the RCIP rely on the promise of mutual gains to involve different levels of government, as well as private interest groups, in complex integrated planning efforts. New models are changing the nature of collaboration. In the past, collaboration often emphasized procedural more than policy coordination. COGs, MPOs, RTPAs, and LAFCOs all reflected this emphasis, for example. This planning style reflects the inheritance of the Progressive Era—the centrality of cities in growth management. Even as the state and federal governments came to dominate regional planning for certain functional concerns, this was organized in a service-oriented way to facilitate local growth prerogatives. Coordination was encouraged 144 among cities to ensure a more orderly process, but individual cities were generally left to define and pursue their own development goals. As regional needs have taken greater precedence, the needs of cities are no longer the starting place for growth policy. Now governments and functional agencies are encouraged to use regional—or subregional—needs as a basis for coordinating more integrated plans. Regional planning is becoming more than merely an interface between federal, state, and local concerns through efforts to define policies with comprehensive objectives. An important aspect of the third-wave planning framework is the greater authority that has emerged at the county level. This new framework represents a compromise between evolution and devolution through existing governance arrangements. Through programs such as the NCCP, SB 45, and county transportation sales tax measures, counties are increasing the scale within which more integrated plans are being devised. The RCIP and SANDAG provide clear evidence of this process evolving in two very different contexts. Collaborative Regional Planning: The Future of Regionalism in California? Although the third wave has extended collaborative models in new directions, collaborative planning is hardly a new idea in California. In fact, it has been the default method for decades for multipurpose regional planning. Will collaboration be enough? Collaborative planning is well suited in many ways to the needs of the state. The decreased emphasis on new administrative authority and regulation is an advantage. Momentum for regional planning reform has been blunted for decades because of resistance to increasing state control or to establishing a new layer of government that would undermine local control. Reform efforts that do not get mired in conflicts about details of new governance arrangements could be essential. A collaborative framework for state support of regional planning may be better suited to accommodate regional differences. An obstacle to regionalism in California has been the very strength and diversity of the state’s regions themselves, which has made it difficult to apply any one- 145 size-fits-all model. Institutional flexibility is important not just because it is more politically palatable. The historical problem of regional governance is fundamentally related to shifting boundaries. Metropolitan areas will always change more rapidly, and new planning problems arise more quickly, than jurisdictional borders can be reconfigured to keep up. The proper scale at which to address different functional problems also varies. Many planning problems are hard to capture within the borders of existing jurisdictions and they require flexible subregional and even superregional institutional configurations. For these reasons, institutional flexibility is a necessary component in any state effort to promote effective regional planning. The strongest advertisement for collaborative planning in California may be that it forms the basis for promising initiatives emerging across the state today. Regional coordination on a collaborative basis is occurring in very diverse areas with very different concerns. Thus, for a number of reasons, collaborative planning may be the best practical way to enhance regionalism in California today. Therefore, it is critical to assess its strengths and weaknesses to consider how it can be supported effectively. What does California’s experience with collaborative planning indicate? Most purely voluntary collaborative initiatives in California have been organized at a subregional level. Purely voluntary efforts tend to emerge among local governments and community leaders with close ties and common concerns. Intergovernmental initiatives have been most effective where the multijurisdictional nature of a planning problem was unavoidable and unmistakable, for example, in the case of a transportation corridor or a watershed. A shared set of clear policy objectives was also essential. Either participants sought mutual benefits in relation to a shared resource such as a transportation corridor, or a policy mandate provided the planning focus, for example, in the case of watershed restoration or habitat preservation. Collaborative initiatives have relied on the promise of mutual gains to be achieved through cooperation. These gains have generally taken the form of greater planning certainty for participants and cost savings through more efficient use of resources. Various current planning debates indicate potential for further gains of this kind. For example, 146 negotiations at the state level during the early 1990s suggested that environmentalists might have been willing to trade an easing of CEQA regulations in designated areas in exchange for firmer commitments to preservation of open space and natural habitat. However, in the absence of clear state growth goals and a regional planning framework in which to address such tradeoffs, environmentalists and developers have remained at a standoff over CEQA reform. Integrated planning initiatives indicate that planning certainty can be a difficult goal to attain, however. In a number of cases—air quality management, the NCCP, and CALFED, for example—this became a matter of considerable conflict. To guarantee certainty to one party, another was called on to absorb the cost of future uncertainty. In some cases, the government may be able to commit to absorb future unpredicted costs. However, in others, the inability to predict future conditions—for example, because of the lack of adequate scientific methods—makes it difficult to establish a basis for negotiation. Voluntary collaboration has long proved to be more difficult as a means for solving complex planning problems across large metropolitan areas and in situations in which deep conflicts existed and no basis for cooperation was established.1 The difficulty in resolving deep-seated conflicts through a collaborative approach is revealed in standoffs over LULUs such as airport expansion and the siting of toxic waste facilities. However, the toxic waste case indicates that local governments are able to resolve differences when faced with the threat of state preemption of their own control over siting decisions. The fair share approach adopted in the toxic waste case could be a model for other similar planning concerns. The difficulty in adopting and implementing complex, multifunctional plans through voluntary collaboration is evident in the history of the state’s COGs. Even in the state’s most politically coherent metropolitan area—the San Diego area—recent debates indicate high levels of frustration with voluntarism, and the outcome of the RGEC process reveals the limits of the model for resolving deep-seated conflicts. ____________ 1This discussion was informed by Fulton et al. (2000b). 147 In multicounty areas, collaborative approaches have been somewhat ineffective even in planning for single-function concerns. For example, the state’s multicounty MPOs have found it difficult to achieve regional focus, often because counties perceive their interests differently. Similarly, the state’s attempt to establish multicounty bioregional councils for habitat preservation during the early 1990s failed, even though smaller-scale watershed and habitat planning has flourished. Finally, collaborative models have worked better for policy formulation than for implementation. The rise of traditional conflicts after the CALFED proposal was taken to the state and federal legislatures, and the difficulty in reconciling bottom-up and top-down watershed planning, point to the limits of collaborative models as mechanisms for policy adoption and implementation. A comparison of collaborative initiatives across different functional planning areas highlights important considerations. Collaboration appears to work best in conjunction with clear policy mandates in relation to public goods that are difficult to divide among different parties. For example, environmental regulations establish precise, healthrelated standards for air and water quality. These provide a focus for regional planning to attain the standards. Air basins and water bodies are indivisible, in the sense that environmental standards must be achieved for their entirety, rather than for component parts. With clear policy mandates and indivisible public goods, implementation may be approached effectively through collaborative methods. Transportation planning has lacked the same clarity and precision in its policy objectives and has also lacked regional focus as a result. As a public good, transportation is characterized to a greater degree by its divisibility. Funds have been allocated on the basis of geographical equity as often as they have been allocated to meet regionally defined objectives. These observations suggest that in relation to distributional goods such as transportation, the tug-of-war between local and regional costs and benefits may be especially hard to resolve. Clear policy objectives and funding geared to regional needs as well as geographic equity may be essential for achieving regional planning focus. Land use is the policy area in which regional priorities and policies have been hardest to define and implement, reflecting the tradition of 148 local control over this policy area. Collaborative land use initiatives such as the NCCP and coordinated urban growth boundaries indicate that local governments are sometimes willing to trade a measure of autonomy to increase control when planning problems cross boundaries and require coordinated solutions. However, these initiatives have generally been limited to smaller areas or only to certain concerns such as habitat preservation. As a result, they have provided only partial solutions to larger planning problems. The state’s influence over land use policy is key, because federal mandates play a smaller role. Even when the state adopts a laissez-faire approach, it plays a central role in influencing land use outcomes, because the state government establishes the combination of mandates and incentives that guide local land use choices and encourage or preclude regional collaboration. The affordable housing crisis brought to light the effects of de facto state land use policy, calling into question the lack of coordination and consistency among state regulations and incentives. The state government has begun to adopt a stronger role in defining land use policy goals, through programs such as the NCCP, watershed regulations, LAFCO reform, enforcement of RHNA requirements, and water concurrency requirements.2 However, resolution of the state’s housing problems may require a more systematic approach. The State’s Role in Regional Planning Emerging regional initiatives in California demonstrate that planning reform is possible through existing institutions. But without stronger support from the state, the most far-reaching efforts such as the RCIP are likely to remain the exception rather than the rule. Planning integration is likely to remain limited to subregional areas and narrower sets of concerns.3 ____________ 2In 2001, a bill was signed into law requiring that local governments include proof of adequate water supply as a condition of approving housing projects with 500 or more residential units. 3Many of the following proposals are drawn from Teitz et al. (2001). 149 To strengthen regional collaboration, the state government would need to adopt policies with three goals: remove obstacles to cooperation, reorient local and state planning to regional needs, and directly strengthen regional planning mechanisms. The state should seek to ensure that fiscal and other incentives faced by local governments do not provoke damaging competition. Proposals such as a return of property tax revenue to local governments in exchange for a shift back to the state government of sales tax revenue offer a way to reorient incentives without major spending increases. Greater alignment of state growth plans and programs would also remove obstacles to regional coordination. Fragmented, even competing objectives in state plans and policies make regional coordination more difficult. Policies are also required to reorient state and local planning to regional needs. For example, fiscal reforms might condition a return of property tax revenue to local governments on enactment of policies to promote transit-oriented infill development. Transportation funding could be leveraged in a similar fashion. However, such blanket policies might not serve the needs of all regions or localities. To orient state programs to regional needs requires a strategy for defining and implementing regional objectives, and this should not be developed by the state government alone. How can the state strengthen integrated regional planning in a collaborative framework? Any effective measures to strengthen regional planning should seek to promote policy integration, regional focus, and accountability. It is the combination of these elements that has been lacking in most traditional regional planning. Some regional plans, for example for transportation, have lacked regional focus, resembling compendia of local plans and political tradeoffs more than a clear articulation of regional priorities and programs. Even when plans are more focused, they may lack comprehensiveness. For example, regional air quality plans have clear policy objectives but implementation measures have been limited by the inability of air agencies to influence land use decisions. Other more comprehensive regional plans have been rendered less effective because of a lack of accountability. For example, SANDAG’s growth-management plans considered interrelationships among functional areas, but they were 150 largely advisory documents that local governments could choose to ignore. An unfortunate tradeoff has often been evident in reform struggles in the state between planning comprehensiveness on the one hand and regional focus and accountability on the other. In general, California has accommodated functional focus far better than comprehensiveness. Measures to enhance regionalism should seek to avoid this tradeoff. There are two main ways that governments traditionally have been able to combine policy comprehensiveness, focus, and accountability. On the one hand, they have established accountability to voters. Voter preferences guide general-purpose governments through the balancing act of trading off the costs and benefits of different policy goals and program choices. This process enables general-purpose governments and their leaders to combine broad scope and clear focus into coherent visions for the future growth and development of communities. The other way that governments provide policy breadth, focus, and accountability is through mandates. For example, growth-management frameworks established in other states rely on an integrated set of statedefined goals, policies, and programs to guide local and regional planning. Regional public-private collaborative initiatives represent a third way. Through broad planning processes involving various agencies and interest groups, these initiatives hope to articulate coherent regional “visions” for growth and development. These consensus-building efforts may be extremely valuable in helping define policy goals. However, they cannot substitute for the electoral process as a means for holding leaders and policies accountable to democratic principles. The parallel between today’s reformers and Progressive Era leaders points not only to the potential for far-reaching change but also to certain pitfalls that should be avoided. As a number of historians have documented, Progressive leaders often advocated the use of “impartial” appointed boards and commissions as a substitute for what was perceived as a messier and more corrupt electoral process. However, this sometimes led to 151 decisionmaking that lacked public involvement and oversight and, far from being impartial, often reflected business interests most heavily.4 Combining elements of all three approaches—voter accountability, state mandates, and public-private collaboration—may be the best way to bridge the traditional tradeoffs that have debilitated regional planning in the state. Oregon’s experience (discussed in Chapter 5) supports this conclusion. First, the establishment of Metro—the directly elected metropolitan service district established for the Portland area—in the 1970s created a measure of “regional home rule.” Metro’s statutory responsibilities include adoption of regional growth goals and objectives, review and coordination of land use activities, and adoption of various functional plans. Second, a broad coalition of civic and community leaders—a “collaborative regional initiative”—kept up pressure for smartgrowth planning. Third, the state adopted a comprehensive set of growth-management goals, objectives, and standards. Local planning was oriented to regional needs, and regional agencies were given stiff outcome-oriented performance mandates. This confluence of forces produced a major transformation of regional land use and transportation policies in the Portland region during the 1990s (Weitz, 1999; Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). A framework for regional planning integration could be established based on lessons learned during the 1990s. The Commission on Regionalism advocates “performance-based regional compacts” as a mechanism for aligning federal, state, regional, and local policies. This model would extend the experience gained through programs such as CALFED, the NCCP, and RCIP more systematically and comprehensively. Realignment of state policies could promote more strategic infrastructure investment and environmental planning. Such realignment has been advocated in numerous assessments of the state’s infrastructure needs, and the state’s new requirement for five-year integrated infrastructure investment plans moves in this direction. However, if the state government goes further than simply coordinating its own programs, and also works to reconcile regional and local plans ____________ 4See Pincetl (1999) on this issue. 152 and policies, the effort might also help overcome policy gridlock regarding fiscal and land use planning. This approach to regionalism might overcome pitfalls of past growth-management reform efforts. If the state government uses its own investments as a lever to promote collaboration, the reforms might not fall flat somewhere between providing bigger “carrots” and stronger “sticks.” In the past, proposals for financial incentives to encourage local compliance with state planning objectives often failed because of budget shortfalls, and stiffer regulatory mandates were rejected as too interventionist. Aligning state programs and policies with the outcomes of a collaborative planning process offers a possible third way for the state to promote regionalism through the promise of mutual gains. However, measures would be needed to ground this approach in a coherent and accountable policy framework. One way to insert public accountability would be to provide a greater measure of “regional home rule” by providing some fiscal authority on a regional basis—for example, the power to raise bonds for infrastructure purposes. The Commission on Regionalism advocates this approach for capital expenditures outlined in collaboratively devised regional plans. This would introduce an element of voter accountability in relation to functions for which voters have been more willing to support multijurisdictional approaches. Another way to strengthen accountability would be for the state government to define and enforce regional growth-management objectives for both state and local agencies to achieve—also a recommendation of the Commission on Regionalism. To preserve flexibility, the objectives could be designed as outcome-oriented performance measures rather than as detailed program requirements. This approach may be more attractive to voters and local government officials than one based on new procedural requirements, since it emphasizes problem-solving. An example is Oregon’s transportation planning rule of 1991, which mandated the attainment of specific, numerical objectives for reductions in regional vehicle miles traveled without prescribing the exact measures that local governments and regional agencies were required to undertake. This approach is also central to state programs such as the NCCP. 153 This approach would align well with collaborative models, accommodating their strength—institutional flexibility—but also addressing their weaknesses. Collaborative initiatives have succeeded when they had clear policy objectives, and in many cases, these were imposed externally. Clear objectives are needed to ensure that plans do not merely aggregate state and local political tradeoffs. They are needed to maintain public accountability in relation to flexible and varied institutional models. They are needed as a basis for negotiation among conflicting interests. Especially in relation to multifunction, multicounty planning, clear policy objectives and measurable standards may be the most critical elements that the state government can provide to help achieve comprehensiveness, focus, and accountability through a collaborative framework. As a guide for comprehensive regional planning, a set of interrelated growth-management objectives may be useful. These can help link different planning areas. For example, requiring efficient use of existing infrastructure would require a more careful consideration of the connection between transportation and land use policies. Promoting affordable housing development that supports regional transportation priorities would have a similar effect. Designation of regional growth boundaries and key natural resource areas for protection could help preserve endangered species and valuable open space, and it could also be aligned with policies to streamline regulation for land developers within other designated areas. To give the objectives “teeth,” they would need to be sufficiently detailed to determine the extent to which they were being implemented. This would carve out an affirmative state commitment to growth management in areas of overriding statewide concern. However, the state would need to consider how to accommodate differences among regions in planning priorities. It would also need to provide guidance regarding the relative importance of objectives that may sometimes conflict. One way to reconcile greater state activism with a voluntary implementation framework would be for the state to provide support for collaborative planning without mandating it. It could provide incentives for local projects and plans that conform to collaboratively defined 154 regional priorities. Some incentives, such as priority funding for state infrastructure investments and regulatory streamlining, would not require significant new state funding appropriations. To provide “teeth” for effective planning, the state would also need to ensure that planning is not just undertaken by like-minded governments but rather at the appropriate geographic scale that corresponds to the regional systems in question. Increasingly, counties serve as the new framework for growth-management planning in California. Although there are some arguments in favor of this, a county-based planning system would be inadequate in most parts of the state. Many metropolitan areas are multicounty. In other cases, key regional systems operate at a multicounty scale even if metropolitan areas do not. County-level planning could form a fundamental and logical part of larger regional planning processes. However, it cannot substitute for regional planning in multicounty areas. Furthermore, planning consistency cannot substitute for planning focus at the appropriate scale. Simply requiring consistency between local, county, and regional plans would provide no assurance that regional plans articulate and implement regionally defined objectives. An approach that emphasizes policy objectives would turn the state’s traditional planning model upside down. In general, state planning law has imposed process rather than policy mandates on local governments. The functional, process-oriented planning model made more sense at a time of broad consensus about the wider social goals of planning and at a time when cities were the building blocks of regional growth and development. As that consensus has started to deteriorate, basic questions need to be revisited about what we want from government in relation to metropolitan growth and development. The state government plays a central role in creating the incentives and institutions that guide metropolitan growth planning. In the absence of general-purpose governments operating at a regional scale, state policy action is needed to help balance local concerns with a broader outlook. California does not lack regional planning institutions so much as regional planning, particularly multipurpose planning with a regional focus and public accountability. State reforms should help provide the 155 focus and accountability that has often been missing at a regional scale without sacrificing the institutional flexibility needed in a diverse and rapidly changing place such as California. 156 Appendix A Geographic Jurisdictions and Governance Structures of California Councils of Governments In general, the geographic boundaries of California metropolitan area COGs coincide with the state’s metropolitan areas as defined by the U.S. Census (Census Bureau metropolitan statistical areas, or MSAs, are composed of counties). Only four of California’s metropolitan area COGs are multicounty: the Association of Bay Area Governments, the COG for the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area; the Southern California Association of Governments, the COG for Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Imperial Counties; the Sacramento Area Council of Governments, the COG for El Dorado, Placer, Sacramento, Sutter, Yolo, and Yuba Counties; and the Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments, the COG for Monterey, Santa Cruz, and San Benito Counties. The differences in the composition of COGS and MSAs in California are: Imperial County is included in the Los Angeles area COG but not the Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA); Madera County is included in the Fresno MSA but not in the Fresno County COG; the Monterey Bay Area COG includes San Benito and Santa Cruz Counties, although Santa Cruz County is included in the San Francisco area CMSA, and San Benito County is not in any MSA; and the Sacramento area COG includes two counties that the Census Bureau designates as a separate MSA—Sutter and Yuba. The most common governing structure used by COGs throughout the United States and in California is apportionment on a onegovernment, one-vote basis. However, the structure of COGs varies somewhat on a case-by-case basis. Some California COGs have implemented weighted voting schemes that better address their particular 157 political circumstances. For example, the Council of Fresno Governments requires that proposals be passed by board members representing at least 40 percent of the population and also by a majority of the board members. This scheme balances representation by population and by political jurisdiction. Board members of the San Diego Association of Governments and the Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments may invoke a population-weighted voting scheme, although this occurs rarely. Other California COGs provide additional votes to larger jurisdictions; this is true for the Sacramento Area Council of Governments, for example. The Southern California Association of Governments comes closest to a strictly population-based method for allocating power. Since the early 1990s, SCAG’s council has included one county supervisor from each of five counties, two from Los Angeles County, and 64 members representing districts comprising about 200,000 in population (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). 158 Appendix B Councils of Governments in California Appendix Table B.1 provides names, addresses, contact information, years of establishment, and a description of member jurisdictions for Councils of Governments in California. 159 Table B.1 Councils of Governments in California 160 Council of Government Association of Bay Area Governments Year Established Address 1961 Metro Center, 101 8th St. P.O. Box 2050 Oakland, CA 94607 Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments 1968 445 Reservation Rd., Suite G P.O. Box 809 Marina, CA 93933 Butte County Association of Governments 1969 479-A Oro Damp Blvd. Oroville, CA 95965 Calaveras County Association of Governmentsa 1998 692 Marshall P.O Box 280 San Andreas, CA 95249 Central Sierra Planning Council and Economic Development District 1973 53 W. Bradford Av, Suite 200 Sonora, CA 95370 Coachella Valley Association of Governments 1973 73710 Fred Waring Dr., Suite 200 Palm Desert, CA 92260 Phone/Fax Numbers Phone: (510) 464-7900 Fax: (510) 464-7970 Member Jurisdictions Counties of Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, Sonoma, and 97 cities Phone: (831) 883-3750 Counties of Monterey, Santa Cruz, San Fax: (831) 883-3755 Benito, and 18 cities Phone: (530) 538-6866 Butte County and 5 cities Fax: (530) 538-6868 Phone: (209) 754-2094 Calaveras County and 1 city Fax: (209) 754-2096 Phone: (209) 532-8768 Counties of Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, Fax: (209) 532-7599 Tuolumne, and 7 cities Phone: (760) 346-1127 Riverside County, 10 cities and 2 Indian Fax: (760) 340-5949 tribes Table B.1 (continued) Council of Governments Council of Fresno County Governments Year Established Address 1969 2100 Tulare St., Suite 619 Fresno, CA 93721 Council of San Benito County Governments 1973 3216 Southside Rd., Hollister, CA 95023 Phone/Fax Numbers Member Jurisdictions Phone: (209) 233-4148 Fresno County and 15 cities Fax: (209) 233-9645 Phone: (831) 637-4170 San Benito County and 2 cities Fax: (831) 636-4160 Eastern Sierra Council of Governments 1995 P.O. Box 1609 Mammoth Lakes, CA 93546 Phone: (760) 934-8989 Inyo and Mono Counties and 2 cities Fax: (760) 934-8608 161 Humboldt County Association of Governments Imperial Valley Association of Governments Kern County Council of Governments 1968 1972 1967 235 4th St., Suite F Eureka, CA 95501 940 W. Main St., Suite 208 El Centro, CA 92243 Kress Building, 3rd Floor 1401 19th St., Suite 300 Bakersfield, CA 93301 Phone: (707) 444-8208 Humboldt County and 7 cities Fax: (707) 444-8319 Phone: (760) 339-4290 Imperial County and 7 cities Fax: (760) 352-7876 Phone: (805) 861-2191 Kern County and 11 cities Fax: (805) 324-8215 Kings County Association of Governments 1967 Government Center 1400 W. Lacey Blvd., Bldg.#6 Hanford, CA 93230 Phone: (559) 582-3211 Kings County and 4 cities Fax: (559) 584-8989 Lake County City 1972 160 5th St. Areawide Planning Council Lakeport, CA 95453 Phone: (707) 263-1600 Lake County and 2 cities Fax: (707) 263-1826 Table B.1 (continued) 162 Council of Governments Mendocino Council of Governments Merced County Association of Governments Year Established Address 1972 367 N. State St., Suite 206 Ukiah, CA 95482 1967 369 W. 18th St., Merced, CA 95340 Orange County Council of Governmentsa 1996 600 W. Santa Ana Blvd., Suite 214 Santa Ana, CA 92701 Sacramento Area Council of Governments 1967 3000 S St., Suite 300, Sacramento, CA 95816 San Bernardino Associated Governments San Diego Association of Governments San Joaquin County Council of Governments 1973 1972 1968 472 N. Arrowhead Av. San Bernardino, CA 92401 Wells Fargo Plaza, 401 B St., Suite 800 San Diego, CA 92101 6 S. Eldorado St., Suite 400 Stockton, CA 95202 Phone/Fax Numbers Phone: (707) 463-1859 Fax: (707) 463-2212 Phone: (209) 723-3153 Fax: (209) 723-0322 Member Jurisdictions Mendocino County and 4 cities Merced County and 6 cities Phone: (714) 972-0077 31 cities and 10 single-purpose planning Fax: (714) 972-1816 agencies Phone: (916) 457-2264 Counties of El Dorado, Placer (part), Fax: (916) 457-3299 Sacramento, Sutter, Yolo, Yuba, and 18 cities Phone: (909) 884-8276 San Bernardino County and 24 cities Fax: (909) 885-4407 Phone: (619) 595-5300 San Diego County and 19 cities Fax: (619) 595-5305 Phone: (209) 468-3913 San Joaquin County and 7 cities Fax: (209) 468-1084 Table B.1 (continued) 163 Council of Governments San Luis Obispo Council of Governments Year Established Address 1968 1150 Osos St., Suite 202 San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 San Mateo County Association of Governmentsb 1992 555 County Center, 5th Floor Redwood City, CA 94063 Santa Barbara County Association of Governments 1966 222 E. Anapamu St., Suite 11 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 Sierra Planning Organization and Economic Development District 1969 560 Wall St., Suite F Auburn, CA 95603 Siskiyou Association of Governmental Entities 1972 County Courthouse Annex 311 4th St., P.O. Box 1085, Yreka, CA 96097 Southern California Association of Governments 1965 818 W. 7th St., 12th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 Phone/Fax Numbers Member Jurisdictions Phone: (805) 781-4219 San Luis Obispo County and 7 cities Fax: (805) 781-5703 Phone: (650) 599-1420 San Mateo County and 20 cities Fax: (650) 361-8227 Phone: (805) 568-2546 Santa Barbara County and 7 cities Fax: (805) 568-2947 Phone: (530) 823-4703 Counties of El Dorado (part), Nevada, Fax: (530) 823-4142 Placer (part), Sierra, and 10 cities Phone: (530) 842-8202 Siskiyou County and 9 cities Fax: (530) 842-8211 Phone: (213) 236-1800 Counties of Imperial, Los Angeles, Fax: (213) 236-1825 Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, and 188 cities Table B.1 (continued) 164 Council of Governments Stanislaus Council of Governments Year Established Address 1971 1025 15th St. Modesto, CA 95354 Phone/Fax Numbers Member Jurisdictions Phone: (209) 558-7830 Stanislaus County and 9 cities Fax: (209) 558-7833 Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 1969 308 Dorla Court, Suite 103 P.O. Box 1038 Zephyr Cove, NV 89448 Phone: (775) 588-4547 Fax: (775) 588-4527 Counties of Douglas (part), El Dorado (basin portion), Placer (basin portion), and Washoe (part); Carson City (part), South Lake Tahoe, and Lake Tahoe Watershed Basin Tulare County Association 1971 5961 S. Mooney Blvd. of Governments Visalia, CA 93277 Phone: (559) 733-6291 Tulare County and 8 cities Fax: (559) 730-2653 Ventura Council of Governmentsc 1992 1130 Capri Way Oxnard, CA 93035 Phone: (805) 984-6997 Ventura County and 10 cities Fax: (805) Western Riverside Council of Governmentsa 1989 3880 Lemon St., 3rd Floor Riverside, CA 92501 Phone: (909) 787-7985 Riverside County and 14 cities Fax: (909) 787-7991 SOURCE: COGs, addresses, and membership information are from the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, http://www.calpin.ca.gov/directory/cog.asp. aIndicates a member of the California Association of Councils of Government, www.calcog.org. bEstablishment dates and other information were obtained independently. cA prior organization, the Ventura County Association of Governments, was disbanded in the late 1980s. Appendix C Key to Functional Responsibilities of California Councils of Governments Table C.1 Key to Functional Responsibilities of California Councils of Governments Listed in Appendix Table C.2 Codes for level of responsibility A Officially designated authority B Lead authority C Co-lead authority D Involved Codes for functions MPO Metropolitan Planning Organization RTPA Regional Transportation Planning Agency CMPA Congestion Management Planning Agency RHA Regional Housing Allocation PPR Plan and Project Review (Regional Clearinghouse) ALUC Airport Land Use Commission RHWMP Preparation of Regional Hazardous Waste Management Plan RAQMP Preparation of Regional Air Quality Management Plan RWQCP Preparation of Regional Water Quality Control Plan RSWMP Preparation of Regional Solid Waste Management Plan ED Economic Development FS Financial Services (e.g., Workers Compensation, Pooled Insurance) GIS Data and Information Services CDC Census Data Center SHS Social/Health Services CMR Conflict Mediation/Resolution RA Rideshare Agency STA Sales Tax Authority 165 Table C.2 Functions of Councils of Governments, Metropolitan Planning Organizations, and Regional Transportation Planning Agencies in California Metropolitan Areas 166 Subregional COG/RTPA Southern California Association of Governments Imperial Valley Association of Governmentsa L.A. County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Orange County Council of Governments Orange County Transportation Authoritya San Bernardino Associated Governments Riverside County Transportation Commissiona Coachella Valley Association of Governments Western Riverside Council of Governments Ventura Council of Governmentsa Ventura County Transportation Commission Metropolitan Transportation Commission Association of Bay Area Governments San Mateo County Association of Governmentsa Sacramento Area Council of Governments El Dorado County Transportation Commission Placer County Transportation Planning Agency MPO RTPA CMPA Multicounty COG/MPO Los Angeles Area AA D D Cb A Cb A Cb A Cb A D DD D Cb A San Francisco Bay Area AA A Sacramento Area AA A DA A Function (see key) RHA PPR ALUC RHWMP A AD D DD B D DD D DD C D AA C D D D C AA A A AA A B D RAQMP C D D D D C D D C/Dc C/Dc D C RWQCP C D D A D Table C.2 (continued) 167 Function (see key) Subregional COG/RTPA MPO RTPA CMPA RHA PPR ALUC RHWMP Monterey Bay Area Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments A AA Council of San Benito County Governments A BA Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation Commission AA D Transportation Agency for Monterey Countya AA D B Single-County Metropolitan Area COG/MPO/RTPA Butte County Association of Governments AA AA Council of Fresno County Governmentsd A A A AA Kern Council of Governments A A A AA Merced County Association of Governments A A A AA San Diego Association of Governments A A A A AA San Joaquin County Council of Governments A A A A AA San Luis Obispo Council of Governments AA AD Santa Barbara County Association of Governments A A A A AA Shasta County Regional Transportation Planning Agency A A A DD Stanislaus Area Association of Governments A A A AA Tulare County Association of Governments A A D AA A A D B C RAQMP C D C C C D C C D D C D RWQCP A D Table C.2 (continued) 168 Function (see key) Subregional COG/RTPA RSWMP ED FS GIS CDC SHS CMR RA STA Multicounty COG/MPO Los Angeles Area Southern California Association of Governments D C D C CD B Imperial Valley Association of Governmentsa DD D L.A. County Metropolitan Transportation Authority A Orange County Council of Governments Orange County Transportation Authoritya A San Bernardino Associated Governments DB CA Riverside County Transportation Commissiona BA Coachella Valley Association of Governments B B B B D Western Riverside Council of Governments D A CD Ventura Council of Governmentsa C C Ventura County Transportation Commission DA A DDA San Francisco Bay Area Metropolitan Transportation Commission Association of Bay Area Governments San Mateo County Association of Governmentsa D A AA D D Sacramento Area Sacramento Area Council of Governments El Dorado County Transportation Commission Placer County Transportation Planning Agency BA A D CA D C D C/D Monterey Bay Area Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments Council of San Benito County Governments Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation Commission Transportation Agency for Monterey Countya D AA D D A Table C.2 (continued) 169 Function (see key) RSWMP ED FS GIS CDC SHS CMR RA STA Single-County Metropolitan Area COG/MPO/RTPA Butte County Association of Governments AA A Council of Fresno County Governmentsd CB Kern Council of Governments D AA Merced County Association of Governments A AA AA San Diego Association of Governments DD D AA A A San Joaquin County Council of Governments BA A San Luis Obispo Council of Governments DA Santa Barbara County Association of Governments DA A Shasta County Regional Transportation Planning Agency B Stanislaus Area Association of Governments AD Tulare County Association of Governments DA DA SOURCE: California Association of Councils of Governments for their members. NOTE: Modifications made to RTPA and CMPA status for Merced County Association of Governments, San Bernardino Associated Governments, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and Ventura County Transportation Commission. aInformation obtained through interview. bDesignated as County Transportation Commissions, to participate in preparing Regional Transportation Plans. cCo-lead for federal plan and cooperates in preparation of state plan. dMadera County was added to the Fresno Metropolitan Statistical Area in 1992. Appendix D Transportation Planning Agencies in California Appendix Table D.1 provides names, addresses, contact information, and geographical coverage for the main types of transportation planning agencies in California. 171 Table D.1 Transportation Planning Agencies in California MPO RTPA CMA Agency XX Southern California Association of Governments Counties Covered Los Angeles Area Imperial, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura Address 818 W. 7th St., 12th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 Phone/Fax Phone: (213) 236-1800 Fax: (213) 236-1963 Xa Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Los Angeles One Gateway Plaza Phone: (213) 922-2820 Mail Stop 99-23-02 Fax: (213) 922-2849 Los Angeles, CA 90012-2952 Xa Orange County Orange Transportation Authority 550 S. Main St. Santa Ana, CA 92868 Phone: (714) 560-6282 Fax: (714) 560-5794 172 Xa Riverside County Riverside Transportation Commission 3560 University Ave., Suite 100 Riverside, CA 92501 Phone: (909) 787-7141 Fax: (909) 787-7920 Xa San Bernardino County San Bernardino Transportation Commission, c/o San Bernardino Ass’d Govts. 472 N. Arrowhead Ave. Phone: (909) 884-8276 San Bernardino, CA 92401 Fax: (909) 885-4407 Xa Ventura County Ventura Transportation Commission 950 County Square Dr., Suite 207 Ventura, CA 93003 Phone: (805) 642-1591 Fax: (805) 642-4860 173 Table D.1 (continued) MPO X RTPA CMA Agency Counties Covered Monterey Bay Area Association of Monterey Bay Monterey, Santa Cruz, San Area Governments Benito Address 445 Reservation Rd., Suite G P.O. Box 809 Marina, CA 93933 X X Transportation Agency for Monterey Monterey County 55-B Plaza Circle Salinas, CA 93901 X Council of San Benito San Benito County Governments 3216 Southside Rd. Hollister, CA 95023 X X Santa Cruz County Santa Cruz 1523 Pacific Ave. Regional Transportation Santa Cruz, CA 95060- Commission 3911 Sacramento Area, Lake Tahoe Regions XX Sacramento Area Council Sacramento, Sutter, Yolo, 3000 S St., of Governments Yuba, nonurbanized portions Suite 300 of Placer and El Dorado Sacramento, CA 95816 outside the Tahoe Basin, and 3 cities in Placer (Roseville, Rocklin, and Lincoln) X El Dorado County El Dorado (excluding Tahoe 550 Main St., Suite C Transportation Commission Basin) Placerville, CA 95667 Phone/Fax Phone: (831) 883-3750 Fax: (831) 883-3755 Phone: (831) 775-0903 Fax: (831) 775-0897 Phone: (831) 637-4170 Fax: (831) 636-8746 Phone: (831) 460-3200 Fax: (408) 460-3215 Phone: (916) 457-2264 Fax: (916) 457-3299 Phone: (530) 642-5260 Fax: (530) 642-5266 Table D.1 (continued) MPO RTPA X CMA Agency X Placer County Transportation Planning Agency Counties Covered Placer (excluding Tahoe Basin) X Sacramento Transportation Sacramento Authority Address 550 High St., Suite 107 Auburn, CA 95603 980 9th St., Suite 1780 Sacramento, CA 95814 Phone/Fax Phone: (530) 823-4030 Fax: (530) 823-4036 Phone: (916) 323-0080 Fax: (916) 443-3708 174 X Sutter County Public Works Sutter and Yuba 1160 Civic Center Blvd., Suite D Yuba City, CA 95993 Phone: (530) 822-7450 Fax: (530) 822-7457 X1 X2 1Tahoe Metropolitan Planning Organization, 2Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Portions of El Dorado and 308 Dorla Ct., Suite 103 Placer Counties in the Tahoe P.O. Box 1038 Basin, and Douglas, Washoe, Zephyr Cove, NV 89448 and Carson City, NV Phone: (775) 588-4547 Fax: (775) 588-4527 X Yolo Transportation District Yolo 350 Industrial Way Phone: (530) 661-0816 Woodland, CA 95776 Fax: (530) 661-1732 San Francisco Bay Area XX Metropolitan Transportation Alameda, Contra Costa, Joseph P. Bort Metro Center Phone: (510) 464-7700 Commission Marin, Napa, San Francisco, 101 8th St. Fax: (510) 464-7848 San Mateo, Santa Clara, Oakland, CA 94607-4700 Solano, Sonoma Table D.1 (continued) MPO RTPA CMA Agency X Alameda County CMA Counties Covered Alameda Address Phone/FAX 1333 Broadway, Suite 220 Phone: (510) 836-2560 Oakland, CA 94612 Fax: (510) 836-2185 X Contra Costa Transportation Contra Costa Authority 1340 Treat Blvd., Suite 150 Phone: (925) 938-3970 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Fax: (925) 938-3993 X Marin Public Works/CMA Marin X Napa County Department of Napa Works Civic Center, P.O. Box 4186 Phone: (415) 499-6570 San Rafael, CA 94913-4186 Fax: (415) 499-3799 1195 3rd St., Room 201 Napa, CA 94559-3082 Phone: (707) 253-4351 Fax: (707) 253-4627 175 X San Francisco Transportation Authority/CMA San Francisco 100 Van Ness, 25th Floor Phone: (415) 522-4802 San Francisco, CA 94102 Fax: (415) 522-4829 X San Mateo County San Mateo Association of Governments 555 County Center, 5th Floor Redwood, CA 94063 Phone: (650) 599-1420 Fax: (650) 361-8227 X Santa Clara County Transportation Authority X Solano County Transportation Authority Santa Clara Solano 331 N. First St., Bldg. B Phone: (408) 321-5725 San Jose, CA 95134-1906 Fax: (408) 321-5723 3 333 Sunset Ave., Suite 200 Phone: (707) 422-6491 Suisun City, CA 94585 Fax: (707) 438-0656 Table D.1 (continued) MPO X RTPA X CMA Agency Counties Covered X Sonoma County Sonoma Transportation Authority/CMA Other Metropolitan Areas Butte County Association of Butte Governments X X X Council of Fresno County Fresno Governments X X X Kern Council of Governments Kern Address 2550 Ventura Ave. Santa Rosa, CA 95403 965 Fir St. Chico, CA 95928-6301 2100 Tulare St., Suite 619 Fresno, CA 93721 1401 19th St., Suite 300 Bakersfield, CA 93301 Phone/FAX Phone: (707) 527-1943 Fax: (707) 527-1103 Phone: (530) 879-2468 Fax: (530) 879-2444 Phone: (559) 233-4148 Fax: (559) 233-9645 Phone: (661) 861-2191 Fax: (805) 324-8215 176 X X X Merced County Association Merced of Governments 369 W. 18th St. Merced, CA 95340 Phone: (209) 723-3153 Fax: (209) 723-0322 X X X San Diego Association of San Diego Governments X X X San Joaquin County of San Joaquin Governments Wells Fargo Plaza Phone: (619) 595-5323 401 B St., Suite 800 Fax: (619) 595-5305 San Diego, CA 92101-4287 6 S. El Dorado St., Suite 400 Stockton, CA 95202 Phone: (209) 468-3913 Fax: (209) 468-1084 Table D.1 (continued) MPO RTPA CMA Agency Counties Covered XX San Luis Obispo Council of San Luis Obispo Governments Address Phone/FAS 1150 Osos St., Suite 202 Phone: (805) 781-4219 San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Fax: (805) 781-5703 X X X Santa Barbara County Santa Barbara Association of Governments 222 E. Anapamu St., Phone: (805) 549-3640 Suite 11 Fax: (805) 568-2947 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 XX Shasta County Regional Transportation Planning Agency Shasta 1855 Placer St. Redding, CA 96001 Phone: (530) 225-5654 Fax: (530) 225-5667 177 X X X Stanislaus Council of Governments Stanislaus 900 H Street, Ste. D Modesto, CA 95354 Phone: (209) 558-7830 Fax: (209) 558-7833 X X X Tulare County Association Tulare 5961 South Mooney Blvd. Phone: (559) 733-6291 of Governments/Trans. Visalia, CA 93277 Fax: (559) 730-2653 Plan. Agency Nonmetropolitan Area Counties X Alpine County Local Alpine 50 Diamond Valley Rd. Phone: (530) 694-2140 Transportation Commission Markleeville, CA 96120 Fax: (530) 694-2214 X Amador County Amador Transportation Commission 11400 American Legion Dr., Suite A Jackson, CA 95642 Phone: (209) 267-2282 Fax: (209) 267-1930 Table D.1 (continued) MPO RTPA CMA Agency X Calaveras Council of Governments Counties Covered Calaveras X Colusa County Colusa Transportation Commission Address P.O. Box 280 692 Marshall, Unit A San Andreas, CA 95249 1215 Market St. Colusa, CA 95932 Phone/FAX Phone: (209) 754-2094 Fax: (209) 754-2096 Phone: (530) 458-5186 Fax: (530) 458-2035 X Del Norte Local Del Norte Transportation Commission 508 H St., Suite 1 Phone: (707) 465-3878 Crescent City, CA 95531 Fax: (707) 465-5518 178 X Glenn County Glenn Transportation Commission X Humboldt County Humboldt Association of Governments P.O. Box 1070 Willows, CA 95988 235 4th St., Suite F Eureka, CA 95501 Phone: (530) 934-6530 Fax: (530) 934-6533 Phone: (707) 444-8208 Fax: (707) 444-8319 X Inyo County Local Inyo Transportation Commission Inyo County Courthouse P.O. Drawer Q 168 N. Edwards Independence, CA 93526 Phone: (760) 878-0201 Fax: (760) 878-2001 X Kings County Association of Kings Governments Kings County Govt. Center Phone: (559) 582-3211 1400 W. Lacey Blvd. Fax: (559) 584-8989 Hanford, CA 93230 X Lake County/City Area Lake Planning Council 160 5th St. Lakeport, CA 95453 Phone: (707) 263-1600 Fax: (707) 263-1826 Table D.1 (continued) MPO RTPA CMA Agency Counties Covered X Lassen County Lassen Transportation Commission X Madera County Madera Transportation Commission X Mariposa County Local Mariposa Transportation Commission Address County Admin. Building 707 Nevada St. Susanville, CA 96310 Phone/FAX Phone: (530) 251-8288 Fax: (530) 257-4671 1816 Howard Rd., Suite 8 Madera, CA 93637 Phone: (559) 675-0721 Fax: (559) 675-9328 4639 Ben Hur Rd. Mariposa, CA 95338 (209) 966-5356 179 X Mendocino County Council Mendocino of Governments 367 N. State St., Suite 206 Ukiah, CA 95482 Phone: (707) 463-1859 Fax: (707) 463-2212 X Modoc County Local Modoc Transportation Commission X Mono County Local Mono Transportation Commission X Nevada County Nevada Transportation Commission 202 W. 4th St. Alturas, CA 96101 Phone: (530) 233-6414 Fax: (530) 233-3132 P.O. Box 347 Mammoth Lakes, CA 93546 Phone: (760) 924-5450 Fax: (760) 924-5458 101 Providence Mine Rd., Phone: (530) 265-3202 Ste. 102 Fax: (530) 265-3260 Nevada City, CA 95959 Table D.1 (continued) 180 MPO RTPA CMA Agency Counties Covered X Plumas County Plumas Transportation Commission Address 1834 E. Main St. Quincy, CA 95971 Phone/FAX Phone: (530) 283-6492 Fax: (530) 283-6323 X Sierra County Local Sierra Transportation Commission Courthouse Annex 101 Courthouse Sq. Downieville, CA 95936 Phone: (530) 289-3201 Fax: (530) 289-3620 X Siskiyou County Siskiyou Transportation Commission County Public Works Bldg. Phone: (530) 842-8250 305 Butte St. Fax: (530) 842-8288 Yreka, CA 96097 X Tehama County Tehama Transportation Commission 9380 San Benito Ave. Phone: (530) 385-1462 Gerber, CA 96035-9702 Fax: (530) 385-1189 X Trinity County Trinity Transportation Commission 190 Glen Rd. P.O. Box 2819 Weaverville, CA 96093-2819 Phone: (530) 623-1351 Fax: (530) 623-1353 X Tuolumne County/City Area Tuolumne Planning Council 2 S. Green St. Sonora, CA 95370 Phone: (209) 533-5601 (209) 533-5583 Fax: (209) 533-5698 SOURCES: California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), California MPO and RTPA Contacts, Congestion Management Agencies, County Transportation Commissions, www.dot.ca.gov/hq/tpp/offices/orip/list/agencies&gov.htm. aAlso designated as county transportation commissions in Division 12, commencing with Section 130.000 of the Public Utilities Code. Appendix E Statutes and Definitions Regarding Transportation Planning Agencies in California1 Regional Transportation Planning Agencies Section 29532 of the Government Code . . . transportation planning agencies designated by the Director of Transportation as follows: (a) For a county included within the jurisdiction of a statutorily created regional transportation planning agency, such agency. (b) For a county which is not included within the jurisdiction of a statutorily created regional transportation agency but for which there is a council of governments, and an election has not been made pursuant to Section 29536, such council. For a county which is not included within the jurisdiction of a statutorily created regional transportation agency but for which there is a council of governments for which an election has been made under the provisions of Section 29536 to form a local transportation commission, such local transportation commission authorized in Section 29535. (c) For a county not within the jurisdiction of a statutorily created regional transportation planning agency or a council of governments, the local transportation commission authorized in Section 29535. ____________ 1Source: California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), California Transportation Agencies and Tribal Governments, Statutes and Definitions, http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/tpp/offices/orip/list/agencies&gov.htm. 181 Local Transportation Commissions Section 29535 of the Government Code Within each county which is not within the jurisdiction of a statutorily created regional transportation planning agency or a council of governments, a local transportation commission shall be established and composed of three members appointed by the board of supervisors, three members appointed by the city selection committee of the county or by the city council in any county in which there is only one incorporated city, and, where applicable, three members appointed by a transit district and one member representing, collectively, the other transit operators in the county. However, in a county in which there are no incorporated cities, five members may be appointed to the commission by the board of supervisors. The appointing authority, for each regular member it appoints, may appoint an alternate member to serve in place of the regular member when the regular member is absent or disqualified from participating in a meeting of the commission. Statutory Regional Transportation Planning Agencies • Metropolitan Transportation Commission2—Title 7.1 of the Government Code (Section 66500 et al.) is the act establishing and empowering this commission for the San Francisco Bay Area. • Tahoe Regional Planning Agency—Title 7.4 of the Government Code (Section 66800 et al.) is the act establishing and empowering this agency for the Tahoe Basin. • Placer County Transportation Planning Agency—Title 7.91 of the Government Code (Section 67910 et al.) is the act ____________ 2The Association of Bay Area Governments is the comprehensive planning organization of the MTC region. 182 establishing and empowering this agency for Placer County, excluding the Tahoe Basin. • Nevada County Transportation Planning Agency—Title 7.92 of the Government Code (Section 67920 et al.) is the act establishing and empowering this agency for Nevada County. • Transportation Agency of Monterey County—Title 7.93 of the Government Code (Section 67930 et al.) is the act establishing and empowering this agency for Monterey County. • The Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation Commission—Title 7.94 of the Government Code (Section 67940 et al.) is the act establishing and empowering this agency for Santa Cruz County. • The El Dorado County Transportation Planning Agency—Title 7.95 of the Government Code (Section 67950 et al.) is the act establishing and empowering this agency for El Dorado County. Councils of Governments • Joint Exercise of Powers—Title 1, Chapter 5 of the Government Code (Section 6500 et al.) is the basis of all existing COGs in California. Metropolitan Planning Organizations An organization designated by the governor as a forum for cooperative transportation decisionmaking for the metropolitan planning area. Federal provision requires an MPO in urbanized areas. Congestion Management Agencies CMAs develop the Congestion Management Program in consultation with other agencies. CMAs can be either the Local Transportation Commission (as defined by Public Utilities Code 130000) or another public agency, as designated by resolutions adopted by the county board of supervisors and the city councils of a majority of the cities representing a majority of the population in the incorporated 183 area of the county. If the county and cities agree, they can either designate an existing agency or form a new agency to develop and monitor the Congestion Management Program. 184 Appendix F Existing Regional Arrangements1 Statewide Air Pollution Control Districts Airport Land Use Commissions Allocation of Regional Housing Needs Councils of Governments County Solid Waste Management Plans Hazardous Waste Management Plans Local Agency Formation Commissions Regional Planning Districts (enabled but never established) Regional Transportation Planning Agencies Regional Water Quality Control Boards Specific Regions For the San Francisco Bay Area Bay Area Air Quality Management District Metropolitan Transportation Commission San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission For the Tahoe Basin California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Tahoe Regional Planning Commission For the Los Angeles region and adjoining areas South Coast Air Quality Management District For the coastal areas California Coastal Commission ____________ 1As catalogued in Gary Jerome, Challenges and Opportunities: A Working Paper for the “New Regionalism” Project, Senate Select Committee on Planning for California’s Growth, Senate Local Government Committee, Sacramento, California, September 1988. 185 Bibliography Altshuler, Alan, William Morrill, Harold Wolman, and Faith Mitchell, eds., Governance and Opportunity in Metropolitan America, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1999. 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Wilshusen, Linda, The Effect of Government Organization on Coordination of Transportation and Land Use Planning: The Role of California’s Regional Transportation Planning Agencies, Transportation Research Board, 71st Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., January 12, 1992. Young, Terry F., and Chelsea H. Congdon, Plowing New Ground: Using Economic Incentives to Control Water Pollution from Agriculture, Environmental Defense Fund, Oakland, California, 1994. 214 Zion, Lee, “RITA Has Competition for Regional ‘Superagency’; Regional Infrastructure Transportation Authority,” San Diego Business Journal, August 7, 2000, p. 3. Zion, Lee, “Superagency for County Will Be Reconsidered,” San Diego Business Journal, December 3, 2001, p. 1. Zoller, Ted D., and Jeffrey A. Capizzano, Evolution and Devolution: A National Perspective on the Changing Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in Areawide Intermodal Planning, Virginia Transportation Research Council, Charlottesville, Virginia, June 1997. 215 About the Author ELISA BARBOUR Elisa Barbour is a research associate at the Public Policy Institute of California, where she has co-authored reports on state-local fiscal relations, local sales taxes, and regional growth planning. Before coming to PPIC, she did research on urban poverty, local labor markets, and workforce development. She also worked for a number of community and advocacy organizations. She holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from Oberlin College and a master’s degree in city planning from the University of California, Berkeley. 217 Related PPIC Publications California’s Infrastructure Policy for the 21st Century: Issues and Opportunities David E. Dowall Cities Under Pressure: Local Growth Controls and Residential Development Policy Paul G. Lewis and Max Neiman Federal Transportation Policy and the Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in California Paul G. Lewis and Mary Sprague Local Economic Development in Southern California’s Suburbs: 1990– 1997 Max Neiman, Gregory Andranovich, and Kenneth Fernandez Building California’s Future: Current Conditions in Infrastructure Planning, Budgeting, and Financing Michael Neuman and Jan Whittington PPIC publications may be ordered by phone or from our website (800) 232-5343 [mainland U.S.] (415) 291-4400 [Canada, Hawaii, overseas] www.ppic.org 219" } ["___content":protected]=> string(104) "

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" ["_permalink":protected]=> string(96) "https://www.ppic.org/publication/metropolitan-growth-planning-in-california-1900-2000/r_1202ebr/" ["_next":protected]=> array(0) { } ["_prev":protected]=> array(0) { } ["_css_class":protected]=> NULL ["id"]=> int(8195) ["ID"]=> int(8195) ["post_author"]=> string(1) "1" ["post_content"]=> string(0) "" ["post_date"]=> string(19) "2017-05-20 02:35:38" ["post_excerpt"]=> string(0) "" ["post_parent"]=> int(3333) ["post_status"]=> string(7) "inherit" ["post_title"]=> string(9) "R 1202EBR" ["post_type"]=> string(10) "attachment" ["slug"]=> string(9) "r_1202ebr" ["__type":protected]=> NULL ["_wp_attached_file"]=> string(13) "R_1202EBR.pdf" ["wpmf_size"]=> string(6) "487304" ["wpmf_filetype"]=> string(3) "pdf" ["wpmf_order"]=> string(1) "0" ["searchwp_content"]=> string(461475) "Metropolitan Growth Planning in California, 1900–2000 ••• Elisa Barbour 2002 PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Barbour, Elisa, 1961- Metropolitan growth planning in California, 1900-2000 / Elisa Barbour. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN: 1-58213-063-9 1. Regional planning—California—History. 2. Cities and towns—California—Growth. 3. Land use—California—Planning. I. Title. HT393.C2 B37 2002 307.1'2'09794—dc21 2002151729 Copyright © 2002 by Public Policy Institute of California All rights reserved San Francisco, CA Short sections of text, not to exceed three paragraphs, may be quoted without written permission provided that full attribution is given to the source and the above copyright notice is included. Research publications reflect the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or Board of Directors of the Public Policy Institute of California. Foreword This report grew out of research assistance that PPIC provided to the Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism beginning in 2000. It also fills an important research need by tracing the historical development of regional planning in California and then assessing the latest reform efforts and their prospects. The report’s historical perspective is helpful, for it highlights some themes and variations that have informed California growth-management policy over the last century. For example, the report recounts how Progressive Era reforms that enabled the expansion of California’s cities hindered subsequent efforts to coordinate and manage growth at the metropolitan level. Many would argue that these home rule powers favored by earlier reformers must now be balanced against the myriad of regional transportation, land use, and environmental issues. Yet it is helpful to note that the latest round of reforms, not to mention the reformers themselves, bear an uncanny resemblance to their Progressive Era counterparts insofar as both sought to stretch government to the dimensions of the planning problems they faced. It is also useful to acknowledge that these recent reform efforts face formidable obstacles. As Barbour notes, cities have been reluctant to cede their home rule powers to regional Councils of Governments, which therefore lack the clout to craft and implement regional solutions to regional problems. She also notes that single-purpose agencies, such as Caltrans, do have the power to shape policy but only in their respective arenas. Furthermore, many of these single-purpose agencies are reluctant to challenge land use policies, traditionally a local prerogative but essential to effective growth-management planning at the metropolitan iii level. This fractured planning system has rendered certain problems less tractable than they would be under a governance system that included integrated planning somewhere between the municipal and state levels. After scanning the current landscape, Barbour finds that “bottomup” efforts are complementing “top-down” reforms to address regional growth concerns. Much like their Progressive Era precursors, today’s public and private leaders throughout the state are favoring regional solutions to regional problems. Riverside and San Diego Counties, for example, have innovative planning activities under way that could strike new balances between land use, transportation, and environmental planning. Barbour suggests that these collaborative approaches may help deflect the local resentment and resistance that often accompany “topdown” interventions. Although this project was launched in response to the needs of the Speaker’s Commission, Elisa Barbour saw the need for an extended study and, by undertaking it, she has made an important contribution to a long-standing and critically important issue David W. Lyon President and CEO Public Policy Institute of California iv Summary During the 1990s, policy responses to major issues in California— including economic development, housing, traffic congestion, and open space preservation—were increasingly framed in regional terms. Statelevel reports called for regional planning reform, and innovative collaborations between government agencies and civic groups were launched. Planners sought coordination across jurisdictions and levels of government and across policy areas that had traditionally been treated separately. By the late 1990s, California had become a laboratory for regional planning reform, and state policymakers were considering ways to sustain and extend the efforts made in these areas. Although these policy responses represented a new phase in California growth management, they also reflected a continuous tradition of metropolitan planning stretching back to the Progressive Era. Throughout the past century, reformers worked to create stronger planning institutions at the metropolitan level. This report traces the history of regional planning for growth management in California throughout the past century. It tracks three key elements— transportation, land use, and environmental planning—and notes their consolidation under city government control during the Progressive Era at the turn of the last century, their subsequent fragmentation at the metropolitan scale once the process of suburban development gained momentum, and recent attempts to reintegrate them without changing the fundamental structures of political authority. Although the history of regional reform efforts—which, for analytical purposes, the report divides into three distinct waves—is illuminating in its own right, the overarching purpose of the analysis is to better understand the origins and prospects of current growth-management reforms at the regional level. v The First Wave: Home Rule Power and Urban Consolidation Modern urban planning in California traces back to the Progressive Era at the turn of the 20th century, when business leaders and other reformers worked to consolidate “home rule,” or the ability of city governments to conduct their affairs without interference from the state government. Progressive Era reforms allowed cities to raise taxes, issue bonds, and build large-scale infrastructure needed for urban expansion, including such projects as the Los Angeles Aqueduct and the Hetch Hetchy Dam. The strengthening of growth-management tools and methods at the city level during this period represented a kind of metropolitan planning. Because a majority of the state’s urban population lived within the boundaries of relatively isolated central cities, these cities were, for all practical purposes, metropolitan regions. Progressive Era civic leaders also attempted to extend the political power of the central cities by annexing developing areas or by consolidating local governments. Ironically, Progressive reforms made such attempts at regional political consolidation more difficult. Even as home rule power helped cities marshal the financial and planning resources for urban expansion, it undermined the political domination of central cities by encouraging the creation and growth of suburban cities and investing them with significant decisionmaking power. By doing so, home rule power helped transform California’s metropolitan areas into clusters of independent cities often differentiated by wealth, race, and function. Although metropolitan areas began to expand beyond the borders of their original central cities, government functions were still organized as if each city were an isolated and sovereign island. The result was political fragmentation of the state’s major metropolitan areas. The Second Wave: Fractured Regionalism During California’s postwar economic and population boom, the state and federal governments stepped in to ameliorate many effects of that fragmentation. Metropolitan planning was increasingly dominated by “vertical regionalism,” as single-purpose state agencies (such as Caltrans), often aided by federal funds and policy mandates, took charge vi of specific policy areas—at first resource management and infrastructure planning and eventually environmental protection as well. Local governments accepted this intrusion because cities usually lacked the resources to provide large-scale infrastructure and to coordinate environmental mandates across multiple jurisdictions. Like home rule power, vertical regionalism also promoted urban development by providing a functional service framework for urban and suburban expansion. Furthermore, single-purpose state agencies continued to respect local control over land use decisions. However, vertical regionalism codified a new form of fragmentation in the planning system. Control over the policy areas that constitute growth management—infrastructure, environmental, and land use planning—was dispersed among different levels of government, none of them organized at the metropolitan scale in most cases. The policy areas under state control were fractured vertically because single-purpose state agencies generally were not required to match plans to those of other state agencies or to an integrated set of state policy objectives. The system was also fractured horizontally because state agencies had no control over general local land use policy. Land use planning was also divided among the multiple local governments that now constituted metropolitan areas. Concerns about the negative aspects of suburbanization— environmental degradation and racial and social disparities in particular—prompted reformers to attempt to extend the state and federal role to land use and environmental planning in addition to infrastructure. Reformers were most successful in the area of environmental protection; the “vertical regional” model was extended to this planning area during the 1970s. However, efforts to centralize land use authority and create strong multipurpose regional planning institutions were rebuffed. Instead, federal and state measures prompted the emergence of a second dominant form of regional planning— voluntary horizontal regionalism. This approach emphasized procedural coordination across local jurisdictions and levels of government. New institutions were established, such as Councils of Governments (COGs), which coordinate planning across a broad range of policy areas in most metropolitan areas. However, because of their voluntary nature and vii governance structures—usually a one-city, one-vote arrangement— COGs were rarely able to forge, implement, and enforce multipurpose plans with a strong focus on regional needs. Thus, as metropolitan regions became more complex, growth management came under the guidance of an ever more complicated and fractured set of institutions and arrangements. The agencies with the strongest policy mandates tended to be narrowly focused, whereas those with broader policy purview tended to be organizationally weak. “Bottom-up” reform efforts within California regions provided further evidence of this dichotomy, as the outcomes often reflected a tradeoff between policy breadth on the one hand and regional focus and accountability on the other. Although reformers were sometimes able to strengthen regional agencies even over the objections of local governments, it was far easier in practice to strengthen the mandates of single-purpose than multipurpose agencies. The Planning System Under Stress During the 1980s and 1990s, the stresses on the fragmented planning system were various but collectively powerful. They included rapid population growth, the decentralization of jobs and housing, environmental and fiscal constraints, and government gridlock. At the same time, the rise of a global economy emphasized the importance of regional economic development. Together, these factors drew greater attention to the regional consequences of policymaking. Rapid population growth exacerbated urban sprawl and blurred traditional distinctions between central cities and suburbs. With more jobs located in the suburbs, Californians depended increasingly on their automobiles. Therefore, suburb-to-suburb transportation systems were strained. As housing production failed to keep up with demand especially in coastal areas, workers sought affordable housing farther from central cities, and suburb-to-central city commutes also worsened. Government’s response to these development pressures was a kind of “policy by neglect” (Fulton, 1992a, p. 23). Federal cutbacks and voter initiatives such as Proposition 13 constrained revenues, and spending on infrastructure plummeted. Fiscal constraint also contributed to housing problems by pushing local governments to favor certain types of viii development, such as retail projects, and to disfavor others, such as multiunit housing, based on their fiscal costs and benefits. Local infrastructure costs were increasingly met through fees imposed on new development projects, adding to housing prices. Fiscal constraint reframed transportation and housing as regional concerns requiring coordinated solutions. As housing affordability problems began to affect the state’s middle-class residents, the negative consequences of fragmented local fiscal and land use choices—longstanding concerns of regional reformers—became a much broader policy topic. State policymakers considered how to reorient local land use policy to meet regional housing needs. Local governments countered that without fiscal reforms to restore revenue stability and alignment of state mandates affecting land use, housing problems would be difficult to solve. Thus, the housing issue mushroomed into a broader discussion about coordinating state and local land use and fiscal policies. Transportation planners—stymied by basic questions about viable systems—considered methods to reorient local land use toward regional transportation needs rather than the reverse, which has been the traditional model. Given current projections about growing demand and limited funding, transportation planners questioned the ability of either highway or transit expansion to prevent rising congestion. The pressure for cost-effective investment and efficient use of existing systems drew attention to land use policy as a potential means for helping maximize transportation investments. A third policy area—environmental protection—also highlighted the need for more integrated regional planning. Rapid population growth strained natural resources, bringing economic and environmental goals into direct conflict in many parts of the state. For example, laws protecting endangered species placed land developers and water users on a collision course with environmental activists. Threats to air and water quality were increasingly traced to urban residents and their automobiles, and policy solutions required extensive local government involvement. Meanwhile, the state and federal government’s centralized, bureaucratic, and piecemeal approach to environmental regulation came under fire for being ineffective and inefficient. Environmental regulators began to seek means to integrate environmental, transportation, and land use policy at ix a bioregional scale and to promote regulatory strategies that use positive incentives and planning coordination to avoid conflicts. Thus, the affordable housing crisis, fiscal gridlock, the need to reconcile environmental and economic goals, and the need for more strategic infrastructure investment form a nexus of policy concerns in California today for which better regional planning coordination could offer a potential remedy. To complement these public sector issues, business leaders have increasingly advocated regional planning as a response to changing economic conditions. In particular, they maintain that integrated regional planning could help protect the high quality of life needed to attract and retain high-wage industries in an increasingly competitive and global economy. The Third Wave: Reintegrating Regional GrowthManagement Policy Taken together, these challenges prompted a third wave of regional planning reforms beginning in the 1990s. Ironically, many reformers resemble Progressive Era precursors. Where earlier Progressives sought to empower city governments to meet the challenges of the industrial age, many third-wave reformers advocate a kind of regional home rule, which would allow metropolitan areas to respond to the rise of global economic competition. Third-wave reform ideas take a variety of forms, but they share two features: policy integration across functional areas and an emphasis on collaborative decisionmaking among existing institutions. The reform wave was launched by new programs in transportation and environmental protection during the 1990s that devolved authority to the regional or county level and called for a greater link between these planning areas and land use policy. In 1991, the passage of the federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) by Congress redirected more authority and resources to regional transportation planning agencies. Under that law, transportation plans were required to make realistic funding assessments, which worked against the tendency to collate project wish lists and dub the result a regional plan. Furthermore, that x legislation required that regional transportation plans meet regional air quality goals. In 1997, the state passed SB 45, which also devolved decisionmaking authority, but favored county-level agencies more than the federal approach did. More than other forms of metropolitan planning, environmental programs during the 1990s extended collaborative planning techniques and approached land use policy in an explicitly regional way. Examples of this collaboration include the formation of CALFED, a joint effort among federal, state, and local agencies to reconcile economic and environmental water uses in the San Joaquin Delta region. Another notable example is the Natural Communities Conservation Planning program, a program in which state and federal agencies, local governments, landowners, developers, and others reconcile species preservation with urban development at an explicitly bioregional scale. These programs rely on stiff policy mandates to provide a focus for planning, but they employ flexible, collaborative decisionmaking techniques for devising implementation methods. The new transportation and environmental programs helped create a planning framework that encourages greater regional policy integration. In some parts of the state, local governments, regional agencies, and civic leaders have taken steps to fill in and extend this new framework. For example, business, civic, and public sector leaders have organized 21 “collaborative regional initiatives” across the state to promote economic competitiveness, social equity, and environmental quality through collaborative techniques. In other cases, local governments spearheaded the reforms. For example, Riverside County is combining an update of its general plan with development of transportation and habitat preservation plans. The effort could serve as a model for county-based integrated planning in California. The San Diego area COG is attempting to develop a comprehensive regional plan that incorporates local plans and uses infrastructure funds to promote “smart-growth” land use goals. Assessing the Third Wave and Its Prospects In comparison with past reform efforts, the current wave places greater emphasis on developing regional consensus on integrated xi planning goals and lesser emphasis on new institutions or procedural requirements, calling instead for collaboration among existing institutions. This approach is well suited to California’s planning traditions—in particular, the strength of the home rule tradition and the state’s well-developed local planning capacity. Collaborative models allow for institutional flexibility and experimentation that can be useful in a state composed of diverse, complex regions. Collaborative efforts generally have worked best at a subregional level—for example, within counties—where they often benefit from existing relationships among local government officials. They also have been effective in cases in which clear objectives were defined, either via policy mandates (as in the case of the new environmental programs) or when participants sought mutual benefits in relation to a shared resource such as a transportation corridor. However, voluntary collaborative planning has been less well suited for solving complex problems in multicounty metropolitan areas. Nor has this approach been especially successful where planning hinges on the resolution of deep conflicts or where the parties have not established a basis for cooperation. Third-wave reforms generally have encouraged but not mandated planning integration across jurisdictions and multiple policy areas. As a result, many reform ideas have yet to overcome longstanding political obstacles to integrated policy planning. For example, land use remains a local prerogative, transportation funding is still allocated largely on the basis of “geographic equity” rather than regional need, and fiscal stalemate continues between the state and local governments. To ensure effective regional planning, the state government will need to take a more active role. The state defines the regulatory environment within which planning occurs, and today many incentives still work against regional cooperation. Furthermore, state programs and investments affect regional outcomes. What steps should the state government take? First, it should seek to eliminate barriers to cooperation, for example, by enacting fiscal reforms to ensure local revenue stability and minimize damaging competition among local governments and between state and local governments. Second, it should seek to reorient local planning toward regional needs, for xii example, by rewarding jurisdictions that develop transit-oriented multiunit housing. Third, it should strengthen regional planning mechanisms more directly. In doing this, the state should simultaneously improve policy comprehensiveness, regional focus, and accountability. Historically, regional planning institutions have been forced to trade off at least one of these elements. One possible framework would extend collaborative models of the 1990s more systematically and comprehensively. Regions might form the organizational scale at which state, regional, and local agencies— through a collaborative process—devise plans integrating infrastructure, land use, and environmental objectives. Realignment of state policies in this manner could promote more strategic infrastructure investment and environmental planning. Coordination of state, regional, and local needs could help overcome policy gridlock regarding fiscal and land use issues. Furthermore, if the state government uses its own investments as a lever to promote collaboration, the reforms might avoid pitfalls of past efforts. In particular, they may not fall flat somewhere between providing bigger “carrots” and stronger “sticks.” In the past, proposals for financial incentives to encourage local compliance with state planning objectives often failed due to budget shortfalls, and stiffer regulatory mandates were rejected as too interventionist. Aligning state programs and policies with the outcomes of a collaborative regional process offers a possible third way for the state to promote regionalism through the promise of mutual gains. However, this approach would need to be grounded in a coherent and accountable policy framework. One way to insert public accountability would be to provide a greater measure of “regional home rule” by providing some fiscal authority on a regional basis—for example, the power to raise bonds for infrastructure purposes outlined in collaboratively devised plans. This would introduce an element of voter accountability in relation to functions for which voters have been more willing to support multijurisdictional approaches. Another way to strengthen public accountability would be for the state government to define and enforce regional growth-management objectives for both state and local agencies to achieve. The objectives could be designed as outcome-oriented performance measures rather xiii than detailed program requirements. If flexible institutional arrangements are desirable, clear objectives and measurable standards may be essential to help ground program choices, provide regional focus, and ensure accountability. An approach that emphasizes policy objectives would turn the state’s traditional planning model upside down. California’s functionally fragmented, process-oriented planning system made more sense at a time when there was broader consensus on the social goals of planning, and when the needs of cities formed the starting place for growthmanagement policy. Today, changes in the nature of economic competition and urban development patterns have brought regional needs to the fore and presented fundamental questions about how governments should manage urban growth. Today’s reformers, just like their Progressive Era predecessors, seek to strengthen metropolitan governance in response. However, the current reform wave shifts attention from the need for new regional institutions to the need for more focused dialogue and comprehensive planning. The state government has an essential role to play in this process by helping provide policy focus and public accountability while also encouraging institutional flexibility and innovation. xiv Contents Foreword..................................... iii Summary..................................... v Figures ...................................... xix Tables ....................................... xxi Acknowledgments ............................... xxiii Acronyms .................................... xxv 1. INTRODUCTION ........................... 1 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE REGIONAL GROWTHMANAGEMENT SYSTEM: PLANNING BEFORE WORLD WAR II ............................ The First Reform Wave: The Progressive Era ........... Progressive Reforms Promote Suburbanization .......... Conclusion ................................. 7 7 11 14 3. POSTWAR PLANNING: THE SECOND REFORM WAVE ................................... Functional Regionalism ......................... The American Dream or a Nightmare of Numbers: Views on Suburbanization ........................ Local Agency Formation Commissions: State Reforms Reinforce Localism ........................ The Federal Government Promotes Voluntary Regionalism ............................. Regionalism in the Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay, and San Diego Areas ............................. The Rise of Environmentalism .................... Conclusion ................................. 15 15 20 26 27 32 38 41 4. THE PLANNING SYSTEM UNDER STRESS ......... Rapid Growth, New Development Patterns, and Fiscal Constraint .............................. Voter Revolt Prompts State-Level Debate ............. 45 46 50 xv Business Leaders and “Smart Growth” ............... Infrastructure, Housing, and Fiscal Issues ............. Policy Responses: The Battle over RHNA ............. Conclusion ................................. 54 57 62 66 5. DEVOLUTION IN TRANSPORTATION ........... Motives for Devolution ......................... Transportation Programs of the 1990s ............... The Congestion Management Program ............. ISTEA .................................. SB 45 Shifts the Power Balance .................. County Sales Tax Measures ..................... Assessing Devolution .......................... Scale and Accountability: What Is “Regional” About Transportation Planning in California?............ Policy Breadth: Making the Connection Between Transportation, Land Use, and the Environment ..... What Makes Integrated Planning Work? .............. Conclusion ................................. 69 69 75 75 76 80 82 84 84 85 89 91 6. DEVOLUTION IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ............................. 93 Air Quality Management ........................ 94 Water Quality Management ...................... 99 CALFED .................................. 105 Natural Communities Conservation Planning........... 108 Hazardous Waste Management .................... 113 Conclusion................................. 116 7. “BOTTOM-UP” THIRD-WAVE REFORMS ......... 119 Civic Entrepreneurs ........................... 120 Local Government Planning Coordination ............. 123 Regional Reform in the Major Metropolitan Areas ........ 126 The San Francisco Bay Area: A Shift in Approach ...... 127 The Los Angeles Area: Centrifugal Forces ........... 128 The Riverside County Integrated Plan: A Model for County-Based Planning Integration .............. 130 The San Diego Area: Testing the Limits of Collaboration ............................ 132 xvi State-Level Reform Efforts ....................... 139 Conclusion................................. 140 8. ASSESSING THE THIRD WAVE ................. 143 Collaborative Regional Planning: The Future of Regionalism in California? ............................ 145 The State’s Role in Regional Planning................ 149 Appendix A. Geographic Jurisdictions and Governance Structures of California Councils of Governments ................ 157 B. Councils of Governments in California ............... 159 C. Key to Functional Responsibilities of California Councils of Governments.............................. 165 D. Transportation Planning Agencies in California ......... 171 E. Statutes and Definitions Regarding Transportation Planning Agencies in California .......................... 181 F. Existing Regional Arrangements ................... 185 Bibliography .................................. 187 About the Author ............................... 217 Related PPIC Publications .......................... 219 xvii Figures 3.1. Share of State Population Growth by City Type, 1940–1970 .............................. 4.1. Population Increase in Selected Areas in California, 1970–2000 .............................. 4.2. Land Use Measures on Local Ballots in California, 1971–2000 .............................. 16 46 50 xix Tables 3.1. City Incorporations and Populations in California, 1900–2000 .............................. 23 3.2. Characteristics of California Cities in Urbanized Areas, 1970 .................................. 24 4.1. Residential Population Growth in California Metropolitan Area Cities, 1970–2000 ............. 47 4.2. California Metropolitan Area City Characteristics, 1970–2000 .............................. 48 B.1. Councils of Governments in California ............ 160 C.1. Key to Functional Responsibilities of California Councils of Governments Listed in Appendix Table C.2 ................................... 165 C.2. Functions of Councils of Governments, Metropolitan Planning Organizations, and Regional Transportation Planning Agencies in California Metropolitan Areas .... 166 D.1. Transportation Planning Agencies in California ....... 172 xxi Acknowledgments I wish to thank Michael Teitz, Paul Lewis, and Fred Silva at PPIC for their support and insight throughout this project. Peter Richardson, also at PPIC, lent expert editorial assistance. Two external reviewers— William Fulton and Peter Detwiler—provided thoughtful comments on a draft of the manuscript. Paul King at the Institute for Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, provided unflagging library support, and Maida Barbour helped keep the project on track. Any errors of fact or interpretation are my own. xxiii Acronyms ABAG BAC BART BCDC CEQA CMA CMAQ CMSA COG CTC DHCD DHS ERAF ESA HCP ISTEA JHB JPA JVSV LAFCO LULU LUTRAQ Association of Bay Area Governments Bay Area Council Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission Bay Conservation and Development Commission California Environmental Quality Act Congestion Management Agency Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area Council of Governments California Transportation Commission Department of Housing and Community Development (California) Department of Health Services (California) Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund Endangered Species Act Habitat Conservation Plan Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act Jobs-Housing Balance Joint Powers Authorities Joint Venture Silicon Valley Network Local Agency Formation Commission Locally Unwanted Land Use Making the Land Use, Transportation, and Air Quality Connection xxv MIS MPO MSA MTA MTC NCCP NIMBY RCIP RCRA RECLAIM RGEC RHNA RTP RTPA SACOG SANDAG SCAG SCAQMD SOAR STP TDA TMDL TOD UGB Major Investment Study Metropolitan Planning Organization Metropolitan Statistical Area Metropolitan Transportation Authority Metropolitan Transportation Commission Natural Communities Conservation Planning Not In My Back Yard Riverside County Integrated Plan Resources, Conservation, and Recovery Act Regional Clean Air Incentives Market Regional Government Efficiency Commission Regional Housing Needs Assessment Regional Transportation Plan Regional Transportation Planning Agency Sacramento Area Council of Governments San Diego Area Association of Governments Southern California Association of Governments South Coast Air Quality Management District Save Open Space and Agricultural Resources Surface Transportation Program Transportation Development Act Total Maximum Daily Load Transit-Oriented Development Urban Growth Boundary xxvi 1. Introduction Today, regional planning coordination is being considered as a means to resolve some of the most pressing policy concerns in California, from affordable housing to infrastructure needs to environmental degradation. A major goal of current reform efforts is to integrate planning across policy areas that have traditionally been treated separately, such as land use, infrastructure planning, environmental protection, economic development, and social welfare policy. The call for policy integration is a response to a set of mounting pressures over the past two decades that revealed weaknesses in the state’s system for managing growth and development. These pressures included fiscal and environmental constraints, more complex development patterns, and the rise of global economic competition. However, current political institutions are not built to facilitate regional policy integration very easily. It is not that regional planning institutions do not exist; most metropolitan regions have many. For example, the federal, state, and local governments have long histories of building and maintaining large-scale infrastructure on a regional basis, from water and power facilities to highways, transit systems, ports, and bridges. Local governments have established numerous interjurisdictional planning and administrative entities to address specific concerns. Business and community leaders also have a history of coordinating policies at the metropolitan level, through chambers of commerce and other groups. However, existing regional institutions have often found it difficult to define and implement comprehensive policies. Specifically, they have been unable to combine three key elements: (1) policy coherence—the ability to integrate and trade off goals and objectives across different functional planning areas, (2) regional focus—a clear articulation of regional rather than local or state-level needs and concerns, and (3) accountability—“teeth” to ensure that policy objectives are implemented. 1 Numerous regional plans and institutions have achieved one or two of these objectives but rarely all three. This report explores some of the reasons why this is so. It employs two main analytical frameworks to provide a context for understanding and assessing current reform efforts. The first framework is historical. Today’s reform proposals and initiatives are only the latest round in a century-long history of efforts to create effective institutions to help guide metropolitan growth and development. In some ways, the goals and practices of regional planners and reformers have remained unchanged throughout that time. Metropolitan planning and governing institutions aim to promote economic growth and social welfare in urban regions, the scale at which many of the primary social and economic relationships that define people’s lives are played out. Reformers seek to ensure that regional institutions and policies are democratic and efficient even as they contend with the fact that those goals sometimes conflict. In seeking to achieve these goals, regional planners and policymakers have faced a set of endemic challenges related to scale. One is how to devise planning institutions to address issues at the scale best suited to the problems at hand, without sacrificing the ability to integrate policies across different functional concerns. For example, the geographic scale of air basins may not correspond to that of transportation systems or to any existing governmental jurisdictions, yet air quality and transportation planning are fundamentally linked and they require coordinated approaches. Therefore, regional planning has long required mechanisms for intergovernmental coordination. Questions about functional scale are connected to somewhat different concerns about political scale—how best to reconcile the values of local control over community character with government action taken for wider purposes. It may not be clear which level of government is best suited to regulate certain functions, such as land use, when significant tradeoffs are associated with both centralized and decentralized approaches. All these challenges are compounded by the rapid rate of change and growing complexity in urban regions today.1 ____________ 1For assessments of metropolitan planning challenges in the American federalist system and in an age of growing complexity, see Christensen (1999) and Innes and Booher (1999). 2 The primary democratic governmental model for integrating policy objectives has been general-purpose government, the type of government that has been established at the state, county, and city levels. Generalpurpose governments rely on voter preferences to help balance policy objectives and provide a range of services funded by voters themselves. However, the boundaries of general-purpose governmental jurisdictions may not match today’s regional systems. For example, 78 percent of the state’s population lives within multicounty metropolitan areas, but no general-purpose governments exist at the same scale.2 Furthermore, even in metropolitan areas encompassed within single county borders, county governments do not act as regional governments because key planning responsibilities are fragmented among different levels of government, jurisdictions, and functional agencies. The challenge of metropolitan governance is to address interrelated metropolitan-wide concerns although the scale of many functional problems does not match, and although general-purpose governments are generally absent at the metropolitan level. Because regional governance tests government’s ability to adapt to rapid change and complexity, it is not surprising that reform activity has followed periods of substantial shifts in basic urban development patterns. In a series of articles, Allan Wallis distinguished three regional reform “waves” in the United States during the 20th century (1994a, 1994b). This report employs and extends his typology, which generally matches California’s experience.3 The first regional reform wave occurred during the early decades of the 20th century, a period often called the Progressive Era. Major reforms unleashed the power of cities to facilitate urban growth in response to the rise of industrial economies. The basis of the state’s system of local government was consolidated at this time. However, Progressive reforms contained elements that would eventually hamper regional coordination. The second reform wave responded to these ____________ 2Population figures are from the California Department of Finance for 2001, and definitions for Metropolitan Statistical Areas are from the 1997 U.S. Census. 3For another historical overview of regional governance in the United States, see Foster (2001). 3 emerging problems during the period of rapid growth that followed World War II. This reform wave filled in the framework of the planning system that exists today. However, although new regional institutions aimed to overcome growing fragmentation in the planning system, in some ways they only served to exacerbate it. The state is currently experiencing its third wave of reform in response to even greater decentralization and more complex development patterns that have accompanied the rise of a global economy during recent decades. Today, reformers seek to overcome the policy fragmentation that has characterized the planning system, without fundamentally restructuring governmental authority. The historical context provides cause for both optimism and pessimism regarding current proposals. On the one hand, today’s reformers can be seen as tackling challenges not dissimilar to those in the past. Also in response to changing economic and social conditions, earlier reform movements were able to achieve far-reaching measures to adapt the state’s planning system to new conditions. However, optimism may also be tempered by a hard look at past failures and the obstinacy of basic challenges. The second analytical framework this report employs is institutional: The state’s experience with various regional planning models is used as a basis for drawing conclusions about what approaches are most effective and under what conditions.4 Special attention is paid to collaborative arrangements—planning models that do not require alterations of existing political authority or even necessarily the establishment of new institutions or administrative authority. Collaborative models are scrutinized because if integration across functional concerns can be seen as the main policy goal of the current reform wave, collaborative decisionmaking can be viewed as its method of choice. However, although current reform initiatives are extending collaborative models in new directions, collaboration has in fact been the default method for decades for multipurpose regional planning in California. This report considers a variety of planning experiences—old and new, collaborative ____________ 4One institutional analysis of regional governance in the Los Angeles area, by Fulton et al. (2000b), was especially helpful for this project. 4 and otherwise—to evaluate which elements are necessary for effective regional planning. The scope of the report is limited to those regional institutions and policies related to land use, transportation, and environmental planning. It ignores a number of planning areas that have been—or could be— addressed in a regional framework. For example, it does not assess regional planning for power and water supply (although it does consider water quality) or waste management (except toxic waste). In addition, the report does not focus on regional economic development and social equity planning—policy areas of growing importance among reformers today—except as they relate to growth management issues. Thus, the report does not provide a full picture of regional concerns or institutions. However, there are good reasons for limiting the report to the three policy areas of transportation, land use, and environmental protection. They are interrelated, helping to define our built environment in relation to our natural environment. They are among the policy areas with the longest tradition of strong government planning power. Transportation and environmental planning have been called the big carrot and the big stick of federal policy affecting regional planning (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). Land use decisionmaking is largely dominated by local governments and yet is inextricably connected to transportation and the environment. Studying the nexus among these planning areas affords insight into the dynamics of intergovernmental coordination in relation to regional growth and development. These are policy areas in which systematic metropolitan planning institutions and policies have long been established. Systematic institutions are those established through law and statute for all metropolitan areas across the state. Studying such institutions across time and in different settings helps elucidate strengths and weaknesses in the state’s approach to regional planning and steps that might be taken to expand regional governance in a systematic way. The agencies created in these areas have been structured quite differently; some are centralized and others decentralized; some are multipurpose, others single-purpose; some rely on stiff regulatory mandates, others on incentives to local governments or voluntary collaboration among participating agencies. Because of these differences, alternative state approaches to achieving 5 regional policy goals can be compared. We can consider how standardized models are implemented in different metropolitan areas, gaining insight about the differences among regions, functional approaches, and the general feasibility of standardized requirements.5 Finally, existing regional agencies are likely to influence and be influenced by any future reforms aimed at broadening regional planning in California, so it is useful to consider their characteristics and history. Chapter 2 describes the first regional reform wave during the 20th century, when the basis for today’s planning structures—and dilemmas—was laid. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the second reform period, after World War II. The evolution of regional institutions in the state’s three largest metropolitan areas is compared. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 describe economic and political trends during the 1980s and 1990s that placed the state’s planning system under increasing stress. Chapter 4 considers the emergence of new development patterns and the consequences of government fiscal constraint. Chapters 5 and 6 describe problems in transportation and environmental planning that prompted a major shift in approach by the state and federal governments in these core regional planning areas. The new programs constituted the beginning of the third wave of regional reform in the state. Chapter 7 describes the further development of the new reform wave by the end of the 1990s through programs developed within regions themselves. The concluding chapter evaluates the prospects for current programs and proposals. It assesses the strengths and weaknesses of collaborative models as a basis for expanding regionalism in California and considers what steps the state government might take to enhance regional planning in a collaborative framework. ____________ 5The report compares the evolution of regional institutions in the state’s three largest metropolitan areas—the Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay, and San Diego areas. Thus, another significant limitation is that it touches only briefly on planning developments elsewhere in the state. However, regional planning history in other areas has been less well documented, making a historical comparison more difficult. 6 2. The Foundation of the Regional Growth-Management System: Planning Before World War II The First Reform Wave: The Progressive Era Regionalism in California is not a new issue. The current attention policymakers are paying to regional governance hearkens back to the Progressive Era during the first decades of the 20th century. Progressive reformers sought to modernize government to make it more effective for the industrial age. The reforms they enacted reshaped state-local government relations profoundly, establishing the basis of today’s planning structure.1 Today’s regional reformers are addressing a similar challenge, seeking to reshape governmental institutions to address modern social and economic concerns more effectively. Ironically, the reforms being discussed today challenge some Progressive Era traditions that are now seen as hampering regional planning. Progressives, many who were professionals and business leaders, sought to professionalize local governments and expand their capacity to build the infrastructure needed for metropolitan growth. Progressives gained control of city councils in Los Angeles and San Francisco in the 1900s and the state legislature and the governor’s office in 1910. To make governments more efficient and businesslike, they introduced reforms including the civil service, nonpartisan local elections, and the use of appointed boards and commissions to oversee many areas of policymaking. They extended “direct democracy” by instituting the ____________ 1Stephanie Pincetl's historical overview of the influence of Progressive Era policies on land use in the state was an important resource for this project (Pincetl, 1999). 7 procedures of public initiative, referendum, and recall. They also sought to expand cities’ borrowing power to enable construction of new facilities, such as water, power, port, sewer, and transportation systems, needed by such rapidly growing central cities as San Francisco and Los Angeles. These major projects required financing beyond the ability of private business to provide (Pincetl, 1999). To achieve these goals, Progressives sought to strengthen “home rule,” or the power of local governments to determine their own affairs without interference from the state government. California’s 1879 Constitution contained the seeds of one of the strongest home rule traditions of all states in the nation. Counties and cities were officially granted “police” and “corporate” powers to permit a wide array of legislative and programmatic functions. Among these powers was considerable local discretion over land use decisions. Also important was the delegation of authority for the building and operation of local public works. During the 1880s and 1890s, cities gained the right to draw up and establish charters to govern their own affairs. Autonomy from state oversight was solidified in 1914 when charter cities were authorized to “make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs subject only to the restrictions and limitations in their charters.”2 Local functions inferred from police and corporate powers became so extensive during later decades that little distinction now remains between generallaw and charter status for both cities and counties (Silva and Barbour, 1999). Over time, county governments would come to perform a dual role, on the one hand serving as agents of the state government, providing an array of countywide social services, and on the other hand acting like city governments for the unincorporated portions of counties, providing basic services such as police and fire protection. County power over land use extends only to the unincorporated territory within county boundaries. This limitation has important consequences for regional planning, as ____________ 2Article 11, Section 6, as amended 1914. For more on establishment of home rule authority, see Meeker (1996) and Sokolow and Detwiler (2001). 8 county governments cannot impose land use policies on cities within their borders. A 1910 ballot measure known as the Separation of Sources reinforced local autonomy by providing local governments with control over the property tax, which provided the bulk of their revenue. Charter status enabled cities to create municipal bond referenda. Thus, growing cities were empowered to mobilize resources to build the infrastructure necessary to accommodate further expansion (Silva and Barbour, 1999; Pincetl, 1999). Progressive reforms transformed the role of local governments, enabling them to undertake major new public works projects. The Los Angeles Aqueduct, completed in 1913, and San Francisco’s Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct, approved in 1913 and completed in 1934, were among the most ambitious projects accomplished with the help of city charter power. Over the 1910s and 1920s, local governments municipalized harbors, water systems, and sometimes power plants. As automobile use began to rise starting in the 1920s, local governments also began to construct extensive networks of roads and streets. Progressive reforms also professionalized city planning. San Francisco established a City Planning Commission in 1917, Los Angeles in 1920, and Los Angeles County created a Regional Planning Commission three years later (Scott, 1985; Dear, 1996). These local reforms were soon strengthened by a state mandate. In 1927, cities and counties were authorized, and in 1937 required, to adopt comprehensive plans. This requirement was far ahead of its time. Even today, many states do not require that local governments adopt plans for growth (Fulton, 1999a). Thus, Progressives centralized and professionalized municipal planning power within the political framework of home rule. This can be viewed as the century’s first set of major metropolitan growthmanagement reforms—and an effective means to centralize metropolitan planning—because at the time, the central cities functioned to a large degree as metropolitan regions (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). In 1910, 71 percent of the total population—and 83 percent of the population living in cities—in the major urban counties (Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Mateo, Alameda, Santa Clara, San Diego, and Sacramento) lived in 9 the central cities (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, San Diego, Sacramento, and San Jose).3 Under those conditions, the boundaries of metropolitan economies and their governing structures roughly matched. However, civic and business leaders in the central cities attempted to extend the influence of their cities even further. Among the most ambitious efforts were campaigns to consolidate local governments during the 1910s and 1920s in the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas. The San Francisco Chamber of Commerce led a campaign in the 1910s to consolidate many Bay Area cities into a “Greater San Francisco” modeled on New York’s borough system. The city’s leaders believed that consolidation would appeal to outlying areas as a means to solve common problems, particularly those related to water supply. San Francisco was exploring the possibility of building an aqueduct from the headwaters of the Tuolumne River in Hetch Hetchy Valley that could have formed the basis of a unified water system for the entire region. A constitutional amendment for Bay Area metropolitan consolidation was taken to the legislature in 1912. However, East Bay cities—Oakland in particular—opposed the measure as a threat to home rule, and it lost in all but three counties statewide. The conflict had the effect of souring negotiations on joint water planning, bridge building, and other regional concerns for decades afterward. Other Bay Area consolidation efforts that followed during the 1910s and 1920s—including proposals to consolidate Alameda County cities and to consolidate San Francisco and San Mateo Counties—also failed (Scott, 1985; Pincetl, 1999). Attempts to consolidate the City and County of Los Angeles were undertaken from the 1890s through the 1910s. As in the Bay Area, outlying cities objected strenuously. The City of Los Angeles expanded rapidly through annexation, however, reaching a size of 442 square miles by 1930. The pattern changed sharply after that, however, as the services that prompted unincorporated areas to join the growing metropolis were increasingly being provided by the county government or special assessment districts (Fogelson, 1967; Teaford, 1979). ____________ 3Calculations are from data in Historical Census Populations of California State and Counties, 1850–1990, and Historical Census Populations of Places, Towns, and Cities in California, 1850–1990, California Department of Finance, Sacramento. 10 The consolidation campaigns highlighted certain contradictions in Progressive goals and policies that would become even more visible in later decades. By promoting home rule, Progressives had helped make it more difficult to centralize authority within metropolitan areas containing multiple jurisdictions. Thus, Progressive Era reforms helped pave the way for regional planning divisions that persist to this day. To provide the infrastructure necessary for urban growth, Progressives centralized municipal planning authority along functional lines. The state’s vertical, systems-oriented regional planning model would develop from these reforms. However, Progressives also promoted local control and professionalism in planning. This laid the groundwork for horizontal regionalism based on voluntary cooperation among local governments. Home rule helped ensure that joint land use planning by local governments would be undertaken only on a voluntary basis, and professional planning gave local governments tools to do so. California’s tradition of regionalist reform seeks to reintegrate vertical and horizontal planning into a more comprehensive approach. It can also be traced back to the Progressive Era. The consolidation campaigns during the period represent the first wave of unsuccessful regional reforms in the 20th century that attempted to consolidate regional planning across jurisdictions within metropolitan areas. Their failure reflects the emergence of a planning system with divisions of planning authority that still persist. Progressive Reforms Promote Suburbanization Progressive reforms helped unleash a new pattern of suburban development. During the boom years of the 1920s, industry expanded and decentralized in response to public investments in transportation and utilities. Mass production of automobiles and new public roadway systems enabled middle class families to move to suburban areas. New planning techniques, such as special-purpose metropolitan service districts, improved provision of services in outlying areas. Suburban interests were increasingly able to override the expansionary plans of central cities. One hundred and sixty new cities were incorporated during the first three decades of the century, a third of all the cities in the state today. 11 Although the Progressive Era ideal of a unified regional vision for growth continued to inspire reformers, long-range planning was increasingly overtaken by practical considerations related to rapid urban expansion. Although many industries expanded, “the biggest industry was the business of growth itself: land speculation and house building based on the great expectations for the future” (Fishman, 1987, p. 162). Especially in Los Angeles, suburban development defined growth patterns. As Greg Hise has demonstrated, modern community planning emerged as a mutual adjustment process between public service providers and private developers based on comprehensive, integrated, and replicable design standards (Hise, 1997). City and county traffic and roadway plans formed the basis for land subdivision, and building standards encouraged developers to repeat traditional patterns. The most essential planning technique for modern community building was zoning power. The Los Angeles City Council implemented one of the nation’s first wide-ranging zoning ordinances in 1909. Zoning became increasingly popular across the state after a Zoning Enabling Act was passed in 1917 (Dear, 1996; Hise, 1997; Pincetl, 1999). “Concern over zoning had now become so great throughout California that people interested in city planning gave little thought to anything else. Zoning was city planning to many officials” (Scott, 1985, p. 166). The primary goal of most zoning ordinances was to preserve singlefamily neighborhoods from encroachment by other land uses through strict segregation of uses. Zoning helped reinforce the deed restrictions imposed by many developers to help maintain property values. The restrictions, usually lasting 10 to 20 years, aimed to create homogeneous populations and compatible land uses. Occupancy by African Americans and Asians was prohibited in most tracts, and sometimes, minimum costs for houses were established. New transportation infrastructure helped to accomplish in practice what advocates of metropolitan consolidation had failed to do—create cohesive metropolitan regions. With car ownership increasing dramatically, transportation became a major public issue demanding government attention during the 1920s. Thus, transportation planning shifted from private to public control just at the time that the preferred 12 travel mode was shifting from public transit to the automobile. Government policy helped ensure that automobiles became the dominant form of transportation, shaping metropolitan development into a less-monocentric configuration. The first state gas tax was passed in 1923, creating an ongoing source of funding. Bridges and roads were constructed to connect the disparate cities in the San Francisco Bay region. In 1926, Los Angeles voters overwhelmingly endorsed a massive bond issue for a new road system to address the growing problem of traffic congestion and at the same time, defeated a proposal to expand mass transit (Fishman, 1987). Suburbanization also was enhanced by federal action in the midst of the Depression to save homeowners threatened by foreclosure. The National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), authorizing it to ensure mortgages up to 90 percent of a home’s value, thereby reducing down payments. Selfamortizing long-term mortgages with equal payments spread over 20 or 30 years became standard. These innovations revolutionized conditions for purchasing and owning a home, creating a stable network of savings and loan institutions, and enhancing economies of scale and speed in the homebuilding industry (Fishman, 1987). They also reinforced racial segregation. Until the 1950s, FHA explicitly endorsed segregation in the award of home loans (Ross and Levine, 1996). Thus, the basic conditions facilitating suburban growth were in place before World War II, and many were prompted by Progressive Era reforms. Improved planning techniques enabled smaller suburban jurisdictions to compete with central cities in providing services. Construction of new roads and highways opened up suburban areas for development. Federal housing policy reinforced the trend to build single-family homes, as loans were insured for that purpose. This trend was especially pronounced in Los Angeles, with fewer multifamily homes than any comparable metropolis (Fishman, 1987). Ambitious regional planning proposals were overwhelmed by the practical details of coordinating suburban development. San Francisco civic leaders launched an effort to establish a Regional Planning Association in the mid-1920s, but it soon fizzled (Scott, 1985). The Los Angeles County Regional Planning Association, the first regional 13 planning association in the country, viewed its mission conservatively. Its activities, such as the development of a set of uniform subdivision regulations in 1929, helped to reinforce existing development patterns rather than redirect them (Fogelson, 1967; Dear, 1996; Hise, 1997; Pincetl, 1999). Its attempt to establish a general plan to guide development during the 1920s “was overwhelmed . . . by the tenacity of impatient private developers and the proliferation of new municipalities in the basin, each with its own planning authority, which it exercised independently” (Pincetl, 1999, p. 124). Conclusion Progressive reforms established home rule authority as the framework for public efforts to manage growth. This was a coherent strategy for facilitating metropolitan growth and development at a time when most of the population in urban areas lived within the borders of the central cities. However, the reforms carried the seeds of a contradiction. They helped promote urban—and eventually suburban—expansion, which changed the basic conditions on which the original reforms had been premised. At the local scale, the development process was well coordinated. But although many neighborhoods were planned in a comprehensive fashion, regional development was not. Both suburban development and the large-scale infrastructure needed to support it were organized on a piecemeal basis. “Well-planned neighborhoods were islands of rationality in a pragmatist sea” (Hise, 1997, p. 52). Especially after World War II, the suburbanization process would reshape metropolitan areas into aggregates of multiple, diverse, and yet interconnected cities. Whereas in 1910, 71 percent of the total population—and 83 percent of the population living in cities—in the major urban counties (Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Mateo, Alameda, Santa Clara, San Diego, and Sacramento) lived in the major central cities (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, San Diego, Sacramento, and San Jose), by 1960, the shares had dropped to 44 percent and 54 percent, respectively. 14 3. Postwar Planning: The Second Reform Wave Suburban development exploded in California after World War II. The unitary Progressive Era approach to metropolitan growth management—consolidation of authority at the city level—became fractured once metropolitan areas expanded well beyond the borders of the original central cities, and planning problems arose that city and county governments were unable to solve on their own. The state and federal governments stepped in to extend the Progressive model of centralized planning authority to the regional scale to provide large-scale infrastructure. This vertical model of regional planning was later extended to environmental planning as well. Local governments also arranged to provide services across borders, for example, through new single-purpose service districts. Together, these developments constituted a functional approach to regionalism that allowed suburban development to flourish but that also created a more fragmented system of governance. Concerns about governmental fragmentation, social inequities, and environmental damage from suburban development gave rise to a further set of reform efforts in the 1960s and 1970s. Reformers attempted to consolidate growth management—including land use policy—at the state and regional levels, but suburban opposition prevailed. Reform efforts highlighted an unfortunate tradeoff between strengthening regional planning focus and accountability, on the one hand, or policy breadth, on the other. Functional Regionalism Postwar suburbanization was propelled by population growth and the decentralization of industry. California industries had secured over 10 percent of total federal war production contracts and wartime growth 15 helped fuel the boom that followed (Hise, 1997). The state’s population nearly doubled from 1945 to 1965.1 Job decentralization was promoted by construction of new roads that allowed goods to be shipped by trucks, ending dependence on rail transportation. Postwar prosperity also enabled large numbers of workers to take advantage of federal homeownership programs. Southern California led the nation in largescale residential development (Pincetl, 1999). Although the Los Angeles area experienced the most rapid growth before the war, other parts of the state, particularly the Bay Area and suburban counties near Los Angeles, grew rapidly afterward. One hundred new cities were incorporated over the 1950s and 1960s, and most new growth was located in suburban communities, as Figure 3.1 indicates. Planning problems arose that local jurisdictions were unable to solve on their own. The state and federal governments took on a larger role in regional planning for large-scale infrastructure, resource management, and environmental protection—planning areas that were inherently regional in scale and required massive investments or intrusive regulation 60 Central cities Suburbs 40 Percentage 20 0 1940–1950 1950–1960 1960–1970 SOURCES: Population data are from California Department of Finance, Historical Census Populations. Central city, urbanized, and metropolitan area definitions are from the 1970 U.S. Census. NOTE: Suburbs are defined as cities other than central cities in urbanized parts of metropolitan areas. Figure 3.1—Share of State Population Growth by City Type, 1940–1970 ____________ 1Calculated based on data from the California Department of Finance, Historical State Population Estimates. 16 of local land use. Thus, the Progressive model of centralized municipal planning was reshaped into a vertical, state-dominated form. The state government took on a larger planning role especially after Governor Edmund “Pat” Brown was elected in 1958. With a Democratic legislature behind him, Brown passed ambitious programs for roads and highways, mass transit, a university system, and a state water project, among other things (Pincetl, 1999). The California Water Plan, approved in the form of a bond issue under Brown’s administration, has been called the single most significant policy decision in the state’s history (Mocine, 1983). An ambitious program of freeway construction was launched with passage of the 1947 State Highway Act and the 1956 and 1962 Federal Highway Acts. California’s current freeway and expressway system, most of which was completed by the 1970s, was the largest public works project ever built by a single organization (Taylor, 1992). State agencies created during the period, such as the California Division of Highways (later renamed Caltrans), played critical roles in shaping development patterns. However, these agencies were provided narrow substantive authority. The plans of separate state departments were rarely well coordinated. Sometimes the permit requirements of one agency even conflicted with those of another. Thus, although the state government did establish powerful planning mechanisms during the postwar period, they were not integrated into a larger framework of coordinated goals and policies (Detwiler, 1980; Mocine, 1983; Kirlin, 1989; Sanders, 1989, 1991; Glickfeld and Levine, 1992; Bradshaw, 1992; Pincetl, 1999). The state government’s influence sometimes overrode local and regional preferences. An example was the development of the Los Angeles freeway system. City and county planners devised a plan before World War II calling for high-capacity boulevards or expressways tightly integrated with existing and planned land development, as well as bus and transit systems (Taylor, 1992; Wachs and Dill, 1999). But implementation lagged because of funding constraints. In exchange for external funding support after the war, Los Angeles area officials agreed to forgo their own plan and to accept highway design standards associated with state and federal programs. The basic character of the 17 regional network was reoriented to facilitate long-distance intercity travel with higher design speeds and degrees of grade separation than originally envisioned. The Los Angeles case indicates that at an important stage in the evolution of transportation programs, the region was able to articulate a unique, possibly appropriate concept for regional transportation investment. The absence of a region-wide body having authority to implement this concept and the absence of fiscal independence at the regional level, however, caused compromises that substantially changed the nature of the plans (Wachs and Dill, 1999, p. 300). The Los Angeles experience was repeated to varying degrees in other metropolitan areas. To secure the funding needed for large-scale systems, cities were forced to relinquish control over the planning, development, and operation of urban freeways. Urban highway funding shifted from local property taxes to state and later federal gasoline taxes, disconnecting urban transportation finance from its effects on local land uses. Planning for freeways was divorced from planning for other modes such as mass transit (Taylor, 1992). Ironically, federal and state highway building actually helped to ensure that local land use patterns were accommodated, rather than redirected. A goal of many early metropolitan expressway plans had been to help stem the decline of downtown areas by directing suburban traffic toward city centers. State highway planners rejected such objectives, preferring to accommodate the rise in suburban traffic by distributing it around regions and in general to “interfere as little as possible with metropolitan land uses” (Taylor, 1992, p. 69). It was easier to implement regionally defined plans for mass transit. The San Francisco Bay Area did so in response to a severe imbalance between jobs and housing that arose during the war years. The Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission, created by the legislature in 1951, advocated a system for all nine Bay Area counties. However, only three counties elected to join the BART District when it was established in 1957. BART, which began construction in the 1960s, was the first large-scale mass transit system to be built in the country for nearly half a century (Scott, 1985; Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). The single-purpose, functional approach adopted by the state government in relation to transportation was also applied to 18 environmental planning in the postwar years, although strong regulatory structures would not be developed until the 1970s. Local governments and business leaders pressured the state to define a systematic approach to air and water quality management to solve problems that local governments could not resolve on their own. Just as for large-scale transportation investments, the costs of necessary environmental technology, personnel, equipment, and facilities were beyond the reach of individual local governments. Furthermore, locally controlled programs had caused conflicts in some areas because pollution inevitably crossed local borders, and neighboring jurisdictions could not always agree on standards or methods for abatement (Wachs and Dill, 1999). After smog problems reached crisis levels in Los Angeles, the legislature authorized counties to regulate air pollution in 1947. Los Angeles County established the first county air pollution control agency in the nation the same year. A five-county agency was established for the San Francisco Bay Area in 1955 (Wachs and Dill, 1999). In contrast to the county-based approach to air quality management, the state government established nine regional water quality control boards in 1949 primarily along hydrologic lines. A State Water Pollution Control Board was also established, but primary responsibility was vested in the regional boards (Robie, 1972). At the local level, cities and counties also pursued a form of functional planning to support suburban expansion. They created numerous “special districts” to provide services such as water, sewers, utilities, and public transit. California used them more often and for a wider variety of services than other states (Eigerman, 1998). From 1952 to 1967, 778 independent special districts were created across California, increasing the total number to over 2,100. The average rate of increase of independent special districts during this period was nearly three times as high as it would be from 1967 to 1997.2 Special districts and other cost-sharing arrangements among local governments helped to facilitate city incorporations. For example, the 1954 Lakewood Plan allowed smaller cities in Los Angeles County to contract with the county government for basic services such as police and ____________ 2Based on data from U.S. Census Bureau (1997), Table 5. 19 fire protection. By showing that smaller cities could be economically viable, the Lakewood Plan put a stop to annexation efforts by larger cities. Over the next 15 years, 32 new cities incorporated, 31 of which contracted with the county for services. The new jurisdictions followed class and racial lines. Thus, functional planning helped provide the means for wealthier white suburbanites to exit from the broader political arena (Fulton, 1997a; Weir, 2000b). The American Dream or a Nightmare of Numbers: Views on Suburbanization The regional growth-management framework that arose during the postwar years—based on functional, single-purpose planning—facilitated rapid suburban development. However, this approach evolved largely in the absence of a clearly articulated policy framework at the state or federal level, especially in relation to land use (Weir, 2000a). By the 1960s, a series of growth-related concerns had gained attention, including disorderly planning, deterioration of inner-city communities, and environmental degradation. These concerns prompted new reform proposals to address the emerging consequences of suburbanization. State policymakers worried about growing fragmentation and disorder in the governmental system. Local governments had engaged in “boundary wars” over incorporations (Eigerman, 1998). Governor Pat Brown’s Commission on Metropolitan Area Problems issued a report in 1960 complaining about rapid population growth, which it described as a “nightmare of numbers,” “jigsaw governments,” “city incorporations to promote special economic interests,” and vast numbers of special districts operating “substantially without democratic control” (pp. 6, 10, 11). The commission also worried about the social equity consequences of governmental fragmentation. These concerns reflected profound changes reshaping the relationship between the economy and government in metropolitan regions. In multicity metropolitan areas, economic decisions were increasingly made at a regional scale. For example, real estate developers, industrial firms, and workers seeking housing and jobs now made location decisions in a regional context. However, the governance system 20 still adhered to an older model of development. No new general-purpose governmental entities had emerged to correspond to the new spatial pattern of development created by new economic and technological forces. Central city neighborhoods had long reflected distinctions by race, class, and function. However, suburbanization permitted cities themselves to splinter into different functional and social types: wealthy bedroom communities, working class suburbs, industrial districts, and central cities, for example. Debates about the consequences of this fragmentation have continued for decades. On the one hand, Americans value local control and governments that are close to the people. Some argue that our system of small local governments is more efficient, accountable, and responsive. Others question the efficiency of the system and argue that it encourages parochialism, fiscal competition, and exclusionary practices, such as zoning, that reinforce racial and economic segregation (Baldassare et al., 1996; Lewis, 1998; Altshuler et al., 1999). As John Kirlin (1993) notes, conflicts over regionalism relate to fundamental values about the purpose of government. Those who view government as an instrument for collective choice are likely to support regionalism; those who see it as a mechanism to support individual choice are not. The fragmentation debate raises questions about the proper scale at which to make government decisions. Metropolitan fragmentation produces a mismatch between the levels of government most commonly associated with the regulation of growth—cities and counties (in unincorporated areas)—and the level at which many effects are felt, the metropolitan region. Because local governments finance services primarily from their own tax base, and they control land use, they have both the means and incentive to implement policies that serve their fiscal interests, even if those policies produce negative effects for the region as a whole (Altshuler et al., 1999). When there is solely local regulation, local jurisdictions can ignore the costs of development with primarily local benefits, such as lowdensity housing, but primarily regional costs, such as traffic congestion or environmental damage. The reverse also occurs; local jurisdictions avoid developments with regional benefits but primarily local costs, such as 21 siting of toxic waste dumps, regional airports, or affordable housing complexes (Bollens, 1992; Lewis, 1998). If policies are employed for local benefit but they produce negative outcomes when viewed at a broader scale—for example, inefficient use of regional resources or unequal tax burdens and service levels across communities— responsibility to address the consequences may then default to higher levels of government. Gregory Weiher has argued that local government fragmentation reshaped the nature of racial segregation and discrimination in the United States. He noted that civil rights policy substantially dismantled neighborhood-level mechanisms of segregation, but that parallel to that process the federal courts exhibited a consistent tendency to reinforce the integrity of local jurisdictional boundaries and land use policies with potential exclusionary effects. “The collective significance of these parallel developments is that segregation by various characteristics within jurisdictions is subject to change through legal action, but that segregation at jurisdictional boundaries is relatively secure against legal attack” (1991, pp. 94–95). Thus, even as the federal and state roles in civil rights and social welfare policy grew more active during the 1960s, steps were taken to reinforce local home rule authority over land use that may have helped produce contradictory outcomes. How fragmented and dissimilar had cities become by the 1960s? Table 3.1 reveals that concerns about fragmentation were not the result of a decline in the average population of California cities. Only during the Progressive Era did the growth rate in city incorporations actually exceed the population growth rate in the state. Rapid population growth ensured that average city population size increased steadily throughout the century in the two largest metropolitan areas—the Los Angeles region and San Francisco Bay Area—even when the major central cities are excluded from the analysis. However, the size of newly incorporated cities was considerably smaller in terms of both population and land area, as Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicate. Even by the year 2000, suburban cities incorporated during the postwar period tended to have smaller populations. During the postwar years, newer cities were not necessarily less densely settled than older ones, however. 22 23 Table 3.1 City Incorporations and Populations in California, 1900–2000 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 Number of cities by beginning of year 112 184 244 273 282 303 359 Number of incorporations during prior decade 23 72 60 29 9 21 55 Growth rate of state population during prior decade, % 22 60 44 66 22 53 48 Growth rate of incorporations during prior decade, % 26 64 33 12 3 7 18 Average city population in the Los Angeles region and San Francisco Bay Area, excluding Los Angeles, Long Beach, San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose 2,868 3,756 4,666 8,278 9,582 15,112 24,139 Average city population in the Los Angeles region and San Francisco Bay Area for cities incorporated during the prior decade 1,151 1,504 1,664 4,035 2,639 6,182 20,866 Average city population in 2000 in the Los Angeles and San Francisco Bay Areas for cities incorporated during the prior decade 78,399 52,688 41,976 48,805 28,743 23,321 49,954 1970 403 45 27 13 1980 422 19 19 5 32,041 36,907 16,683 23,436 36,256 46,511 SOURCE: Calculated using data from California Department of Finance, Historical Census Populations. 1990 456 34 26 8 45,142 37,539 47,763 2000 473 17 14 4 50,821 27,813 27,813 24 Table 3.2 Characteristics of California Cities in Urbanized Areas, 1970 Incorporation Date No. of Cities Average No. Average Land of Residents Area, Sq. Mi. per Sq. Mi.a Average % Nonwhite Average Family Income, $a Los Angeles County Before 1900 1900–1919 1920–1949 1950–1959 1960–1969 11 22 11 21 10 56 7 7 7 6 6,283 6,249 7,172 6,261 7,433 15 3 6 3 5 12,326 15,120 13,145 12,292 10,713 San Francisco Bay Area (9 counties) Before 1900 1900–1919 1920–1949 1950–1959 1960–1969 21 21 8 11 8 22 9 5 15 8 4,727 4,324 4,856 2,749 1,722 11 6 5 4 2 15,185 16,603 17,229 16,550 16,212 Cities in Other Urbanized Areas Before 1900 1900–1919 1920–1949 1950–1959 1960–1969 24 16 5 15 9 38 13 6 8 14 3,382 3,265 4,052 4,473 1,846 8 3 3 5 2 11,071 12,500 12,162 12,415 14,240 SOURCE: U.S. Census. NOTE: Values are calculated for cities, i.e., not weighted for population. aIncome statistics are for cities with populations of 2,500 or more. Average % of Population Under Age 18 31 29 31 38 40 29 32 31 41 37 33 34 37 39 40 Average Home Value, $ 26,771 30,524 27,055 26,677 27,003 31,252 33,904 33,955 34,261 34,996 22,724 26,283 25,990 26,168 28,818 Suburbanization reflected racial distinctions, as Table 3.2 indicates. In 1970, racial minorities were far more likely to be living in California’s older central cities. Newer cities were disproportionately white and tended to have higher proportions of children in the population. The pattern of class distinctions was a little more complicated. In the largest metropolitan areas, older suburbs were populated on average by wealthier residents. In Los Angeles County, new suburbs were particularly affordable in terms of average home values. However, this pattern was less evident elsewhere in California, where the newest suburbs had more valuable homes on average. Thus, although racial distinctions between newer and older cities were quite sharp across the state, economic distinctions were less prominent in some areas. In The Fractured Metropolis (1991), Gregory Weiher analyzed segregation by race and class at the neighborhood and city level in Los Angeles County in 1960, 1970, and 1980. He assessed neighborhoodlevel (census-tract-level) variance in racial composition and socioeconomic status, determining that the proportion explained by municipal boundaries increased substantially over the years tested, whereas the proportion explained by neighborhood composition declined. Furthermore, municipal distinctions accounted for the majority of variance in neighborhood composition by 1980. These findings lend support to the concerns of regional reformers that local government fragmentation exacerbated social inequalities during the period, and that segregation had been altered from a process relying on overt use of discriminatory mechanisms to one more dependent on intermunicipal distinctions. However, most voters and local government officials did not share such concerns about governmental fragmentation. On the contrary, they were generally wary of attempts to create new regional planning structures. For example, the state association of county boards of supervisors distributed hundreds of pens during the 1950s that read “home rule is the golden rule in the golden state” (MacDougall, 1983; also see Carpenter, 1983). Suburban areas were particularly suspicious of regional government, and suburban voters were increasingly influential in state politics, especially after the U.S. Supreme Court ordered that the state Senate be reapportioned on the basis of population in 1964. 25 Two main hypotheses have been advanced to explain why suburban voters tend to oppose regional governance: lifestyle differences and loss of control (Bollens, 1990). Williams (1967) argued that suburban voters wish to preserve the physical and social character of their communities and therefore oppose integration of “lifestyle” services such as land use, schools, police protection, and health and welfare. However, they are far more likely to accept integration of “systems-maintenance” functions, such as transportation and utilities, because of potential cost savings. California’s planning history confirms this view, as most regional planning entities were established to address infrastructure and service needs (Baldassare et al., 1996). The other explanation for suburban distrust of regional government emphasizes fear of losing access to government decisionmaking (Bollens, 1990). Surveys of Orange County voters consistently found limited support for regional governance among voters, and many respondents expressed fear that a regional government would take away too much local power. However, most were also favorable to a regional agency taking responsibility for air quality (Baldassare et al., 1996). Local Agency Formation Commissions: State Reforms Reinforce Localism During the 1960s, far-reaching reforms were proposed to address mounting concerns about the consequences of the suburban development process. For example, state legislators considered a more centralized approach to local governance and land use policy. However, these proposals provoked strong resistance. As suburban voters came to dominate state politics, they ensured that planning reforms did not undermine their authority. In its 1960 report, Governor Brown’s Commission on Metropolitan Area Problems called for a more centralized approach to governmental formation and planning. More coordinated metropolitan planning was advocated for land use, transportation, air pollution, and water supply, among other things. The commission made three specific recommendations: first, to improve laws concerning incorporations, annexations, and special districts; second, to establish metropolitan area 26 multipurpose districts with planning functions; and third, to establish a State Metropolitan Area Commission to evaluate local boundary changes (Governor’s Commission on Metropolitan Area Problems, 1960). However, local governments opposed this centralized model. The County Supervisors Association supported an alternative, the KnoxNisbet Act, which passed in 1963. The act required that each county create a Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) to regulate incorporations, annexations, special district formations, and other structural changes. LAFCO governing boards included representatives from both cities and the county board of supervisors. However, since they relied on county governments for funding, LAFCOs sometimes represented county interests more heavily. LAFCOs reinforced the home rule framework. They provided a means for better policy coordination among local governments, but with relatively loose policy guidance from the state, approaches to jurisdictional arrangements have varied. Each county developed its own model of city building, with some channeling urban growth into cities and others permitting substantial amounts of development in unincorporated areas. Some observers argue that LAFCOs have often been highly politicized and primarily reactive, exerting little independent control over land use decisions. Nevertheless, city incorporations in California did decline after 1963 (Mocine, 1983; Lewis, 1998; Pincetl, 1999; Fulton, 1999a; Weir, 2000b; Commission on Local Governance for the 21st Century, 2000). The Federal Government Promotes Voluntary Regionalism The federal government also worked to strengthen planning coordination during the 1960s, and federal reforms helped propel and reinforce state efforts. Federal and state reform goals were similar: to promote more coherent metropolitan decisionmaking and address the social equity and environmental consequences of suburbanization. The outcome was also similar. Although a national land use planning act was considered by Congress during the early 1970s, the main result of federal action during the period was the establishment of new institutions to 27 increase procedural coordination among local governments. However, federal reforms went further than LAFCOs in that they produced institutions at the scale of metropolitan regions, rather than at the county level, and they promoted planning coordination across multiple program areas. Early federal urban programs had supported local rather than regional planning. The Federal Housing Act of 1954 made money available to cities for planning through the so-called “701 Program.” Hundreds of general plans in California cities were prepared during the postwar years under the 701 aegis (Johnson, 1976; Mocine, 1983; Jones, 1983; Pincetl, 1999). The state reinforced this federal objective by reorganizing local planning requirements during the 1960s, culminating with a 1971 amendment to the state’s Planning, Zoning, and Development Law that required that local zoning ordinances be consistent with general plans. This turned general plans into true “constitutions” for growth and development rather than simply advisory documents (Fulton, 1999a). However, local planning was not directed toward substantive goals. Thus, the planning goals of adjacent jurisdictions might work at cross-purposes. State planning law therefore reinforced the Progressive Era legacy; comprehensive planning was strengthened within but not among local jurisdictions. Starting in the 1960s, the federal government began to require regional planning as a condition for funding for highways, mass transit, airports, sewage treatment plants, housing, health facilities, and open space. The Federal Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 consolidated regional review of grant applications. Implemented by the Bureau of the Budget (now Office of Management and Budget) Circular A-95 a year later, the law applied regional review requirements to numerous federal programs. By 1973, about 150 programs were covered (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). The California legislature had enacted laws permitting regional planning as early as 1929, with few results (Douglas, 1968). This changed in 1963, when the state legislature passed the Regional Planning Act. It provided for the division of California into regional planning areas and for the establishment of planning districts with limited taxing powers to be governed by local elected officials, if two-thirds of the cities 28 and counties in the areas agreed upon the need for such a district. However, the County Supervisors Association obtained an amendment creating an escape clause. It provided that if a voluntary association was already in existence, no new planning district would be activated (Douglas, 1968; Johnson, 1976). Through this series of events, federal policies helped create the broadest systematic form of cross-jurisdictional regionalism in California, which still persists today. Twenty-six interjurisdictional planning organizations called Councils of Governments (COGs) were established in California during the 1960s and early 1970s. Local governments took advantage of the “escape clause” in the state’s Regional Planning Act and structured COGs as voluntary organizations of local governments, instead of the limited regional governments permitted by the statute. The geographic boundaries of California’s metropolitan area COGs generally coincide with U.S. Census Bureau definitions of the state’s metropolitan areas. Only four are multicounty: the COGs for the San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Monterey Bay areas. The most common governing structure used by COGs is apportionment on a one-government, one-vote basis, regardless of the population or economic influence of the municipalities. However, some California COGs have implemented weighted voting schemes that better address their particular political circumstances.3 During the period, a new system of regional transportation planning was also established in response to federal mandates, a system that persists today. The new transportation structure was interwoven with the COG structure. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 denied federal highway funds to projects not considered in a comprehensive regional planning process. The 1964 Federal Mass Transportation Act provided funds for mass transit systems for the first time and also called for regional planning. The 1970, 1973, and 1978 Highway Acts strengthened the requirements, calling for regional review by “metropolitan planning organizations” (MPOs) in urban areas with a population of 50,000 or more and earmarking funds for planning. ____________ 3See Appendices A, B, and C for more about geographic jurisdictions, governing structures, dates of establishment, and current responsibilities of California COGs. 29 MPOs are responsible for “continuing, comprehensive, and cooperative” planning for transportation (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). In California, most MPOs were designated to coincide with existing COGs.4 The state government took its own steps to establish a framework for regional transportation planning. In a pattern that has continued, the state directed greater authority to county-level (rather than metropolitan) agencies than did the federal approach. The California Transportation Development Act (TDA), passed in 1971, gave each county the proceeds of a quarter-cent increase in the state sales tax earmarked mainly for transit. This represented a major shift in state funding priorities. To win support from Republicans and rural legislators, the TDA tax increase was designated as a local tax to be returned to the county in which it was collected. Within counties (with the exception of Los Angeles), revenues were apportioned to transit operators on the basis of service area population. Because per capita transit ridership varies greatly from central city to suburb, the program has been called an “extraordinary windfall for suburban transit operators” (Taylor, 1991). The TDA designated “regional transportation planning agencies” (RTPAs) to allocate the new funds. In 1972, RTPAs were also required to submit comprehensive, long-range transportation plans to the state. The designation of RTPAs undermined somewhat the multicounty character of the federal COG/MPO structure. RTPAs are almost all organized at the county level. In two of the state’s four multicounty regions—the San Francisco Bay and Los Angeles areas—RTPA designations match the federal structure. However, in the Sacramento and Monterey Bay areas, RTPAs were also designated at the county level. Furthermore, “county transportation commissions” (CTCs) were established for four (later five) of the counties under the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles regional COG to give them a greater voice in the preparation of the regional plan. In general, the RTPA designations “suited the regions’ political context” (Wilshusen, 1992, p. 4; also see Bollens, 1993b). ____________ 4See Appendices A, C, D, and E for more about the jurisdictions, functions, and statutes governing federal and state transportation planning agencies in California. See Lewis and Sprague (1997) for more information on governing structures of the state’s MPOs. 30 By the mid-1970s, COGs and MPOs were at the height of their influence. Federally mandated “A-95 review” quickly became their major activity, entailing review of local grant applications for projects totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. COGs also served as forums for discussion, conducted research and hearings, and made advisory policy recommendations (Johnson, 1976; Grigsby, 1996; Pincetl, 1999). However, critics charged that COG regional plans tended to be weak or unenforceable and that their review role amounted to a veto power seldom used. Occasionally, a local project might fail to receive approval if it was egregiously inconsistent with regional goals. However, COGs rarely undertook systematic deliberation and implementation of regional priorities and objectives.5 A survey of local officials in the Los Angeles area in the early 1970s found that few consulted the regional plan when preparing grant applications (Johnson, 1976, p. 190). Johnson also noted that federal officials interviewed paid scant attention to COG comments (p. 182). The structure of COGs has produced an inherent conflict that can undermine their effectiveness. Created largely in response to federal mandates, they are nevertheless run by local elected officials, who find themselves in the position of being asked to impose regional policies on themselves. From this perspective, the COG A-95 review role was flawed because those reviewed were doing the reviewing (Schmandt, 1973). Voluntary membership can encourage COGs/MPOs to adopt a lowest-common-denominator approach, since maintaining membership is the key to their power. This can be especially problematic in diverse, multicentered regions. This exchange, recorded during a 1998 meeting of local government officials in the San Francisco Bay Area attempting to define regional criteria for transportation funding, exemplifies the weakness: We have to agree that every change creates winners and losers. But we can navigate. We can make a change so that everyone wins in the region as a whole, not just each fiefdom. ____________ 5For more on COG processes, see Johnson (1976); Heitman (1982); Jones (1983); Mocine (1983); LeGrant (1984); Fulton (1992b, 1993, 1999a); Lewis and Sprague (1997); Pincetl (1999); and Weir (2000a). 31 We’d all love to do that. But we report to the fiefdoms (Innes and Gruber, 2001, p. 301). Regionalism in the Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay, and San Diego Areas Federal and state reform measures produced new regional institutions in the state’s major metropolitan areas during the 1960s and 1970s. But in only one—the San Francisco Bay Area—did a concerted debate emerge about how to structure the institutions. Conditions in the Bay Area gave rise to protracted conflicts over regional governance that continue today. Regionalism in California’s two other most populous metropolitan areas—the Greater Los Angeles and San Diego areas— evolved without the same degree of conflict. Regional planning in the Los Angeles area emerged largely in response to federal mandates and the threat of state action. That regionalism was not more vigorously promoted from the bottom up reflects the decentralized fashion in which the region had developed. “City and regional planning was adopted earlier, implemented more thoroughly, but undermined more insidiously [in Los Angeles] than elsewhere” (Fogelson, 1967, p. 2). By 1970, 10 million people lived in more than 150 jurisdictions in a six-county area the size of Ohio.6 Given the size of the counties, their governments had acted to some degree as regional planning entities, but they tended to oppose planning integration across their borders. Although city governments cooperated on an ad hoc basis to provide services, they rarely felt the need to coordinate broad regional policies. The City of Los Angeles was huge, containing 28 percent of the sixcounty region’s population. However, deeper social divisions had emerged between Los Angeles and its suburbs than had developed elsewhere in the state (Davis, 1992; Saltzstein, 1996; Fulton, 1992b, 1997a; Innes et al., 1994; and Fulton et al., 2000b). ____________ 6The five-county region as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau includes Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura, San Bernardino, and Riverside Counties. The Southern California Association of Governments also includes Imperial County in its jurisdiction. 32 The Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG), the COG for the six-county Los Angeles region, was established in 1965 to avoid state designation of a more authoritative regional planning entity (Douglas, 1968; Johnson, 1976). During the early 1970s, SCAG considered reorganization in response to state and federal reform proposals that were gaining momentum. However, the main outcome was to promote establishment of “mini-COGs” in five subregional areas mostly coinciding with county boundaries (Johnson, 1976). Thus, subregional, rather than regional planning, was affirmed. In contrast to the Los Angeles region, the San Diego area is relatively coherent politically and geographically. This has influenced its regional planning history by making voluntary cooperation seem more viable. The San Diego area is encompassed by a single county and includes only 18 cities. The San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) developed along classic COG lines as a voluntary association of local governments. During the 1970s, the major focus of growth management reform was in the City of San Diego itself. The second-largest city in California, San Diego dominates its region. In 1970, the City of San Diego held 51 percent of the county’s residents, a share that would drop to 44 percent by 2000. In 1979, the city adopted a general plan that linked development decisions to a set of three tiered areas—urban, suburban, and rural. It pioneered the combination of growth management with the financing of infrastructure through imposition of developer fees in rural areas and waiver of fees in urban areas (Fulton, 1999a). The San Francisco Bay Area has greater political coherence than the Los Angeles region, but less than the San Diego area. The San Francisco Bay itself helps explain why; it both promotes and retards cooperation among the cities that surround it. The region as commonly conceived comprises nine counties that touch the bay, covering an area of about 7,000 square miles. As a common resource, the bay helps to define the region, and poses a common planning challenge. Yet the bay also separates the communities around it. Oakland in particular viewed itself as a potential competitor to San Francisco from early on (Scott, 1985; Pincetl, 1999). 33 In contrast to the Los Angeles area, the San Francisco Bay region did not suburbanize rapidly until after World War II. The region’s population nearly doubled over the 1950s and 1960s. By 1970, no single city dominated the region. The three largest—San Francisco, San Jose, and Oakland—were of medium size (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). In 1970, they contained 33 percent of the region’s population, a share that remained steady over the following decades. They are also located at some distance from one another. As a result, the Bay Area has been described as “a region of overlapping sub-regions” (Jones and Rothblatt, 1993). Whereas Los Angeles Progressive leaders had marshaled municipal power to expand outward, Bay Area civic leaders faced the challenge of persuading the cities around the bay to join forces to integrate the region inward. Early in the century, San Francisco had developed a strong tradition of “business associationalism” as the state’s first major financial and economic center. Civic leaders sought to direct the region’s growth, but their consolidation campaigns provoked such a hostile reaction that cooperation was hampered for decades afterward. As a result, regional integration remained an unresolved issue (Scott, 1985; Pincetl, 1999). Regional environmental and transportation problems became matters of pressing concern by the 1960s. In particular, the San Francisco Bay was becoming increasingly degraded, and the region lacked a coordinated mass transit network. The fact that these regional problems gained attention just as national and state reforms were enacted addressing the same issues helped provoke a struggle over regionalism. The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) was created in 1961 partly in reaction to growing impatience about these problems, but it proved unable to address them effectively. When ABAG members were unable to agree on a plan for measures to protect the bay, environmental groups pushed for the creation of an independent commission with regulatory powers (Scott and Bollens, 1968; Kent, 1983; Jones, 1983; Scott, 1985; Jones and Rothblatt, 1993). In 1965, the state legislature passed revolutionary legislation establishing the Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) as a state agency with overriding authority over land uses that affect the bay. It became the prototype for other such agencies both in California and elsewhere. 34 Disputes emerged over proposals to build bridges, airports, and other facilities. Business leaders from San Francisco and Oakland, concerned that political fragmentation in the region would damage economic competitiveness, became vocal advocates for stronger regional transportation planning. Thus, the historical business rivalry between San Francisco and Oakland was healed as both cities faced a similar challenge from suburban areas (Scott, 1985; Pincetl, 1999). The Bay Area Council, an organization of regional business leaders, was instrumental in creation of the BART District in 1957. Through the next decade, it pushed for a new regional transportation authority to manage roads, harbors, and airports. Many suburban cities and counties objected to what they viewed as an effort by the central cities to promote their own interests. ABAG’s transportation planning committee was unable to intervene in disputes between member governments over the question (Scott and Bollens, 1968; Kent, 1983; Jones, 1983; Scott, 1985; Jones and Rothblatt, 1993). The Federal Transit Administration became frustrated with ABAG’s inability to define a mechanism for coordination of regional mass transit systems. With construction of BART under way, it was felt that an areawide authority was needed to integrate different elements (Jones, 1974, 1983). In 1970, the Federal Transit Administration threatened to withhold all aid for the Bay Area if a transportation agency stronger than ABAG was not created. The state legislature complied, establishing the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) in 1970 to oversee transportation planning and funding for the nine-county Bay Area. It is the strongest regional transportation planning body in the state and the only one that is officially a legal subdivision of the state. The role of transportation planning is key to understanding the distinct development of regional institutions in the San Francisco Bay and Los Angeles areas during the period. Just at the time that state and federal funds were first made available for mass transit, the Bay Area finally reached a stage of development that made it necessary to define an integrated regional approach in this area. The BART system finally linked the region’s two historical central cities, although many suburban transit systems were also established on autonomous lines. 35 During the same period, proposals to organize a mass transit system in the Los Angeles area failed to win broad support because suburban areas objected to investments in systems that would primarily benefit central areas and that seemed unwarranted given the region’s low-density development pattern (Wachs, 1996). The perceived need to establish MTC as a separate agency emerged directly from its role in transit planning. In contrast, there was broad consensus that the basis of Los Angeles’s system was limited to roads and freeways, and much of that system was already complete when SCAG adopted the role of regional transportation planner. In addition to supporting efforts to strengthen regional planning in relation to specific functional concerns, some San Francisco Bay Area reformers mounted an even more ambitious campaign in the late 1960s to consolidate agencies. A reform coalition of concerned officials, environmentalists, regional business leaders, and good-government groups banded together to advocate establishment of a stronger multipurpose institution. The reformers had come to view local government resistance to regional planning as a major obstacle to achieving their goals. Local governments were forced to respond. By the end of the decade, local officials were even willing to establish a new regional government if they could thereby preempt the creation of stronger agencies viewed as threats to home rule (Kent, 1983; Jones, 1974, 1983). Between 1969 and 1975, dozens of bills were introduced in the state legislature to establish a new regional authority for the Bay Area. In a pattern that would be repeated elsewhere, controversy surrounded procedural issues more than policy matters. The major sticking points centered on governance issues: the size and composition of the governing board of the new regional authority, which regional agencies should come under its wing, and financing. Ultimately, the coalition fell apart in frustration. Although legislative votes reflected partisan lines, most negative votes came from outside the Bay Area. The most vocal opponents were Southern California officials, concerned about setting a precedent. Thus, the effort to establish regional home rule was effectively defeated by other regions (Knox, 1983; Jones, 1974, 1983; MacDougall, 1983; Jones and Rothblatt, 1993). 36 The evolution of regionalism in the three major California metropolitan areas suggests a number of conclusions. First, political conditions affected the way reforms were implemented. In particular, in the two regions in which the political balance between central and suburban cities was stable, COGs emerged along the classic voluntarist lines. However, in the Bay Area, tension between the major central cities had stalled development of regional planning mechanisms that aligned with the political structure. A second, related matter is the history of economic development in the regions. Rapid postwar development in the Bay Area brought regional problems to the fore—especially in the key areas of environmental and transportation planning. This coincided with a rise in federal and state environmental regulation and involvement in these areas. The combination helped produce a thoroughgoing discussion about governance institutions. This pattern would also be repeated elsewhere: When transportation or environmental problems overwhelm regional decisionmaking mechanisms, and this coincides with broader reforms in these policy areas, homegrown efforts to strengthen regional institutions are more likely to emerge. Business and environmental leaders usually play a key role in such reform efforts because their interests are often inherently regional. The outcome of the Bay Area struggle is important to note, because it also would come to be repeated. Reformers faced an unfortunate tradeoff between regional focus and accountability on the one hand and breadth of policy authority on the other. Reformers were able to strengthen regional planning authorities, even over the objections of local governments, but only along narrow functional lines. Strengthening regional multipurpose planning institutions has proved much harder, especially when their purview includes land use. This tradeoff sets up an ironic challenge for COGs. The local government members of COGs may view the establishment of singlepurpose agencies as a threat to home rule, but these agencies may be more acceptable to local governments than a regional multipurpose authority with an independent role in land use policy. Once singlepurpose agencies are established, they may in turn form an obstacle to 37 planning integration because they often oppose efforts to merge their functions with those of other agencies. Finally, it is useful to note the role that the state legislature played in the Bay Area struggles. The lack of bipartisan, broad-based support in the legislature helped spell the demise of Bay Area reforms. Thus, the very strength and diversity of California’s regions can pose an obstacle to reform because objections from other regions may undermine the ability of a single region to go its own way. By the same token, the strength of the state’s regions also helps explain why the state government has not mandated establishment of stronger regional authorities. Not only does regional diversity make any uniform set of regional policies difficult to enact, but also regional governments might pose a threat to state prerogatives. The Rise of Environmentalism Environmental concerns slowly gained attention during the postwar expansion as air and water quality began to deteriorate. By the late 1960s, a broad environmental movement had emerged, galvanized by catastrophes such as the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill (Pincetl, 1999). Reformers primarily called for regulation to control pollution and preserve natural resources; environmental regulation followed the singlepurpose functional approach to regional planning in areas beyond the ability of local governments to control. Water management in California evolved into a state-directed process organized on a bioregional basis. In 1967, the legislature created the State Water Resources Control Board to oversee water rights and quality through the nine regional water control boards established in 1949 (Robie, 1972). The 1969 Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act and the 1972 federal Clean Water Act placed the state board at the center of a comprehensive system to grant, review, and enforce permits to appropriate water in the state, and to govern quality standards (Young and Congdon, 1994). The Clean Water Act created the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System program, which established permit requirements for surface discharges from “point sources,” the specific, primarily industrial, sources of pollutants into water pipes. 38 Other regulations required that large developers obtain federal permits for draining or filling wetlands. The nine regional water boards are governed by members appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state senate. In setting standards, the regional boards must balance environmental characteristics, beneficial uses, and economic considerations. This blend of goals contrasts somewhat with other environmental programs. The greater intrusion of water policy into local land use decisions, and the need to balance multiple policy goals, may help explain why the state government adopted a centralized institutional approach in this area. Federal and state legislation also established the basic framework for air pollution control that persists today. The legislature created the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board in 1960 to control auto emissions. The State Air Resources Board was established in 1967 to define emission and quality standards, air basins, and regional pollution control districts that would regulate stationary sources such as industrial and commercial establishments. The federal Clean Air Act of 1970 established emissions standards and gave states authority for implementation and enforcement. In spite of efforts to establish air pollution control districts based on air basins, the institutional structure of air quality management retained its tradition of county control. Although 15 air basins have been defined in California based on objective standards, 35 air pollution control districts have been designated. Twenty-five are at the county or subcounty level. Most of the multicounty agencies were created through consolidation agreements among existing districts, but three required special legislation.7 Governing boards are generally composed of county supervisors.8 In some air basins, the existence of numerous county-level ____________ 7These are the Bay Area Air Quality Management District for the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area, the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) for the portions of four Los Angeles area counties included in the South Coast Air Basin, and the Mojave Desert Air Quality Management District for portions of San Bernardino and Riverside Counties. 8The South Coast Air Quality Management District, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, and San Joaquin Unified District also provide representation to cities. SCAQMD’s governing board includes the further addition of three members 39 districts reveals a lack of policy consensus (Wachs and Dill, 1999; Denney et al., 1999). In a few unique cases, the state created regional governance structures during the 1970s with significant land use authority. They were special cases calling for protection of valued and endangered natural resources, with significant effects on local government land use policy. In these instances, public concern was sufficient to overcome the objections of local governments to the establishment of strong regional authorities. In response to pressure from citizen activists, the state legislature established the Bay Conservation and Development Commission in 1965 to regulate land uses that affect the San Francisco Bay. As noted, it became the prototype for other agencies, including the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, established in 1967, and the California Coastal Commission, approved by voters in 1972. As Madelyn Glickfeld and Ned Levine note, these three bodies represent California’s strongest efforts to promote comprehensive planning and regulate land use at the regional level. The California Coastal Commission and BCDC are among the few California agencies given the ability to coordinate and approve the plans of local, state, and federal agencies. However, these agencies have limits as models for regional growth management, since all have been defined around cherished natural resources rather than economic regions. In addition, they do not fund capital improvements or services, unlike general-purpose governments (Glickfeld and Levine, 1992). Perhaps the most important piece of land use legislation during the period addressed environmental concerns. The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), passed in 1970, requires that state and local agencies assess the potential environmental impacts of development projects and adopt all “feasible” measures to mitigate adverse effects. The state provides for no administrative review of CEQA decisions, however. As a result, enforcement is up to citizens and the courts (Fulton, 1999a). ________________________________________________________ appointed by the governor, the speaker of the state assembly, and the Senate Rules Committee. 40 Thus, CEQA repeated the state’s historical pattern of strengthening local planning requirements in a fashion more procedural than substantive. Because its requirements relate to specific development projects rather than the overall general plans of local jurisdictions, CEQA has been called a “paper tiger,” generating tremendous amounts of procedural material and litigation but not necessarily protecting the environment because of its piecemeal approach. CEQA requirements have been amended to require assessment of the cumulative effects of development, but this has proved difficult for local governments to evaluate (Fulton, 1999a). Another outcome of the environmental movement was legislation passed in 1970 calling on the governor’s planning office to develop a comprehensive state land use policy and to prepare a periodic “Environmental Goals and Policy Report” for submission to the legislature (Simpson, 1983; Pincetl, 1999). However, the Urban Strategy for California produced by Governor Jerry Brown’s administration is considered the sole instance when the provisions of the legislation were met. Brown’s Strategy called for an intergovernmental planning process among state agencies and COGs to prepare joint work programs to be submitted to the governor and the legislature. Brown issued an executive order (B-41-78) requiring that all state agencies, boards, and commissions follow the Strategy’s three priorities for development: to renew and maintain existing urban and suburban areas, to develop vacant and underutilized land within those areas, and when urban development was deemed necessary outside them, to use immediately adjacent land. This has been considered the only instance in which a California state administration developed an integrated set of policy objectives to guide growth management. However, Brown’s program was largely ignored (Fulton, 1992a; Pincetl, 1999). Conclusion By the mid-1970s, the main components of today’s regional planning system had been established.9 The postwar reform wave ____________ 9Appendix F lists the major regional arrangements as identified by the state senate in 1988. Most of the arrangements have been described in this report. With the addition of 41 reconfigured the Progressive Era growth management framework, fracturing metropolitan planning in the process. Metropolitan governance became more fragmented not only in terms of the sheer numbers of new cities, single-purpose planning agencies, and special districts but also in terms of the division of responsibility for functional areas. A division was introduced between planning areas dominated by the state and federal governments—regional transportation and environmental concerns—and land use, which remained a local prerogative. Not only was control of these policy areas placed under different levels of government, but also none were organized at the scale of metropolitan regions as they had come to be constituted by then. Vertical regionalism—state-dominated regional planning for largescale infrastructure and environmental planning—ensured that adequate public resources and accountability could be applied to regional policy problems with inherently regional scale and that local governments were unable to solve alone. However, the regional planning system became vertically fractured because single-purpose state agencies were organized along narrow functional lines. State and federal policy could be quite interventionist in these areas, as the history of highway planning indicates. However, in relation to land use, state policy was far less intrusive. In fact, it worked to facilitate local control by helping provide a regional infrastructure and service framework for suburban incorporation and development. Thus, the system also became horizontally fractured because state agencies have no direct control over local land use, although their policies are often directly related to land use patterns. This helped to ensure that local land use decisions would come to drive regional growth planning because local plans and projections were taken as given. A distinction emerged between federal and state growth management policy, one that would be reinforced in later decades. Federal reforms were more likely to promote metropolitan area planning, whereas state policies tended to strengthen the existing governmental structure, either by directing more planning authority to city or county agencies, as in the ________________________________________________________ the Delta Protection Commission, discussed in Chapter 6, the list in Appendix F can be considered up-to-date. 42 case of LAFCOs, air pollution management districts, and RTPAs, or by defining a more dominant role for state agencies, as in the case of water quality regulation. In response to growing fragmentation, the second reform wave also established the second major regional institutional model in California— the voluntary, horizontal form. This had first emerged on a smaller scale through numerous cross-jurisdictional special districts and service arrangements among local governments. Federal reforms extended this model both geographically and in functional scope. However, COGs served primarily as an interface rather than as independent decisionmaking bodies. With COG authority entirely derived from other levels of government, and without a reassertion of state land use policy objectives, the fundamental structure of accountability had not been altered. As a result, COGs were unable to overcome the planning divisions that had emerged. The main reforms related to land use governance during the period all displayed the same characteristic: They emphasized procedural rather than policy change. This is true of COGs, LAFCOs, local general planning requirements, and CEQA. The reforms protected home rule control of land use while attempting to establish a more orderly decision process. The outcome of the Bay Area struggle supports the argument that regionalism in California had developed into a tradeoff between regional focus and accountability on the one hand and breadth of policy authority on the other. Reformers were able to strengthen regional planning authorities, even over the objections of local governments, but generally only along narrow functional lines, and not over land use policy except in rare cases when a precious natural resource was in imminent danger. 43 4. The Planning System Under Stress The next three chapters describe strains on the regional planning system that arose during the 1980s and 1990s, making it increasingly difficult for the system to achieve its own objectives. A number of factors caused stress, including rapid population growth, decentralization of jobs and housing, fiscal and environmental constraints, and government gridlock. By the end of the 1990s, certain growth issues had gained prominence—in particular, housing needs, infrastructure deficiencies (especially transportation), and natural resource constraints (especially water). These issues highlighted regional consequences of fragmented policymaking, providing justification for integrating land use, transportation, and environmental planning. At the same time, the rise of a global economy reinforced the importance of regional approaches to economic development. This chapter describes how rapid growth and more complex development patterns created new planning challenges, while fiscal constraint limited government’s ability to respond. Fiscal constraint has been a double-edged sword for regional planning, at once highlighting the need for cooperation but also making it more difficult. Fiscal constraint is considered in relation to its effect on two growth management issues: infrastructure and affordable housing. Chapters 5 and 6 describe how regional planners in the two functional areas that have been approached systematically through a regional framework—transportation and environmental protection— began to perceive basic faults in the planning system by the late 1980s. In response, they developed new programs to try to overcome weaknesses in the traditional model. 45 Rapid Growth, New Development Patterns, and Fiscal Constraint The 1980s was a decade of unprecedented population growth in California. Growth spilled inland from coastal areas, especially to Sacramento County in the north and San Bernardino and Riverside Counties in the south.1 Figure 4.1 shows population gains by region. The rate of job growth was even higher than population growth, and it was highest in suburban areas. By 1990, less than half of all jobs in California metropolitan areas were located in the state’s 49 central cities, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.2 As employment moved to outlying areas, new “edge cities”—characterized by office parks, lowdensity housing, and automobiles—grew up. This pattern of development strained transportation systems not designed for suburb-tosuburb commutes. 16 1970–1980 1980–1990 12 1990–2000 8 Population increase (100,000s) 4 0 Los Angeles and Ventura Counties Orange County San Bernardino and Riverside Counties San Francisco Bay Area San Diego County SOURCE: U.S. Census. Central Valley Other Figure 4.1—Population Increase in Selected Areas in California, 1970–2000 ____________ 1This section draws from Landis (1992), Glickfeld and Levine (1992), and Fulton (1993a). 2Calculations are based on data from the 1990 U.S. Census Transportation Planning Package. 46 People and jobs spread farther out, but they also filled in older areas, so many communities underwent rapid change. By 1990, about half the state’s metropolitan area population lived in central cities, and another quarter lived in older suburbs incorporated before 1950. Central cities and older suburbs captured the largest share of overall growth during the 1980s and 1990s. Central city growth rates nearly matched suburban rates, contrasting with trends in many other parts of the country, where central cities were more apt to be abandoned. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show characteristics of California cities by age. Densification and racial change have been cited as factors prompting concern about growth in Southern California by the late 1980s (Landis, 1992; Davis, 1992). Older and middle-aged suburbs were the most densely populated areas by 1990, even more than central cities, and they had experienced high density gains over previous decades. The demographic composition of cities was also changing rapidly, as minorities increased in share. As the state’s population boomed, the government’s ability to respond to growth was sharply curtailed. A number of factors limited government spending. In particular, frustrated voters passed Proposition Table 4.1 Residential Population Growth in California Metropolitan Area Cities, 1970–2000 Incorporation Date Central cities Suburbs Before 1950 1950–1969 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–2000 No. of Cities, 2000 59 % Share of Total Metro Growth Rate (% Change) Area Population 1970– 1980– 1990– in Cities, 2000 1980 1990 2000 49 16 26 12 % Share of Metro Area (City) Population Growth 1970– 1980– 1990– 1980 1990 2000 46 43 38 250 29 100 14 14 1 33 5 18 2 18 25 16 29 24 29 24 26 15 18 12 13 38 14 8 2 1 21 19 6 13 SOURCE: U.S. Census. 47 Table 4.2 California Metropolitan Area City Characteristics, 1970–2000 Incorporation Date Central cities Suburbs Before 1950 1950–1969 1970–1999 Residents per Sq. Mi. for Cities with Population > 2,500 % Change Avg., 1970– 1980– 1990– 2000 1980 1990 2000 4,417 3 16 10 % Growth Rates for Cities with Population > 25,000a Residents, Jobs, 1980– 1990– 1990 2000 35 30 % of Population Not White-non-Hispanicb % Point Change Avg., 1980– 1990– 2000 1990 2000 47 9 11 4,590 4,837 2,995 8 30 15 5 23 14 20 10 24 46 50 9 25 63 50 10 49 147 34 9 10 11 10 SOURCE: U.S. Census. Values are calculated across cities (i.e., not weighted for population) in metropolitan areas; central city and metropolitan area definitions are as of 2000. aJourney-to-work data for 2000 were not available at the time of publication. bIn 2000, the Census Bureau permitted respondents to select multiple race categories. The share of the population considered “not white-non-Hispanic” in 2000 includes non-Hispanic respondents who selected more than one race. In previous Census years, a share of these respondents was coded as “white non-Hispanic.” Thus, the categories are not exactly comparable across Census years. The average share of the 2000 resident population that was mixed-race non-Hispanic, for the cities in this analysis, was 2.5 percent. 13 in 1978.3 Property tax revenue to city and county governments declined by half in the year after its passage, leaving them with fewer resources to address the costs of growth. Local governments lost a quarter of their total own-source, nonenterprise revenue (Silva and Barbour, 1999). Subsequent voter initiatives further constrained state and local revenue. Federal assistance to states and localities also was cut sharply starting in the late 1970s. Federal subventions to California cities declined by over three-quarters in inflation-adjusted per capita dollars from 1978 to 1992, and by about one-quarter to counties (Silva and Barbour, 1999). Fiscal constraint directly undermined regional planning by reducing resources for councils of governments. Two weeks after the passage of Proposition 13, ABAG members voted to cut dues by 70 percent, for ____________ 3This landmark initiative reduced property tax rates to 1 percent of the full value of the property and limited reassessment of the property to no more than 2 percent annually, except for cases of a change in ownership or new construction. 48 example (LeGrant, 1984). The further decline of COGs was ensured by federal government cutbacks. Among the first programs eliminated after President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 were domestic urban ones including those that had bolstered regional planning. Most federal requirements for regional review of local projects were rescinded by 1982 (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). Since the state government did not share the same commitment to regional planning that the federal government had exhibited over the past decades, regional planning suffered. ABAG’s budget and staff declined by two-thirds over the six-year period from 1977 to 1982, for example (LeGrant, 1984). As fiscal constraint reduced resources for planning, it also exacerbated planning problems. The state’s response to rapid growth during the 1980s was largely “policy by neglect” (Fulton, 1992a, p. 23). During the late 1960s, capital outlays for upgrading basic infrastructure had exceeded 15 percent of the state budget. By 1975, the share had dropped to less than 4 percent, and it remained below 3 percent throughout the following two decades. Routine maintenance also was severely cut back for many programs (Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy, 1999). Traffic congestion is often cited as a major cause of rising antigrowth sentiment by the late 1980s (Landis and Kroll, 1989). During the decade, state highway system capacity expanded only 4 percent, whereas the number of motor vehicles in California increased by more than 50 percent (Rawls and Bean, 1998). Three of the four U.S. metropolitan areas experiencing the nation’s greatest increases in commute durations over the 1980s were in California (Bernick and Cervero, 1997). Housing production failed to keep up with demand, especially in coastal areas. From 1980 to 1989, statewide housing demand exceeded supply by more than 660,000 units, equivalent to 6 percent of the state’s housing inventory (California Department of Housing and Community Development, 2000). Workers were forced to look for housing at increasing distances from their jobs, adding to traffic congestion. The rise in Californians’ commute times during the 1980s was highest among first-time homebuyers (California Department of Housing and Community Development, 2000). These “jobs-housing imbalances” 49 drew attention to the relationship between commercial and residential land use, on the one hand, and access to transportation, on the other. Voter Revolt Prompts State-Level Debate By the late 1980s, Californians increasingly associated growth with a deteriorating quality of life. Frustrated by growth-related problems that seemed to be going out of control, voters also viewed policies and expenditures to accommodate new growth with suspicion. Conservatives opposed higher taxes and services, and environmentalists opposed development that threatened natural resources (Landis and Kroll, 1989; Glickfeld and Levine, 1992; Fulton, 1993a; Pincetl, 1999). Such concerns helped ignite a growth-control “revolution” in the form of hundreds of local ballot-box measures passed across the state in the mid-1980s. Figure 4.2 shows the explosion of activity. Ballot-box planning had started in the late 1970s in Northern California, but by 1988, two-thirds of growth-related initiatives were on Southern California ballots. Not all measures were placed on ballots by citizen groups; many were initiated by local governments. By 1989, there were more than 850 growth-control or growth-management measures in place. California pioneered many techniques including development restrictions, requirements for concurrency with infrastructure, and 120 No. of measures 80 40 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 SOURCES: Data for 1971 to 1986 are from Glickfeld et al. (1987); data for 1986 to 2000 are from Fulton et al. (2000a). Figure 4.2—Land Use Measures on Local Ballots in California, 1971–2000 50 competitions among developers (Landis and Kroll, 1989; Landis, 1992; Fulton, 1993a; Pincetl, 1999). The ballot initiatives brought conflicts over growth into public view but also suggested that certain compromises might be required (Landis and Kroll, 1989). Support for growth control crossed traditional demographic and political lines (Glickfeld and Levine, 1992; Baldassare, 1994). But even growth-control advocates did not always share the same goals. One observer noted, “You really have two groups with diametrically opposed points of view in this movement. One has the traditional American dream of a single-family house in the suburbs. . . . They’re concerned about too much density, too much traffic congestion. . . . The environmental solution to that suburban concern is more density. . . . It’s not at all clear that these groups can agree” (Lucy Blake, Executive Director of the California League of Conservation Voters, quoted in Trombley, 1988; also see Boyarsky, 1988, and Davis, 1992). Madelyn Glickfeld and Ned Levine assessed the relationship of local growth-control measures and regional growth patterns during the 1980s and early 1990s in their 1992 report, Regional Growth—Local Reaction. The authors hypothesized that growth-control measures are a political response to regional growth, noting that although no simple relationship could be demonstrated between the number of growth-control measures enacted at the local level and actual growth rates at that level, a very strong relationship existed between the number of measures enacted locally and state-level measures of growth. They hypothesized that local growth measures might constitute a reaction to regional growth trends. However, they concluded that local measures are an uncoordinated response that only exacerbates problems if housing and jobs are displaced farther toward the suburban fringe. Paul Lewis and Max Neiman assessed the possible influence of local growth measures on housing production during the late 1990s, employing a variety of data on city characteristics and survey responses from California city managers and planning directors (Lewis and Neiman, 2002). They concluded that since only a small share of cities 51 had adopted policies that might actually restrict development, the effect of such measures on housing production must be minimal compared to other factors such as zoning policies, market forces, federal and state tax incentives, fiscal rules, and legal constraints. However, they also noted that local conditions, such as commute times and jobs-housing balances, help determine cities’ orientations toward housing and growth. “It is the real consequences of growth ‘on the ground,’ rather than merely local snobbery, that provoke citizen opposition. In relatively stable and settled local communities without other overriding issues, this citizen unease contributes to the passage of policies that attempt to increase public control of the rate and character of housing development” (Lewis and Neiman, 2002, p. 72). The rise in local ballot activity pushed government leaders to act. Nearly 70 bills related to growth-management planning were introduced in the state legislature in the late 1980s and most included an enhanced regional governance component (Innes et al., 1994). Many bills called for more comprehensive state growth policies, development of comprehensive regional plans, and methods to encourage or mandate local consistency. As the legislative process wore on, bills tended to emphasize incentives rather than mandates (Landis, 1992; Trombley, 1992; California Planning and Development Report, 1992, 1996; Innes et al., 1994). Broad consensus-building efforts were organized behind the scenes, and a historic compromise seemed possible.4 Developers wanted CEQA reform. They were frustrated by the lengthy and cumbersome permit review process and sought to streamline requirements and reduce bureaucratic delays. Environmentalists seemed open to such measures in ____________ 4An eight-month-long process, known as the Growth Management Consensus Project, was organized behind the scenes in 1991 by the Center for California Studies at California State University, Sacramento, and the Senate and Assembly Offices of Research. It brought together representatives from large businesses, environmental and social equity groups, local government associations, and the development and real estate lobbies. Participants reached agreement on the following points: The state should coordinate its policies, any growth-management system had to provide certainty for all interests, compact growth would be important and would require some land designation system, and both environmental protection and economic development were equally important (Innes et al., 1994; Bradshaw, 1992). 52 exchange for strong commitments from the state to preserve natural resource areas. Environmentalists wanted urban growth boundaries— firm borders delineating growth and no-growth zones—an approach that has been employed in other states as a way to integrate environmental and economic planning at a regional scale. However, environmentalists seemed receptive to compromise if the state designated significant lands and funding to acquire them. All sides expressed the desire to address development matters at the level of general plans rather than specific projects (California Planning and Development Report, 1992; Fulton, 1993b). Governor Pete Wilson’s administration weighed in on the issue in 1993, when his appointed commission on growth management released Strategic Growth: Taking Charge of the Future. The report emphasized CEQA reform but also contained elements attractive to environmentalists. It called for statewide standards on growth and conservation and a new mechanism to coordinate and finance state infrastructure investment. Local government compliance with state development goals would be encouraged through incentives such as preferential access to state loans and grants. Every city and county would be required to develop a comprehensive plan that would facilitate a “master environmental impact report.” Projects determined to be consistent with the plan would be exempt from detailed environmental review. Councils of Governments would be reorganized to incorporate existing regional agencies and would perform a review role (Fulton, 1993b; Preston, 1993; Pincetl, 1999). After Wilson’s strategy was released, observers noted that the “the outlines of a political deal seem apparent” (Fulton, 1993b). However, the winds had begun to change. The state was experiencing the worst economic downturn since the Depression, diverting attention from growth concerns and making proposals that relied on spending increases appear to be unworkable. Furthermore, the recession prompted a souring of state-local relations. In fiscal year 1992–1993, the legislature and the governor called for a huge shift in property tax revenue away from local governments. The state government began transferring some $3.6 billion annually in property taxes, or about one-fifth of property taxes, from cities and counties to school districts. This enabled the state 53 to meet its statutory obligations to schools during a time of tight budgets, but local governments were outraged and demanded a reversal of this socalled “ERAF” shift (ERAF stands for Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund). By supporting both the property tax shift and the potential restriction of infrastructure funding to local governments that did not comply with state growth policies, Wilson angered local government lobbyists. Without an offer of fiscal reform, local governments had little incentive to accede to greater state control over their development policies (Trombley, 1992; Fulton, 1993b; Innes et al., 1994). By the end of 1994, most growth-management bills had fizzled out. Momentum for change could not withstand the recession and the impasse in state-local relations. California was not the only state to seriously consider growthmanagement reform during the 1980s and early 1990s. A number of states passed comprehensive growth management reforms during the period, including Florida (1985), New Jersey (1985), Vermont (1988), Georgia (1989), Washington (1990), and Maryland (1992). The reforms sought to balance growth-accommodating and growth-restricting policies within comprehensive state frameworks of land use and development policies. The bills proposed in Sacramento in the late 1980s reflected many of the prevalent characteristics: integration of infrastructure and land use planning; plan consistency at the state, regional, and local levels; and an enhanced role for regional agencies to help achieve that consistency (DeGrove, 1992; DeGrove and Metzger, 1993; Bollens, 1992, 1993a; Innes, 1993; Weitz, 1999). Business Leaders and “Smart Growth” Growth-related problems—in particular, traffic congestion and lack of affordable housing—only worsened after the California economy began booming again by the late 1990s. In 1998, approximately 40 percent of the state’s urban freeways were congested, up from 27 percent in 1988 (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000c). The Los Angeles, San Francisco-Oakland, and San Jose metropolitan areas were among the nation’s most congested (Surface Transportation Policy 54 Project, 2000). By then, housing affordability problems were also perceived to have reached crisis proportions in some areas. In 2000, 15 of the 25 most unaffordable metropolitan housing markets in the nation were in California (Fulton, 2000a). Problems were especially bad in high-growth areas such as Silicon Valley, where job growth outpaced housing growth nearly sevenfold from 1995 to 1999.5 Many business leaders became vocal advocates for planning reform by the late 1990s. Their activism reflected increasing concern about regional quality-of-life factors deemed essential for attracting and maintaining a high-quality workforce. As firms became more mobile over recent decades, and knowledge-based employment became critical to economic competitiveness, quality-of-life factors gained more attention as key determinants of regional economic health. These factors include affordable housing, good transportation, good schools and workforce training systems, cultural amenities, and attractive natural and built surroundings—elements that rely on adequate and coordinated public investment (Peirce, 1993; Barnes and Ledebur, 1998). Business activism today is reminiscent of the Progressive Era at the turn of the last century, when business leaders also pushed governments to manage growth more effectively in a new economic age. But although Progressive leaders marshaled resources for cities to become engines of economic productivity, today the focus has shifted to metropolitan regions. Business concerns with quality of life are evident in the following argument made by the president of the Bay Area Council, a group of 275 large employers in the San Francisco Bay Area: “The intensity of concern around transportation and housing suggests we’ve got this brewing collision. . . . We really view this as reaching crisis proportions and we’ve got to get these problems solved in the region, or it’s going to be a threat to the economy” (Hendrix, 2001). Similarly, in 2000 the president of the state Chamber of Commerce asserted that “housing shortages and high prices have begun to chase our work force to other states where housing is more affordable” (Herdt, 2000). ____________ 5Calculations for San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties are based on data from the California Employment Development Department (n.d.) and the California Department of Finance (2000). 55 A widely noted example of business advocacy for reform was the sponsorship by the Bank of America (along with the California Resources Agency, the Greenbelt Alliance, and the Low Income Housing Fund) of an influential report called Beyond Sprawl, released in 1995. According to the report, unchecked development had “shifted from an engine of California’s growth to a force that now threatens to inhibit growth and degrade the quality of our life.” The authors recommended policies to make more efficient use of land and provide more certainty in the development process. A number of reports and studies followed assessing the extent and alleged consequences of “sprawl” in California.6 These reports formed part of a growing national literature on the costs of sprawl and the potential for “smart growth” (also called “sustainable development”) as an alternative.7 Although smart growth has been defined many ways, it generally refers to policies to promote compact development, preserve open space, and discourage dependence on the automobile.8 Smart growth gained national attention in 1999 after Vice President Al Gore announced a Livability Agenda, with programs to preserve open space, ease traffic congestion, and pursue regional strategies. Additionally, a number of states passed new or modified legislation with smart growth themes during the 1990s, including Maryland, New Jersey, Tennessee, Oregon, and Florida. Sprawl-related studies often attempt to evaluate the costs— particularly for infrastructure—associated with land use and development patterns that have been taken for granted for decades. Assessments of alternative land use and transportation scenarios raised prospects of potential gains that might be achieved through regional coordination. In California, such studies of alternative scenarios have been undertaken by ____________ 6See for example Landis (1995); Hayward (1996); Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy (1998); Moss (1999); Wassmer (2001); Fulton et al. (2001a). 7For a review and discussion of nearly 500 studies on the costs and benefits of sprawl, see Burchell et al. (1998). 8Like smart growth, the definition of sprawl has also been open to interpretation, but it generally refers to low-density development that expands in a noncontiguous way from a built-up inner-city core. Land uses are often segregated and reliant on automobiles for transportation access (culled from Burchell et al., 1998). 56 the San Diego Association of Governments (1998), the Bay Area Transportation and Land Use Coalition (1998, 1999), and the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (described in Metro Investment Report, March, 2001b), among others. During the late1990s, business leaders helped organize regional and subregional smart growth initiatives. They are described in Chapter 7, which discusses grass-roots regional strategies. Business leaders also helped statewide reform coalitions, such as the California Futures Network, which helped organize a “Smart Growth Summit” in 1999 that drew 700 government officials and others. Similarly, the Job-Center Housing Coalition, a statewide group of about 50 business, development, labor, housing, and poverty groups, lobbied for environmental regulatory relief, local government finance reform, and reform of construction defect liability that obstructs financing for condominiums and townhouses. By the late 1990s, the public at large was also concerned about growth problems. A PPIC statewide poll conducted in 2001 revealed that, after the state’s dire electricity crisis, growth was viewed as the most important issue facing Californians (Baldassare, 2001). In the poll, the public reaffirmed its support for local control over growth management but also indicated that it was receptive to planning coordination. A large majority (89 percent) indicated that local governments should work together on growth issues rather than make decisions on their own. Infrastructure, Housing, and Fiscal Issues By the late 1990s, state policymakers again turned their attention to planning reform. Two problems in particular—infrastructure needs and affordable housing—brought regional consequences of development policy into sharper focus. With record state budget surpluses and population growth projected at 12 million by 2020, state legislators turned to the question of infrastructure needs after two decades of deferred investment and maintenance. A series of reports revealed a staggering level of need.9 For ____________ 9See California Legislative Analyst’s Office (1998c); California Business Roundtable (1998); California Department of Finance (1999); California State Treasurer (1999); 57 example, the Department of Finance’s 1999 Capital Outlay Infrastructure Report pegged unfunded infrastructure needs over the next decade at about $80 billion, with the largest categories being transportation and education. The California Transportation Commission estimated statewide ten-year unfunded needs in transportation alone at nearly $100 billion (the difference is due to inclusion of local, regional, and state funding needs in their report). California ranked well below average in state investment in key areas such as education and transportation (California Business Roundtable, 1998). The reports called not just for substantial new investment but also for better strategic planning to target it more wisely. For example, the California Legislative Analyst’s Office argued that the lack of clear goals and objectives in many state programs, and the lack of a broader context of statewide goals, objectives, and criteria for setting development priorities, had produced an ad hoc process of infrastructure planning and financing “that has not and will not meet either the requirements of an aging statewide infrastructure or the need for new infrastructure to sustain a growing economy and population” (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 1998c, p. 3). The report argued for a new, more comprehensive approach. A few reports specifically called for regional planning as a framework for more efficient investment.10 They advocated reintegration of state investment plans across functional areas and of state, regional, and local plans and objectives. One example is an unusual edition of the state’s annual debt affordability report issued by the California State Treasurer in 1999. It called for a comprehensive approach to state capital planning to promote sustainability goals, asserting that “any state capital outlay financing process must include a strong regional planning component, with state infrastructure investments made in accordance with and in support of credible regional plans which foster the state’s growth principles. Further, regions must be empowered to better finance ________________________________________________________ Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy (1999); Dowall (2000); Neuman and Whittington (2000) . 10See California State Treasurer (1999), and Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy (1999). 58 investments of regional significance” (California State Treasurer, 1999, p.18). Housing affordability problems also demanded the attention of lawmakers by the late 1990s, and this tested the limits of the traditional planning model, since control over land use traditionally had been delegated in large part to local governments. However, many policymakers had become convinced that the state’s housing shortage was more than just a reflection of cyclical trends. Research indicated that housing production, particularly for multiunit housing, had failed to keep up with demand in the state for over two decades (California Department of Housing and Community Development, 2000; California Budget Project, 2000). Among urban Californians, homeownership and rental cost burdens had been consistently higher than for residents of comparable metropolitan areas in the rest of the country, with the gap widening since the 1970s. With the state producing only about half the new units needed to meet projected demand over the next two decades, the studies predicted worsening conditions. A primary explanation offered to account for high prices and underproduction of housing was local government fiscal constraint. According to this argument, voter initiatives to limit local revenue— Proposition 13 in particular—prompted local governments to shift the burden of paying for infrastructure and services to support new growth onto fees exacted from new development projects, thereby adding to housing prices.11 In addition, local governments increasingly “fiscalized” land use choices in favor of development that could maximize revenue. By reducing property tax revenue, Proposition 13 skewed fiscal decisionmaking in favor of land uses able to generate sales tax revenue—a major remaining source of local discretionary revenue. Thus, competition for retail development increased and other land uses deemed too costly in terms of service provision, in particular multiunit housing, were discouraged. A 1999 PPIC report, California Cities and the Local Sales Tax, provided empirical support for the fiscalization claim, revealing an ____________ 11This issue was evaluated by Dresch and Sheffrin (1997). 59 overwhelming preference among California city managers for retail development and a lack of preference for multiunit housing as land use options (Lewis and Barbour, 1999). The report also pointed to possible negative consequences of local competition for retail development besides those related to housing provision. Despite intense competition among local governments for retail development, the overall geographic pattern and level of retail sales in the state did not change substantially from the early 1970s to the early 1990s. Therefore, efforts to entice retail development may have amounted to competition over a fixed pie, entailing a net transfer of resources from local government coffers to retailers or perhaps their customers. The chase for sales tax revenue was only one alleged consequence of Proposition 13. Other patterns attributed to the initiative include increased rates of city incorporation, increased use of redevelopment to capture property taxes, and greater conflict between cities and counties over incorporations and resulting tax allocations.12 According to William Fulton, these trends exemplify a “zero-sum culture” among government agencies that emerged after 1978 (Fulton, 1998). Others have argued that Proposition 13 reduced local government accountability and discretion by breaking the link between local property tax rates and local services, and by shifting the revenue base from community-wide taxes used for broad purposes to other more restrictive revenue sources (Sokolow, 1998; Silva and Barbour, 1999). However, in spite of the attention paid to Proposition 13’s effects, land use had been “fiscalized” long before its passage. For decades, regional reformers had voiced concerns about consequences of local fiscal decisionmaking and exclusionary land use policies. They argued that within multicentric metropolitan areas, home rule enables and encourages local governments to maximize local benefit and ignore regional costs. When viewed through a local government lens, policies to discourage unwanted land uses, such as multiunit housing, or to entice ____________ 12Paul G. Lewis, in 1998, analyzed local government fragmentation in California and concluded that after controlling for other factors, it had not increased substantially after Proposition 13. 60 preferred land uses, such as retail stores, may be quite rational, but these policies can appear less beneficial when viewed in regional terms. Although concerns about regional consequences of local land use decisionmaking were hardly new, it took the affordable housing crisis of the late 1990s to put them on the front burner. It was not until affordable housing grew into a problem affecting middle-class as well as poorer state residents that policymakers turned concerted attention to the negative effects of local fiscal planning. Local governments responded to the issue with calls for state fiscal reform. They had been pressing hard for fiscal relief since the ERAF shift of 1992, when the state government began transferring about $3.6 billion annually in property taxes from cities and counties to school districts. They saw the ERAF shift as another step in the erosion of home rule that followed the passage of Proposition 13. In addition to reducing property tax revenue, Proposition 13 transferred control over its allocation to the state government. This undermined the traditional doctrine of the “separation of sources” of state and local revenue, a basis for local fiscal stability and predictability. The ERAF shift turned the state-local fiscal relationship into a bitter stand-off, signaling to localities the state government’s willingness to shift remaining local revenues to suit its own purposes during times of recession (Silva and Barbour, 1999; Coleman, 1999). Any move to impose stricter requirements on local planning practices was likely to meet opposition if the fiscal concerns of local governments were not addressed (Ferraro, 2000; Perry, 2002). Thus, by the late 1990s, fiscal reform became a linchpin in planning reform efforts and it was intensely scrutinized.13 Reform proposals called for greater local control over revenue—especially property taxes—or at least a realignment of state and local functions and responsibilities. They also considered means to encourage housing production and reduce ____________ 13Proposals were issued by the Commission on Local Governance for the 21st Century (2000), the California State Controller (1999), the Speaker’s Commission on State and Local Government Finance (2000), the California Legislative Analyst’s Office (2000a), the League of California Cities (see McKenzie, 2000), and the California State Association of Counties (see Silva and Lewis, 2000), among others. For a comparison of the proposals, see Silva and Lewis (2000). 61 competition for retail development, such as a switch of sales tax for property tax revenue to local governments. Local governments argued that other state policies and actions besides fiscal rules also made housing production more difficult. Examples include inadequate funding for infrastructure and affordable housing, CEQA regulations, construction defect liability law, endangered species protection, open space preservation policies, water service requirements, and congestion management requirements (Carrigg, 2002; Little Hoover Commission, 2002). Thus, the affordable housing problem engendered a broader discussion about the context of state rules and regulations in which local governments operate. What may have started as a focus on housing production and fiscal issues quickly led to consideration of de facto state land use policy as it is manifested in numerous, sometimes conflicting, rules and regulations. Thus, by the late 1990s certain development issues called state policymakers’ attention to regional planning outcomes. The need for efficiency in infrastructure investment prompted consideration of regional planning as a framework for more strategic state investment, and housing problems forced the state government to consider regional consequences of fiscal and land use policy. Policy Responses: The Battle over RHNA Incremental steps were taken during the late 1990s and early 2000s to address these concerns. In 1999, a new requirement was established for the governor to submit an annual five-year capital improvement plan to promote more coordinated state investment planning. In 2000, LAFCOs were required to help stem sprawl by establishing policies to ensure efficient service provision and open space preservation, and funding was altered to require contributions by cities and special districts in addition to counties. However, the governor and the legislature found comprehensive fiscal reform too daunting a task. Steps were taken to promote housing production more directly through incentives and mandates on local governments. The 2000–2001 state budget included $570 million in support for housing programs— the largest state commitment ever (Shigley, 2000c). However, funding was cut the following year after the state’s electricity crisis and a 62 downturn in the economy constricted the state budget. Thus, this approach fell prey to a weakness of post-Proposition 13 reform efforts— spending increases to encourage local compliance with growth goals have often failed in the face of state budget constraints. The state also took steps to enforce housing mandates. Controversy in this area highlighted weaknesses in both the state’s housing policy and its regional planning system. Since 1980, the main “stick” of state housing policy has been its housing element law. Since then, housing elements in local general plans have been required to address the locality’s “fair share” contribution to meeting regional housing needs across a range of affordability levels during five-year time intervals. The fair share requirements represent one of California’s most active efforts to direct local planning—specifically, land use planning—toward a substantive policy goal, one that addresses unequal spatial opportunity in metropolitan areas. Housing elements are the only sections of local general plans that must be reviewed by the state. The Regional Housing Needs Assessment (RHNA) process is used to implement the state’s fair share requirements. Under RHNA, the California Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) provides a target production number of housing units to a planning agency in each region, generally the Council of Governments, to distribute among all jurisdictions. The jurisdictions are then required to use these “fair share” targets as the basis for the housing elements of their general plans. Enforcement of fair share housing requirements has long been a source of contention, however, since local governments have complained that state review is onerous, and housing advocates have complained about lax enforcement. The requirements are backed up by incentives to developers for low-income construction, and failure to implement the requirements can result in ineligibility for the incentives and greater vulnerability to lawsuits over development decisions. This may not be much of a deterrent for municipalities seeking to discourage such housing, however. According to DHCD, only 64 percent of jurisdictions were in compliance in May 2002, and these jurisdictions had produced 78 percent of single-family, and 91 percent of multifamily units in the state (Little Hoover Commission, 2002). 63 What is more, even if housing elements are deemed in compliance, this is no guarantee that the specified housing will actually get built. A study of fast-growing Bay Area jurisdictions found that from 1988 to 1998, only 34 percent of affordable housing goals were met in communities with certified housing elements, and only 9 percent in jurisdictions deemed noncompliant (Dodge, 2002). A study of development project approvals in Ventura County between 1996 and 2001 found that, on average, residential development was approved at 80 percent of zoning capacity and 54 percent of the capacity outlined in jurisdictions’ general plans (Fulton et al., 2001b). The housing element compliance process was suspended during the mid-1990s because of state budget constraints. In 1999, DHCD began a statewide RHNA update. The process became highly contentious in the Los Angeles area, in spite of the fact that the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG)—the regional COG—had devoted a lot of resources to it and devolved the process to the subregional level whenever possible. Forty-seven jurisdictions—most located in inland areas—appealed their RHNA target numbers. SCAG was caught in the middle, seeking to meet its responsibility to the state on the one hand, and to its member jurisdictions on the other. SCAG accepted 11 appeals and submitted a report to the state allocating 66,000 fewer units than had been mandated. DHCD rejected it, forcing the 11 jurisdictions to negotiate directly with the state. Most of the region’s jurisdictions did not complete housing plans by the deadline (Fulton, 2000c; Shigley, 2001a). Most jurisdictions that contested their fair share allocations were in inland areas. A DHCD spokesperson complained that this reflected SCAG’s failure to coordinate an effective regional approach to distributing jobs and housing, and that instead it had followed the traditional pattern of placing housing inland and jobs at the coast. “This is fundamentally a problem that the region needs to deal with,” said DHCD’s deputy director (Shigley, 2001a). However, SCAG officials retorted that if the state didn’t address fiscal reform, more infill housing would remain unrealistic. Similar controversies highlighting intraregional growth issues erupted elsewhere. For example, during the RHNA update process in 64 the San Francisco Bay Area in 2001, county officials from semirural areas questioned their allocations, arguing that residential development should be directed to cities instead of unincorporated areas with limited infrastructure (Shigley, 2002b). In one county, negotiations were undertaken between city and county officials about redistributing the numbers. However, a spokesperson for the Association of Bay Area Governments indicated that such tradeoffs would not be permitted across county lines. “The unincorporated planning issue is something we need to address, because more and more counties are moving to slow growth,” he noted (Shigley, 2002b, p. 14). However, he indicated that an underlying issue—denser city development—would need to be addressed to protect farmland and open space for the long term. Continuing controversy over the RHNA process is not surprising. Policies with regional benefits but primarily local costs are likely to provoke local resistance. Redistributive policies that affect spatial opportunity structures and interjurisdictional disparities are prime examples of this. Because of the controversy, such policies are “seldom dealt with effectively through metropolitan consensus-building efforts” (Altshuler et al., 1999, p. 37), and they are more likely to succeed at the state and national levels. California’s RHNA process supports this view, because it is imposed by the state. However, by the late 1990s, the conflict over RHNA had expanded well beyond traditional controversies about accommodating low-income housing. As housing affordability problems increasingly affected middle-class state residents, RHNA became a focal point for conflict about housing policy in general (Lewis, forthcoming). Although the state enforces the housing element law, it relies on COGs to make the process work. However, it may be unrealistic to expect COGs to reconcile conflicting state mandates and uncoordinated local growth-management policies to fashion well-coordinated strategies for regional development. The RHNA conflict reflects the lack of a coherent state approach to land use in general and in particular the lack of sufficient incentives and mandates to achieve local compliance with state housing goals. Without independent authority, regional agencies have little wherewithal to overcome fundamental conflicts between local and statewide interests. 65 In a 2002 report on the state’s affordable housing crisis, the Little Hoover Commission, an independent state oversight agency, acknowledged the weak position of COGs in resolving complex growth issues. The report argued that COGs should be “empowered” to help solve housing problems, because currently “there is little connection between [the RHNA] process and the allocation of funds to support the needs for affordable housing. If COGs were given the authority to influence performance, outcomes could be improved” (Little Hoover Commission, 2002, p. 27). Policies were recommended to align funding and planning processes for regional housing, transportation, and environmental needs. Conclusion By the late 1990s, housing shortages and infrastructure needs called state policymakers’ attention to regional planning outcomes. The reframing of planning considerations in terms of regional consequences is underscored in the growing popularity of “smart growth” policies. “Smart growth” fundamentally refers to growth policies that are smart from a regional perspective. State and local planning officials had not actually supported “dumb growth” in the past. Rather, what looks smart through the lens of a local elected leader or a single-purpose state planning bureaucracy may appear less so in terms of regional consequences. “Smart growth” reasserts an essential element of generalpurpose government at the metropolitan scale by promoting consideration of interconnections and tradeoffs among policy goals in different functional areas. By the late 1990s, the lack of integrated planning at the regional scale was increasingly viewed as a liability. Infrastructure, housing, and fiscal issues formed a nexus that might have prompted state planning reform by the late 1990s. In particular, the connection between the affordable housing problem and local fiscal complaints suggested that state and local governments might have found a basis for negotiation on a new approach to land use planning. However, state-level reform was stymied in the late 1990s—just as during the early 1990s—by the fiscal standoff between the state and local governments. 66 Thus, fiscal constraint has been a double-edged sword for regionalism. Although it has helped draw attention to regional planning needs, it also hampered intergovernmental cooperation to solve them. Competition among local governments exacerbated many growth problems, and fiscal gridlock between the state and local governments obstructed new planning solutions. Even as fiscal constraint helped provide justification for regional coordination, it also effectively disabled the planning system’s ability to respond. 67 5. Devolution in Transportation For the past half century, transportation and environmental protection have been dominated by state and federal agencies, constituting what this report has called a vertical, functional model of regional planning. Land use remained a local government prerogative. New programs of the 1990s began to break down that model because its basic premise was no longer workable. Power was devolved from the federal and state to the regional and county levels, and new programs called for stronger links among land use, transportation, and environmental planning. Thus, they began to overcome functional divisions that have obstructed comprehensive regional planning. The new programs constituted the beginning of a third wave of regional reform in California during the 20th century. This chapter evaluates transportation programs of the 1990s, and the next addresses environmental programs. Motives for Devolution No public infrastructure does more to shape urban development than transportation, and no regional planning area involves a larger expenditure of public funds or a longer planning horizon. In terms of the three attributes defined above as key to effective regional policymaking—policy breadth, regional scale, and program accountability—transportation has always been regional in scale (but also local and interregional). The expenditure of funds has provided a framework for accountability and coordination. However, because all levels of government invest in transportation and yet the projects are highly interconnected, transportation planning has reflected a tension about the scale at which policymaking should be held accountable. Because many transportation investments are costly, long-term, and regional or interregional in scope, the planning system has long accommodated a centralized approach. Yet transportation investments 69 have direct and disproportional effects on localities across metropolitan areas (and for that matter across regions or states). So, transportation planning has also respected the principle of “return to source,” in which funds are allocated based on population and political jurisdictions. Transportation planning has sought to strike a balance between maximizing efficiency across political jurisdictions and respecting distributional, or what is also called geographic, equity. As David Winstead described this tension, “transportation policy is inherently political, for it determines who gets what, when, and how— the classic definition of politics. Yet transportation decisions affect systems in which arbitrary political boundaries are meaningless, like markets and ecosystems. . . . Transportation decisions have a quality of permanence that requires a long-range view” (in Porter, 1997, p. 250). With the rise of vertical regionalism in the postwar era, the state and federal governments took major control of transportation planning, defining policy goals and programs. Somewhat ironically, however, transportation planning was also driven substantially by local land use choices, especially after the end of the highway-building era. Transportation agencies took local government projections for population growth and development largely as a given and asserted no direct control over local land use policy. Results from a survey of RTPAs—the state-defined regional transportation agencies—in the early 1990s confirmed this conclusion. “Most RTPAs identified coordination with land use planning as their least effective program area and cited lack of authority as the main reason” (Wilshusen, 1992, p. 15). Transportation planning also was largely disconnected from environmental planning because of the functional approach of state and federal programs. All this began to change during the 1990s. Transportation programs devolved programming authority from the federal and state levels to regional and county agencies, emphasized multimodalism—that is, the ability to transfer funds more flexibly across different types of projects— and attempted to integrate transportation, land use, and air quality planning more effectively. Two interrelated factors help account for this new approach. The first is that after the completion of the federal and 70 state highway systems, the policy focus that had driven centralized planning began to deteriorate. State and federal policy goals became more complex and contested as basic assumptions were thrown into doubt, in particular the notions that continued highway expansion could alleviate congestion and that long-term mobility could be increased without substantial changes to current tax and land use policies. The second factor is fiscal constraint. Starting in the 1960s, a gap emerged between revenues and demand for transportation, as measured by growth in vehicle miles traveled on the state’s highways. The revenue gap is the product of declining gas tax receipts, resulting from greater fuel efficiency and the failure of tax increases to match inflation, and increasing costs of maintenance and new construction (Taylor, 1995; California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 1998a; Brown et al., 1999; Haas et al., 2000). As a result of fiscal constraint, efficiency in transportation investment has become a prominent concern. These factors combined to shift policymaking to the local and regional levels, where programs could be devised to meet specific regional needs and priorities in a context of fiscal constraint and policy uncertainty. Starting in the 1970s, federal laws began to encourage multimodalism by requiring that highway and transit planning processes be merged. This merger reflected a national rail renaissance under way at the time. Like many others across the country, four California cities opened rail systems during the 1980s and 1990s: San Diego, Los Angeles, San Jose, and Sacramento (Bernick and Cervero, 1997). The resurgence of rail reflected growing discontent with highway expansion. Highways provoked popular protest for such negative effects as air pollution, community disruption, and sprawl. Transportation planners themselves also had come to question the logic of expanding road capacity as a means to increase mobility. A growing body of evidence on “induced demand” indicated that as long as drivers desired more mobility than could be accommodated by an existing roadway system, increases in capacity were quickly consumed. “Critics have often accused road building of being a process in which increased supply supports a reorganization of land-use patterns, which in turn increases demand for 71 transportation; ultimately, it can become impossible to build one’s way out of the problem” (Lewis and Sprague, 1997, p. 15).1 Planners called for policies to promote alternatives to solo automobile use to improve mobility or, in other words, policies to manage transportation demand rather than just to increase supply. One alternative to auto use is mass transit. But in spite of high subsidies, public transit ridership lost ground to automobile use over the 1980s for commute trips in most metropolitan areas. Decentralized development patterns and demographic shifts such as a rise in female employment outside the home increased solo driving, while at the same time lower gas prices and other factors helped place transit at an economic disadvantage relative to driving (Bernick and Cervero, 1997). Thus, by the late 1980s, transportation policy seemed to have lost its bearings. Although rising congestion provoked a public outcry for relief, the efficacy of investments in both roadways and mass transit had been called into question. Many observers argued that the underlying problem was a long-term pattern of public subsidy for private automobile use. They called for dramatic increases in taxes or other means of capturing the full social costs of automobile use. However, such policies were politically difficult to enact (Bernick and Cervero, 1997). Attention was also directed to the connection between land use and transportation behavior as another policy lever to promote more efficient investment and enhance mobility. Researchers explored the effect of land use patterns on transit use and other alternatives to solo driving. Numerous studies demonstrated that higher residential densities near transit stations are associated with substantially higher rates of transit use. ____________ 1See Bernick and Cervero (1997) for a discussion of the issue of “induced demand.” A study using 18 years of data from 14 California metropolitan areas found that every 10 percent increase in highway lane miles was associated with a 9 percent increase in vehicle miles traveled four years after road expansion, controlling for other factors (Hansen and Huang, 1997). The Surface Transportation Policy Project found that increasing highway capacity does not lead to a reduction in congestion, and that the presence of transit service makes a significant difference in the number of residents subject to congestion. The Los Angeles metropolitan area was ranked as having the nation’s worst congestion burden; the San Francisco Bay Area, with the second-worst rush-hour congestion, dropped to 29th in the Congestion Burden Index because of higher transit use (Surface Transportation Policy Project, 2001). 72 Others studies indicated that for transit to capture a significant share of commute trips, both home and work destinations must be close by (Bernick and Cervero, 1997). Others countered that even substantial increases in density near rail stations would change travel patterns only marginally—at least over the short term—in auto-oriented metropolitan areas such as those in California (Wachs, 1993). They concluded that other demandmanagement measures would be far more cost-effective than rail expansion, such as congestion pricing, parking charges, expansion of bus services, and adaptive improvements to street networks. To these critiques, rail advocates responded that mixed-use transit-oriented development forms only one part—although an essential one—of coordinated regional policies to create a “transit metropolis” (Bernick and Cervero, 1997). Policymakers sought means to reorient land use to regional transportation needs. Programs promoting “transit-oriented development” (TOD) gained attention in California and the nation. Effective implementation of TOD programs has been relatively rare in California, however. Commonly cited obstacles include “not in my back yard” (NIMBY) attitudes about high-density development, the general market aversion to multifamily development, and difficulty in assembling land parcels. Research by Marlon Boarnet and Randall Crane also points to a subtler problem, demonstrating that municipalities in Southern California tend to favor commercial rather than residential or office zoning near rail transit stations, at least in part to maximize fiscal returns (Boarnet and Crane, 1997, 1998). Boarnet and Crane conclude that when it comes to transit-oriented residential development, a discrepancy may exist between regional costs and benefits and local ones. “Recent research suggests that local institutional obstacles to TOD may be a greater problem than is generally understood. . . . One explanation is that while transit-based housing is possibly consistent with regional ridership goals, as the TOD literature tends to argue, it may well be at odds with local development goals” (Boarnet and Crane, 1998, p. 206). Thus, transit-oriented residential development may be underproduced because of the same discrepancy between regional and 73 local priorities that exacerbates the affordable housing problem. As in the case of affordable housing, TOD may not increase substantially in the absence of stronger and more systematic policy measures. Such measures would require that local land use planning be reoriented to the needs of regional transportation systems, rather than the reverse, which is the traditional model. Another approach to reorient land use to regional transportation needs touted by some scholars and policymakers is to promote the “jobshousing balance” (JHB), or closer proximity of employment and residential locations. Interest in this subject rose in response to the job decentralization of the 1980s. With suburbanization of jobs promoting greater solo automobile commuting, JHB appealed as a policy lever to help shorten commutes and reduce auto use. The concept drew fire from some scholars, however, who suggested that JHB might not be a useful tool because factors other than employment access exert strong influences on residential location choices. They also suggested that to the degree that they are mutually determined, jobs and housing should collocate over time so as to maintain equilibrium in commute times (Giuliano and Small, 1993). Other scholars retorted that average commute lengths and times increased in most large U.S. metropolitan areas over the 1980s, and that a systematic shortage of high-density affordable housing might be a primary cause. Carefully targeted JHB policies could be useful, they argued, in particular programs to add more housing for low-to-moderate-income singleworker households in or near job-rich cities (Cervero, 1996; Cervero and Wu, 1997). Thus, by the late 1980s, policymakers were dealing with fiscal constraint and policy confusion, and they were considering solutions requiring politically difficult measures such as tax increases and intrusion into local land use decisions. Scholars were uncertain about how to interpret shifting urban form and how to assess local and regional costs and benefits of policies that might influence it. In this context, federal and state programs pushed funding and programming authority downward to regional and local agencies. They also called for more integrated planning for land use, transportation, and environmental protection. 74 Transportation Programs of the 1990s Although the federal government had encouraged a multimodal approach to regional transportation planning since the 1970s, in reality MPOs were provided little real discretion. Most federal and state funds were still in the form of categorical grants for specific purposes and allocated according to geographical and functional divisions. Regional transportation agencies served as brokers more than policymakers, helping to adjust local preferences to take advantage of the likely availability of federal and state funds (Wachs and Dill, 1999). This began to change with new legislation passed at the state and federal levels in 1989 and 1991. The Congestion Management Program Facing a backlog of unfunded transportation projects, the legislature passed the Transportation Blueprint for the 21st Century in 1989. The measure, approved by the voters as Proposition 111 in 1990, doubled the state gas tax and authorized bond funding of rail transit projects. The revenue was dedicated to the Congestion Management Program to reduce congestion in the state’s 32 urbanized counties. The program strengthened the county role in transportation planning. Subventions were allocated to counties based on a 40/60 north-south split statewide, and a formula for county funding based on population and road-miles (Innes and Gruber, 2001). A countywide body, usually the existing transportation planning agency, was designated the “Congestion Management Agency” (CMA). In single-county metropolitan areas, the CMA responsibilities were generally subsumed under the prior MPO/RTPA functions and structures. However, in multicounty metropolitan areas, county congestion-management planning took on greater importance as the basis from which local projects were selected for inclusion in regional plans. Within counties, local governments determine the composition of the CMA governing boards, which are generally composed of sitting elected officials. The Congestion Management Program permitted flexible use of funds to make the most effective use of all modes—a shift from the historical use of the state gas tax for highways. A major goal of the 75 program was to improve the relationship among land use, transportation, and air quality. CMAs were responsible for organizing programs to analyze the transportation effects of local land use decisions, set congestion limits, develop a seven-year capital improvement program, and include projected costs of mitigation (Nash, 1992; Wilshusen, 1992). CMAs had to approve local growth-management plans before the governments could receive their share of funding. However, the law provided a significant degree of latitude in meeting its requirements, permitting a series of exclusions and alternatives to meeting standards for congestion reduction (Rothblatt and Colman, 1995). With no actual power over local land use, and often distant relationships with transit operators and other local transportation agencies, CMAs sometimes found it difficult to impose strict standards and integrate planning with other agencies. In practice, CMAs often emphasized road and highway improvements instead of taking a more multimodal approach (Nash, 1992; Innes and Gruber, 2001; Chen, 1996). The Congestion Management Program exemplifies the tradeoff between breadth and depth that has characterized regional planning efforts in California. To integrate land use, transportation, and air quality planning in a way that was politically acceptable across the entire state, the depth of the mandate was weakened. General goals were advanced but left largely up to local actors to interpret through a weak structure that reinforced local control. ISTEA In 1991, the federal government also adopted a new approach to transportation—one that was similar to California’s Congestion Management Program except that it attempted to empower regional rather than county agencies. The federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) and its sequel TEA-21, which passed in 1998, required that programming decisions conform to a number of policy goals including congestion management, energy conservation, and efficient use and maintenance of existing facilities. Federal transportation policy was redirected from highway building toward a more multimodal approach. ISTEA and TEA-21 permit about 76 half of all federal funds to be used across program categories, in other words, for projects in different transportation modes depending on regional needs (Innes and Gruber, 2001; California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 1998b). ISTEA significantly empowered regional transportation planning agencies. About one-fifth of the federal funds that California received from the federal government under ISTEA were directed to MPOs, the federally designated regional transportation planning agencies in urban areas with a population of 50,000 or more. More specifically, the state government was required to “suballocate” Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement (CMAQ) funds, and Surface Transportation Program (STP) funds for metropolitan areas with a population of 200,000 or more, to projects programmed by MPOs (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). ISTEA required that MPOs take the lead in preparing both longand short-range transportation plans. The regional plans were then to be used by the state in compiling its own plan. In practice, this meant that MPOs gained a stronger role in defining regional funding priorities, but the state still determined the final outcome. ISTEA’s greater emphasis on efficiency and multimodalism also strengthened the MPO role. Transportation plans were required to be “fiscally constrained” or, in other words, based on realistic prospects for funding. This requirement worked against simply stapling together local “wish lists” of projects and calling the product a regional plan (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). The MPO role was also strengthened by ISTEA’s attempt to establish a link between transportation and air quality planning. Under the program, regional transportation plans must conform to regional air quality goals, and MPOs must perform the “conformity reviews” for all transportation projects. Finally, regional transportation planning was strengthened by the promotion of a new planning approach—the Major Investment Study (MIS)—for high-cost proposals. An MIS is intended to be a comprehensive and collaborative planning effort that considers several project alternatives simultaneously across all modes and all levels of government (David Winstead, in Porter, 1997). The greater authority provided to regional agencies by ISTEA has been called “the most important expansion of power for regional 77 planning agencies in many years” (Fulton, 1999a, p. 96). However, state legislation undermined federal goals in California’s two largest regions, redirecting authority toward the county level instead of the region. Shortly after ISTEA’s passage, California Senate Bill 1435 mandated that the Southern California and Monterey Bay MPOs further suballocate their CMAQ and STP funds to the county transportation planning agencies in their area on the basis of population or, for CMAQ funds, on the basis of ozone nonattainment. In the San Francisco Bay Area, MTC had to suballocate half of STP funds to county congestion management agencies (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). This suballocation process contravened the federal goal of directing decisionmaking authority to MPOs. According to Department of Transportation guidance during this period, “Procedures or agreements that distribute suballocated STP or Section 9 funds to individual jurisdictions or modes . . . by predetermined percentages or formulas are inconsistent with the ISTEA provisions” (Innes and Gruber, 2001, p. 80). A few studies have assessed the implementation of ISTEA in the Los Angeles and San Francisco Bay regions, concluding that the degree of influence given to county-level agencies by the state’s implementing legislation tended to hinder a regional decisionmaking process. Paul Lewis and Mary Sprague concluded that in the Greater Los Angeles area, transportation plans continued to reflect the priorities of county officials, and thus road improvement projects were given more precedence than mass transit and other types of programs with a more regional effect. Since the county agencies serve areas with distinct needs and use different project criteria, there was also wide variation in the way they allocated ISTEA funds (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). An extensive study of decisionmaking within MTC during the mid1990s reached a similar conclusion and helps shed light on the motives of participants (Innes and Gruber, 2001). MTC leaders were aware that under ISTEA’s new balance of power, the strength and influence of their agency depended on its ability to forge a regional consensus. “MTC was acutely conscious of the potential for conflict, and the possibility that CMA directors or transit operators would take disagreements with programming proposals to the California Transportation Commission or 78 even the legislature. . . . Evidence of conflict could reduce MTC’s credibility” (Innes and Gruber, 2001, p. 54). Soon after ISTEA’s passage, MTC organized a new, collaborative approach to regional planning. It created the Partnership for Urban Transportation, composed of 36 regional transportation stakeholders, to define a new decisionmaking process. It adopted the dual goals of selecting projects that provided the greatest benefit to the regional transportation system, regardless of mode, but also provided for geographic equity (Innes and Gruber, 2001; Francois, 1994). Thus, the partnership sought to reconcile or at least split the difference between two competing planning models—one based on “geographic equity” and another maximizing regional benefit. MTC and the partnership developed an innovative set of criteria to score eligible projects for funding across different modes. Projects were scored on the basis of priority factors, including maintaining the regional system; improving its efficiency; expansion; and effects on air quality, energy conservation, land use, and accessibility to the disabled. Final programming decisions were to be based primarily, but not only, on the scores (Innes and Gruber, 2001). The scoring process was used for several years and was generally viewed favorably among stakeholders. Agreed-upon criteria greatly reduced conflicts. Funded projects were more likely to meet regionally defined criteria than otherwise. However, the tension between geographic equity and regional benefit was never resolved. The partners could not produce a working definition of a regional project, for example, because they could not agree on the criteria. Older, denser counties such as San Francisco and Alameda argued for using regional criteria such as cost-effectiveness in enhancing transit ridership, but more suburban counties unlikely to benefit from such decisions argued for a county-based system for defining priorities instead. Because of these disagreements, the scoring process “was ultimately a way of programming individual projects rather than planning for a region as a whole” (Innes and Gruber, 2001, p. 205). MTC and the partnership found it particularly difficult to address land use issues. Some partners, including those representing Santa Clara and San Francisco Counties and the air quality management district, felt 79 that sprawl development should not be rewarded. However, other partners and MTC staff insisted that the agency was not authorized to direct local land use policy, nor should it make local transportation funding subject to land use policy choices. Three land use criteria were included in the overall scoring but they were given relatively low weight. SB 45 Shifts the Power Balance In 1997, the state established a new framework for transportation policy with the passage of SB 45. Numerous funding categories were combined into more flexible block grants. SB 45 also changed the decisionmaking rules by devolving authority downward from the state to regional and county agencies.2 SB 45 had mixed effects for regional agencies. On the one hand, the role of regionally prepared plans was strengthened relative to the state plan in terms of project selection for metropolitan areas. Before, the California Transportation Commission (CTC) took heed of plans prepared by regional transportation planning agencies (RTPAs)—the state-designated regional transportation agencies that generally coincide with MPOs. However, the CTC could make final programming choices. With the passage of SB 45, the CTC must approve or reject RTPA plans in their entirety (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000c; Innes and Gruber, 2001). However, although SB 45 strengthened the role of regional plans relative to the state plan, it did not necessarily strengthen the role of regional planning agencies in developing those plans in multicounty areas. As noted above, most RTPAs in California are organized at the county level, but there are three multicounty RTPAs: the San Francisco Bay Area’s Metropolitan Transportation Commission, the Southern California Association of Governments in the Los Angeles area, and the Sacramento Association of Governments. Before SB 45, state transportation capital improvement funds for metropolitan areas were allocated based on a formula that balanced state ____________ 2The requirements of the Congestion Management Program were folded into the new law. However, since 1996, counties have been entitled to exempt themselves from preparing a Congestion Management Plan if a majority of local governments representing a majority of the population elected to do so. 80 control with geographic equity at the regional and county level. Funds were allocated on a 40–60 north-south split, and then further divided, with 70 percent allocated to county “minimums” and 30 percent allocated to projects at the discretion of the CTC.3 SB 45 replaced this with a model in which state control is maintained only over “interregional” projects, whereas regions control the rest of the funds. Now, 75 percent of the state’s transportation improvement funds are designated for the Regional Transportation Improvement Program (RTIP), for projects to be selected by RTPAs in the state’s urban areas. The remaining 25 percent of funds are designated for interregional projects to be selected by Caltrans.4 Theoretically, the new system gives RTPAs more power over funds for projects within their regions. However, the RTIP funds—those to be administered by the RTPAs—are now all allocated using a county-based formula, instead of just 70 percent of the funds programmed by RTPAs being allocated to county minimum shares (Innes and Gruber, 2001; California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000c).5 Thus, this attempt to devolve transportation planning authority repeated a traditional pattern; SB 45 strengthened county agencies more than multicounty ones. The Innes and Gruber study confirms that SB 45 undermined MTC’s power as RTPA relative to the county planning agencies. County proposals form the basis from which MTC selects local projects for inclusion in the regional plan. With all state funds to be programmed through the regional process now allocated on a county basis, and formerly restricted funds collapsed into broad block grants, the county plans submitted by congestion management agencies took on a new importance in the Bay Area, according to the study. The county ____________ 3The formula for allocating county minimums was based 75 percent on population and 25 percent on highway lane miles. 4Sixty percent of interregional funds are limited in use for interregional routes outside the urban areas and intercity rail. The remaining 40 percent are available for use anywhere on the state highway system, as well as for intercity rail, grade separations, and mass transit guides. 5The RTIP funds are geographically divided based on the same formula used in the past: a 40–60 north-south split, and then a further division into county shares based 75 percent on population and 25 percent on highway lane miles. 81 proposals reflected the CMAs’ traditional preference for improvement of highways, streets, and roads. Because the MTC partnership had never agreed on the definition of a regional project, it had no mechanism to support projects not initiated by counties, or to allocate costs for projects that crossed county lines. After SB 45, MTC was forced to look to federal funding to support projects it deemed to be of regional significance because they were considered less important by CMAs. These projects included transit expansion and system management. SB 45 therefore opened a divide among the interests of MTC, the transit agencies, and the county CMAs that had been less visible previously (Innes and Gruber, 2001). County Sales Tax Measures The new transportation programs of the 1990s altered the traditional planning model, in which powerful federal and state transportation agencies directed programs mostly from the top down. However, devolution was complicated by the difference between federal programs that strengthened regional planning agencies and state programs that were more likely to redirect power to the county level. County authority was enhanced not only by the state’s Congestion Management Program and SB 45 but also by optional “self-help” county sales taxes dedicated to voter-approved projects. Starting in the early 1980s, the California legislature had sought means to enable counties to increase local taxes for transportation. The legislature began to authorize individual counties to adopt half-cent sales tax increases for transportation programs, subject to voter approval. A blanket enabling law for all counties was passed in 1987. The ballot measures must outline a specific package of transportation improvements and contain expenditure plans. Upon approval, they are administered by county transportation authorities, governed by local elected officials (Goldman et al., 2001). Between 1984 and 1990, at least 34 of these “self-help” measures for half-cent sales tax increases for transportation purposes were placed on county ballots. Measures passed in 16 counties, providing them with a significant new source of transportation funding and a new programming role. The measures range in duration from 10 to 20 years. Most of the 82 programs emphasize improvements to highways, streets, and roads (Goldman et al., 2001). Over the 1990s, as transportation needs in the state increasingly outstripped available revenue, the “self-help” sales taxes took on considerable importance. Today, 85 percent of California’s population lives in a county in which an additional half-cent sales tax is levied for transportation.6 These taxes form the largest source of local transportation funds, which make up more than half of all transportation funding (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000c). Self-help measures strengthened the county role in transportation planning. Few large-scale transportation projects in the state rely on funding solely from a single level of government; most combine federal, state, and local contributions. Projects put forward for funding in county sales tax measures can influence the allocation of state and federal dollars, and thus a single county can reorient regional priorities. This occurred in 2000 in the San Francisco Bay Area when a Santa Clara County sales tax measure dedicated funds just to transit projects, including an extension of the regional BART system. The measure, however, raised only a portion of the necessary funds; more than $1 billion in additional state and federal funds was sought. “This money gives the extension a big leg up, no question. If you have a high percentage of local and state dollars on the table, you stand a far better chance of competing for scarce federal dollars,” said Steve Heminger, MTC’s deputy director (Vorderbrueggen, 2000; also see Gathright and Pimentel, 2000). Self-help measures enhance the role of voters in the planning process, and this has also provoked concern about effects on regional planning. For example, Martin Wachs has argued that growing reliance on local funding sources, in particular sales tax measures, for transit has produced a shift in funding from inner-city operations to suburban services, ____________ 6A 1995 court ruling (Santa Clara County Transportation Authority vs. Guardino) made the self-help sales tax measures harder to pass by establishing that a two-thirds vote of the electorate was required for approval of special-purpose sales taxes such as these. However, to the surprise of many observers, two measures scheduled for reauthorization in Alameda and Santa Clara Counties passed the two-thirds vote hurdle in the November 2000 elections. The other existing measures will all expire before 2012. 83 although inner-city systems are often more cost-effective. The reason for this, according to Wachs, is that transit funding packages have been designed to appeal to suburban voters. By reinforcing the principle of geographic equity within counties, the sales tax measures may further disconnect county transportation planning from regional priorities and processes (Wachs, 1997). Assessing Devolution To varying degrees, the new transportation programs of the 1990s aimed to strengthen regional transportation planning in relation to all three elements this report has argued are most important: regional scale, program accountability, and policy breadth. Have they succeeded? Scale and Accountability: What Is “Regional” About Transportation Planning in California? California’s current compromise between efficiency and return-tosource principles directs significant planning authority to the county level, thanks to programs such as SB 45 and county sales tax measures. This raises significant questions about what has come to constitute “regional” transportation planning in California. On the one hand, there are advantages to county-based transportation planning. Many argue that the scale and complexity of some California regions make a more centralized planning role problematic. In some parts of California, such as the Los Angeles area, counties themselves are so large that calling their governments “local” is somewhat misleading. In the Greater Los Angeles region, only 13 percent of workers worked outside their county of residence in 1990, compared to 27 percent in the San Francisco Bay Area (U.S. Census). However, the new system may not work as well in multicounty metropolitan areas. Issues that cross county borders may be neglected. MTC’s difficulty in ensuring funding after passage of SB 45 for projects it deemed to be regionally significant confirms this conclusion. Without independent authority and accountability for funding and programming at the regional level, there is no constituency for addressing regional goals. Overall, the level of cross-county commuting in the state’s metropolitan regions is significant; in 1990, 17 percent of employed 84 residents of counties contained in multicounty MPO regions in California commuted to work in other counties. A planning framework is needed in which to identify and address concerns that cross county borders, including the needs of these commuters (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). The new system centers greater programming authority close to local governments, and this may lead to greater local accountability. A collaborative decisionmaking process among local governments within counties to develop fiscally constrained transportation programs should produce more careful decisions than the traditional “wish lists” presented by many local governments to regional and state agencies in the past. Such a process may help induce more careful consideration of local land use choices. For local governments who wish to do so, the new structure provides tools to undertake more integrated planning to connect land use and transportation policies. But will that happen? It would require that MPOs and CMAs shift from their traditional role as brokers between state and local interests into more truly deliberative bodies. However, the governing structure of county and regional transportation agencies remains unchanged. An MPO or CMA is essentially a coalition of local governments, the state department of transportation, and local transit providers. A primary objective of participants is often to enhance their jurisdictions’ ability to get a larger piece of the pie. Today the pie is shrinking relative to need. In the absence of clear policy mandates from the state and federal levels, and as ballot measures gain importance in establishing transportation priorities, local agencies may become more competitive rather than more amenable to setting aside parochial concerns in favor of policies that benefit the region or even the county as a whole. Policy Breadth: Making the Connection Among Transportation, Land Use, and the Environment Programs during the 1990s devolved authority, but partly because of that, policy priorities still remained unclear. The attempt to link transportation, land use, and air quality planning at the regional level has so far only been moderately successful. 85 Air quality mandates prompted various transportation control measures, including high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, carpooling programs, and trip-reduction plans. These programs have shown little definitive effect on air quality, though. More dramatic measures such as congestion pricing or parking charges proved to be politically infeasible (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). Programs to promote jobs-housing balance and transit-oriented development were strengthened. For example, in 2000, the state legislature provided $100 million to support housing development through a new Jobs-Housing Improvement Program, with higher awards provided for affordable multifamily infill development in job-rich areas. The same year, $5 million was also provided for a more targeted program to support interregional collaborations to mitigate jobs-housing imbalances. Funding was slashed the following year, however, to help balance the state budget. MTC launched a TOD program in 1998 called Transportation for Livable Communities program, providing $9 million in federal funds annually to local governments to improve town centers and public transit hubs. The program was later modified to provide funds to reward production of high-density transit-oriented infill development (MTC website). More ambitious efforts were also undertaken within regions to consider land use and transportation planning in an explicitly regional framework. The efforts are still in preliminary stages, however, since they must build political support. Reformers in the San Francisco Bay Area organized the Bay Area Alliance for Sustainable Development, uniting five regional planning agencies and about 40 civic organizations. Through extensive public outreach during 2001 and 2002, the alliance developed smart growth alternative land use scenarios that could form the basis for regional planning for transportation, air quality, and other concerns. Regional agencies are pursuing their own “Smart Growth” project using federal TEA-21 funds, in coordination with the alliance (Bay Area Alliance for Sustainable Development, Association of Bay Area Governments websites; Innes and Gruber, 2001). SANDAG, the San Diego area COG, evaluated four alternative land use scenarios in preparing its 2000 Regional Transportation Plan (RTP). Three smart growth scenarios each demonstrated a significant 86 improvement over existing land use policies in relation to various mobility and environmental criteria. SANDAG incorporated one of these scenarios into its planning assumptions, which it considered to be consistent with its adopted Regional Growth Management Strategy. However, the RTP noted that current land use plans and policies in the region generally did not reflect the smart growth principles, and this contradiction remained unresolved (San Diego Association of Governments, 2000). These JHB and TOD programs and smart growth scenarios are still only tentative steps toward reintegrating planning for land use and transportation at a regional level. Without clearer state policy mandates or incentives, they may continue to develop quite slowly. However, there is one reason to expect that pressure for regional planning integration will continue to mount, and that is fiscal constraint. In fact, efficiency is emerging as an overriding policy concern. Recent regional plans across the state underscore the need for more strategic investment and planning. For example, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission’s 1998 Regional Transportation Plan proposed a 21 percent increase in freeway expansion between 1990 and 2020, at a cost of over $10 billion. Yet during the same period, congestion was projected to grow by 249 percent, the transit share to decline by 6 percent, and vehicle miles traveled to grow by 55 percent (Bay Area Transportation and Land Use Coalition, 1998). Similarly, the Southern California Association of Governments’ draft 2001 20-year Regional Transportation Plan estimated a potential shortfall of $10 billion just to keep existing systems in operation, and a shortfall of $40 billion for needed improvements. “The future transportation system is expected to be overwhelmed by new demand,” the plan stated (Shuit and Rabin, 2000). Faced with such seemingly unacceptable forecasts, state and regional agencies are paying more attention to strategic planning. At the regional level, conflicts about system priorities have become more visible. For example, proposals for rail and airport expansion in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas have been the subject of intense debates. Especially in the Los Angeles area, airport expansion provoked stiff local resistance—a case of local priorities trumping regional needs (Wachs, 1996; Nolte, 87 2000). The Southern California Association of Governments played an increasingly visible role in mediating a regionwide debate over “fair share” principles in relation to airport expansion (Pasco, 2001; Shuit and Rabin, 2000). Concern about the need for more strategic investment prompted some state policymakers to seek a recentralization of policy authority. For example, recent state-level reports called for new methods to determine state needs and priorities (California Commission on Building for the 21st Century, 1999, 2002; California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 1998a). Governor Gray Davis reasserted a state planning role in 2000 when he included $5.3 billion in the state budget over five years for specific transportation projects, with an emphasis on transit. However, the governor’s plan was widely criticized for failing to adhere to the MPO/RTPA regional process and for rewarding the governor’s political allies instead (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000d). The emphasis on efficiency is evident in steps taken to promote system performance measurement. ISTEA and SB 45 called for improved methods for evaluating multimodal tradeoffs in selection of projects for funding. The California Transportation Commission’s 2000 RTP Guidelines recommended that RTPAs define a set of “program level” system performance measures (California Transportation Commission, 1999). Caltrans is also considering system performance measures for interregional planning (Institute of Transportation Studies, 2001). However, system performance measurement is a challenging objective because “intermodalism represents a major paradigm shift for the profession” (Zoller and Capizzano, 1997, p. 17). Furthermore, as MTC’s experience demonstrates, technical methods for assessing system performance are useful only when planners understand and agree on the policy objectives the system is meant to achieve. However, given that policy accountability in the current system remains weak at the regional level, the tension between regional and local benefit is likely to remain unresolved. State policymakers still appear to be unsure how to balance policy objectives and accountability at the state, regional, and local levels. Even as steps are being taken to improve system performance measurement, other trends such as the increased reliance on 88 transportation ballot measures inject different criteria into the decisionmaking process. What Makes Integrated Planning Work? Certain planning experiences provide useful lessons about effective integration of planning for land use, transportation, and the environment. In California, one subregional planning effort in the mid1990s was called a “perfect example” of planning to enhance transitoriented development (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). Officials from Sonoma and Marin Counties and 18 cities developed a proposal to improve mobility along the single major transportation corridor that links the two counties to San Francisco via the Golden Gate Bridge. After comparing various strategies, the group approved a multimodal approach including land use changes. The proposal included investments in bikeways, bus feeder service, a new train system, HOV links, zoning changes to promote transit-oriented development, and even open space. The proposal was framed as a sales tax ballot initiative in 1998, but it failed to pass the two-thirds vote hurdle required (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). The Sonoma-Marin Corridor Study is a perfect example of strategic subregional planning because the conditions that prompted it are especially amenable to a collaborative approach. In this case, problems on a single transportation corridor focused attention on a common goal and policy options for achieving it. In contrast, planning problems such as the airport debates in the Los Angeles area or regionwide policies to reorient land use planning to transportation needs are far less amenable to technical solutions because participants do not start with common goals and perceptions of problems. Examples from other states of planning to integrate land use and transportation help clarify what is required for such efforts to succeed at a broader scale. Oregon passed a new transportation planning rule in 1991 requiring that local plans reconsider land use designations and densities to see if they support multiple transportation modes, infill development, and—for new communities in larger areas—the jobs-housing balance. The measure ensured that local governments would address regional needs in their own plans. The transportation planning rule also 89 mandated aggressive, specific goals and objectives for the state’s three MPOs to reduce congestion and per capita vehicle miles traveled, and to improve air quality (American Planning Association, 1999; Weitz, 1999; Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). By mandating that MPOs attain specific regional policy objectives, and that local governments address regional needs in their own plans, the stage was set for a reconsideration of the form of regional development. This was accomplished in the Portland area through a project called Making the Land Use, Transportation, and Air Quality Connection, or LUTRAQ. LUTRAQ was an alternative regional transportation and land use strategy proposed by environmentalists in 1992 to Metro, Portland’s elected regional planning body. LUTRAQ envisioned a new light-rail extension, increased feeder bus service, transit-oriented land use planning, and complementary improvements in local arterial roads. LUTRAQ performed better than an alternative highway expansion option being considered by all mobility and environmental criteria used for evaluation. It was adopted by the state’s transportation department in 1996 (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). LUTRAQ led to a reassessment of land use in the Portland area. Metro crafted a long-range land use plan in cooperation with local governments to meet the objectives of the new regional transportation plan and the state’s stiff growth-management requirements. The plan, adopted in 1996, calls for compact development at significantly higher densities in the urban core and at moderately higher densities in suburban areas. It focuses transportation-oriented development along the regional corridors (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). Another, less authoritative, example of integrated regional transportation planning is the U.S. 301 Corridor study in Maryland. After environmentalists stalled a proposal for a new highway in the early 1990s, a state-level task force studied alternatives. In 1996, it prepared a multimodal proposal including transportation management, transit and highway expansion, and land use plans emphasizing compact growth and jobs-housing balance. The governor approved the plan, and to gain local compliance, major state investments were conditioned on the strengthening of local land use policies to support the transportation improvements (Porter, 1997). 90 These examples suggest that certain components help promote effective regional planning integration. State leadership was required, especially in prompting local land use changes. But state planners did not impose specific final outcomes. Instead, the state government provided policy goals and outcome-oriented objectives that left room for local implementation and channeled its own investments to reward local compliance with its goals. The role of activists was also critical in prompting action. Conclusion Transportation is the planning area in which intergovernmental coordination traditionally has been most well developed. Planning trends in this arena tend to influence others. Currently, transportation planning in California—and the nation as a whole—is in transition. For decades, the federal and state governments provided the policy and planning coherence needed to implement large-scale long-term projects. Recently, authority was devolved downward as policy objectives became less certain. An underlying motivation for devolution was to establish a stronger connection between planning for transportation and land use. Increasingly, transportation planning is stymied by basic questions about how to build and operate viable transportation systems that correspond appropriately to the current form of urban development (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). With current assumptions about future growth, development patterns, and funding levels producing seemingly unacceptable mobility scenarios for the future, new strategies are needed to consider how to develop sustainable long-range transportation plans. This new framework will necessitate a consideration of how land use could be oriented to transportation needs rather than the reverse, which has been the traditional model. Devolution makes this possible by placing responsibility for transportation planning closer to the level of government at which land use decisions are made. However, devolution within the current decisionmaking structure may not accomplish regional policy reintegration effectively. Policy accountability for land use still lies with local governments. Similarly, transportation funding still adheres to 91 formulas based on geographic equity. Without clearer policy guidance from the state or federal level, it is not clear to what degree local governments—especially in multicounty metropolitan areas—will use their enhanced authority to develop and implement plans with a strong regional focus. 92 6. Devolution in Environmental Protection In environmental planning as in transportation, authority was devolved from the federal and state to the regional and local levels during the 1990s. However, devolution occurred for somewhat different reasons. Policy objectives for environmental protection were not thrown into doubt in the same way. Instead, the methods to achieve them were severely attacked. Environmental protection has been called the “big stick” of federal policy affecting regional planning (Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). More than any other policy area, it relies on strong, scientifically based mandates to address problems that are inherently regional— bioregional—in scale. The basic approach established during the 1970s relied on centralized, bureaucratic regulation of specific, separate problems, through “end-of-the-pipe” controls of emissions and discharges from such sources as auto tailpipes, smokestacks, or sewer outflow pipes (Mazmanian and Kraft, 1999). During the 1980s, this approach met with a backlash from industry and state and local governments. Command-and-control techniques came to be viewed as too costly and ineffective, based on remedial rather than preventive action and cumbersome, adversarial processes. Because remaining pollution sources were increasingly traced to urban dwellers and their automobiles, further gains in environmental quality would rely on more extensive changes in local land use policy. As a result, environmentalists increasingly called for policies to promote “sustainability,” arguing that lasting gains in quality of life cannot be achieved without integrating environmental, social, and economic planning at the local and regional levels (Mazmanian and Kraft, 1999). These critiques prompted a new approach to environmental regulation in the 1990s, which formed a central element in a broader 93 movement by the Clinton administration to “reinvent government.” In 1995, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency announced a new institutional approach featuring stronger reliance on positive incentives, streamlined regulation, greater cross-media planning integration, greater coordination with states and localities, and partnership arrangements providing an enhanced role for local stakeholders in decisionmaking. Prominent tools include alternative dispute resolution and negotiated rule-making processes, the use of market mechanisms to establish or implement policy, and the use of collaborative groups as vehicles for policy development and problem-solving (Rosenbaum, 2000). More than any other programs undertaken by the state or federal government, new environmental programs reflect the approach to regional planning that this report characterizes as the “third wave” of reform during the 20th century. These programs call for greater coordination not only among different levels of government but among land use, transportation, and environmental planning. California has pioneered new collaborative models. Because such initiatives are among the most prominent examples of new regional governance arrangements, California has become a laboratory for redefining government. Air Quality Management Air quality regulation was strengthened during the 1990s to include new authority over land use and transportation. However, this approach proved difficult to administer, both technically and politically. This difficulty highlighted basic challenges in integrating environmental planning with other policy areas. By the late 1980s, many metropolitan areas, including in California, had failed repeatedly to achieve federal air quality standards on schedule. The EPA recognized growth in vehicle miles traveled as a major reason, attributable to suburban development, a larger workforce, and increased solo commuting. Amendments to the Federal Clean Air Act passed in 1977 had called for consistency between transportation and clean air plans. MPOs were required to assess conformity of their plans to regional air quality goals, but methods were not clearly defined and, in practice, the requirement was often ignored (Garrett and Wachs, 1996). 94 In 1989, Citizens for a Better Environment and the Sierra Club filed suit against a number of state and regional agencies in the San Francisco Bay Area, including the MTC and the Bay Area Air Quality Management District. The lawsuit would have national consequences. It challenged the adequacy of MTC’s conformity assessments and its failure to impose contingency measures outlined in the regional air quality attainment plan in the face of continuing noncompliance (Garrett and Wachs, 1996). The dispute brought out conflicts in fundamental assumptions that govern environmental and transportation planning, raising basic questions about the nature and purpose of planning. The plaintiffs believed that compliance should imply actual attainment of air quality standards, in spite of planners’ faulty estimates about growth in the region and its effects. The defendants argued that they should be held accountable only to the provisions in the attainment plan but not to unexpected growth or incorrect planning assumptions. In this view, planners’ models produce only estimates, which may be helpful as guidance but should not be taken as literal truth (Garrett and Wachs, 1996). The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in key respects. MTC’s conformity assessment practices were deemed deficient. The agency had to develop an improved quantitative process to assess the effects of programs and projects on air quality. Because of continuing failure to meet air standards in the region, MTC also had to impose contingency measures contained in the regional attainment plan. Thus, the provisions in the plan were deemed specific enough to be enforceable. However, regional agencies were not held accountable simply for failure to meet federal air standards. The decision had national consequences because it held defendants to a higher level of technical proficiency than most current modeling practice allowed. Travel forecasting models had been developed to achieve the aim of relieving traffic congestion, not reducing traffic levels or improving air quality. A major limitation of the models is the absence of feedback regarding the effects of transportation systems on the level and distribution of regional growth. During the Bay Area lawsuit, MTC argued that there was no practical way to model the 95 connection. The national Transportation Research Board concluded that “analytical methods in use are inadequate for addressing regulatory requirements. . . . Modeled estimates are imprecise and limited in their account of changes in traffic flow characteristics, trip making, and land use attributable to transportation systems” (quoted in Garrett and Wachs, 1996, p. 203). The case underscored the difficulty in reconciling environmental and other planning goals. Strict health-based standards provide a clearer regional policy focus for environmental planning than for other growthmanagement policy areas. However, the unbendable standards also make it hard to reconcile different planning objectives when the costs of uncertainty must be factored in. This uncertainty is hard to overcome technically and to negotiate politically. In no other planning area have practitioners become more convinced of the need for integrated planning than in environmental protection. However, the difficulty in integrating air quality and transportation planning highlights the practical limits of long-range planning in complex metropolitan regions. By 1990, Congress “finally recognized that it could not solve the air pollution crisis merely through stationary source controls or by making cars run cleaner” (Garrett and Wachs, 1996, p. 20). Amendments were passed to the Clean Air Act, toughening regulations and requiring a closer connection among air quality, transportation, and land use decisions. The passage of ISTEA in 1991 reflected the changes and took account of the issues raised in the Bay Area lawsuit. Transportation plans must conform to air quality plans, which now in effect establish a pollution budget for nonattainment areas. Mobile source emissions must be quantified, and local plans must be developed to achieve levels of vehicle use consistent with established targets. Expected emissions from all transportation plans and programs must be consistent with the pollution budget. The regulations significantly strengthened the role of air quality agencies in regional planning. The stricter provisions led some observers to argue that no new regional planning authority over land use need be established (Jones and Rothblatt, 1993). However, since state laws also expressly prohibit air agencies from making land use decisions, their statutory authority was somewhat unclear (Dohan, 1993). 96 Experience in the Los Angeles region, where the South Coast Air Quality Management District was coping with the nation’s worst air, is exemplary of the challenges air agencies faced in the new planning environment.1 In 1989, SCAQMD passed the most far-reaching air pollution cleanup plan in U.S. history. It was the first to enact a series of measures aimed at indirect sources of pollution, for example, pollution caused by land use choices. It required measures to relate land use and business activity to reductions in car traffic, making local governments partners in compliance. For example, regulations were adopted requiring large employers to impose trip reduction programs. By the early 1990s, SCAQMD had become a powerful organization, with an annual budget of over $100 million. Air quality concerns could slow down development projects in the region significantly. However, the more stringent policies provoked heated opposition. Businesses lobbied against the trip reduction policy, especially after SCAQMD imposed $1 million in fines. Local governments were wary of intrusion into their land use authority. SCAG adopted only one land use measure, related to jobs-housing balance, and it was only advisory (Grant, 1995). The stiffer regulatory approach to air pollution was reversed. More conservative appointments to SCAQMD after 1991 resulted in scaledback regulation and a shift to market-based approaches. As a result, SCAQMD’s long-term effect on the local development process was minimal. The experience was not unusual. In general, the attempt to link transportation and air quality planning has been only moderately successful (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). In particular, measures to regulate land use have proved to be politically infeasible without authority over local land use decisionmaking. In 1994, SCAQMD instituted a new approach based on incentives rather than penalties. It introduced the first smog market in the United States, the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market or RECLAIM, which became a model for others around the world. The program allowed operators of nearly 400 industrial facilities to buy and sell excess or ____________ 1For more on SCAQMD’s experience during the early 1990s, see Dohan (1993); Innes et al. (1994); Grant (1995); Saltzstein (1996); Mazmanian (1999); Wachs and Dill (1999); Fulton (1996a, 1999a). 97 unused emission permits, which provided the right to emit a certain amount of a specific pollutant. As an added incentive, participating companies were assured fast-track permitting (Mazmanian, 1999). It was thought that a market approach would reduce costs and allow greater flexibility and efficiency. However, by the end of the decade, the RECLAIM program was pronounced a disappointment by critics including the EPA, the state air board, and environmentalists. The state’s electricity shortages in 2000 threw the program into chaos when regional power producers operated far beyond pollution limits in response. Critics charged that the energy crisis merely allowed structural flaws in the program to surface, however. According to the state air board, for example, RECLAIM did not perform as well as the regulations it replaced (Polakovic, 2001). Participating companies had reduced emissions by much less than anticipated, and few technological upgrades had been initiated. The critics contended that the program was seeded with too many credits in relation to real emission levels, sending the wrong signals to participating companies. In 1999, SCAQMD announced yet another shift in direction, striking a compromise between stiffer regulation and the new market approach (Cone, 1999a). SCAQMD’s experience points to continuing confusion in air quality planning. Although air boards have accomplished much, many regions remain out of compliance, and pressure to improve continues. Although most of the new regulatory authority assigned to regional air boards a decade ago remains intact, they have grown wary of exercising it to its full extent (Wachs and Dill, 1999). This indicates that simply strengthening regional planning mandates—using a bigger “stick”—may not achieve better results. However, less intrusive methods such as market approaches are also proving to be problematic. Regional air agencies face more difficult challenges today than in the past. Most of the politically easiest mitigation measures have already been adopted, including controls on stationary sources and automobile emissions. If improvements in emissions technology keep ahead of growth in population and car use, the role of regional agencies in improving air quality could decline. But if the reverse occurs, regional policies could become more central in efforts to improve air quality. If 98 that happens, the conflicts that emerged in California in the 1990s are likely to resurface (Fulton, 1996a; Wachs and Dill, 1999). Water Quality Management Water quality was an important policy area for testing new collaborative regional planning models during the 1990s, including an ambitious one to establish a system to bridge state, regional, and local agencies. The results were mixed, however, providing insight about what makes collaborative planning work. By the 1990s, the need for better integration of water quality and land use planning at an explicitly bioregional scale had become pressing. This reflects two interrelated developments in water quality management: the growing importance of “nonpoint” source regulation and of regulations governing particular bodies of water, rather than technology-driven effluent standards that had characterized the traditional approach. After passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972, regulators had focused primarily on controlling “point” sources of water pollution such as effluents from factories. By the 1980s, this piecemeal “end-of-the-pipe” approach had reached the limit of its effectiveness. The worst point source problems had been addressed, but pollution levels remained high. The primary cause of continuing pollution is “nonpoint” sources such as runoff from agriculture, construction, forestry, and urban use. These sources are far more difficult to control without a major escalation in water quality regulation involving stringent controls on local governments and consumers and new industry practices (Ruffolo, 1999). California faces severe problems from urban runoff, with estimated cleanup costs as high as $14 billion (Cone, 1999a). Amendments to the federal Clean Water Act passed in 1987 strengthened programs to control nonpoint sources. States were required to develop control plans relying on nonregulatory techniques. Waste discharge requirements were issued for a few nonpoint sources, namely, storm water from communities with populations above 100,000 and large construction sites. In response, the State Water Resources Control Board developed a Nonpoint Source Management Plan in 1988. It was not a formal statewide program comparable to the permit system for 99 point sources. Instead, regional boards could decide among management options and generally relied on encouraging voluntary compliance (Ruffolo, 1999). During the late 1990s, the state stepped up enforcement measures. In 1999, the state began enforcing a permit system for local governments for stormwater runoff (Cone, 1999a). In 2000, the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board adopted numerical standards requiring that developers treat stormwater runoff in new developments (Sokoloff, 2000b). The San Diego regional board followed suit in 2001. Along with growing attention to nonpoint sources of water pollution has come a more explicitly bioregional approach to water quality standards, and the connection has driven a new approach to water quality management. Regulations that address the quality of particular bodies of water are gaining importance over the technology-driven effluent standards that govern the permit system for point sources. Environmental lawsuits starting in the 1980s prodded the U.S. EPA to enforce regulations requiring that states identify water bodies that do not meet quality standards. For those that are “impaired,” states are required to establish TMDLs, or total maximum daily loads, defining how much of a pollutant a body of water can tolerate on a daily basis and still meet standards (Ruffolo, 1999). TMDLs have been interpreted as setting regulatory limits on nonpoint as well as point sources, in the context of particular water bodies. There are more than 500 water bodies in California that fail to meet applicable standards, including numerous watersheds in metropolitan areas. However, without a clear set of statewide policies or regulations guiding TMDL development, regional boards have been “making them up,” and the process has been highly contested (Ruffolo, 1999). Many TMDLs have been developed without implementation plans. These trends in water quality management have substantial implications for planning. The indivisibility of natural systems, the diffuse nature of continuing sources of pollution, and the persistence of pollution in the face of urban development necessitate a new planning approach. It will require more extensive local regulatory measures and better planning coordination than in the past. The collaborative nature 100 of state programs during the 1980s reflected a desire to incorporate local governments and landowners in the planning process without directly undermining their land use authority. This is necessary not only because rising opposition to stiff regulation preempts stiffer mandates from the top down but also because planning coordination—particularly in relation to land use—is vital to success. Regulators have devoted increasing attention to promoting new institutional strategies, in particular local watershed management initiatives. Watershed management meshes point and nonpoint source control in the context of specific hydrologic and geologic regions. As it is currently being practiced, the approach relies on bringing public and private “stakeholders” together to develop programs through collaborative processes that reflect local conditions and needs. Thus, it blends regional planning with evolving concepts of governance associated with the current era of “alternative problem-solving.” Both aspects represent a significant departure from the technology-based state and federal regulatory framework that has characterized water pollution control in the past (Ruffolo, 1999). Watershed initiatives have increased dramatically throughout the western United States over the past decade, to the degree that they are now often characterized as a “movement.” The Natural Resources Law Center listed 85 California watershed initiatives in its year 2000 directory, most of them in urbanized areas (Kenney et al., 2000).2 The increase in watershed initiatives is partly the result of local efforts to respond to new nonpoint source and TMDL requirements as well as laws protecting endangered species. It is also the result of explicit support by federal and state agencies. The U.S. EPA and other federal agencies have given priority attention to promoting watershed-based approaches to water quality management (Kenney et al., 2000). In California, ____________ 2The criteria used for inclusion in the directory were that an initiative was focused on a water resource; defined geographically using the physical character of the resource; involved local citizens, stakeholders, and/or governments as well as one or more governmental regulatory bodies; and featured a collaborative decisionmaking process. Common objectives included water quality improvement and habitat restoration for rare and endangered species. Watershed size varied dramatically, from 2000 to over one million acres (Kenney et al., 2000). 101 watershed planning was boosted in 2000 with passage of a $1.97 billion bond measure for water projects including nearly $750 million for watershed restoration and management (Krist, 2002). The California Coastal Conservancy has also worked for more than a decade to fund projects to restore coastal watersheds under its Watershed Enhancement Program (Natural Resources Law Center, 1998). Because of the proliferation of watershed-management initiatives and the interest among state and federal regulators in promoting them, they may serve as a test case for emerging models of regional governance based on collaborative private-public partnerships. However, so far little empirical research has assessed their effectiveness. One small-scale study of on-the-ground outcomes concluded that about half the evaluated initiatives produced measurable ecological benefits (Kenney et al., 2000). The popularity of locally organized watershed initiatives indicates that self-organization on a multijurisdictional basis is possible. The collaborative decisionmaking process favored in these efforts appears to be well suited for such planning problems as watershed management, in which a clearly defined multijurisdictional planning problem exists and for which solutions require broad participation from a variety of public and private parties. Voluntary involvement by local governments is critical, since many mitigation measures call for restrictions on land use, and this remains the prerogative of local governments. One assessment of watershed initiatives concluded that “local government actions affecting land use and development and major infrastructure financing and development must be connected with watershed management. In many watersheds, this will be the determinant of success or failure” (River Network, 1999, p. 56). However, the regulatory “stick” has also played a key role in promoting watershed planning. Recent assessments of watershed initiatives concluded that far fewer would have been pursued in the absence of stepped-up nonpoint and TMDL regulation. The researchers argued that the initiatives appear to work best as a supplement to traditional regulatory approaches rather than as a replacement (River Network, 1999; Kenney et al., 2000). It is significant to note that watershed initiative participants overwhelmingly agree that formal authority should not be transferred to their groups (Kenney et al., 2000). 102 State and federal involvement may be especially important for plan implementation and monitoring; some mechanism to ensure consistency between local plans and state regulatory efforts will be needed. In California, attempts to develop a coherent state-level policy framework for watershed management have been under way for a decade. An ambitious experiment by the state in the early 1990s to improve water quality and protect biodiversity attempted to merge collaborative local watershed planning with state regulatory oversight—in other words, to mesh top-down and bottom-up planning. Scientific research and practical experience had convinced California’s resource managers that preservation of threatened and endangered species could not be approached in a piecemeal way—in other words, for one species at a time or one parcel of land at a time. Instead, entire natural habitats had to be protected (Jensen, 1994). In 1991, Governor Pete Wilson introduced a plan to improve resource conservation called Resourceful California. One of its main elements, a Memorandum of Understanding on Biological Diversity, was adopted by the directors of six state agencies and four federal agencies. The state wanted to establish bioregions as the theater of operations for species preservation. At the state level, an executive council composed of agency heads would develop a statewide biodiversity strategy and facilitate coordination. At the local level, organizations such as watershed groups would prepare habitat restoration and management plans. With many endangered species crossing local watersheds, however, an intermediate level of organization was deemed necessary between the state and local watershed and other conservation groups. Eleven bioregions were defined, which were further subdivided into landscape associations and subdivided again into watershed associations. The state would sponsor bioregional councils to ensure that local plans were complementary (Jensen, 1994; Thomas, 1999). However, in the seven years following the memorandum of understanding, no government-defined bioregional council emerged in any officially designated bioregion in the state. Many local groups protested the regional concept as a top-down imposition of control. Regional-level managers in state agencies also resisted implementing the plan because of concern about interference from outside groups (Jensen, 103 1994; Thomas, 1999). One study of the Klamath Bioregion noted that groups tended to emerge at the county level instead. “The parochial scale of existing social processes . . . was not breached easily by attempts to form a bioregional council” (Thomas, 1999, p. 560). Ultimately, the bioregional council concept was rejected and the state began to work directly with local watershed and other conservation groups instead. After a decade of experimentation and dialogue, a statewide framework for watershed management remains in the developmental stage. Devising a statewide system for watershed management has been a challenging task in large part because the collaborative, community-based governance model reflected in local initiatives—and advocated in theory by federal and state regulators—represents a radical departure from traditional regulatory and administrative practices. Few institutional models help prescribe how to strike the appropriate balance between accountability and local flexibility. The aborted attempt to establish bioregional councils in the state suggests that it will not be easy to mesh bottom-up voluntary planning with top-down administration and regulation. Collaborative approaches are more easily organized at a relatively small scale, where they benefit from established relationships among local governments. This helps explain why the regional administrative concept devolved to the county level in the Klamath case. The success of local watershed planning mirrors certain types of transportation planning, such as the Sonoma-Marin Corridor Study, that address shared goals for a major corridor. In these cases, the planning focus crosses jurisdictions but is still manageable and understandable. In the watershed case, regulatory mandates provide the policy coherence—the common objective—but implementation is addressed locally and flexibly. As with transportation planning, voluntarism proved largely unsuccessful in establishing strong planning capacity in the broader regional “middle ground” between the state and local levels. Although this middle level may correspond to objectively defined catchment areas for important regional systems such as river basins and metropolitan transportation networks, effective voluntarism appears to depend on local relationships and less-complex objectives. 104 CALFED The best-known watershed planning initiative in California is CALFED, a joint effort among state and federal agencies to address water-management concerns in the San Francisco Bay-San Joaquin Delta region. It was one of the most ambitious experiments in collaborative regional planning ever in California, testing the model at a wide scale, not just geographically but in terms of its ability to reconcile diverse interests. CALFED addressed water quality and water supply concerns simultaneously, attempting to reconcile environmental and economic needs. It revealed the power—and the limits—of the collaborative model. The San Francisco Bay–San Joaquin Delta is a 700-square-mile region where the San Francisco Bay meets the state’s two biggest rivers. It is the largest wetland habitat in the western United States, supporting more than 750 species of wildlife and plants. The Delta also forms the hub of California’s two largest water distribution systems and numerous smaller ones. It provides 40 percent of California’s drinking water and irrigation for 45 percent of the nation’s fruits and vegetables (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 1996; Landy et al., 1998). By the early 1990s, the different competing uses of Delta water appeared headed for a collision. Drought and diversion of water for human use had caused significant environmental damage. The 1992 Central Valley Project Improvement Act mandated a diversion of additional water for environmental uses. The following year, two fish species were listed as endangered, with other petitions pending. The U.S. EPA announced that it would issue its own quality standards for the Delta, after having warned the California State Water Resources Control Board for over ten years that it needed a stronger plan. However, any increase in freshwater flows for environmental purposes would entail a reduction for farms and drinking water. The Delta became the most contested area of water rights in the state (Landy et al., 1998). Four federal agencies organized themselves into a united front and began negotiations with state agencies, municipal and agricultural users, and environmental organizations. Therefore, the CALFED process was the direct result of federal laws and advocacy. According to the Betsy 105 Rieke, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, “absent the mandates of the Clean Water Act and the ESA [Endangered Species Act], there would be no Bay-Delta Agreement” (Landy et al., 1998, p. 48). All the parties had incentives to cooperate, however. With serious water shortages projected in coming years, the negotiations offered the chance to establish certainty in the face of increasing constraint (Brinkerhoff, 1999). Certainty became the major stumbling block in negotiations, however, as users demanded guaranteed future allocations and environmentalists argued that existing science could not adequately predict future habitat needs. In this respect, CALFED encountered the same planning challenge that made air quality planning difficult; even the best current scientific methods cannot provide airtight predictions about the effects of future growth and development. This makes negotiation among competing interest groups far more problematic. The federal government brokered a compromise, agreeing to absorb the cost of the uncertainty. In June 1994, less than six months from a federal court-imposed deadline for EPA issuance of final water quality standards, an unprecedented Framework Agreement was signed. The agreement provided for a voluntary reduction of allocations by San Joaquin Valley interests and increased freshwater flows for Delta environmental needs, but also that any additional allocations needed for new listings under the Endangered Species Act would be purchased with federal funds from willing sellers, not taken through regulatory action (Landy et al., 1998; Saxton, 2000).3 A three-year truce was proclaimed while an implementation plan could be hammered out. CALFED envisioned an ambitious 30-year program for the Bay-Delta projected to cost approximately $8.5 billion, making it one of the largest resource projects anywhere. This made it reminiscent of the extensive projects undertaken under Governor Pat Brown’s administration, prompted by similar concerns about ____________ 3Linked to the CALFED process was the establishment in 1993 of the Delta Protection Commission, a new state agency created to devise a land use plan for the area. The commission became the fourth such regional body in the state, similar to the Bay Conservation and Development Commission, the California Coastal Commission, and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. However, unlike the other agencies, the Delta Protection Commission does not have regulatory power. 106 infrastructure to accommodate growth. However, the planning landscape had changed substantially since the 1950s, and CALFED exemplified the change. Because of stricter regulation, environmental needs now demanded an equal place at the bargaining table alongside agricultural and urban users. Rapid urban growth had invoked its own constraints as well. There are few untapped rivers left in the state and those that remain are well protected by environmental laws. Finally, fiscal constraint—such as the prohibitive cost of building new dams— also precluded traditional planning solutions (Brinkerhoff, 1999). CALFED’s emphasis on consensus-building—not a hallmark of state infrastructure planning during earlier decades—exemplifies current regional planning challenges. Today, environmental and economic goals must be reconciled in a context of increasing constraint. CALFED announced a “preferred alternative” program in 1999 and a final version in 2000. Its proposals were intended to please all parties. The plan called for greater efficiency through conservation, better water transfer markets, and improved water storage. It deferred discussion on construction of a controversial new canal to divert water to Southern California. A central recommendation was a new environmental water account that would provide funding and a guaranteed block of water that could be stored against dry times for delivery where and when it was needed. This program would create a more integrated water supply system in which environmental needs were accorded water rights and funding along with other traditional users (Martin, 1999; Vogel, 1999; Lewis and Clemings, 1999). Although CALFED attempted to please all parties, by 2000 it was mired in controversy. Agricultural and metropolitan water users demanded new dam construction and environmentalists opposed even the storage facilities being proposed. Various competing lawsuits were filed (Krist, 2001). In 2001, the conflicts escalated to the national level as competing funding bills for CALFED were debated, some of which redirected priorities from the agreed-upon plan (Taugher, 2001; Doyle, 2001). By 2002, the program had run out of money. Because lawmakers in Sacramento and Washington failed to provide enough funding for it, CALFED officials were forced to rely heavily on the proceeds of water bonds (Taugher, 2002). 107 Thus, the hard-won consensus established through years of CALFED negotiations appeared to disintegrate along traditional lines of conflict. In part, this outcome merely reflects the limitations of the CALFED process. CALFED was not constructed as an agency with enforcement or regulatory authority but rather as a forum for debate and consensus-building. Political differences perhaps inevitably hardened as decisions were taken up by the authorizing and regulatory bodies. Simply by tracing the outlines of potential consensus in California’s fabled “water wars,” CALFED might be deemed a success. However, the current conflicts also suggest that consensus-building exercises alone are insufficient to produce lasting settlements. Traditional political divisions and tactics reemerge—and traditional political leadership is required—as the process shifts from debating policy to adopting it, especially in the context of fiscal and environmental constraint. Natural Communities Conservation Planning During the 1990s, California was at the center of controversy surrounding protection of endangered species. An innovative approach to habitat preservation became a national model for new regional governance techniques. The Federal Endangered Species Act was first passed in 1973. The ESA has been called the “pit bull” of environmental law, with some of the stiffest provisions especially in relation to land use. California’s current Endangered Species Act dates from 1984. It prohibits state agencies from approving activities that will jeopardize or adversely modify the habitat of threatened or endangered species when measures are available to avoid these effects. Once a species is “listed” as threatened or endangered, substantial limits may be placed on private land uses. However, since 1982 federal and state wildlife agencies have been authorized to issue incidental permits for the “taking”—or in other words the destruction—of endangered habitat or wildlife if a “Habitat Conservation Plan” (HCP) has been prepared to mitigate the effects. The process to obtain a take permit can be arduous, however (Murphy, 1999; Pollak, 2001a). 108 By the late 1980s, the Endangered Species Act was being criticized from all sides. Landowners and government regulators were frustrated by the cost and inconvenience of permitting. Environmentalists were frustrated that HCPs were initiated only after a species was in trouble, and only on a project-by-project basis. The piecemeal approach of preserving small, unconnected parcels of land for one species at a time was proving to be inadequate. To be biologically effective, habitat must be protected at an ecosystem scale for interrelated species and for the long term. ESA regulations, considered among the stiffest of environmental mandates, were proving incapable of preventing extinction (Thompson, 1994). California had become a hot spot for this sort of conflict. The framers of the ESA had not foreseen how much it would collide with urban development. California is one of the richest biological regions on the planet, and rapid development in the 1980s, especially in Southern California, had resulted in conversion of much habitat, causing precipitous drops in the populations of many species. By the early 1990s, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service had listed 320 threatened or endangered plant or animal species in the state, and 2,350 more were candidates (Pincetl, 1999). Listings were increasing on private property in urbanizing areas. A legal and political train wreck was looming as species protection collided with private land use decisions and the prerogatives of local governments. As in the Bay-Delta region, environmental and economic goals were coming into direct conflict (Thompson, 1994; Murphy, 1999). The impending listing of a bird called the gnatcatcher in Southern California in the early 1990s prompted the state government to adopt a new approach to habitat preservation. The gnatcatcher lives in the dwindling coastal sage scrub ecosystem of Southern California, a 6,000square-mile area in five counties—Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Diego, and San Bernardino—containing a human population of 18.5 million. Seventy-one percent of suitable vegetation for the gnatcatcher was on private land, and the bird’s listing would have affected some of the largest landowners and development interests in the state. A large developer, the Irvine Ranch Company, had developed a habitat preservation plan in cooperation with the California Resources Agency, 109 and this seemed a good test case for a new planning approach (Pincetl, 1999). Governor Wilson introduced the Natural Communities Conservation Planning (NCCP) program in 1991. It was designed as a voluntary program to create regional, multispecies conservation plans through collaboration among local governments, landowners, developers, and others. Its goal was to reconcile species preservation with increased demand for urban development by taking a preventive, long-term approach. If wildlife and habitat could be protected at a broad scale in advance of development, the likelihood of additional species listings would be reduced, thereby decreasing economic and environmental costs and conflicts. In exchange for setting aside land as wildlife habitat, development could be facilitated in other areas, thus reducing uncertainty in the regulatory process. Regulators could avoid trench warfare and share implementation responsibility with local governments (Murphy, 1999; Pollak, 2001a). The NCCP was envisioned as a voluntary process, and the enabling legislation that passed in 1991 imposed no new rules or regulations (Pollak, 2001a). Rather, it authorized the California Department of Fish and Game to enter into agreements with private parties, local governments, and federal agencies to prepare multispecies habitat conservation plans “through a collaborative consensual planning process.” The department was authorized to issue take permits based on approved plans. NCCP take authorizations could cover any species, including unlisted ones. This could form the basis for valuable assurances to landowners that they would avoid economic consequences from future listings, something that federal agencies had sanctioned through a policy called “no surprises.” Thus, just as in the case of CALFED, increased planning certainty formed the incentive to encourage stakeholder participation. The program was defined as a pilot project addressing the Southern California coastal scrub habitat. Three species were identified for initial study to serve as surrogates for others. The five-county habitat area was broken down into 11 subregions, because the larger area was thought to be administratively unmanageable. The subregions reflected political boundaries as much as the location of habitat, which concerned some 110 scientists (Pollak, 2001a, 2001b). This is similar to the state’s bioregional council initiative. The effort to establish voluntary planning mechanisms at a broad bioregional scale has devolved in practice to the county level in many cases. Scientists were also concerned that although conservation guidelines were adopted by the state’s Department of Fish and Game in 1993, no process was defined for review of NCCP plans by independent scientists (Thompson, 1994; Pollak, 2001a, 2001b). The NCCP process turned out to be far more time-consuming than originally anticipated. Although the entire plan was expected to be completed in 18 months, ten years later only two major subregional plans had been approved, and these built on prior efforts. The first was the Orange County Central-Coastal plan, approved in 1996. Negotiations with large Orange County landowners helped set the stage for the NCCP program as a whole, giving the Orange County plan a head start. The process also was greatly simplified by the small number of landowners involved. The approved plan reflects this, since the land reserves are based mainly on contributions from the landowners or public acquisition. It was followed a year later by the San Diego Multiple Species Conservation Program. The San Diego plan involves many more landowners and local jurisdictions than the Orange County plan. Because of its scale and the degree of local involvement, it has been praised as a remarkable attempt to fully integrate conservation with planning for new development (Rempel et al., 1999). It is an ambitious plan that aims to preserve more than 150,000 acres. Key to success was the ability to provide certainty for both developers and conservationists. Developers were reassured by the commitment to “no surprises,” while conservationists were swayed by state and federal commitments to land acquisition and ongoing management. Projected costs were allocated among state and federal wildlife agencies, local governments, and mitigation from new development (Rempel et al., 1999; Pollak, 2001a, 2001b). The program integrated conservation into local planning to an unprecedented degree. State and federal incidental take permits were issued to local jurisdictions, which were then responsible for overseeing local compliance. Conservation was integrated into local planning by 111 requiring that local ordinances and general plans include its provisions. The NCCP cannot actually compel local land use changes, but compliance may be assured through the potential revocation of take permits (Rempel et al., 1999; Pollak, 2001a, 2001b). The NCCP represents one of the most advanced efforts to develop a new model for collaborative regional planning in the state. It overcomes basic weaknesses in the traditional regional planning system. In particular, it reintegrates environmental and economic planning at a bioregional scale, in furtherance of explicitly regional objectives. It accomplishes this by meshing federal, state, and local policies and responsibilities. It demonstrates that a collaborative framework can succeed in producing integrated regional plans. Key to its success were clear state and federal mandates requiring action on an explicitly regional scale. Regulatory mandates alone were insufficient, though, because they had to be reconciled with private property rights and local land use authority. To accomplish this, the second key ingredient to success was the promise of mutual gains through coordinated planning. Such potential gains form the incentive needed for voluntary processes to succeed. Like CALFED, the NCCP brokers a deal on resource allocation among competing interests. Comprehensive negotiations offer the hope of efficiency gains by reducing conflicts on a piecemeal basis. Because of its voluntary approach, another ingredient in the success of the NCCP has been the strength of existing local planning practices. Both subregional plans completed so far relied on a prior history of cooperation. The NCCP has also suffered from certain weaknesses, however. Although most major environmental organizations supported its principles, some grew to distrust its process and results, complaining that scientific processes were sacrificed in favor of political ones (Pollak, 2001a, 2001b). The devolution of the program to politically defined subregions and the lack of explicit scientific standards and monitoring support this conclusion. Legislation passed in 2002 sought to resolve such complaints by requiring strict scientific standards as the basis for plans and rough proportionality between mitigation and effect on species (Shigley, 2002c). 112 Like the effort to mesh air quality and transportation planning, the NCCP’s attempt to reintegrate planning areas in a more comprehensive fashion proved more arduous than its framers anticipated. The central goal of reducing planning uncertainty for participant stakeholders has been hard to achieve, because it requires an assumption of future risk. The “no surprises” policy, essential for landowner participation, transfers the assumption of risk of future uncertainty in species preservation costs from developers and landowners to the federal and state governments or, possibly, even to the species themselves. For this reason, the NCCP program continues to divide the environmental community. Hazardous Waste Management Toxic waste became a major public and intergovernmental issue during the 1980s, and its disposal became an area of policy innovation in regional planning and governance. It is a useful case study because, in contrast to most of the other regional planning issues discussed in this report, toxic waste is not so much a public “good” as a public “bad.” Disposal sites are prime examples of “LULUs” or “locally unwanted land uses,” a source of contention among neighboring governments and a classic regional governance problem. Among the spate of federal environmental legislation passed during the 1970s were a number of laws affecting disposal of toxic wastes, including the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, the Resources, Conservation, and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, and the Superfund legislation, passed in 1980. RCRA called for regulation of existing toxic sites, construction of new safer facilities for disposal and treatment, and creation of a system for tracking and overall management. In the early 1980s, the hazardous waste issue became a major policy concern in California. The state’s toxic waste problem had become one of the worst in the nation. No new landfill had been opened for a decade because market-based efforts to obtain siting agreements had failed in the face of fierce local opposition. When new federal and state legislation prohibited land disposal of hazardous waste, the problem became a crisis. Most major landfills closed to avoid the higher standards. Better treatment options would necessitate an expansion of facilities (Asmus, 1990; Rabe, 1994). 113 In 1982, a state-level council was created to study options. A more effective decisionmaking process was clearly needed to solve the problems. Conflict over facility siting epitomized the tension that can arise between local and regional needs, and solutions would require some means to overcome local opposition. The council considered a more centralized framework. But although business leaders were strongly in favor, local governments were equally strongly opposed. A centralized, state-run model was also problematic because it might heighten local resistance and lead to further gridlock. The council devised an innovative new approach to address these concerns as well as the need for better information about future needs for facilities. In 1986, the legislature approved the Hazardous Waste Management Plans and Facility Siting Procedures, or the “Tanner bill.” The process was considered a national model because of its balance of local concerns and statewide priorities (Asmus, 1990; Mazmanian and Morell, 1992; Rabe, 1994). The new system was inspired by an experiment undertaken in the mid-1980s by local governments in Southern California. Representatives from local governments in seven counties had established the Southern California Hazardous Waste Management Project as a Joint Powers Authority to define a comprehensive equity-based policy for site evaluation at the regional level. Each county agreed to take responsibility for its “fair share” of waste disposal and management. The region was the first in the nation to adopt such a fair share approach. However, it proved easier to reach agreement on the concept than on implementation. The counties could not agree on how many facilities of what kind would be sited (Mazmanian and Morell, 1992). The Southern California process was eclipsed by the new state legislation. Under the Tanner bill, local governments were allowed to retain initial siting authority. Each county had two years to prepare a plan including an assessment of the volume and types of waste generated and the adequacy of existing facilities and a proposal for waste reduction and management. To address the matter of economies of scale, counties were encouraged to devise partnerships for managing waste. Thus, the process repeated the fair share approach while also accommodating efficiency through scale economies. The Department of Health Services 114 would develop guidelines, provide technical assistance, review and approve plans, and finally assemble the county plans into an overall state plan. Each county board of supervisors was asked to appoint an advisory committee to negotiate permit approvals. The locally based approach was balanced, however, by the establishment of a state-level appeals body with authority to override local decisions. The primary basis for such overrides would be inconsistency with approved county-devised plans (Asmus, 1990; Mazmanian and Morell, 1992; Rabe, 1994). Every county prepared a plan, because failure to do so would have made it vulnerable to decisions made by the state appeals board. The process forced the state to assess in concrete terms the scope of its hazardous waste problem and forced each county to reconcile its load with its capacity to manage it. The new state regulations banning land disposal quickly converted participants to the virtues of source reduction. County plans included proposed source reduction of between 30 percent and 75 percent by 2000 (Mazmanian and Morell, 1992). In spite of widespread support for the program, its provisions were undermined in 1987 when the Department of Health Services issued guidelines calling for each county to identify feasible sites for all types of new facilities, regardless of the county’s own requirements. The guidelines, a mandate from the executive branch, departed from agreements reached during the legislative process, according to some observers. This provision undermined equity or fair share as the fundamental basis for county plans, because it indicated that health, economic, and other technical considerations were to be given greater priority. Because the appeals board was given authority to override local rejection of a proposed facility, it could use the Tanner bill as a preemption tool (Mazmanian and Morell, 1992; Rabe, 1994). Local governments protested by refusing to accede to the requirement. Only three counties developed plans to accommodate more than their own waste (Mazmanian and Morell, 1992). DHS proposed a compromise. Industry was required to make significant strides toward source reduction as a condition for receiving permits for new facilities. In return, local governments accepted responsibility for defending plans before voters and approving siting decisions. However, 115 the attempt to develop a new basis for siting decisions was lost in the bargain. Subsequent siting efforts tended to follow the traditional market-based approach, and conflict prevailed in most (Rabe, 1994). In 1993, the state consolidated its hazardous waste management system and devolved enforcement authority to county-level agencies known as Certified Unified Program Agencies. Thus, the state established a system for hazardous waste similar to the model for air pollution control (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2000b). California’s experience during the 1980s as a national model for a more cooperative state-local approach to facilities siting was short-lived. Nevertheless, the case carries lessons for other similarly contentious LULU issues such as the impasse over airport expansion in the Los Angeles area. It indicates that when faced with the threat of state intervention and the loss of local control, local governments are able to overcome classic NIMBY obstacles to regional cooperation. Regional cooperation based on fair share principles holds hope as a means to overcome these classic regional governance challenges without sacrificing state or local control. The state government’s more centralized approach may have helped overcome the impasse over LULU siting, but that came at the expense of its ability to develop cooperative relationships with local governments to explore options in a systematic way (Mazmanian and Morell, 1992). Conclusion Among all regional planning areas, environmental planning has the strongest accountability mechanisms. That is because ecosystems are inherently regional, and environmental standards are health-based. Within ecosystems, environmental problems and solutions are often indivisible among political jurisdictions (for example, air pollution does not recognize political boundaries). Thus, environmental planning suffers far less from the problems that plague transportation planning, where local and regional benefits can be traded off more easily. But if transportation planning has suffered, especially recently, from a lack of regional policy focus, environmental planning has suffered from a lack of effective regulatory techniques. The traditional piecemeal, procedural approach failed to address cumulative effects, and therefore it 116 failed in protecting the environment even as it provoked resentment among landowners and others whose activities were affected. The new approach to environmental planning stresses negotiation and compromise, because piecemeal skirmishes between environmental and economic interests have become too costly for all concerned. More comprehensive planning offers the possibility of efficiency gains and reduced conflict. More than any other programs, environmental ones are testing new governance models that exemplify what this report calls the “third wave” approach. First, they call for regional policy integration, requiring that land use and transportation policies be oriented to regional environmental needs. The NCCP, for example, essentially produces regional (or more accurately, subregional) land use plans to reconcile economic and environmental goals, a fundamental shift from the traditional planning model. Second, many of the programs promote collaborative decisionmaking, especially those programs seeking land use changes. Although this represents a kind of institution-building, the new programs do not try to alter the existing distribution of authority. Instead, collaborative programs aim to reconcile public and private interests, and federal, state, regional, and local interests, through the promise of mutual gains. They seek to incorporate landowners and local governments—and their land use authority—into a more comprehensive planning process. The new environmental programs have made progress in overcoming traditional weaknesses of the regional planning system—its lack of regional focus, comprehensiveness, and accountability. However, they also have weaknesses. The mutual gains on which they depend for success have not been easy to negotiate. To guarantee greater certainty in outcomes for some parties—the inducement for participation and compromise—others must assume the risk of future uncertainty. This may serve to weaken environmental mandates in favor of politically acceptable solutions. Trends in air quality management underscore this problem. Even the best science is unable to predict accurately the effect of complex changes in urban areas, making long-range integrated planning a difficult proposition. 117 Collaborative models have worked best in smaller areas, relying on existing political relationships to succeed. They have been much harder to foster across large areas. Thus, like transportation planning, environmental planning has been devolved to the county level in many cases, undermining the bioregional scale that the new programs seek to emphasize. Collaborative initiatives have served well as forums for dialogue that can be essential in devising new approaches to complex problems. But because they are not policymaking bodies, traditional conflicts have reemerged once the process shifted from plan development to plan adoption and implementation. Although collaboration may help resolve conflict and produce creative strategies, it is not a substitute for political decisionmaking through more traditional mechanisms. 118 7. “Bottom-Up” Third-Wave Reforms A new approach to regional reform emerged in California during the 1990s as a result of the planning pressures and new programs described in previous chapters. The current reform wave emphasizes economic development, efficient and equitable public investment in the face of fiscal constraint, and integration of environmental and economic goals. It relies on collaborative decisionmaking and public-private partnerships.1 It can be distinguished from the previous reform wave by its greater emphasis on developing regional consensus on integrated planning goals and its lesser emphasis on establishing new institutions or procedural requirements. The most important elements that account for the new reform wave are the transportation and environmental programs discussed in Chapters 5 and 6—because they changed the institutional framework for regional planning—and the rise of broad-based regional reform coalitions with strong support from business leaders—because they supply political pressure and policy focus for continuing reform. The transportation and environmental programs created a new framework for regional planning. Authority in these policy areas—what this report has termed “vertical regionalism”—was devolved downward. Increasingly, regions and more often counties now form the organizational scale at which local, state, and federal agencies meld plans to achieve interrelated policy goals. But this new framework only goes partway toward reintegrating regional growth-management planning. The new programs connect some of the dots—such as strengthening the connection between transportation and air quality planning and between ____________ 1This description of the third wave of regional governance reform in the United States during the 20th century is informed by Wallis (1994b). 119 subregional land use and species preservation planning—but gaps remain. Furthermore, many basic incentives remain unchanged. For example, although local governments and regional agencies now have much more control of transportation policy objectives, the funding process still reinforces “geographic equity” at the county more than at the regional scale. Land use is still a local government prerogative, and fiscal constraint and competition persist. Although the new framework encourages greater planning integration, it still remains up to local governments within metropolitan regions to choose how far to take it. This is where regional activists come in. Broad-based reform coalitions in metropolitan areas across the state are pushing governments to fill in the new regional framework. Thus, planning integration is currently gaining as much momentum from the bottom up as from the top down. Local governments also have experimented with new crossjurisdictional approaches to growth management. In some areas, local governments have combined the greater authority provided by devolution with greater interjurisdictional cooperation on a horizontal basis to begin to bridge the gaps that still characterize our regional planning system. These initiatives form models for ways to enhance regional planning in California. Civic Entrepreneurs Perhaps the most significant trend in bottom-up regional reform during the 1990s was the emergence of “collaborative regional initiatives” across the state. These efforts unite public officials, educators, and leaders from business, labor, environmental, social equity, and other organizations in developing regional growth-management strategies. Their work is assisted by foundations and support networks such as the California Center for Regional Leadership, which has organized five annual “Civic Entrepreneur Summits” to promote cross-learning among 21 collaborative regional initiatives across the state. The most well-developed collaborative public-private initiatives are in parts of the state in which growth pressures are intense and business leaders are well organized. The initiatives seek to define consensus across public, private, and nonprofit sector interests about a new approach to growth management. Reflecting what is called “new regionalism,” 120 collaborative regional initiatives “are creating a new type of governance for the twenty-first century—regional in scope, collaborative in nature, and based on an understanding of the interdependence between the economy, the environment, and social equity” (California Center for Regional Leadership, 2001, p. 9). The emphasis on broad consensus-building with business leaders at the forefront makes the “new regionalism” reminiscent of the Progressive Era, also a time when a broad reform coalition worked to adapt local governments to function more effectively in changed economic circumstances. The collaborative initiatives help provide a policy focus for expanding regional planning integration, one that will be essential if the apparatus of regional governance is to be systematically reformed. The vision must be compelling enough to overcome traditional suspicions among the public about expanding government’s role. The geographic scale of most of the state’s collaborative regional initiatives confirms that voluntary collaboration is more likely to emerge at a subregional or county scale than across wide metropolitan regions. Seventeen of the 21 collaborative regional initiatives participating in the California Center for Regional Leadership network operate at the county or subregional level (four of them work within single-county metropolitan areas). A well-known example of a collaborative initiative is the Joint Venture Silicon Valley Network, a coalition of public and private leaders in Santa Clara and San Mateo Counties that focuses primarily on education and smart-growth issues. The JVSV Network and another organization, the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group, have worked closely with local governments to address growth concerns. For example, JVSV persuaded 27 cities and two counties to adopt a uniform building code to speed up the permitting process and reduce intercity rivalry. The Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group—whose member firms employ one-quarter of Silicon Valley workers—led battles to increase taxes for highway and light-rail construction, established a multimillion-dollar affordable housing trust fund, and organized a broad coalition that advocates for infill development projects (Association of Bay Area Governments, 2000). These efforts by the Silicon Valley business community have been called the “greatest unsung land-use success story 121 in America” (Richmond, 2000; also see Pastor, 1997; Coleman, 1998; Shigley, 1999). The importance of economic development concerns is also evident in collaborative initiatives in the Los Angeles area. The recession of the early 1990s hit the region hard and accelerated a shift in the economic base toward service-related industries. A number of initiatives emerged in the mid-1990s, focusing especially on education and transportation. Some also embraced the idea of targeting assistance to specific industry “clusters” thought to be key to the region’s economy.2 An example is the Gateway Cities Partnership. The Gateway cities, to the southeast of Los Angeles, cover some of the poorest parts of metropolitan Southern California. Hard hit by aerospace declines in the early 1990s, the cities have coordinated economic analysis and common strategies to promote workforce development and assist manufacturing in the area. Participants also seek to ensure that benefits from the Alameda Corridor transportation project, which slices through the Gateway cities region, will accrue to all cities along the corridor (Fulton et al., 2000b; Pastor et al., 2000). Collaborative regional initiatives by no means have been limited to the largest urban areas in the state. Far-reaching initiatives have been organized in the Central Valley and Sierra foothills, for example. This activity reflects the rapid pace of change transforming the 450-mile-long, 50-mile-wide agricultural valley that runs down the center of the state. One of the nation’s premier agricultural regions for over a century, the Central Valley is being transformed by rapid population growth and residential development spilling over from the San Francisco Bay, Sacramento, and Los Angeles metropolitan areas. An example of a collaborative regional initiative in the Central Valley is the Growth Alternatives Alliance, called the “first agriculture-businesshomebuilder-conservation coalition of its kind in California” (Whiteside, 1999). It includes the American Farmland Trust, the Fresno County Farm Bureau, the Fresno Chamber of Commerce, the Building Industry Association of San Joaquin Valley, and the Fresno Business Council, among others. The alliance issued a far-reaching report in April 1998, ____________ 2See Pastor et al. (2000) for descriptions of these initiatives. 122 called A Landscape of Choice: Strategies for Improving Patterns of Growth. It promoted policies for revising local government general plans, advocating compact development, urban growth boundaries, farmland preservation, and multijurisdictional planning. Subsequently, all cities and the county government adopted the report’s statement of principles. The City and County of Fresno revised their General Plans along compact growth lines (Hopkins and Bottorff, 1998; Newman, 1996; Shigley, 2000a; California Planning and Development Report, 2001). Local Government Planning Coordination Regional planning also has been enhanced in recent years by coordinated activity among local governments. This activity has several aspects. Local governments have increased single-purpose interjurisdictional planning through joint powers authorities. JPAs are cooperative entities formed on a contractual basis by local governments, often to deal with single issues. They differ from independent special districts—often criticized as increasing governmental fragmentation rather than consolidation—because JPAs remain under the control of the general-purpose governments that establish and administer them. The number of JPAs in the state has risen rapidly, from 362 in fiscal year 1980–1981 to 675 in fiscal year 1998–1999.3 JPAs traditionally have been used to address concerns such as insurance, public finance, and public facilities such as parks. However, a number of recent high-profile JPAs have also dealt with transportation, land use, and environmental matters. These include JPAs established to administer NCCP plans in Riverside and Orange Counties, and the Alameda Corridor, a $2 billion truck-and-rail infrastructure project that will connect the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach with rail yards in downtown Los Angeles (Fulton et al., 2000b). According to Fulton Increasingly, local governments are finding ways to work together to solve common planning problems—essentially creating ad hoc regional planning policy. . . . Ad hoc regional planning is going on all over the place in the nooks and crannies of local government. The five Southern California governments didn’t wait for a state or regional agency to emerge to deal with transportation ____________ 3From California State Controller’s Office (1982 ). 123 issues; they created a joint-powers authority to run Metrolink, the region’s commuter rail system. Similarly, when Solano County and two of its cities wanted to deal with preservation of farmland and open space . . . they formed a joint-powers authority. . . . There are dozens, maybe hundreds of similar examples. . . . If there is to be a Post-Post-Proposition 13 Era in California planning, this ad hoc regional planning is probably what it will be about (Fulton, 1995, p. 3). The second trend is related to growth-management techniques adopted by local governments and voters. They have increasingly favored techniques to shape future growth and coordinate planning across communities, rather than adopting measures to stave off change. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the most popular growthmanagement techniques employed by local governments were measures to limit density or the size of buildings and to ensure provision of adequate public facilities concurrent with development. By contrast, during the late 1990s, general plan revisions, specific plans, and urban growth boundaries became popular (California Department of Housing and Community Development, 2000).4 By 1998, 95 cities claimed to have enacted an urban growth boundary (UGB), most after 1995 (Commission on Local Governance for the 21st Century, 2000). A well-known coordinated UGB campaign was the Save Open Space and Agricultural Resources (SOAR) initiative, passed by Ventura County voters in 1998. SOAR was the most comprehensive and coordinated set of countywide land use initiatives so far in California. It included a county ballot initiative requiring voter approval for any zoning change affecting agricultural land or other open space as well as urban growth boundary measures in six cities in the county. All the measures passed (Fulton and Sokoloff, 1998). Not all multijurisdictional growth planning has been as cooperative, however. In some cases, JPAs and growth boundaries were established as the outcome of intense conflict. For example, events during the 1990s in the Tri-Valley area on the eastern edge of the San Francisco Bay Area reflect prospects and pitfalls of subregional planning in California. The ____________ 4Specific plans are sets of development standards applied to specific geographical areas, giving cities and developers the ability to plan for large developments. 124 area has been among the fastest-growing parts of the region, with new office parks altering its formerly suburban and rural character. In 1993, four Tri-Valley cities approved the South Livermore Plan following seven years of negotiations. The plan, called “a model of regional cooperation,” covered 400 square miles in the eastern portion of Alameda County. It coordinated urban growth boundaries, directed development away from agricultural land, and required one-to-one mitigation of open space acres preserved for land turned over to new development (Schilling, 1993; also see California Planning and Development Report, 1994). However, disagreements remained. A series of lawsuits led to further negotiations and also the establishment of an innovative cross-county JPA to fund traffic improvements (California Planning and Development Report, 1994; Sokoloff, 1999a; Shigley, 2000b). In 1999, voters defeated three coordinated ballot measures that would have imposed extremely strict voter approval requirements for development decisions. The following year, voters passed a countywide measure—Measure D—that overturned the results of a carefully crafted compromise between Alameda County and the City of Livermore on the city’s expansion plans. The initiative established a tighter growth boundary for the city, preserving at least temporarily as open space the area slated for new development. Environmental groups, dissatisfied with the densities proposed for new development, had placed the measure on the ballot (Shigley, 2000b; Transportation Choices Forum and Urban Ecology, 2000). The series of negotiations, lawsuits, and ballot-box battles that has constituted growth planning for the Tri-Valley area highlights prospects and challenges in today’s planning environment. On the one hand, collaborative planning bore fruit. Today, local governments are increasingly forced to negotiate across jurisdictional borders to retain local control over growth—a reformulation of home rule. However, at various points discontented stakeholders also turned to other mechanisms—the courts and the ballot box in particular—to overturn outcomes they disliked. But even that route could provide only partial 125 victories. For example, Measure D provided only the potential for the environmentalists’ smart-growth alternative to be realized. It is up to governing officials and residents of the City of Livermore—not the environmentalists who fought for Measure D—to decide if higherdensity infill development will actually be built. If it is not, and another community builds the replacement housing at even lower densities than those proposed for Livermore, proponents of Measure D may have won a Pyrrhic victory. The case highlights a fundamental weakness in subregional growthmanagement strategies in the state today. Such efforts cannot substitute for land use planning at a metropolitan scale. For example, regionwide urban growth boundaries such as those established in Portland, Oregon, in 1979 worked to funnel development into the urban core because no alternative was possible. However, that is not the case for urban growth boundaries passed on a piecemeal basis within California metropolitan areas. Without a regional growth boundary and local commitments to build denser infill housing, development may simply be diverted to other parts of the region more willing to accept it. As John Landis noted, The Portland experiment may have succeeded, but the failing of most cities that attempt urban growth boundaries is that they haven’t taken the steps Portland implemented to encourage more development and revitalization within the inner core. . . . There is no evidence that growth will move from rural areas to urban areas because of growth boundaries. . . . If you want to encourage inner-city development, you do things to get people back into the city, like reducing traffic congestion and improving the school system. Portland has done all these things. This [urban growth boundaries] is a new gimmick, and most of these proposals are not going to work because they’re not sufficiently well thought out in the California context (quoted in Weisberg, 1998). Regional Reform in the Major Metropolitan Areas Momentum for reform during the late 1980s and 1990s led to campaigns within regions to strengthen regional agencies. In some ways, the efforts paralleled those two decades earlier, showing that regional reform follows an internal logic reflecting each area’s political and economic character. However, events also reflected a transition from second- to third-wave approaches. 126 The San Francisco Bay Area: A Shift in Approach During the early 1990s, Bay Area reformers led a campaign that was strikingly similar to the one two decades earlier. The similarity reveals the persistence of an uneasy power balance in the region between proregionalist and antiregionalist forces. The sense of regional identity is strong enough to produce repeated calls for stronger institutions, but the area is too diverse and multicentered to facilitate simple solutions. In 1990, a coalition of reform groups convened a blue-ribbon commission called Bay Vision 2020 to study regional governance. Principal conveners were the Bay Area Council (or BAC, an organization of regional businesses such as Chevron and Bank of America), the Greenbelt Alliance, and an informal group of locally elected officials, many from Santa Clara County (Lydon, 1993; Innes et al., 1994). Although the coalition was similar to the one organized during the 1970s, the motives of reformers had changed somewhat since then. By the 1990s, they had become much more deeply involved in local land use planning. Environmentalists were pushing for urban growth boundaries to protect open space, and regional business elites were concerned about affordable housing and other quality-of-life issues affecting their employees. Although during the 1970s many reformers favored establishing strong single-purpose agencies to address particular regional concerns such as mass transit expansion and bay preservation, by the 1990s, they sought to reintegrate the same agencies. The commission produced a report in 1991, which was cast as a legislative bill. It called for merger of three regional agencies (ABAG, MTC, and the air district), more compact development, and the establishment of another commission to develop a long-term plan for presentation to the legislature. Each regional agency that would have been integrated announced its opposition to the merger. Echoing debates two decades earlier, the composition of the proposed temporary body was also highly contentious. The bill was narrowly defeated in 1992. ABAG sponsored a counterproposal, calling for the development of a regional governance proposal with direction limited to sitting officials. This action paralleled ABAG’s response two decades earlier, as it sought to stave off more radical proposals. In efforts to reach compromise, the Bay Vision coalition fell apart. In particular, the BAC 127 and South Bay elected officials opposed compromise because ABAG’s bill envisioned no agency consolidation and retained a form of representation that appeared to favor sparsely populated areas. As the Bay Vision coalition fragmented, support for ABAG’s bill also faded in Sacramento (Lydon, 1993; Innes et al., 1994; Weinstein, 1994). The Bay Vision campaign was a reiteration of the second-wave approach to reform, and it met with the same fate in the 1990s as it had in the 1970s. This time, opposition from Southern California could not be blamed. Rather, the effort failed because of continuing resistance to reforms calling for institutional change. After Bay Vision’s failure, the reformers altered their tactics, shifting to a third-wave approach. They attempted to achieve reform goals through existing institutions, rather than by altering them. This made reform goals the focus, rather than political power struggles. For example, the Greenbelt Alliance helped organize UGB campaigns in neighboring cities, efforts that were especially successful in Santa Clara, Sonoma, and Contra Costa Counties (Fulton, 1996b). The Bay Area Council helped organize the Bay Area Alliance for Sustainable Development, an ambitious “collaborative regional initiative” that is developing regional smart-growth land use scenarios through public outreach. In addition, the alliance is developing a Community Capital Investment Initiative to link economic development in poor neighborhoods with smart-growth planning (Wegener, 2001). The Los Angeles Area: Centrifugal Forces Events in the Los Angeles area during the early 1990s also repeated earlier patterns: Regionalism at the metropolitan scale was strengthened more by external mandates than from within. Single-purpose regional planning agencies were strengthened more than multipurpose ones. The third-wave approach emerged at the subregional level, reflecting the region’s decentralized character. The Southern California Association of Governments has been a prime example of the governance dilemmas faced by many COGs. By the early 1990s, the organization had been boycotted at one time or another by about 20 percent of its potential local government members (Feldman, 1991). Powerful Orange County was a particularly vocal 128 opponent, having tried a number of times to secede (Fulton, 1992b, 1993a, 1997a). By the early 1990s, the negative consequences of growth— particularly environmental problems—began to catch up with the region. Stiffer air quality mandates turned the Southern California Air Quality Management District into a powerful organization, and they also should have strengthened SCAG. As the region’s designated MPO, SCAG was responsible for ensuring conformity of transportation and air quality plans. However, efforts to coordinate land use, transportation, and air planning led to a “difficult negotiating relationship” between the two agencies (Grant, 1995, p. 89). SCAQMD’s attempt to enforce local government compliance with traffic reduction measures was curtailed after it met stiff resistance. ISTEA also should have strengthened SCAG, but that outcome was undermined when state enabling legislation required suballocation of federal funds to the county transportation commissions. SCAG’s power therefore still amounted primarily to its ability to veto local projects, which was rarely exercised (Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 1993; Lewis and Sprague, 1997). County transportation agencies grew far more powerful, bolstered by new ISTEA funding and local sales tax revenue earmarked for construction of rail transit and other projects. For example, the budget of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) grew to over $1 billion a year by the early 1990s, making it the region’s biggest player in terms of autonomy and resources (Fulton, 1992b; Innes et al., 1994). SCAG leaders made the most of the policy window that opened statewide in the late 1980s for enhanced regional planning, attempting to strengthen the mandate of the organization. A proposal was put forward in the spring of 1990 to merge SCAG, the air district, and other planning agencies. The new agency would be run by a legislative-style council, with half its members elected by the public. It would develop a regional comprehensive plan that all local governments would have to follow. SCAG’s membership approved the concept in 1991 (Saltzstein, 1996; Fulton, 1997a; Innes et al., 1994). Soon after, the political winds began to shift. As state-level growthmanagement reform proposals withered in the face of the worsening 129 recession, Orange County remounted efforts to secede from SCAG. SCAG’s leadership retreated from its proposal, calling instead for a tripling of the size of the board of directors to 70 members and for new subregional planning bodies. The planning structure was formally devolved to 14 subregional councils.5 A regional comprehensive plan was approved in 1994, but local opposition ensured that the sections not mandated by law would not be binding (Fulton, 1997a). Thus, centrifugal forces proved too powerful to overcome. This repeated events two decades earlier. The main result of the reform phase was to strengthen single-purpose agencies and subregional planning within SCAG. As William Fulton noted, While SCAG has struggled to define itself, a regional planning structure has grown up around it. . . . The truth is that regional planning in Southern California has become a floating crap game. It’s not controlled by SCAG or any other single agency. Rather it is centered—if that is the word—in scattered meetings and negotiations and skirmishes that occur over this 100 square mile region. It’s not quite what the advocates of metropolitan planning had in mind back in the sixties but in the long run this free-floating system may prove workable for such a fragmented region (Fulton, 1992b, p. 13). The Riverside County Integrated Plan: A Model for CountyBased Planning Integration Third-wave reforms emerged in the Los Angeles area at the subregional level. One particularly strong example is the Riverside County Integrated Plan (RCIP). This three-year county-led local planning process, estimated to be the most expensive in California history, is considered a national model for integrated planning. Begun in 1999, the RCIP integrates an update of the county’s general plan for land use with development of an NCCP plan and a long-term transportation corridor investment plan. The RCIP probably would never have happened if not for the NCCP. Habitat preservation, in particular for the kangaroo rat, had been the subject of costly legal battles in the county during the 1980s and 1990s. One of the fastestgrowing counties in the nation, Riverside County is expected to double ____________ 5Four of the subregional councils are coterminous with county boundaries, whereas Riverside County is divided into two parts and Los Angeles County into nine. 130 in population over the next 20 years as development continues to spill from neighboring Orange and Los Angeles Counties. The pressure to develop a preemptive approach to habitat preservation prompted the extensive new effort to combine long-term land use, transportation, and habitat planning into one unified blueprint for growth (Fulton, 2000b; Verdin, 2000; Soto, 1999, 2000; Drummer, 1999). A strength of the model is that it builds on and integrates existing planning capacity at the county level, especially the devolution of authority in transportation and environmental planning. “The way land use planning and habitat planning occurred in the past is, you come up with the land use plan. And after that, oh, by the way, we’ll need to do some transportation planning. And everything left over is open space, so that’s habitat,” according to the head of the county’s transportation and land management agency (Shigley, 2002a). The RCIP, by contrast, starts by considering how land use can be oriented to the county’s transportation and environmental needs. Through use of incentives such as waiver of development fees and permission to build at higher densities, the program aims to steer high-density growth to designated transitoriented areas, while at the same time setting other land aside as open space or habitat (Sanchez, 2002). The RCIP is a model for planning integration using counties as the framework. The county forms the organizational scale in which the goals and commitments of various levels of government and planning agencies coalesce. The RCIP is an alliance of ten local, state, and federal agencies and involves environmental groups, property owners, business associations, farmers, and local officials. It engages residents through community meetings, surveys, focus groups, and public hearings. Given the state’s political traditions, this may be one of the most viable ways to strengthen subregional comprehensive planning. The director of the state’s Housing and Community Development Department voiced this viewpoint, noting that “Riverside County has brought the development community, the public, the transportation and the environmental communities to the table. . . . That process . . . should have enormous potential for becoming a model for the state” (The Planning Report, 2001a). 131 The RCIP could be a model for other counties even where the NCCP “stick” hasn’t forced action. For example, local governments in Santa Clara and Ventura Counties have also developed more coordinated transportation, land use, and open space policies. Furthermore, as urban growth puts pressure on natural habitat in areas such as the Central Valley and the Sierra foothills, habitat planning—and the broader imperative to reconcile environmental and economic development goals—has become necessary there as well. However, there are also weaknesses in the RCIP model. In particular, the county-led RCIP process cannot force city governments to comply with its goals. In Riverside County, where there is still a lot of unincorporated land, the county government plays a critical role in land use planning. This helps explain why the RCIP process was organized in the first place. However, in more fully developed urbanized counties, city land use planning decisions are far more influential relative to the county’s role. The governance challenge is different as a result; it depends primarily on establishing agreement among separate, independent cities. Another weakness of the RCIP model is the arbitrariness of county boundaries in relation to regional planning concerns. Many regional systems do not conform to existing political boundaries. This is evident in Riverside County itself, where concerns among communities on the western side are quite different from those in the less-developed eastern portion, and where many growth-related problems reflect larger regional issues. Thus, the very strength of the RCIP—that it relies on existing political institutions—is also a weakness. The San Diego Area: Testing the Limits of Collaboration No metropolitan area in the state has gone further than the San Diego area in attempting to implement fundamental reforms to its regional planning system. Political coherence has promoted collaboration, making the voluntary model more viable as a basis for reform than elsewhere in the state. However, growth problems have become so acute that reformers have sought more far-reaching changes. Because it works within a single-county metropolitan area, SANDAG combines the functions of COG, MPO, county congestion 132 management agency, and RTPA, among others. In addition, SANDAG oversees allocation of revenue from a county transportation sales tax measure passed in 1987. Therefore, SANDAG was the sole beneficiary of the new authority over transportation funding provided by state and federal programs in the early 1990s. The tension that has emerged elsewhere between county and regional planning needs does not surface in the San Diego area. By the late 1980s, the region faced severe growth pressures. Unlike other regions in the state, the San Diego area has inflexible borders on all sides (both natural and political), which make it more difficult for growth to sprawl in all directions. The county population had grown by 34 percent during the decade. Local governments were becoming concerned that the state government on the one hand, or angry citizens on the other, would force inflexible regional planning requirements on them (Innes et al., 1994). In response, local governments organized a voluntary process to develop a comprehensive regional development plan, a process that continued to evolve throughout the following decade. The county board of supervisors placed Proposition C on the ballot in 1988, calling for establishment of a Regional Planning and Growth Management Review Board to develop and manage a regional plan and program. The measure passed, and a blue ribbon panel designated SANDAG as the review board. SANDAG members agreed to “selfcertify” the consistency of pertinent elements of their general plans with the goals of the regional plan. Through a kind of cross-acceptance policy, they would present their plans to the regional board for comment and approval (Porter, 1997). The SANDAG board ratified the Regional Growth Management Strategy in 1993. However, self-certification with plan elements proved difficult in practice. In 1998, SANDAG called instead for a periodic staff-produced regional “report card” to assess progress. The growthmanagement plan was consolidated into five elements. Although some were passed by the SANDAG board, housing and land use policies proved problematic. A smart-growth land use scenario, considered consistent with the 1993 Regional Growth Management Strategy, was incorporated into planning assumptions for SANDAG’s 2000 long-range transportation plan. However, current land use plans and policies in the 133 region were characterized as generally inconsistent because of the low density of planned development. They were predicted to result in all developable land in the region being consumed within 20 years. This inconsistency between SANDAG planning assumptions and local land use policies was not resolved (San Diego Association of Governments, 1998, 1999, 2000; Weisberg, 1999; Arner, 1999; Downey, 2001a). By the late 1990s, growth problems had worsened in the region. Fewer than one-quarter of households in San Diego county could afford to purchase the median-priced home, and rush hour congestion ranked fifth worst in the nation (San Diego Union-Tribune, 2001). The San Diego Airport was projected to run out of capacity within a decade. These concerns raised a set of interrelated questions about expanding an integrated multimodal transportation system through greater reliance on rail. But in turn, rail expansion was viewed as inefficient without changes in local land use practices to encourage more transit-oriented development (Gallegos, 1999; Peace, 1999a, 1999b). Governance arrangements were criticized. For example, San Diego Dialogue, a binational consortium of political, academic, and business leaders, released an influential report in 1999 that blamed inadequate infrastructure—particularly the lack of a regional airport—for the loss of billions of dollars in trade annually. It also blamed governmental fragmentation on both sides of the border for undermining economic competitiveness (Erie, 1999). Work by San Diego Dialogue over the 1990s reinforced the idea that San Diego and Tijuana are strategically placed, if they unite, to become “one of the first truly international information regions, a city-state of the future” (Gross, 1995). Increasing media recognition of binational economic interdependency promoted awareness of metropolitan planning concerns—rather than a focus on existing political boundaries. With the City and County of San Diego embarking on updates of their general plans, the time was ripe for an “explosion” of the regional planning issue into the political arena (Morgan, 1999). As in the Bay Area during the 1960s, the need to establish a more coordinated regional transportation system sparked a broader debate about regional governance. As one local news commentator put it, “San Diego is being 134 studied now from inside and out; many sense an exquisite moment at hand for a city that hasn’t lost its chance to get it right” (Morgan, 1999). In 1999, State Senator Steve Peace launched an intensive three-year debate on regional governance when he introduced a bill in the state legislature to create a new regional agency that would subsume six existing agencies and be governed by a directly elected board. Many of the agencies that would have been merged protested the proposal. In 2000, state legislation created the Regional Government Efficiency Commission, or RGEC, to draft a plan for improving regional coordination.6 The most contentious issues in RGEC deliberations concerned agency consolidation, the governing structure of the new regional agency, and land use authority. The governance issues echoed earlier debates in the San Francisco Bay Area: Should regional planning be placed under the authority of an agency with directly elected representatives or should it remain under the COG governing model of one-city, one-vote? The pressure for land use reform had reached a higher pitch in the San Diego area, however, because of the pressing need to expand the airport and pending proposals for transit and accompanying residential development. San Diego’s mayor advocated a stronger regional transportation authority to help implement the city’s proposed new general plan calling for a “city of villages” based on compact, transit-oriented development. The city’s plan depends on new transit investment and residential development connected to it (LaVelle, 2001; The Planning Report, 2001b; Parks, 2001). The process also reflected factors that prompted the Riverside County Integrated Plan. In both cases, the need for substantial new transportation investment, combined with pressure to reconcile habitat preservation and residential development, created momentum for planning integration within the framework of enhanced county-level authority. San Diego area leaders have considered using an extension of the local half-cent transportation sales tax as a source not only for ____________ 6For more on the evolution of regional proposals during the period, see San Diego Dialogue (2000a, 2000b); Zion (2000); Lavelle (2000); LaVelle (2001); Downey (2001c, 2002a, 2002c); and Zion (2001). 135 transportation improvements but also for habitat and stormwater programs. This would present voters with an integrated set of regional environmental, transportation, and land use objectives (California Center for Regional Leadership, 2000; Downey, 2002b). The RGEC debates revealed dissatisfaction with voluntary arrangements. According to one RGEC consultant, “There is a feeling that SANDAG may be the best COG in the country, but we deserve better. We need something with some teeth” (Shigley, 2001b). However, they also reflected SANDAG’s success. According to Charles Nathanson, executive director of San Diego Dialogue, “We might be able to demonstrate that tying regional transportation planning and land use together isn’t such a scary thing for local jurisdictions. I think SANDAG has established a pattern of negotiation with local jurisdictions over the last 15 years that has laid the basis for a real bottoms-up conversation . . . without having to sacrifice a strong regional perspective” (The Planning Report, 2001b). The RGEC process highlighted classic tensions about democracy and home rule. News coverage contrasted arguments for “one-person, onevote” legal principles with arguments for home rule, especially from smaller cities that feared they would be overwhelmed by a “nonresponsive mega-government” (Emery, 2001). The traditional tension in transportation planning between regional objectives and geographic equity was also evident. For example, officials from northern cities in the county objected that a stronger agency might abuse authority over transportation funds currently allocated on a geographic basis. “This is our pot of money,” said one (Downey, 2001). The final RGEC proposal, released in 2001, called for two new authorities. One would govern airport expansion and operation, with an appointed board given the ability to override local objections. The state legislature and the governor approved this proposal, but the second one raised more protest. It called for establishment of a new transportation and land use agency, to assume SANDAG’s role and new powers including eminent domain over “regionally significant” transportation projects, and the ability to manipulate distribution of transportation funds to promote compliance with a regional transportation, housing, 136 and land use plan. It would be run by an 11-member board, eight of whom would be elected from proportional districts. Fierce debates continued through 2002 as bills to implement the RGEC proposal made their way through the state legislature. North county cities objected to ceding local land use authority to an agency with a directly elected board, and the county board of supervisors fought equally hard for a transportation agency with an elected board. Ultimately, an acceptable compromise boiled down to two options: agreement to hold a public election on what form the board structure would take or agreement to scale back the consolidation of agencies (Downey, 2002d). In the end, participants agreed to scale back the proposal. The elements that would have given SANDAG the ability to override local opposition to unwanted transportation projects, to implement a regional comprehensive plan, and to merge with a border infrastructure agency were eliminated. The final bill, signed by the governor in September 2002, was considerably less ambitious than the original vision. It transferred planning responsibilities from the county’s two transit agencies to SANDAG and altered its governing arrangements, providing an additional vote to the City of San Diego and requiring populationweighted votes in addition to the traditional jurisdiction-based voting scheme (Downey, 2002d, 2002e). Meanwhile, SANDAG began formulating a Regional Comprehensive Plan to include an integrated regional infrastructure financing strategy that would identify regional priorities and could serve as the basis for allocating funds to jurisdictions that complied with its provisions (San Diego Association of Governments, 2002). Throughout the past decade, SANDAG evolved a third-wave approach to regional reform, seeking to integrate not only disparate functional regional plans but also the goals and policies of its member local governments, without undermining their authority. However, many were unsatisfied with the results. As in the Bay Area during the 1970s, transportation concerns provoked a broader dialogue about regional multipurpose planning. Reformers launched an effort to create a stronger multipurpose authority, an approach this report has characterized as second-wave. 137 The three-year debate in the San Diego region repeated patterns seen elsewhere. Reformers faced a similar tradeoff between strengthening planning scope and accountability. San Diego’s new airport authority— like MTC in the Bay Area—was established along single-purpose lines so that more concerted authority could be applied to pressing concerns. The broader goal of reorienting general land use policy to regional transportation and environmental needs was much harder to accomplish, however. The RGEC proposals tested whether planning conflicts could be resolved within the framework of the voluntary model—whether SANDAG could evolve into a more authoritative agency. A new approach was envisioned in which SANDAG would use transportation funding—the “big carrot” of regional planning—as leverage to encourage greater coordination across functional planning areas and among local jurisdictions. However, as with Bay Vision 2020, negotiations broke down over governance arrangements. Participants were unable to strike an acceptable balance between two fundamentally different notions of regional governance—a one-government, one-vote basis or a one-person, one-vote basis. A comparison of the RGEC process and Riverside County’s Integrated Plan process is useful in considering models for strengthening regionalism in California. In both cases, more integrated planning has evolved in the framework of enhanced planning authority at the county level. At first blush, the comparative success of the RCIP process might suggest that it is a better model for strengthening regionalism in a systematic way. However, the RCIP reflects the importance of the county government’s role in an area where much land remains unincorporated and no city dominates. It employs existing county authority in a more coordinated way to produce a more integrated county plan. The RCIP may be a good model for planning in parts of the state where county responsibilities are predominant, and perhaps as a building block for planning in multicounty areas, but it does not fully resolve how to coordinate governance among disparate jurisdictions in well-developed metropolitan regions. The RGEC process tackled that question head on, and in that respect it was a better test of methods for solving 138 metropolitan regional problems today. RGEC failed to hammer out a new set of governance arrangements acceptable to all parties, but its attempt to clarify how the COG might use transportation funds as leverage to promote more coordinated planning could serve as a model for other regions. State-Level Reform Efforts By 2000, momentum for planning reform had reached a high pitch in the state legislature. Groups such as the Smart Growth Caucus, organized by 37 assembly and senate members, and the Job-Center Housing Coalition, a statewide coalition of business, development, labor, poverty, and housing groups, promoted bills encouraging infill development, transit-oriented housing, regulatory relief for infill projects, adequate provision of infrastructure for new development, planning law revision, protection of farmland, open space, and natural habitat, and better planning coordination. A legislator-stakeholder working group began meeting in 2001 to hammer out revisions to housing element law. Arguments for smart growth and better regional planning made their way into a number of state-level policy proposals, cutting across seemingly distinct areas from affordable housing to state infrastructure planning and fiscal reform.7 In 2000, the speaker of the California State Assembly, Robert Hertzberg, appointed a Commission on Regionalism to develop “innovative state government policies and strategies that will encourage and support regional collaboration among local governments; and to encourage regional collaboration among local governments and civic, business, and other community organizations, to better enable our governments and our citizens to address California’s major economic, social, and environmental challenges in the years ahead.”8 In early 2002, the commission released its final report. It advocated a long-term ____________ 7See, for example, California State Treasurer (1999), Commission on Local Governance for the 21st Century (2000), Speaker’s Commission on State and Local Government Finance (2000), California Commission on Building for the 21st Century (2002), and Little Hoover Commission (2002). 8Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism (2000). 139 realignment of state programs and policies in a number of areas—from education, economic, and workforce development to environmental, infrastructure, and fiscal policies—to support regional coordination. For example, it called for integration of school and university construction with local planning. The report addressed fiscal issues, recommending a return of ERAF funds and a constitutional amendment to prevent the state from reallocating local property tax revenue for its own purposes. On a regional basis, local governments would be encouraged to adopt tax base sharing and redistribution measures. The report advocated adoption, through a consultation process with regional and local agencies, of clear state planning goals and performance standards. Alignment of state, regional, and local investments and programs was proposed through collaboratively designed regional plans. Adopted regional plans should then enable voters to approve general bonds for capital purposes, and tax increases for specific purposes, by a 55 percent majority. This mechanism would establish a regional finance base—a measure of “regional home rule”—for infrastructure purposes and to reallocate unequally shared cost burdens. Flexible support for performance-based regional planning compacts was also advocated to address various concerns. Conclusion By the time the Commission on Regionalism’s report was released, the state’s electricity crisis, security concerns, and an economic downturn had diverted attention and produced a severe budget shortfall. It appeared that the commission’s proposals might fall prey to the same cycle of boom and bust that spelled defeat a decade earlier. However, some things had changed since the last reform cycle. During the early 2000s, lawmakers were not reacting to a surge of local ballot-box measures. Rather, there was a convergence of state and local concerns regarding infrastructure, housing, and fiscal reform that served to justify stronger regional coordination. Second, new collaborative planning models had emerged during the decade, such as the RCIP and the NCCP, which might provide a basis for further reform. The emergence of these models during the decade stood in 140 contrast to the continuing failure of second-wave efforts that attempted to alter governance structures. These factors help explain why the Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism promoted a range of policy measures and flexible support for collaborative regional compacts rather than a systematic set of new institutional mandates. The commission’s institutional approach—realignment of state, regional, and local policies through flexible, collaborative arrangements—reflected the emergence of the third wave at the state level. First, it reflected growing frustration with policy gridlock and fragmentation. Realignment could help resolve the state-local fiscal impasse while also addressing the need for more strategic infrastructure investment and environmental planning. Second, it took heed of pitfalls that had plagued earlier reform efforts. During the early 1990s, legislative proposals to impose stiff regional planning mandates had been rejected as too interventionist, but other proposals relying on increased spending for incentives to obtain local compliance with state planning goals also failed because of fiscal constraint. Reforms that realign existing programs and resources to benefit all parties have been more successful. The state gained experience with such models during the 1990s through programs such as the NCCP and the RCIP. Because of these new developments, the economic downturn of the early 2000s did not prevent the state from moving incrementally toward better planning coordination. Debates about growth-management issues—housing in particular—continued throughout the 2001–2002 legislative session. In September 2002, the governor signed a bill (AB 857) resurrecting the requirement passed in 1970 for the governor’s planning office to develop a comprehensive state land use policy and prepare a periodic “Environmental Goals and Policy Report” for submission to the legislature. The provisions were meshed with the mandate established in 1999 for the governor to submit an annual fiveyear capital improvement plan to promote more coordinated state investment planning. State agencies were required to develop consistent planning and spending priorities based on a set of smart-growth principles, including promoting infill development, protecting environmental and agricultural resources, and encouraging efficient development patterns. By beginning to reintegrate its own programs and 141 policies, the state government took a critical—though only preliminary—step toward reintegrating regional growth management planning in California. 142 8. Assessing the Third Wave The history of regional planning for growth management in California points to a few main conclusions. In spite of all the changes in California during the last century, the fundamental goals of regional reformers have remained unchanged. They have sought to achieve two sometimes interrelated goals: to make regional planning and governance both more efficient and more equitable. The most far-reaching reforms have attempted to establish decisionmaking institutions at the metropolitan scale that embody key aspects of general-purpose government—policy breadth and coherence, regional focus, and public accountability. However, the obstacles to regionalism have been as persistent as the goals. The recurrence of similar concerns and proposed reforms over decades of change reflects a set of continuing challenges. One is how to balance tradeoffs between local control and policy action at a wider scale, or as one author put it, how to reconcile “imperial dreams and parochial desires” (Teaford, 1979, p. 105). Another is how best to respond to complexity and change. Metropolitan areas change so rapidly, and their planning problems are so complex, that governments have a hard time keeping up. Although fundamental challenges persist, the solutions must always evolve. Regional planning tests government’s ability to adapt to economic and social change. As urban conditions change, so do policy strategies. California’s third wave of regional reform articulates a new variation on traditional themes in its approach. It emphasizes policy integration and consensus-building, and it de-emphasizes new procedural or regulatory requirements. What accounts for the shift? Weaknesses in the planning system have become more visible after two decades of fiscal constraint, rapid growth, and pressure on natural resources. Increasingly, planning problems spill across borders—both local government borders 143 and the functional policy borders of single-purpose planning agencies. Recognition of the inadequacy of fragmented, single-purpose regional planning has come from within the system itself; the new transportation and environmental programs of the 1990s seek better policy integration to achieve their own goals. Today’s reformers face challenges similar to those faced by Progressive Era leaders, who viewed their system of government as increasingly dysfunctional in its response to economic development needs. Whereas Progressives advocated that city governments be empowered, today’s reformers seek “regional home rule,” or the ability of metropolitan regions to marshal resources in a more coordinated way to respond to rising global economic competition. This goal explains why today’s reformers place so much emphasis on policy integration. They are attempting to change the scale at which policy coherence and accountability are framed. Smart-growth policies attempt to substitute a regional view for a local or even a statewide lens on policy outcomes. Continuing resistance to reforms that alter governmental arrangements also leads reformers to stress policy goals rather than new procedural requirements or a redistribution of authority. Traditionally, the opponents of strong regional planning capacity have outnumbered the constituencies that favor it. Today, however, a nexus of policy concerns may alter this equation. As momentum builds for action to address growth-related problems, reformers seek compromises that avoid traditional standoffs. New collaborative models such as the NCCP and the RCIP rely on the promise of mutual gains to involve different levels of government, as well as private interest groups, in complex integrated planning efforts. New models are changing the nature of collaboration. In the past, collaboration often emphasized procedural more than policy coordination. COGs, MPOs, RTPAs, and LAFCOs all reflected this emphasis, for example. This planning style reflects the inheritance of the Progressive Era—the centrality of cities in growth management. Even as the state and federal governments came to dominate regional planning for certain functional concerns, this was organized in a service-oriented way to facilitate local growth prerogatives. Coordination was encouraged 144 among cities to ensure a more orderly process, but individual cities were generally left to define and pursue their own development goals. As regional needs have taken greater precedence, the needs of cities are no longer the starting place for growth policy. Now governments and functional agencies are encouraged to use regional—or subregional—needs as a basis for coordinating more integrated plans. Regional planning is becoming more than merely an interface between federal, state, and local concerns through efforts to define policies with comprehensive objectives. An important aspect of the third-wave planning framework is the greater authority that has emerged at the county level. This new framework represents a compromise between evolution and devolution through existing governance arrangements. Through programs such as the NCCP, SB 45, and county transportation sales tax measures, counties are increasing the scale within which more integrated plans are being devised. The RCIP and SANDAG provide clear evidence of this process evolving in two very different contexts. Collaborative Regional Planning: The Future of Regionalism in California? Although the third wave has extended collaborative models in new directions, collaborative planning is hardly a new idea in California. In fact, it has been the default method for decades for multipurpose regional planning. Will collaboration be enough? Collaborative planning is well suited in many ways to the needs of the state. The decreased emphasis on new administrative authority and regulation is an advantage. Momentum for regional planning reform has been blunted for decades because of resistance to increasing state control or to establishing a new layer of government that would undermine local control. Reform efforts that do not get mired in conflicts about details of new governance arrangements could be essential. A collaborative framework for state support of regional planning may be better suited to accommodate regional differences. An obstacle to regionalism in California has been the very strength and diversity of the state’s regions themselves, which has made it difficult to apply any one- 145 size-fits-all model. Institutional flexibility is important not just because it is more politically palatable. The historical problem of regional governance is fundamentally related to shifting boundaries. Metropolitan areas will always change more rapidly, and new planning problems arise more quickly, than jurisdictional borders can be reconfigured to keep up. The proper scale at which to address different functional problems also varies. Many planning problems are hard to capture within the borders of existing jurisdictions and they require flexible subregional and even superregional institutional configurations. For these reasons, institutional flexibility is a necessary component in any state effort to promote effective regional planning. The strongest advertisement for collaborative planning in California may be that it forms the basis for promising initiatives emerging across the state today. Regional coordination on a collaborative basis is occurring in very diverse areas with very different concerns. Thus, for a number of reasons, collaborative planning may be the best practical way to enhance regionalism in California today. Therefore, it is critical to assess its strengths and weaknesses to consider how it can be supported effectively. What does California’s experience with collaborative planning indicate? Most purely voluntary collaborative initiatives in California have been organized at a subregional level. Purely voluntary efforts tend to emerge among local governments and community leaders with close ties and common concerns. Intergovernmental initiatives have been most effective where the multijurisdictional nature of a planning problem was unavoidable and unmistakable, for example, in the case of a transportation corridor or a watershed. A shared set of clear policy objectives was also essential. Either participants sought mutual benefits in relation to a shared resource such as a transportation corridor, or a policy mandate provided the planning focus, for example, in the case of watershed restoration or habitat preservation. Collaborative initiatives have relied on the promise of mutual gains to be achieved through cooperation. These gains have generally taken the form of greater planning certainty for participants and cost savings through more efficient use of resources. Various current planning debates indicate potential for further gains of this kind. For example, 146 negotiations at the state level during the early 1990s suggested that environmentalists might have been willing to trade an easing of CEQA regulations in designated areas in exchange for firmer commitments to preservation of open space and natural habitat. However, in the absence of clear state growth goals and a regional planning framework in which to address such tradeoffs, environmentalists and developers have remained at a standoff over CEQA reform. Integrated planning initiatives indicate that planning certainty can be a difficult goal to attain, however. In a number of cases—air quality management, the NCCP, and CALFED, for example—this became a matter of considerable conflict. To guarantee certainty to one party, another was called on to absorb the cost of future uncertainty. In some cases, the government may be able to commit to absorb future unpredicted costs. However, in others, the inability to predict future conditions—for example, because of the lack of adequate scientific methods—makes it difficult to establish a basis for negotiation. Voluntary collaboration has long proved to be more difficult as a means for solving complex planning problems across large metropolitan areas and in situations in which deep conflicts existed and no basis for cooperation was established.1 The difficulty in resolving deep-seated conflicts through a collaborative approach is revealed in standoffs over LULUs such as airport expansion and the siting of toxic waste facilities. However, the toxic waste case indicates that local governments are able to resolve differences when faced with the threat of state preemption of their own control over siting decisions. The fair share approach adopted in the toxic waste case could be a model for other similar planning concerns. The difficulty in adopting and implementing complex, multifunctional plans through voluntary collaboration is evident in the history of the state’s COGs. Even in the state’s most politically coherent metropolitan area—the San Diego area—recent debates indicate high levels of frustration with voluntarism, and the outcome of the RGEC process reveals the limits of the model for resolving deep-seated conflicts. ____________ 1This discussion was informed by Fulton et al. (2000b). 147 In multicounty areas, collaborative approaches have been somewhat ineffective even in planning for single-function concerns. For example, the state’s multicounty MPOs have found it difficult to achieve regional focus, often because counties perceive their interests differently. Similarly, the state’s attempt to establish multicounty bioregional councils for habitat preservation during the early 1990s failed, even though smaller-scale watershed and habitat planning has flourished. Finally, collaborative models have worked better for policy formulation than for implementation. The rise of traditional conflicts after the CALFED proposal was taken to the state and federal legislatures, and the difficulty in reconciling bottom-up and top-down watershed planning, point to the limits of collaborative models as mechanisms for policy adoption and implementation. A comparison of collaborative initiatives across different functional planning areas highlights important considerations. Collaboration appears to work best in conjunction with clear policy mandates in relation to public goods that are difficult to divide among different parties. For example, environmental regulations establish precise, healthrelated standards for air and water quality. These provide a focus for regional planning to attain the standards. Air basins and water bodies are indivisible, in the sense that environmental standards must be achieved for their entirety, rather than for component parts. With clear policy mandates and indivisible public goods, implementation may be approached effectively through collaborative methods. Transportation planning has lacked the same clarity and precision in its policy objectives and has also lacked regional focus as a result. As a public good, transportation is characterized to a greater degree by its divisibility. Funds have been allocated on the basis of geographical equity as often as they have been allocated to meet regionally defined objectives. These observations suggest that in relation to distributional goods such as transportation, the tug-of-war between local and regional costs and benefits may be especially hard to resolve. Clear policy objectives and funding geared to regional needs as well as geographic equity may be essential for achieving regional planning focus. Land use is the policy area in which regional priorities and policies have been hardest to define and implement, reflecting the tradition of 148 local control over this policy area. Collaborative land use initiatives such as the NCCP and coordinated urban growth boundaries indicate that local governments are sometimes willing to trade a measure of autonomy to increase control when planning problems cross boundaries and require coordinated solutions. However, these initiatives have generally been limited to smaller areas or only to certain concerns such as habitat preservation. As a result, they have provided only partial solutions to larger planning problems. The state’s influence over land use policy is key, because federal mandates play a smaller role. Even when the state adopts a laissez-faire approach, it plays a central role in influencing land use outcomes, because the state government establishes the combination of mandates and incentives that guide local land use choices and encourage or preclude regional collaboration. The affordable housing crisis brought to light the effects of de facto state land use policy, calling into question the lack of coordination and consistency among state regulations and incentives. The state government has begun to adopt a stronger role in defining land use policy goals, through programs such as the NCCP, watershed regulations, LAFCO reform, enforcement of RHNA requirements, and water concurrency requirements.2 However, resolution of the state’s housing problems may require a more systematic approach. The State’s Role in Regional Planning Emerging regional initiatives in California demonstrate that planning reform is possible through existing institutions. But without stronger support from the state, the most far-reaching efforts such as the RCIP are likely to remain the exception rather than the rule. Planning integration is likely to remain limited to subregional areas and narrower sets of concerns.3 ____________ 2In 2001, a bill was signed into law requiring that local governments include proof of adequate water supply as a condition of approving housing projects with 500 or more residential units. 3Many of the following proposals are drawn from Teitz et al. (2001). 149 To strengthen regional collaboration, the state government would need to adopt policies with three goals: remove obstacles to cooperation, reorient local and state planning to regional needs, and directly strengthen regional planning mechanisms. The state should seek to ensure that fiscal and other incentives faced by local governments do not provoke damaging competition. Proposals such as a return of property tax revenue to local governments in exchange for a shift back to the state government of sales tax revenue offer a way to reorient incentives without major spending increases. Greater alignment of state growth plans and programs would also remove obstacles to regional coordination. Fragmented, even competing objectives in state plans and policies make regional coordination more difficult. Policies are also required to reorient state and local planning to regional needs. For example, fiscal reforms might condition a return of property tax revenue to local governments on enactment of policies to promote transit-oriented infill development. Transportation funding could be leveraged in a similar fashion. However, such blanket policies might not serve the needs of all regions or localities. To orient state programs to regional needs requires a strategy for defining and implementing regional objectives, and this should not be developed by the state government alone. How can the state strengthen integrated regional planning in a collaborative framework? Any effective measures to strengthen regional planning should seek to promote policy integration, regional focus, and accountability. It is the combination of these elements that has been lacking in most traditional regional planning. Some regional plans, for example for transportation, have lacked regional focus, resembling compendia of local plans and political tradeoffs more than a clear articulation of regional priorities and programs. Even when plans are more focused, they may lack comprehensiveness. For example, regional air quality plans have clear policy objectives but implementation measures have been limited by the inability of air agencies to influence land use decisions. Other more comprehensive regional plans have been rendered less effective because of a lack of accountability. For example, SANDAG’s growth-management plans considered interrelationships among functional areas, but they were 150 largely advisory documents that local governments could choose to ignore. An unfortunate tradeoff has often been evident in reform struggles in the state between planning comprehensiveness on the one hand and regional focus and accountability on the other. In general, California has accommodated functional focus far better than comprehensiveness. Measures to enhance regionalism should seek to avoid this tradeoff. There are two main ways that governments traditionally have been able to combine policy comprehensiveness, focus, and accountability. On the one hand, they have established accountability to voters. Voter preferences guide general-purpose governments through the balancing act of trading off the costs and benefits of different policy goals and program choices. This process enables general-purpose governments and their leaders to combine broad scope and clear focus into coherent visions for the future growth and development of communities. The other way that governments provide policy breadth, focus, and accountability is through mandates. For example, growth-management frameworks established in other states rely on an integrated set of statedefined goals, policies, and programs to guide local and regional planning. Regional public-private collaborative initiatives represent a third way. Through broad planning processes involving various agencies and interest groups, these initiatives hope to articulate coherent regional “visions” for growth and development. These consensus-building efforts may be extremely valuable in helping define policy goals. However, they cannot substitute for the electoral process as a means for holding leaders and policies accountable to democratic principles. The parallel between today’s reformers and Progressive Era leaders points not only to the potential for far-reaching change but also to certain pitfalls that should be avoided. As a number of historians have documented, Progressive leaders often advocated the use of “impartial” appointed boards and commissions as a substitute for what was perceived as a messier and more corrupt electoral process. However, this sometimes led to 151 decisionmaking that lacked public involvement and oversight and, far from being impartial, often reflected business interests most heavily.4 Combining elements of all three approaches—voter accountability, state mandates, and public-private collaboration—may be the best way to bridge the traditional tradeoffs that have debilitated regional planning in the state. Oregon’s experience (discussed in Chapter 5) supports this conclusion. First, the establishment of Metro—the directly elected metropolitan service district established for the Portland area—in the 1970s created a measure of “regional home rule.” Metro’s statutory responsibilities include adoption of regional growth goals and objectives, review and coordination of land use activities, and adoption of various functional plans. Second, a broad coalition of civic and community leaders—a “collaborative regional initiative”—kept up pressure for smartgrowth planning. Third, the state adopted a comprehensive set of growth-management goals, objectives, and standards. Local planning was oriented to regional needs, and regional agencies were given stiff outcome-oriented performance mandates. This confluence of forces produced a major transformation of regional land use and transportation policies in the Portland region during the 1990s (Weitz, 1999; Calthorpe and Fulton, 2000). A framework for regional planning integration could be established based on lessons learned during the 1990s. The Commission on Regionalism advocates “performance-based regional compacts” as a mechanism for aligning federal, state, regional, and local policies. This model would extend the experience gained through programs such as CALFED, the NCCP, and RCIP more systematically and comprehensively. Realignment of state policies could promote more strategic infrastructure investment and environmental planning. Such realignment has been advocated in numerous assessments of the state’s infrastructure needs, and the state’s new requirement for five-year integrated infrastructure investment plans moves in this direction. However, if the state government goes further than simply coordinating its own programs, and also works to reconcile regional and local plans ____________ 4See Pincetl (1999) on this issue. 152 and policies, the effort might also help overcome policy gridlock regarding fiscal and land use planning. This approach to regionalism might overcome pitfalls of past growth-management reform efforts. If the state government uses its own investments as a lever to promote collaboration, the reforms might not fall flat somewhere between providing bigger “carrots” and stronger “sticks.” In the past, proposals for financial incentives to encourage local compliance with state planning objectives often failed because of budget shortfalls, and stiffer regulatory mandates were rejected as too interventionist. Aligning state programs and policies with the outcomes of a collaborative planning process offers a possible third way for the state to promote regionalism through the promise of mutual gains. However, measures would be needed to ground this approach in a coherent and accountable policy framework. One way to insert public accountability would be to provide a greater measure of “regional home rule” by providing some fiscal authority on a regional basis—for example, the power to raise bonds for infrastructure purposes. The Commission on Regionalism advocates this approach for capital expenditures outlined in collaboratively devised regional plans. This would introduce an element of voter accountability in relation to functions for which voters have been more willing to support multijurisdictional approaches. Another way to strengthen accountability would be for the state government to define and enforce regional growth-management objectives for both state and local agencies to achieve—also a recommendation of the Commission on Regionalism. To preserve flexibility, the objectives could be designed as outcome-oriented performance measures rather than as detailed program requirements. This approach may be more attractive to voters and local government officials than one based on new procedural requirements, since it emphasizes problem-solving. An example is Oregon’s transportation planning rule of 1991, which mandated the attainment of specific, numerical objectives for reductions in regional vehicle miles traveled without prescribing the exact measures that local governments and regional agencies were required to undertake. This approach is also central to state programs such as the NCCP. 153 This approach would align well with collaborative models, accommodating their strength—institutional flexibility—but also addressing their weaknesses. Collaborative initiatives have succeeded when they had clear policy objectives, and in many cases, these were imposed externally. Clear objectives are needed to ensure that plans do not merely aggregate state and local political tradeoffs. They are needed to maintain public accountability in relation to flexible and varied institutional models. They are needed as a basis for negotiation among conflicting interests. Especially in relation to multifunction, multicounty planning, clear policy objectives and measurable standards may be the most critical elements that the state government can provide to help achieve comprehensiveness, focus, and accountability through a collaborative framework. As a guide for comprehensive regional planning, a set of interrelated growth-management objectives may be useful. These can help link different planning areas. For example, requiring efficient use of existing infrastructure would require a more careful consideration of the connection between transportation and land use policies. Promoting affordable housing development that supports regional transportation priorities would have a similar effect. Designation of regional growth boundaries and key natural resource areas for protection could help preserve endangered species and valuable open space, and it could also be aligned with policies to streamline regulation for land developers within other designated areas. To give the objectives “teeth,” they would need to be sufficiently detailed to determine the extent to which they were being implemented. This would carve out an affirmative state commitment to growth management in areas of overriding statewide concern. However, the state would need to consider how to accommodate differences among regions in planning priorities. It would also need to provide guidance regarding the relative importance of objectives that may sometimes conflict. One way to reconcile greater state activism with a voluntary implementation framework would be for the state to provide support for collaborative planning without mandating it. It could provide incentives for local projects and plans that conform to collaboratively defined 154 regional priorities. Some incentives, such as priority funding for state infrastructure investments and regulatory streamlining, would not require significant new state funding appropriations. To provide “teeth” for effective planning, the state would also need to ensure that planning is not just undertaken by like-minded governments but rather at the appropriate geographic scale that corresponds to the regional systems in question. Increasingly, counties serve as the new framework for growth-management planning in California. Although there are some arguments in favor of this, a county-based planning system would be inadequate in most parts of the state. Many metropolitan areas are multicounty. In other cases, key regional systems operate at a multicounty scale even if metropolitan areas do not. County-level planning could form a fundamental and logical part of larger regional planning processes. However, it cannot substitute for regional planning in multicounty areas. Furthermore, planning consistency cannot substitute for planning focus at the appropriate scale. Simply requiring consistency between local, county, and regional plans would provide no assurance that regional plans articulate and implement regionally defined objectives. An approach that emphasizes policy objectives would turn the state’s traditional planning model upside down. In general, state planning law has imposed process rather than policy mandates on local governments. The functional, process-oriented planning model made more sense at a time of broad consensus about the wider social goals of planning and at a time when cities were the building blocks of regional growth and development. As that consensus has started to deteriorate, basic questions need to be revisited about what we want from government in relation to metropolitan growth and development. The state government plays a central role in creating the incentives and institutions that guide metropolitan growth planning. In the absence of general-purpose governments operating at a regional scale, state policy action is needed to help balance local concerns with a broader outlook. California does not lack regional planning institutions so much as regional planning, particularly multipurpose planning with a regional focus and public accountability. State reforms should help provide the 155 focus and accountability that has often been missing at a regional scale without sacrificing the institutional flexibility needed in a diverse and rapidly changing place such as California. 156 Appendix A Geographic Jurisdictions and Governance Structures of California Councils of Governments In general, the geographic boundaries of California metropolitan area COGs coincide with the state’s metropolitan areas as defined by the U.S. Census (Census Bureau metropolitan statistical areas, or MSAs, are composed of counties). Only four of California’s metropolitan area COGs are multicounty: the Association of Bay Area Governments, the COG for the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area; the Southern California Association of Governments, the COG for Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Imperial Counties; the Sacramento Area Council of Governments, the COG for El Dorado, Placer, Sacramento, Sutter, Yolo, and Yuba Counties; and the Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments, the COG for Monterey, Santa Cruz, and San Benito Counties. The differences in the composition of COGS and MSAs in California are: Imperial County is included in the Los Angeles area COG but not the Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA); Madera County is included in the Fresno MSA but not in the Fresno County COG; the Monterey Bay Area COG includes San Benito and Santa Cruz Counties, although Santa Cruz County is included in the San Francisco area CMSA, and San Benito County is not in any MSA; and the Sacramento area COG includes two counties that the Census Bureau designates as a separate MSA—Sutter and Yuba. The most common governing structure used by COGs throughout the United States and in California is apportionment on a onegovernment, one-vote basis. However, the structure of COGs varies somewhat on a case-by-case basis. Some California COGs have implemented weighted voting schemes that better address their particular 157 political circumstances. For example, the Council of Fresno Governments requires that proposals be passed by board members representing at least 40 percent of the population and also by a majority of the board members. This scheme balances representation by population and by political jurisdiction. Board members of the San Diego Association of Governments and the Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments may invoke a population-weighted voting scheme, although this occurs rarely. Other California COGs provide additional votes to larger jurisdictions; this is true for the Sacramento Area Council of Governments, for example. The Southern California Association of Governments comes closest to a strictly population-based method for allocating power. Since the early 1990s, SCAG’s council has included one county supervisor from each of five counties, two from Los Angeles County, and 64 members representing districts comprising about 200,000 in population (Lewis and Sprague, 1997). 158 Appendix B Councils of Governments in California Appendix Table B.1 provides names, addresses, contact information, years of establishment, and a description of member jurisdictions for Councils of Governments in California. 159 Table B.1 Councils of Governments in California 160 Council of Government Association of Bay Area Governments Year Established Address 1961 Metro Center, 101 8th St. P.O. Box 2050 Oakland, CA 94607 Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments 1968 445 Reservation Rd., Suite G P.O. Box 809 Marina, CA 93933 Butte County Association of Governments 1969 479-A Oro Damp Blvd. Oroville, CA 95965 Calaveras County Association of Governmentsa 1998 692 Marshall P.O Box 280 San Andreas, CA 95249 Central Sierra Planning Council and Economic Development District 1973 53 W. Bradford Av, Suite 200 Sonora, CA 95370 Coachella Valley Association of Governments 1973 73710 Fred Waring Dr., Suite 200 Palm Desert, CA 92260 Phone/Fax Numbers Phone: (510) 464-7900 Fax: (510) 464-7970 Member Jurisdictions Counties of Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, Sonoma, and 97 cities Phone: (831) 883-3750 Counties of Monterey, Santa Cruz, San Fax: (831) 883-3755 Benito, and 18 cities Phone: (530) 538-6866 Butte County and 5 cities Fax: (530) 538-6868 Phone: (209) 754-2094 Calaveras County and 1 city Fax: (209) 754-2096 Phone: (209) 532-8768 Counties of Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, Fax: (209) 532-7599 Tuolumne, and 7 cities Phone: (760) 346-1127 Riverside County, 10 cities and 2 Indian Fax: (760) 340-5949 tribes Table B.1 (continued) Council of Governments Council of Fresno County Governments Year Established Address 1969 2100 Tulare St., Suite 619 Fresno, CA 93721 Council of San Benito County Governments 1973 3216 Southside Rd., Hollister, CA 95023 Phone/Fax Numbers Member Jurisdictions Phone: (209) 233-4148 Fresno County and 15 cities Fax: (209) 233-9645 Phone: (831) 637-4170 San Benito County and 2 cities Fax: (831) 636-4160 Eastern Sierra Council of Governments 1995 P.O. Box 1609 Mammoth Lakes, CA 93546 Phone: (760) 934-8989 Inyo and Mono Counties and 2 cities Fax: (760) 934-8608 161 Humboldt County Association of Governments Imperial Valley Association of Governments Kern County Council of Governments 1968 1972 1967 235 4th St., Suite F Eureka, CA 95501 940 W. Main St., Suite 208 El Centro, CA 92243 Kress Building, 3rd Floor 1401 19th St., Suite 300 Bakersfield, CA 93301 Phone: (707) 444-8208 Humboldt County and 7 cities Fax: (707) 444-8319 Phone: (760) 339-4290 Imperial County and 7 cities Fax: (760) 352-7876 Phone: (805) 861-2191 Kern County and 11 cities Fax: (805) 324-8215 Kings County Association of Governments 1967 Government Center 1400 W. Lacey Blvd., Bldg.#6 Hanford, CA 93230 Phone: (559) 582-3211 Kings County and 4 cities Fax: (559) 584-8989 Lake County City 1972 160 5th St. Areawide Planning Council Lakeport, CA 95453 Phone: (707) 263-1600 Lake County and 2 cities Fax: (707) 263-1826 Table B.1 (continued) 162 Council of Governments Mendocino Council of Governments Merced County Association of Governments Year Established Address 1972 367 N. State St., Suite 206 Ukiah, CA 95482 1967 369 W. 18th St., Merced, CA 95340 Orange County Council of Governmentsa 1996 600 W. Santa Ana Blvd., Suite 214 Santa Ana, CA 92701 Sacramento Area Council of Governments 1967 3000 S St., Suite 300, Sacramento, CA 95816 San Bernardino Associated Governments San Diego Association of Governments San Joaquin County Council of Governments 1973 1972 1968 472 N. Arrowhead Av. San Bernardino, CA 92401 Wells Fargo Plaza, 401 B St., Suite 800 San Diego, CA 92101 6 S. Eldorado St., Suite 400 Stockton, CA 95202 Phone/Fax Numbers Phone: (707) 463-1859 Fax: (707) 463-2212 Phone: (209) 723-3153 Fax: (209) 723-0322 Member Jurisdictions Mendocino County and 4 cities Merced County and 6 cities Phone: (714) 972-0077 31 cities and 10 single-purpose planning Fax: (714) 972-1816 agencies Phone: (916) 457-2264 Counties of El Dorado, Placer (part), Fax: (916) 457-3299 Sacramento, Sutter, Yolo, Yuba, and 18 cities Phone: (909) 884-8276 San Bernardino County and 24 cities Fax: (909) 885-4407 Phone: (619) 595-5300 San Diego County and 19 cities Fax: (619) 595-5305 Phone: (209) 468-3913 San Joaquin County and 7 cities Fax: (209) 468-1084 Table B.1 (continued) 163 Council of Governments San Luis Obispo Council of Governments Year Established Address 1968 1150 Osos St., Suite 202 San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 San Mateo County Association of Governmentsb 1992 555 County Center, 5th Floor Redwood City, CA 94063 Santa Barbara County Association of Governments 1966 222 E. Anapamu St., Suite 11 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 Sierra Planning Organization and Economic Development District 1969 560 Wall St., Suite F Auburn, CA 95603 Siskiyou Association of Governmental Entities 1972 County Courthouse Annex 311 4th St., P.O. Box 1085, Yreka, CA 96097 Southern California Association of Governments 1965 818 W. 7th St., 12th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 Phone/Fax Numbers Member Jurisdictions Phone: (805) 781-4219 San Luis Obispo County and 7 cities Fax: (805) 781-5703 Phone: (650) 599-1420 San Mateo County and 20 cities Fax: (650) 361-8227 Phone: (805) 568-2546 Santa Barbara County and 7 cities Fax: (805) 568-2947 Phone: (530) 823-4703 Counties of El Dorado (part), Nevada, Fax: (530) 823-4142 Placer (part), Sierra, and 10 cities Phone: (530) 842-8202 Siskiyou County and 9 cities Fax: (530) 842-8211 Phone: (213) 236-1800 Counties of Imperial, Los Angeles, Fax: (213) 236-1825 Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, and 188 cities Table B.1 (continued) 164 Council of Governments Stanislaus Council of Governments Year Established Address 1971 1025 15th St. Modesto, CA 95354 Phone/Fax Numbers Member Jurisdictions Phone: (209) 558-7830 Stanislaus County and 9 cities Fax: (209) 558-7833 Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 1969 308 Dorla Court, Suite 103 P.O. Box 1038 Zephyr Cove, NV 89448 Phone: (775) 588-4547 Fax: (775) 588-4527 Counties of Douglas (part), El Dorado (basin portion), Placer (basin portion), and Washoe (part); Carson City (part), South Lake Tahoe, and Lake Tahoe Watershed Basin Tulare County Association 1971 5961 S. Mooney Blvd. of Governments Visalia, CA 93277 Phone: (559) 733-6291 Tulare County and 8 cities Fax: (559) 730-2653 Ventura Council of Governmentsc 1992 1130 Capri Way Oxnard, CA 93035 Phone: (805) 984-6997 Ventura County and 10 cities Fax: (805) Western Riverside Council of Governmentsa 1989 3880 Lemon St., 3rd Floor Riverside, CA 92501 Phone: (909) 787-7985 Riverside County and 14 cities Fax: (909) 787-7991 SOURCE: COGs, addresses, and membership information are from the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, http://www.calpin.ca.gov/directory/cog.asp. aIndicates a member of the California Association of Councils of Government, www.calcog.org. bEstablishment dates and other information were obtained independently. cA prior organization, the Ventura County Association of Governments, was disbanded in the late 1980s. Appendix C Key to Functional Responsibilities of California Councils of Governments Table C.1 Key to Functional Responsibilities of California Councils of Governments Listed in Appendix Table C.2 Codes for level of responsibility A Officially designated authority B Lead authority C Co-lead authority D Involved Codes for functions MPO Metropolitan Planning Organization RTPA Regional Transportation Planning Agency CMPA Congestion Management Planning Agency RHA Regional Housing Allocation PPR Plan and Project Review (Regional Clearinghouse) ALUC Airport Land Use Commission RHWMP Preparation of Regional Hazardous Waste Management Plan RAQMP Preparation of Regional Air Quality Management Plan RWQCP Preparation of Regional Water Quality Control Plan RSWMP Preparation of Regional Solid Waste Management Plan ED Economic Development FS Financial Services (e.g., Workers Compensation, Pooled Insurance) GIS Data and Information Services CDC Census Data Center SHS Social/Health Services CMR Conflict Mediation/Resolution RA Rideshare Agency STA Sales Tax Authority 165 Table C.2 Functions of Councils of Governments, Metropolitan Planning Organizations, and Regional Transportation Planning Agencies in California Metropolitan Areas 166 Subregional COG/RTPA Southern California Association of Governments Imperial Valley Association of Governmentsa L.A. County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Orange County Council of Governments Orange County Transportation Authoritya San Bernardino Associated Governments Riverside County Transportation Commissiona Coachella Valley Association of Governments Western Riverside Council of Governments Ventura Council of Governmentsa Ventura County Transportation Commission Metropolitan Transportation Commission Association of Bay Area Governments San Mateo County Association of Governmentsa Sacramento Area Council of Governments El Dorado County Transportation Commission Placer County Transportation Planning Agency MPO RTPA CMPA Multicounty COG/MPO Los Angeles Area AA D D Cb A Cb A Cb A Cb A D DD D Cb A San Francisco Bay Area AA A Sacramento Area AA A DA A Function (see key) RHA PPR ALUC RHWMP A AD D DD B D DD D DD C D AA C D D D C AA A A AA A B D RAQMP C D D D D C D D C/Dc C/Dc D C RWQCP C D D A D Table C.2 (continued) 167 Function (see key) Subregional COG/RTPA MPO RTPA CMPA RHA PPR ALUC RHWMP Monterey Bay Area Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments A AA Council of San Benito County Governments A BA Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation Commission AA D Transportation Agency for Monterey Countya AA D B Single-County Metropolitan Area COG/MPO/RTPA Butte County Association of Governments AA AA Council of Fresno County Governmentsd A A A AA Kern Council of Governments A A A AA Merced County Association of Governments A A A AA San Diego Association of Governments A A A A AA San Joaquin County Council of Governments A A A A AA San Luis Obispo Council of Governments AA AD Santa Barbara County Association of Governments A A A A AA Shasta County Regional Transportation Planning Agency A A A DD Stanislaus Area Association of Governments A A A AA Tulare County Association of Governments A A D AA A A D B C RAQMP C D C C C D C C D D C D RWQCP A D Table C.2 (continued) 168 Function (see key) Subregional COG/RTPA RSWMP ED FS GIS CDC SHS CMR RA STA Multicounty COG/MPO Los Angeles Area Southern California Association of Governments D C D C CD B Imperial Valley Association of Governmentsa DD D L.A. County Metropolitan Transportation Authority A Orange County Council of Governments Orange County Transportation Authoritya A San Bernardino Associated Governments DB CA Riverside County Transportation Commissiona BA Coachella Valley Association of Governments B B B B D Western Riverside Council of Governments D A CD Ventura Council of Governmentsa C C Ventura County Transportation Commission DA A DDA San Francisco Bay Area Metropolitan Transportation Commission Association of Bay Area Governments San Mateo County Association of Governmentsa D A AA D D Sacramento Area Sacramento Area Council of Governments El Dorado County Transportation Commission Placer County Transportation Planning Agency BA A D CA D C D C/D Monterey Bay Area Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments Council of San Benito County Governments Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation Commission Transportation Agency for Monterey Countya D AA D D A Table C.2 (continued) 169 Function (see key) RSWMP ED FS GIS CDC SHS CMR RA STA Single-County Metropolitan Area COG/MPO/RTPA Butte County Association of Governments AA A Council of Fresno County Governmentsd CB Kern Council of Governments D AA Merced County Association of Governments A AA AA San Diego Association of Governments DD D AA A A San Joaquin County Council of Governments BA A San Luis Obispo Council of Governments DA Santa Barbara County Association of Governments DA A Shasta County Regional Transportation Planning Agency B Stanislaus Area Association of Governments AD Tulare County Association of Governments DA DA SOURCE: California Association of Councils of Governments for their members. NOTE: Modifications made to RTPA and CMPA status for Merced County Association of Governments, San Bernardino Associated Governments, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and Ventura County Transportation Commission. aInformation obtained through interview. bDesignated as County Transportation Commissions, to participate in preparing Regional Transportation Plans. cCo-lead for federal plan and cooperates in preparation of state plan. dMadera County was added to the Fresno Metropolitan Statistical Area in 1992. Appendix D Transportation Planning Agencies in California Appendix Table D.1 provides names, addresses, contact information, and geographical coverage for the main types of transportation planning agencies in California. 171 Table D.1 Transportation Planning Agencies in California MPO RTPA CMA Agency XX Southern California Association of Governments Counties Covered Los Angeles Area Imperial, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura Address 818 W. 7th St., 12th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 Phone/Fax Phone: (213) 236-1800 Fax: (213) 236-1963 Xa Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Los Angeles One Gateway Plaza Phone: (213) 922-2820 Mail Stop 99-23-02 Fax: (213) 922-2849 Los Angeles, CA 90012-2952 Xa Orange County Orange Transportation Authority 550 S. Main St. Santa Ana, CA 92868 Phone: (714) 560-6282 Fax: (714) 560-5794 172 Xa Riverside County Riverside Transportation Commission 3560 University Ave., Suite 100 Riverside, CA 92501 Phone: (909) 787-7141 Fax: (909) 787-7920 Xa San Bernardino County San Bernardino Transportation Commission, c/o San Bernardino Ass’d Govts. 472 N. Arrowhead Ave. Phone: (909) 884-8276 San Bernardino, CA 92401 Fax: (909) 885-4407 Xa Ventura County Ventura Transportation Commission 950 County Square Dr., Suite 207 Ventura, CA 93003 Phone: (805) 642-1591 Fax: (805) 642-4860 173 Table D.1 (continued) MPO X RTPA CMA Agency Counties Covered Monterey Bay Area Association of Monterey Bay Monterey, Santa Cruz, San Area Governments Benito Address 445 Reservation Rd., Suite G P.O. Box 809 Marina, CA 93933 X X Transportation Agency for Monterey Monterey County 55-B Plaza Circle Salinas, CA 93901 X Council of San Benito San Benito County Governments 3216 Southside Rd. Hollister, CA 95023 X X Santa Cruz County Santa Cruz 1523 Pacific Ave. Regional Transportation Santa Cruz, CA 95060- Commission 3911 Sacramento Area, Lake Tahoe Regions XX Sacramento Area Council Sacramento, Sutter, Yolo, 3000 S St., of Governments Yuba, nonurbanized portions Suite 300 of Placer and El Dorado Sacramento, CA 95816 outside the Tahoe Basin, and 3 cities in Placer (Roseville, Rocklin, and Lincoln) X El Dorado County El Dorado (excluding Tahoe 550 Main St., Suite C Transportation Commission Basin) Placerville, CA 95667 Phone/Fax Phone: (831) 883-3750 Fax: (831) 883-3755 Phone: (831) 775-0903 Fax: (831) 775-0897 Phone: (831) 637-4170 Fax: (831) 636-8746 Phone: (831) 460-3200 Fax: (408) 460-3215 Phone: (916) 457-2264 Fax: (916) 457-3299 Phone: (530) 642-5260 Fax: (530) 642-5266 Table D.1 (continued) MPO RTPA X CMA Agency X Placer County Transportation Planning Agency Counties Covered Placer (excluding Tahoe Basin) X Sacramento Transportation Sacramento Authority Address 550 High St., Suite 107 Auburn, CA 95603 980 9th St., Suite 1780 Sacramento, CA 95814 Phone/Fax Phone: (530) 823-4030 Fax: (530) 823-4036 Phone: (916) 323-0080 Fax: (916) 443-3708 174 X Sutter County Public Works Sutter and Yuba 1160 Civic Center Blvd., Suite D Yuba City, CA 95993 Phone: (530) 822-7450 Fax: (530) 822-7457 X1 X2 1Tahoe Metropolitan Planning Organization, 2Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Portions of El Dorado and 308 Dorla Ct., Suite 103 Placer Counties in the Tahoe P.O. Box 1038 Basin, and Douglas, Washoe, Zephyr Cove, NV 89448 and Carson City, NV Phone: (775) 588-4547 Fax: (775) 588-4527 X Yolo Transportation District Yolo 350 Industrial Way Phone: (530) 661-0816 Woodland, CA 95776 Fax: (530) 661-1732 San Francisco Bay Area XX Metropolitan Transportation Alameda, Contra Costa, Joseph P. Bort Metro Center Phone: (510) 464-7700 Commission Marin, Napa, San Francisco, 101 8th St. Fax: (510) 464-7848 San Mateo, Santa Clara, Oakland, CA 94607-4700 Solano, Sonoma Table D.1 (continued) MPO RTPA CMA Agency X Alameda County CMA Counties Covered Alameda Address Phone/FAX 1333 Broadway, Suite 220 Phone: (510) 836-2560 Oakland, CA 94612 Fax: (510) 836-2185 X Contra Costa Transportation Contra Costa Authority 1340 Treat Blvd., Suite 150 Phone: (925) 938-3970 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Fax: (925) 938-3993 X Marin Public Works/CMA Marin X Napa County Department of Napa Works Civic Center, P.O. Box 4186 Phone: (415) 499-6570 San Rafael, CA 94913-4186 Fax: (415) 499-3799 1195 3rd St., Room 201 Napa, CA 94559-3082 Phone: (707) 253-4351 Fax: (707) 253-4627 175 X San Francisco Transportation Authority/CMA San Francisco 100 Van Ness, 25th Floor Phone: (415) 522-4802 San Francisco, CA 94102 Fax: (415) 522-4829 X San Mateo County San Mateo Association of Governments 555 County Center, 5th Floor Redwood, CA 94063 Phone: (650) 599-1420 Fax: (650) 361-8227 X Santa Clara County Transportation Authority X Solano County Transportation Authority Santa Clara Solano 331 N. First St., Bldg. B Phone: (408) 321-5725 San Jose, CA 95134-1906 Fax: (408) 321-5723 3 333 Sunset Ave., Suite 200 Phone: (707) 422-6491 Suisun City, CA 94585 Fax: (707) 438-0656 Table D.1 (continued) MPO X RTPA X CMA Agency Counties Covered X Sonoma County Sonoma Transportation Authority/CMA Other Metropolitan Areas Butte County Association of Butte Governments X X X Council of Fresno County Fresno Governments X X X Kern Council of Governments Kern Address 2550 Ventura Ave. Santa Rosa, CA 95403 965 Fir St. Chico, CA 95928-6301 2100 Tulare St., Suite 619 Fresno, CA 93721 1401 19th St., Suite 300 Bakersfield, CA 93301 Phone/FAX Phone: (707) 527-1943 Fax: (707) 527-1103 Phone: (530) 879-2468 Fax: (530) 879-2444 Phone: (559) 233-4148 Fax: (559) 233-9645 Phone: (661) 861-2191 Fax: (805) 324-8215 176 X X X Merced County Association Merced of Governments 369 W. 18th St. Merced, CA 95340 Phone: (209) 723-3153 Fax: (209) 723-0322 X X X San Diego Association of San Diego Governments X X X San Joaquin County of San Joaquin Governments Wells Fargo Plaza Phone: (619) 595-5323 401 B St., Suite 800 Fax: (619) 595-5305 San Diego, CA 92101-4287 6 S. El Dorado St., Suite 400 Stockton, CA 95202 Phone: (209) 468-3913 Fax: (209) 468-1084 Table D.1 (continued) MPO RTPA CMA Agency Counties Covered XX San Luis Obispo Council of San Luis Obispo Governments Address Phone/FAS 1150 Osos St., Suite 202 Phone: (805) 781-4219 San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Fax: (805) 781-5703 X X X Santa Barbara County Santa Barbara Association of Governments 222 E. Anapamu St., Phone: (805) 549-3640 Suite 11 Fax: (805) 568-2947 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 XX Shasta County Regional Transportation Planning Agency Shasta 1855 Placer St. Redding, CA 96001 Phone: (530) 225-5654 Fax: (530) 225-5667 177 X X X Stanislaus Council of Governments Stanislaus 900 H Street, Ste. D Modesto, CA 95354 Phone: (209) 558-7830 Fax: (209) 558-7833 X X X Tulare County Association Tulare 5961 South Mooney Blvd. Phone: (559) 733-6291 of Governments/Trans. Visalia, CA 93277 Fax: (559) 730-2653 Plan. Agency Nonmetropolitan Area Counties X Alpine County Local Alpine 50 Diamond Valley Rd. Phone: (530) 694-2140 Transportation Commission Markleeville, CA 96120 Fax: (530) 694-2214 X Amador County Amador Transportation Commission 11400 American Legion Dr., Suite A Jackson, CA 95642 Phone: (209) 267-2282 Fax: (209) 267-1930 Table D.1 (continued) MPO RTPA CMA Agency X Calaveras Council of Governments Counties Covered Calaveras X Colusa County Colusa Transportation Commission Address P.O. Box 280 692 Marshall, Unit A San Andreas, CA 95249 1215 Market St. Colusa, CA 95932 Phone/FAX Phone: (209) 754-2094 Fax: (209) 754-2096 Phone: (530) 458-5186 Fax: (530) 458-2035 X Del Norte Local Del Norte Transportation Commission 508 H St., Suite 1 Phone: (707) 465-3878 Crescent City, CA 95531 Fax: (707) 465-5518 178 X Glenn County Glenn Transportation Commission X Humboldt County Humboldt Association of Governments P.O. Box 1070 Willows, CA 95988 235 4th St., Suite F Eureka, CA 95501 Phone: (530) 934-6530 Fax: (530) 934-6533 Phone: (707) 444-8208 Fax: (707) 444-8319 X Inyo County Local Inyo Transportation Commission Inyo County Courthouse P.O. Drawer Q 168 N. Edwards Independence, CA 93526 Phone: (760) 878-0201 Fax: (760) 878-2001 X Kings County Association of Kings Governments Kings County Govt. Center Phone: (559) 582-3211 1400 W. Lacey Blvd. Fax: (559) 584-8989 Hanford, CA 93230 X Lake County/City Area Lake Planning Council 160 5th St. Lakeport, CA 95453 Phone: (707) 263-1600 Fax: (707) 263-1826 Table D.1 (continued) MPO RTPA CMA Agency Counties Covered X Lassen County Lassen Transportation Commission X Madera County Madera Transportation Commission X Mariposa County Local Mariposa Transportation Commission Address County Admin. Building 707 Nevada St. Susanville, CA 96310 Phone/FAX Phone: (530) 251-8288 Fax: (530) 257-4671 1816 Howard Rd., Suite 8 Madera, CA 93637 Phone: (559) 675-0721 Fax: (559) 675-9328 4639 Ben Hur Rd. Mariposa, CA 95338 (209) 966-5356 179 X Mendocino County Council Mendocino of Governments 367 N. State St., Suite 206 Ukiah, CA 95482 Phone: (707) 463-1859 Fax: (707) 463-2212 X Modoc County Local Modoc Transportation Commission X Mono County Local Mono Transportation Commission X Nevada County Nevada Transportation Commission 202 W. 4th St. Alturas, CA 96101 Phone: (530) 233-6414 Fax: (530) 233-3132 P.O. Box 347 Mammoth Lakes, CA 93546 Phone: (760) 924-5450 Fax: (760) 924-5458 101 Providence Mine Rd., Phone: (530) 265-3202 Ste. 102 Fax: (530) 265-3260 Nevada City, CA 95959 Table D.1 (continued) 180 MPO RTPA CMA Agency Counties Covered X Plumas County Plumas Transportation Commission Address 1834 E. Main St. Quincy, CA 95971 Phone/FAX Phone: (530) 283-6492 Fax: (530) 283-6323 X Sierra County Local Sierra Transportation Commission Courthouse Annex 101 Courthouse Sq. Downieville, CA 95936 Phone: (530) 289-3201 Fax: (530) 289-3620 X Siskiyou County Siskiyou Transportation Commission County Public Works Bldg. Phone: (530) 842-8250 305 Butte St. Fax: (530) 842-8288 Yreka, CA 96097 X Tehama County Tehama Transportation Commission 9380 San Benito Ave. Phone: (530) 385-1462 Gerber, CA 96035-9702 Fax: (530) 385-1189 X Trinity County Trinity Transportation Commission 190 Glen Rd. P.O. Box 2819 Weaverville, CA 96093-2819 Phone: (530) 623-1351 Fax: (530) 623-1353 X Tuolumne County/City Area Tuolumne Planning Council 2 S. Green St. Sonora, CA 95370 Phone: (209) 533-5601 (209) 533-5583 Fax: (209) 533-5698 SOURCES: California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), California MPO and RTPA Contacts, Congestion Management Agencies, County Transportation Commissions, www.dot.ca.gov/hq/tpp/offices/orip/list/agencies&gov.htm. aAlso designated as county transportation commissions in Division 12, commencing with Section 130.000 of the Public Utilities Code. Appendix E Statutes and Definitions Regarding Transportation Planning Agencies in California1 Regional Transportation Planning Agencies Section 29532 of the Government Code . . . transportation planning agencies designated by the Director of Transportation as follows: (a) For a county included within the jurisdiction of a statutorily created regional transportation planning agency, such agency. (b) For a county which is not included within the jurisdiction of a statutorily created regional transportation agency but for which there is a council of governments, and an election has not been made pursuant to Section 29536, such council. For a county which is not included within the jurisdiction of a statutorily created regional transportation agency but for which there is a council of governments for which an election has been made under the provisions of Section 29536 to form a local transportation commission, such local transportation commission authorized in Section 29535. (c) For a county not within the jurisdiction of a statutorily created regional transportation planning agency or a council of governments, the local transportation commission authorized in Section 29535. ____________ 1Source: California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), California Transportation Agencies and Tribal Governments, Statutes and Definitions, http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/tpp/offices/orip/list/agencies&gov.htm. 181 Local Transportation Commissions Section 29535 of the Government Code Within each county which is not within the jurisdiction of a statutorily created regional transportation planning agency or a council of governments, a local transportation commission shall be established and composed of three members appointed by the board of supervisors, three members appointed by the city selection committee of the county or by the city council in any county in which there is only one incorporated city, and, where applicable, three members appointed by a transit district and one member representing, collectively, the other transit operators in the county. However, in a county in which there are no incorporated cities, five members may be appointed to the commission by the board of supervisors. The appointing authority, for each regular member it appoints, may appoint an alternate member to serve in place of the regular member when the regular member is absent or disqualified from participating in a meeting of the commission. Statutory Regional Transportation Planning Agencies • Metropolitan Transportation Commission2—Title 7.1 of the Government Code (Section 66500 et al.) is the act establishing and empowering this commission for the San Francisco Bay Area. • Tahoe Regional Planning Agency—Title 7.4 of the Government Code (Section 66800 et al.) is the act establishing and empowering this agency for the Tahoe Basin. • Placer County Transportation Planning Agency—Title 7.91 of the Government Code (Section 67910 et al.) is the act ____________ 2The Association of Bay Area Governments is the comprehensive planning organization of the MTC region. 182 establishing and empowering this agency for Placer County, excluding the Tahoe Basin. • Nevada County Transportation Planning Agency—Title 7.92 of the Government Code (Section 67920 et al.) is the act establishing and empowering this agency for Nevada County. • Transportation Agency of Monterey County—Title 7.93 of the Government Code (Section 67930 et al.) is the act establishing and empowering this agency for Monterey County. • The Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation Commission—Title 7.94 of the Government Code (Section 67940 et al.) is the act establishing and empowering this agency for Santa Cruz County. • The El Dorado County Transportation Planning Agency—Title 7.95 of the Government Code (Section 67950 et al.) is the act establishing and empowering this agency for El Dorado County. Councils of Governments • Joint Exercise of Powers—Title 1, Chapter 5 of the Government Code (Section 6500 et al.) is the basis of all existing COGs in California. Metropolitan Planning Organizations An organization designated by the governor as a forum for cooperative transportation decisionmaking for the metropolitan planning area. Federal provision requires an MPO in urbanized areas. Congestion Management Agencies CMAs develop the Congestion Management Program in consultation with other agencies. CMAs can be either the Local Transportation Commission (as defined by Public Utilities Code 130000) or another public agency, as designated by resolutions adopted by the county board of supervisors and the city councils of a majority of the cities representing a majority of the population in the incorporated 183 area of the county. If the county and cities agree, they can either designate an existing agency or form a new agency to develop and monitor the Congestion Management Program. 184 Appendix F Existing Regional Arrangements1 Statewide Air Pollution Control Districts Airport Land Use Commissions Allocation of Regional Housing Needs Councils of Governments County Solid Waste Management Plans Hazardous Waste Management Plans Local Agency Formation Commissions Regional Planning Districts (enabled but never established) Regional Transportation Planning Agencies Regional Water Quality Control Boards Specific Regions For the San Francisco Bay Area Bay Area Air Quality Management District Metropolitan Transportation Commission San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission For the Tahoe Basin California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Tahoe Regional Planning Commission For the Los Angeles region and adjoining areas South Coast Air Quality Management District For the coastal areas California Coastal Commission ____________ 1As catalogued in Gary Jerome, Challenges and Opportunities: A Working Paper for the “New Regionalism” Project, Senate Select Committee on Planning for California’s Growth, Senate Local Government Committee, Sacramento, California, September 1988. 185 Bibliography Altshuler, Alan, William Morrill, Harold Wolman, and Faith Mitchell, eds., Governance and Opportunity in Metropolitan America, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1999. 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Wilshusen, Linda, The Effect of Government Organization on Coordination of Transportation and Land Use Planning: The Role of California’s Regional Transportation Planning Agencies, Transportation Research Board, 71st Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., January 12, 1992. Young, Terry F., and Chelsea H. Congdon, Plowing New Ground: Using Economic Incentives to Control Water Pollution from Agriculture, Environmental Defense Fund, Oakland, California, 1994. 214 Zion, Lee, “RITA Has Competition for Regional ‘Superagency’; Regional Infrastructure Transportation Authority,” San Diego Business Journal, August 7, 2000, p. 3. Zion, Lee, “Superagency for County Will Be Reconsidered,” San Diego Business Journal, December 3, 2001, p. 1. Zoller, Ted D., and Jeffrey A. Capizzano, Evolution and Devolution: A National Perspective on the Changing Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in Areawide Intermodal Planning, Virginia Transportation Research Council, Charlottesville, Virginia, June 1997. 215 About the Author ELISA BARBOUR Elisa Barbour is a research associate at the Public Policy Institute of California, where she has co-authored reports on state-local fiscal relations, local sales taxes, and regional growth planning. Before coming to PPIC, she did research on urban poverty, local labor markets, and workforce development. She also worked for a number of community and advocacy organizations. She holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from Oberlin College and a master’s degree in city planning from the University of California, Berkeley. 217 Related PPIC Publications California’s Infrastructure Policy for the 21st Century: Issues and Opportunities David E. Dowall Cities Under Pressure: Local Growth Controls and Residential Development Policy Paul G. Lewis and Max Neiman Federal Transportation Policy and the Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in California Paul G. Lewis and Mary Sprague Local Economic Development in Southern California’s Suburbs: 1990– 1997 Max Neiman, Gregory Andranovich, and Kenneth Fernandez Building California’s Future: Current Conditions in Infrastructure Planning, Budgeting, and Financing Michael Neuman and Jan Whittington PPIC publications may be ordered by phone or from our website (800) 232-5343 [mainland U.S.] (415) 291-4400 [Canada, Hawaii, overseas] www.ppic.org 219" ["post_date_gmt"]=> string(19) "2017-05-20 09:35:38" ["comment_status"]=> string(4) "open" ["ping_status"]=> string(6) "closed" ["post_password"]=> string(0) "" ["post_name"]=> string(9) "r_1202ebr" ["to_ping"]=> string(0) "" ["pinged"]=> string(0) "" ["post_modified"]=> string(19) "2017-05-20 02:35:38" ["post_modified_gmt"]=> string(19) "2017-05-20 09:35:38" ["post_content_filtered"]=> string(0) "" ["guid"]=> string(51) "http://148.62.4.17/wp-content/uploads/R_1202EBR.pdf" ["menu_order"]=> int(0) ["post_mime_type"]=> string(15) "application/pdf" ["comment_count"]=> string(1) "0" ["filter"]=> string(3) "raw" ["status"]=> string(7) "inherit" ["attachment_authors"]=> bool(false) }