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object(Timber\Post)#3711 (44) { ["ImageClass"]=> string(12) "Timber\Image" ["PostClass"]=> string(11) "Timber\Post" ["TermClass"]=> string(11) "Timber\Term" ["object_type"]=> string(4) "post" ["custom"]=> array(5) { ["_wp_attached_file"]=> string(14) "AI_210EMAI.pdf" ["wpmf_size"]=> string(7) "3134824" ["wpmf_filetype"]=> string(3) "pdf" ["wpmf_order"]=> string(1) "0" ["searchwp_content"]=> string(51198) "As a par t of the Februar y 2009 budfet deal, the state lefislature plabed a “top-two-vote-fetter” ( T T VG) primar y reform initiative on the June 2010 ballot. If passed, T T VG would allow voters in all state, U.S. House, and U.S. Sen - ate primaries to bast ballots for any bandidate, refardless of their own or the bandidate’s par ty identifibation. The two bandidates rebeivinf the most votes—afain, refardless of par ty—would probeed to a fall runof f elebtion. The most bommonly bited foal of this reform is to make it easier for relatively moderate bandidates to be nominated for and elebted to publib of fibe. This At Issue desbribes the proposed reform and plabes it in the bontex t of rebent primar y law in California; presents some of the arfuments for and afainst the reform; desbribes the lefal basis for some of its provisions; and evaluates the ef febt the law is likely to have on voter behavior and bandidate moderation. OPEN PRIMARIES ERIC MCGHEE , WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM DANIEL KRIMM REFORMING CALIFORNIA’S PRIMARIES In the June 2010 primary election, California voters will consider a top-two-vote-getter initiative that would allow voters to choose any candidate, regardless of party, in the primary election for all state and national races (U.S. Senate, U.S. House, California Assembly, and so on) with the exception of the presidential race. The two candidates receiving the most votes in these races—again, regardless of party—would advance to a fall runoff election. The law would not affect local elections, which already use a runoff system similar to the one in the TTVG measure. 1 How does TTVG differ from California’s existing primary system? Under the current “semi-closed” system, voters must register with a party to vote in its primary, but the parties may allow “decline-to-state” voters (California’s official name for independents) to participate as well. Except in presidential elections, the two major parties have always allowed independent voters to participate in their primaries. 2 Independents receive in- formation about party options before every primary election, and can make a request to vote in a party’s primary at their polling place without notifying their registrar of voters in advance. 3 This would not be the first time California has experimented with its primary system. In 1996, the state’s voters approved Proposition 198, which established a blanket primary for all state and federal elections. 4 Like TTVG, the blanket primary placed all candidates on the same ballot and allowed voters to choose one candidate for each office without re - gard to party labels. But unlike TTVG, the blanket primary advanced the top vote-getter within each party . In other words, candidates in blanket primaries compete only against other candidates from the same party, whereas in the TTVG system each candidate com - petes with all other candidates, regardless of party. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the blanket primary in 2000, after which California adopted the current semi-closed system. As we have seen, in the semi-closed system only independent voters can participate in the party primary of their choice, while both the blanket and TTVG systems let partisans as well as independents “cross over” to sup - port a candidate of a different party in any or all races. But only the TTVG removes party boundaries for voters and candidates alike (Figure 1). The TTVG reform is currently popular with California voters. A September 2009 PPIC Statewide Survey found that 68 percent of likely voters—including equal shares of Democrats, Republicans, and independents—supported the general outlines of the reform (Baldassare et al. 2009). 5 But a similar proposal was rejected in November 2004 by a margin of 54 to 46 percent after it led in early polls. Thus, the fate of TTVG will probably depend on the campaign waged by each side and on the broader political context of the election. AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 2 PROS AND CONS OF T T VG What are the arguments in favor of TTVG? Its advocates most com m only cite its potential to increase moderation in the state’s political parties. Currently, members of the California legislature and congressional delegation vote mostly along party lines. Many TTVG sup - porters feel that this partisanship prevents legislators from finding pragmatic solutions to the state’s problems. They suggest that semi-closed primaries are at least partly to F I G f R E 1. T T VG E L I M I N AT E S PA R T Y b O f N DA R I E S F O R VOT E R S A N D C A N D I DAT E S Voters Semi-closed primarty (current systemf Blanket primary Candidates Voters Candidates Top-tbo-vote-getter prtimary Voters Candidates R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D I II I I I I I II I II I I I I I II I II I I I I I II AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 3 blame because the primary voters in each major party tend to be ideologically extreme: Democrats are more liberal than the general electorate and Republicans are more conser- vative. These voters tend to nominate extreme candidates, who become the only viable choices in the fall campaign, leaving voters in the middle without a moderate alternative. Supporters of TTVG see open primaries as one solution to this problem. They argue that if voters could cross over to support candidates from other parties, moderate candidates could build winning coalitions of their own parties’ moderates and crossover support - ers. As a result, candidates with moderate views would be more likely to run and donors would have more reason to support them. In the end, more of these moderate candidates would be nominated and go on to win public office in the fall campaign. 6 In addition to bolstering political moderation, supporters argue, TTVG is likely to in - crease both competiveness and voter turnout, since a broader range of voters would be able to cast a vote in each race. This argument may have special force because of the large and growing number of decline-to-state voters, who do not explicitly identify with any political party and who may feel especially constrained under the current system. What about the cons? One of the most common objections to TTVG is that it will en - croach upon each party’s right to control its own fate. Open primaries give voters who have not taken an interest in the success of a party—and may even have actively opposed its goals—as much say in deciding its nominees as those who have been dedicated fol - lowers (Jones 1996). Opponents express particular concern about raiders: voters who seek to clear the way for their own party’s nominee by voting for the weakest candidate in the opposing party. Since this weak candidate may also be more extreme, substantial raiding could undermine TTVG’s moderating effect. Another concern is that the TTVG system will limit choice. Smaller parties are likely to be excluded from the fall election, since their candidates rarely manage to finish first or second in a primary. And a TTVG primary can result in two candidates of the same party facing each other in the fall. How often has this happened in the two TTVG primary states, Louisiana and Washington? Since 1991, 17 percent of Louisiana’s House primaries, 12 per - cent of its Senate primaries, and 9 percent of its U.S. House primaries have produced same- party runoffs. 7 In Washington, which began using TTVG in 2008, the numbers are lower: 6 percent of its House primaries, 2 percent of its Senate primaries, and none of its U.S. House races produced same-party runoffs. 8 Finally, some TTVG opponents argue that weakening party influence in elections will create a vacuum that will be filled by organized interests with agendas that are less transparent and public-spirited. For instance, the liquor lobby had enormous and out - sized influence over the California legislature in the 1940s and ’50s, when a form of open primary was in use and party control was generally weaker (Masket 2004). THE LEGALIT Y OF OPEN PRIMARIES California’s adoption of the blanket primary in 1996 sent shock waves through the po - litical community. The state was not the first to adopt the blanket primary—Alaska and Washington had been using it for some time—but it was the largest and therefore most politically consequential. 9 AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 4 The most commonly cited goal of this reform is to make it easier for relatively moderate candidates to be elected to public office. AP PHOTO/PAUL SAKUMA AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 5 California’s parties sued, and the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the blanket primary in 2000, ruling in California Democratic Party v. Jones (530 U.S. 567 2000) that the law vio - lated the parties’ first amendment right to free association. Of particular importance was the idea that voters who were not members of a party could help select a candidate who would be the party’s official nominee and standard-bearer. The majority on the court felt that this forced the parties to associate with voters they might otherwise have excluded from their organizations. In the wake of this decision, the California legislature adopted the state’s current semi- closed system in 2001. As we have seen, this was not the final word on the subject: California voters considered and rejected a TTVG proposal in 2004. Proposition 60, a competing measure on the same ballot that simply ratified the current semi-closed system, passed with 68 percent. At the same time, Washington voters passed a TTVG reform with 60 percent of the vote (their blanket primary had also been struck down in the Jones decision). In a criti - cal 2008 case ( Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party et al. ), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this reform. The court reasoned that since the law asks candidates to identify only a party “preference,” which could differ from a candidate’s actual party registration, voters would not consider candidates to be officially connected with a party organization. Since the drafters of California’s TTVG initiative have copied the Washington law in vir - tually every respect, the initiative’s constitutionality is not in serious doubt. CROSSOVER VOTING Is crossover voting common? What motivates it? And does it change electoral outcomes? First, it is important to note that most decline-to-state voters do not take advantage of their options under the current system. The PPIC Statewide Survey has asked these voters which primary they intend to choose—Democratic, Republican, or nonpartisan (with only initiatives and nonpartisan candidates on the ballot)—in every gubernatorial and presidential primary since the adoption of the semi-closed system. Since the March 2004 primary, a majority of decline-to-state voters has always chosen a nonpartisan ballot (Baldassare 2004, 2006; Baldassare et al. 2008). 10 In June 2008, the Secretary of State released official estimates of crossover voting based on actual turnout that closely mirrored the ear - lier numbers from the Statewide Survey (see Figure 2). How many voters might cross over under TTVG? The best evidence on this question comes from California’s experience with the blanket primary. Under that system, crossover voting was sometimes quite high, especially among Republicans in heavily Democratic districts and Democrats in heavily Republican districts (Alvarez and Nagler 2002; Kousser 2002; Sides et al. 2002). In the presidential primary of 2000, fully 27 percent of ballots were crossovers in one direction or the other. Thus, it seems reasonable to ex - pect that crossover voting would be prevalent under TTVG, at least in some races. Is raiding common in an open primary? Evidence from California’s blanket primary sug - gests it is not, perhaps because successful raiding requires difficult coordination among voters (Alvarez and Nagler 2002; Sides et al. 2002). Some voters might well use their new AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 6 freedoms to sabotage another party, but the great majority would probably vote for the candidate they liked best.11 Voters might be drawn to candidates they like, but they will not cross over to support a candidate they have never heard of. This basic fact has important implications. Many voters cross over to support the incumbent because the incumbent is familiar, and still more cross over in order to participate in a competitive contest (Alvarez and Nagler 2002; Kousser 2002; Salvanto and Wattenberg 2002). Candidates with well-funded campaigns are generally better known and more competitive. One can presume, then, that dispari - ties in campaign funding will continue to matter greatly under a TTVG system. Does crossover voting change many outcomes? The evidence on this point is not as clear because we do not have data on crossover voting from a broad enough number of races. Crossover voting cannot change an election’s outcome unless the gap in votes between candidates is smaller than the number of crossover voters and crossover voters vote dif - ferently from regular partisans. In the California races that have been studied, crossover voting rarely met both criteria. This does not mean that crossover voting never changes outcomes, only that it did not do so in the year (1998) and the races (governor, U.S. senator, and some House and Assembly districts) that have been closely examined (Alvarez and Nagler 2002; Sides et al. 2002). F I G f R E 2 . M O S T D E C L I N E -TO - S TAT E VOT E R S H AV E N OT O P T E D TO C R O S S OV E R f N D E R T H E C f R R E N T SYS T E M SOURCES: PPIC numbers are from the last Statewide Sur vey bondubted before eabh year’s primar y elebtion (Baldassare 20 04, 20 0 6; Baldassare et al. 20 08). Sebretar y of State numbers are from the of f ibial statement of the vote. NOTES: For details about the numbers, see note 10. Republibans did not allow debline-to-state voters to par tibipate in their 20 08 presidential primar y. In 20 08 California held its presidential primar y in Februar y and its state lefislative and U.S. bonfressional primar y in June. 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 10 20 30 2004 20062008 presidentiaf primary 2008 fegisfatibe primary PPIC Statewide Survey Secretary of State (actuaf returns) Percent of decfinebtobs(tate voters Intend to bote /did bote in: Democratic primary Repubfican primary Neither/nonpartisana primary AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 7 INCREASED MODER ATION AND OTHER POSSIbLE EFFECTS OF T T VG Do open primaries increase moderation? Reformers clearly believe they do, but some have argued that they are just as likely to have the opposite effect: too many moderates will run and split the moderate vote, allowing extreme candidates to advance to the fall campaign (Hill 2009). Which of these perspectives is correct? The evidence—much of it from California’s experience with the blanket primary— points toward a slight advantage to moderate candidates. Moderates were more likely to be elected to the Assembly in the blanket primary years of 1998 and 2000 (Gerber 2002; Paul 1998). Voting in the Assembly was more bipartisan during those years (see the technical appendix ). 12 And it is often argued that a higher number of strongly liberal bills were killed at the committee stage. Figure 3 shows the ideological location and range of opinions in each party on the eco - nomic and business regulation issues tracked by the Chamber of Commerce. The points represent the median opinion in each party caucus in each year, with dots closer to the middle of the vertical axis suggesting greater moderation (since legislators with higher Chamber scores tend to be more conservative). Longer vertical lines signify a broader range of opinions. The graph suggests that members of both parties, but particularly Democrats, were more moderate in the Assembly under the blanket primary. Each party—but again, the Democratic Party in particular—was also somewhat more diverse during that time, with more moderates alongside the usual partisans. 13 However, Figure 3 also shows that apart from a slight change among Republicans there was no compa - rable effect in the state senate. One possible explanation is that the effect of the blanket primary depended on the circumstances of each race—its competitiveness, for example, or the partisanship of the district. But efforts to confirm this hypothesis do not turn up much evidence for it. 14 There is some evidence that California’s U.S. House delegation was more moderate during the blanket primary period, but it is not very strong (see the technical appendix). A moderate (Gray Davis) won a contested Democratic primary for governor, though it is not clear that there was a more liberal candidate so the outcome may have been predetermined. A conservative (Matt Fong) won the Republican primary for the U.S. Senate, but many considered him to be more moderate than the other candidate in the race. The 2000 presidential nominees were not selected via the blanket system. Studies focused on the nation as a whole have found some large moderating effects from open primaries but have also identified polarizing effects in some races (Kanthak and Morton 2001; Gerber and Morton 1998). This research suffers from two weaknesses. First, it draws on elections from the 1980s, when the parties were less polarized so it was less politically costly to be a moderate. Second, it attributes any differences in political moder - ation between open and closed primary states to the primary system, even though there may be other factors at play. States that have adopted the open primary might have more moderates for any number of reasons. PPIC research conducted with more recent data and better methods suggests that open pri - maries offer at best a modest advantage to moderate candidates, a conclusion that stands up to many important counterarguments (see the technical appendix). 15 It might seem logical that the moderating effect of open primaries would be greatest in districts with a AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 8 F I G f R E 3 . M O D E R AT I O N I N C R E A S E D I N T H E A S S E M b LY b f T N OT I N T H E S E N AT E D f R I N G T H E b L A N K E T P R I M A RY Y E A R S NOTE: Bebause the Chamber of Commerbe tends to have a bonser vative perspebtive on ebonomib and business refulation issues, lefislators with hifher sbores are likely to be more bonser vative than those with lower sbores. The dots in the fraph represent the median (50th perbentile) sbore of eabh par t y baubus. The ver tibal lines five a sense of the distribution in eabh baubus: for Demobrats, they ranfe from the lowest sbore to the 75th perbentile; for Republibans, they ranfe from the 25th perbentile to the hifhest sbore. roughly even mix of Democrats and Republicans, for the simple reason that more voters can cross over and vote in the dominant party’s primary. But support for this hypothesis is also limited and weak (see the technical appendix). 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Republicafs Mobe cofsebvative Mobe libebal Democbats Blafket pbimaby 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Republicafs Mobe cofsebvative Mobe libebal Democbats Blafket pbimaby Mediaf Rafge Assembly Senate Chamber of Commerce rating Chamber of Commerce rating AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 9 Truly nonpartisan primaries, which do not print party affiliations on the ballot, can lead to a significant breakdown of party loyalty among elected officials (Masket 2009; Wright and Schaffner 2002). For example, from 1914 to 1959 California allowed candidates to “cross-file”—to seek nomination in more than one party primary without revealing their party affiliation. During this period party influence was weak; it began to rise again only after party affiliations were restored to the ballot (Masket 2009). In sum, while open primaries do not necessarily foster more moderate representation, nonpartisan primaries of the sort that will be on the June ballot do sometimes have a mod - erating effect. A truly nonpartisan primary would probably have the strongest moderating effect of all. But, of course, it will not be considered by California voters in June 2010. bEYOND MODER ATION Moderation is not the only effect that has been predicted for TTVG primaries. Three others are often mentioned as well. First, many supporters argue that turnout will be higher in the primaries if more choices are offered, because voters who feel left out under the current system would have a reason to show up at the polls. There is some evidence to support this claim. Turnout for the 1998 midterm election under the blanket primary was 2.9 percentage points higher than the average of the two midterms that preceded it (1990 and 1994), and 6.1 points higher than the average of the two that followed (2002 and 2006). It is not clear whether voter turnout should have been higher in 2000 as well, since crossover votes in the presidential race—which always has the highest voter turnout— did not count toward selecting the presidential nominees. Nonetheless, turnout was 4.6 points higher in 2000 than the average of 1992 and 1996, and 2.2 points higher than the average of 2004 and 2008. 16 Second, supporters argue that TTVG primary elections will be more competitive because the ideological diversity of the TTVG electorate makes it harder for one candidate to build a broad base of support. But closed primaries can often host fiercely competitive nomination fights that have at least as much to do with personality as with ideology. At any rate, there is little evidence that primaries were more competitive under either the blanket system in California or the recent TTVG system in Washington (Hill 2009; Tam Cho and Gaines 2002). TTVG skeptics often express concern about a third potential effect of TTVG. Several political consultants interviewed for this report suggested that more money would be spent on primaries as candidates sought to reach a broader swath of the electorate, which might give moneyed interests more influence in the political process. Recent experience does not support this theory: under the blanket primary, spending on pri - maries did grow, but at a rate consistent with the broader trend in campaign spending (Tam Cho and Gaines 2002). AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 10 Many supporters argue that turnout will be higher in the primaries if more choices are offered. AP PHOTO/RICH PEDRONCELLI AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 11 LOOKING AHEAD In short, TTVG would probably have a noticeable but modest effect on voting and rep- resentation in California. Crossover voting rates could be high, but perhaps in only a handful of races. Moderates might benefit, but only slightly more often than under the current system. Because voters often cross party lines to support incumbents, a TTVG system would be just as likely as the current system to maintain the status quo. However, incumbency helps keep officials in office whether they are moderate or highly partisan. Thus, even a small moderating effect might build over time, as past moderate winners retain office and new ones arrive to join them. Moreover, there is evidence that it took voters and can - didates several election cycles to take full advantage of both the passage of cross-filing in 1914 and its removal in 1954 (Gaines and Tam Cho 2002; Masket 2009). In other words, time may offer the best test of TTVG’s effect on moderation. The same could be said for TTVG’s other potential effects on voter turnout, competitive - ness, and campaign spending. These effects have not yet been tested over a long period of time. Overall, the evidence underscores the need for patience in assessing the effects of TTVG. If voters approve TTVG, it will be unlikely to change California politics overnight. There may be a long period of adjustment before the state arrives at a new, potentially more moderate equilibrium. But TTVG’s overall effect on California’s political landscape would probably be modest. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Bruce Cain, Tony Quinn, Karthick Ramakrishnan, and John Sides for especially penetrating commentary on earlier drafts, which made the final product much stronger than it would have been otherwise. Thanks also to Stephen Hill, Tim Hodson, Seth Masket, Zabrae Valentine, and Micah Weinberg for speaking with me and offering thoughts about this project as it took shape. Several anonymous campaign consultants, Democratic and Republican, offered valuable insights into the effects of the blanket primary, California’s last experiment with nomination procedures. Finally, at PPIC, Jed Kolko, Max Neiman, and Lynette Ubois deserve special thanks for their insightful thoughts and reviews. AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 12 Notes 1 Lo c a l e l e c t i o n s f i f f e r f r o m t b e T T VG m e a s u r e i n t w o w a y s . F i r s t , a r u n o f f i s r e q u i r e f i n l o c a l e l e c t i o n s o n l y i f n o c a n f i f a t e r e c e i v e s m o r e t b a n 5 0 p e r c e n t o f t b e v o t e i n t b e f i r s t r o u n f . I n a T T VG s y s t e m t b e r e w o u l f a l w a y s b e a r u n o f f, p u r s u a n t t o t b e S u p r e m e C o u r t ’s f e c i s i o n i n F o s t e r v. L o v e ( 5 2 2 U. S . 67 [19 97 ] ), w b i c b r e q u i r e f t b a t a v o t e b e t a ke n i n e a c b s c b e f u l e f r a c e i n e v e r y f a l l f e f e r a l e l e c t i o n . S e c o n f , T T VG w o u l f a l l o w c a n f i f a t e s t o i n f i c a t e a p a r t y “ p r e f e r e n c e ,” w b i l e l o c a l e l e c t i o n s e x p l i c i t l y b a n p a r t y l a b e l s f r o m t b e b a l l o t . S o m e v o t e r s w o u l f u n f o u b t e f l y f a c t o r p a r t y p r e f e r e n c e i n t o t b e i r v o t i n g f e c i s i o n s , w b i c b m i g b t g i v e p a r t i e s a l a r g e r r o l e t b a n t b e y w o u l f o t b e r w i s e b a v e . 2 Se e t b e C a l i f o r n i a Vo t e r F o u n f a t i o n (w w w.c a l v o t e r.o r g /n e w s /c v f n e w s /c v f n e w s 0 213 0 2. b t m l ) a n f t b e C a l i f o r n i a S e c r e t a r y o f S t a te ( w w w. s o s .c a .g ov/e l e c t i o n s /e l e c t i o n s _ f e c l i n e.b t m #p a r t i e s ) fo r f u r t b e r i n fo r m a- t i o n a b o u t t b e p a r t i e s’ f e c i s i o n s i n e a c b e l e c t i o n . 3 Co n v e r s a t i o n w i t b J a c o b C o r b i n , C a l i f o r n i a s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e , O c t o b e r 6 , 2 0 0 9. 4 Pr e s i f e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s w e r e l a t e r e xe m p t e f i n r e s p o n s e t o p r e s s u r e f r o m t b e n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s . T b e l e g i s l a t u r e p a s s e f a b i l l i n 19 9 9 ( S B 10 0 ) t o e s t a b l i s b a s y s t e m o f f o u b l e c o u n t i n g : t b e r e s u l t s o f t b e b l a n ke t p r i m a r y w o u l f b e t a b u l a t e f a n f r e p o r t e f , b u t o n l y t b e v o t e s o f p a r t y r e g i s t r a n t s w o u l f c o u n t t o w a r f f e l e g a t e s e l e c t i o n . O n t b e R e p u b l i c a n s i f e , G e o r g e B u s b p e r f o r m e f f a r b e t t e r a g a i n s t J o b n M c C a i n w i t b p a r t y r e g i s t r a n t s t b a n w i t b c r o s s o v e r v o t e r s , w b i l e t b e r e w a s n o m e a n i n g f u l f i f f e r e n c e o n t b e D e m o c r a t i c s i f e i n t b e c o n t e s t b e - t w e e n A l G o r e a n f B i l l B r a f l e y. 5 Tb e w o r f i n g o f t b e q u e s t i o n w a s a s f o l l o w s : “ S o m e p e o p l e b a v e p r o p o s e f c b a n g i n g C a l i f o r n i a’s s t a t e p r i- m a r y e l e c t i o n s f r o m a p a r t i a l l y c l o s e f s y s t e m t o a s y s t e m w b e r e r e g i s t e r e f v o t e r s c o u l f c a s t b a l l o t s f o r a n y c a n f i f a t e i n a p r i m a r y a n f t b e t o p t w o v o t e - g e t t e r s—r e g a r f l e s s o f p a r t y—w o u l f a f v a n c e t o t b e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n . D o y o u t b i n k t b i s i s a g o o f i f e a o r a b a f i f e a? ” S e e w w w. p p i c .o r g /m a i n /p u b l i c a t i o n . a s p?i = 914 f o r m o r e f e t a i l s . 6 It i s t e m p t i n g t o e x p e c t t b a t a n o p e n p r i m a r y w i l l m a ke r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s m o r e “ r e s p o n s i v e ” i n a g e n e r i c s e n s e t o t b e f i s t r i c t m e f i a n v o t e r. B u t a n o p e n p r i m a r y f o e s n o t m a ke e i t b e r t b e f i s t r i c t o r t b e p r i m a r y m e f i a n c l e a r e r t o c a n f i f a t e s ; i t s i m p l y m o v e s t b e p r i m a r y m e f i a n t o w a r f t b e o p p o s i n g p a r t y. F o r e x a m p l e , D e m o c r a t i c c a n f i f a t e s t o t b e l e f t o f t b e i r p r i m a r y m e f i a n m i g b t m o v e t o w a r f t b e c e n t e r u n f e r a n o p e n p r i m a r y, a s t b e i r p r i m a r y m e f i a n m o ve s i n t b e s a m e f i r e c t i o n . B u t D e m o c r a t i c c a n f i f a t e s t o t b e r i g b t o f t b e D e m o c r a t i c m e f i a n s b o u l f n o t m o v e a t a l l—t b e m e f i a n i s a l r e a f y m o v i n g t o w a r d t h e m . B y t b e s a m e t o ke n , R e p u b l i c a n s t o t b e r i g b t o f t b e i r m e f i a n m i g b t m o v e t o w a r f t b e c e n t e r, b u t t b o s e t o t b e l e f t s b o u l f n o t m o v e a t a l l . I n e f f e c t , r e l a t i v e l y c o n s e r v a t i v e D e m o c r a t s a n f l i b e r a l R e p u b l i c a n s b a v e a l r e a f y e s c a p e f t b e c e n t r i f u g a l p r e s s u r e s o f t b e c l o s e f p r i m a r y, s o a n o p e n p r i m a r y s b o u l f m a ke l i t t l e f i f f e r e n c e t o t b e i r i f e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n i n g . T b u s , r e s p o n s i v e n e s s t o t b e f i s t r i c t m e f i a n w i l l i m p r o v e o n l y i n a n o p e n p r i m a r y w i t b c a n f i f a t e s w b o a r e t o o e x t r e m e . 7 Tb e s e n u m b e r s e xc l u f e 2 0 0 8 U. S . H o u s e r a c e s , b e c a u s e L o u i s i a n a f r o p p e f t b e T T VG s y s t e m f o r H o u s e r a c e s s t a r t i n g t b a t y e a r. 8 Tb e T T VG sy s te m s i n L o u i s i a n a a n f Wa s b i n g to n f i f fe r s o m ew b a t: Wa s b i n g to n a l way s a f va n c e s t b e to p t wo vo te g e t te r s , b u t L o u i s i a n a c a n c e l s t b e r u n o f f i f o n e c a n f i f a t e r e c e i v e s m o r e t b a n 5 0 p e r c e n t i n t b e f i r s t r o u n f (a n f b o l f s i t s f i r s t- r o u n f e l e c t i o n a t t b e s a m e t i m e a s t b e f a l l e l e c t i o n i n Wa s b i n g t o n , p u r s u a n t t o F o s t e r v. L o v e ( 5 2 2 U. S . 67 [19 97 ] ). T b e n u m b e r o f s a m e - p a r t y r a c e s i n Wa s b i n g t o n i s e v e n l o w e r i f r a c e s w b e r e o n e c a n f i f a t e r e c e i v e f m o r e t b a n 5 0 p e r c e n t o f t b e v o t e i n t b e p r i m a r y a r e e xc l u f e f . 9 Tb e A l a s k a R e p u b l i c a n p a r t y s u c c e s s f u l l y s o u g b t e xe m p t i o n f r o m t b e b l a n ke t p r i m a r y f r o m 19 9 2 t o 19 9 6 , a t w b i c b t i m e t b e A l a s k a S u p r e m e C o u r t r u l e f t b a t t b e s t a t e’s b l a n ke t p r i m a r y s t a t u t e r e q u i r e f p a r t i c i p a t i o n b y a l l p a r t i e s . 10 Tb e s e n u m b e r s e xc l u f e t b o s e w b o f i f n o t k n o w b o w t b e y w o u l f v o t e o r f i f n o t p l a n t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t b e p r i m a r y e l e c t i o n . A m a j o r i t y s a i f t b e y w o u l f c b o o s e a p a r t i s a n b a l l o t f o r t b e M a r c b 2 0 0 2 p r i m a r y, b u t t b e i r a n s w e r s m a y b a v e b e e n i n f l u e n c e f b y t b e w a y t b e q u e s t i o n w a s w o r f e f . T b e q u e s t i o n a s ke f i f r e - s p o n f e n t s p l a n n e f t o v o t e i n “ t b e R e p u b l i c a n p r i m a r y, t b e D e m o c r a t i c p r i m a r y, o r n e i t b e r,” w b i c b m i g b t b a v e c r e a t e f t b e i m p r e s s i o n t b a t a b s t e n t i o n f r o m v o t i n g w a s t b e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t o a p a r t i s a n p r i m a r y ( B a l f a s s a r e 2 0 0 2). I n s u b s e q u e n t s u r v e y s v o t e r s w e r e a s ke f i f t b e y p l a n n e f t o v o t e i n “ t b e R e p u b l i c a n p r i m a r y, t b e D e m o c r a t i c p r i m a r y, o r o n t b e n o n p a r t i s a n b a l l o t .” T b e s u r v e y s s i n c e 2 0 0 2 b a v e a l s o i n f o r m e f r e s p o n f e n t s t b a t t b e i r c b o i c e o f b a l l o t f o e s n o t a f f e c t t b e i r a b i l i t y t o v o t e f o r s t a t e w i f e p r o p o s i t i o n s , s o m e t b i n g t b e 2 0 0 2 s u r v e y f i f n o t m e n t i o n . 11 Ra i f i n g i s j u s t o n e t y p e o f s t r a t e g i c c r o s s o v e r v o t i n g . A l l s t r a t e g i c v o t e r s p r e f e r a c a n f i f a t e o f t b e i r o w n p a r t y b u t c r o s s o v e r t o s e t u p t b e c o n t e s t t b e y w o u l f m o s t l i ke t o s e e f o r t b e f a l l . B u t w b i l e r a i f e r s s u p p o r t t b e w e a ke s t c a n f i f a t e i n t b e o p p o s i n g p a r t y, h e d g e r s c r o s s o v e r t o s u p p o r t t b e o t b e r p a r t y ’s b e s t c a n f i - f a t e , i n o r f e r t o e n s u r e t b e b e s t p o s s i b l e o u t c o m e i n t b e f a l l r e g a r f l e s s w b o w i n s . I n s b o r t , t b e s e v o t e r s b e f g e t b e i r b e t s . T b e e v i f e n c e s u g g e s t s t b a t b e f g e r s a r e m o r e c o m m o n t b a n r a i f e r s , b u t t b a t s i n c e r e v o t e r s a r e t b e m o s t c o m m o n o f a l l ( S i f e s e t a l . 2 0 0 2). AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 13 12 Se e t b e t e c b n i c a l a p p e n f i x t o t b i s A t I s s u e , w b i c b i s a v a i l a b l e o n t b e P PI C w e b s i t e: w w w. p p i c .o r g /c o n t e n t /p u b s /o t b e r/ 210 E M A I _ a p p e n f i x . p f f . 13 Pa r t y l e a f e r s b i p m i g b t b a v e p l a y e f a r o l e i n t b e m o f e r a t i o n o f t b e A s s e m b l y. R o b e r t H e r t z b e r g w a s A s s e m b l y s p e a ke r f o r p r e c i s e l y t b e y e a r s t b e b l a n ke t p r i m a r y w a s i n e f f e c t , a n f b e w a s w i f e l y a c k n o w l - e f g e f t o b e a c b a m p i o n f o r t b e m o f e r a t e b r a n c b o f b i s c a u c u s . B y c o n t r a s t , J o b n B u r t o n , w b o w a s t b e D e m o c r a t i c l e a f e r o f t b e S t a t e S e n a t e , i s g e n e r a l l y k n o w n a s a s t r o n g p a r t i s a n . I t i s u n l i ke l y t b a t H e r t z b e r g c o u l f b a v e l e f b i s c a u c u s t o w a r f g r e a t e r m o f e r a t i o n i f t b e y b a f n o t b e e n w i l l i n g t o f o l l o w b i m , b u t b e m i g b t b a ve b a f a m o f e r a t i n g e f f e c t . 14 Sp e c i f i c a l l y, t b e r e i s n o t m u c b e v i f e n c e t b a t t b e e f f e c t o f o p e n p r i m a r i e s i n t b e C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t u r e i s f e p e n f e n t o n 1) w b e t b e r t b e i n c u m b e n t r a n f o r r e e l e c t i o n; 2) t b e f i s t r i c t ’s p a r t i s a n b a l a n c e b e t w e e n D e m o c r a t s a n f R e p u b l i c a n s; 3) t b e s b a r e o f t b e f i s t r i c t ’s vo te r s w b o i f e n t i f y a s f e c l i n e -to - s t a te; 4) w b e t b e r t b e p r i m a r y w a s c o n t e s t e f; 5 ) i f t b e p r i m a r y w a s c o n t e s t e f , b o w c l o s e i t p r o v e f t o b e; o r 6 ) w b e t b e r t b e m e m b e r i n q u e s t i o n w a s f o r b i f f e n t o r u n f o r r e e l e c t i o n u n f e r t e r m l i m i t s (s e e t b e t e c b n i c a l a p p e n f i x a t w w w. p p i c .o r g /c o n t e n t /p u b s /o t b e r/ 210 E M A I _ a p p e n f i x . p f f ). 15 As w a s t b e c a s e f o r t b e C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t u r e , t b e i n f l u e n c e o f o p e n p r i m a r i e s a p p e a r s t o b e a b o u t a s a m b i g u o u s v i s - á - v i s o p e n s e a t s a s i n r a c e s w b e r e a n i n c u m b e n t i s r u n n i n g . H o w e v e r, t b e n u m b e r o f o p e n s e a t s a v a i l a b l e f o r t e s t i n g t b i s b y p o t b e s i s i s u s u a l l y v e r y s m a l l , s i n c e a b o u t 9 0 p e r c e n t o f i n c u m b e n t s t y p i - c a l l y r u n f o r r e e l e c t i o n . T b e r e i s s o m e e v i f e n c e t b a t t b e e f f e c t o f o p e n p r i m a r i e s w a s c o n f i t i o n a l o n t b e p a r t i s a n c o m p o s i t i o n o f t b e f i s t r i c t , b u t t b i s v a r i a t i o n w a s n o t i t s e l f c o n s i s t e n t . D e m o c r a t i c l e g i s l a t o r s r e p r e s e n t i n g c o m p e t i t i v e f i s t r i c t s w e r e o f t e n m o r e s e n s i t i v e t o t b e p r e s e n c e o f a n o n p a r t i s a n p r i m a r y t b a n w e r e t b o s e r e p r e s e n t i n g u n c o m p e t i t i v e f i s t r i c t s , b u t l e s s s e n s i t i v e t o t b e p r e s e n c e o f a s e m i - c l o s e f s y s t e m . T b e r e w a s n o c l e a r e f f e c t i n e i t b e r f i r e c t i o n f o r R e p u b l i c a n s . 16 Tb e e xc i t e m e n t g e n e r a t e f b y a n e l e c t i o n i s a l w a y s a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r. Tu r n o u t w a s a c t u a l l y 2. 4 p o i n t s b i g b e r i n t b e 2 0 0 8 p r e s i f e n t i a l p r i m a r y t b a n i n t b e 2 0 0 0 p r i m a r y, f e s p i t e t b e f a c t t b a t o n l y t b e p r e s i f e n t i a l r a c e w a s o n t b e b a l l o t , t b e s y s t e m w a s m o r e c l o s e f , a n f f e c l i n e - t o - s t a t e v o t e r s c o u l f n o t c a s t b a l l o t s i n t b e R e p u b l i c a n p r i m a r y. T b e 2 0 0 8 p r e s i f e n t i a l n o m i n a t i o n w a s s t i l l u n f e c i f e f o n b o t b s i f e s b y t b e t i m e C a l i f o r n i a b e l f i t s p r i m a r y, w b i c b w a s n o t t b e c a s e i n 2 0 0 0 . References A l va r e z , R . 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M o r t o n . 19 9 8 . “ P r i m a r y E l e c t i o n S y s t e m s a n f R e p r e s e n t a t i o n .” T h e J o u r n a l o f L a w, E c o n o m i c s , a n d O r g a n i z a t i o n 14 ( 2): 3 0 4 – 24 . H i l l , S t e v e n . 2 0 0 9. “’ To p t w o’ i s n’ t t b e o n e .” L o s A n g e l e s T i m e s, F e b r u a r y 2 0 . J o n e s , B i l l . 19 9 6 . C a l i f o r n i a B a l l o t f a m p h l e t b f r i m a r y E l e c t i o n , M a r c h 2 6 , 19 9 6 . S a c r a m e n t o: C a l i f o r n i a S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , E l e c t i o n s D i v i s i o n . K a n t b a k , K r i s t i n , a n f R e b e c c a M o r t o n . 2 0 01. “ T b e E f f e c t s o f E l e c t o r a l R u l e s o n C o n g r e s s i o n a l P r i m a r i e s .” I n C o n g r e s s i o n a l f r i m a r i e s a n d t h e f o l i t i c s o f R e p r e s e n t a t i o n , e f . P. F. G a l f e r i s i , M . E z r a a n f M . Ly o n s . AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 14 L a n b a m , M D : R o w m a n a n f L i t t l e f i e l f . Ko u s s e r, T b a f . 20 0 2. “ C r o s s i n g O ve r W b e n I t C o u n t s: H ow t b e M o t i ve s o f Vo te r s i n B l a n ke t P r i m a r i e s A r e R e ve a l e f by T b e i r A c t i o n s i n G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s .” I n Vo t i n g a t t h e f o l i t i c a l Fa u l t L i n eb C a l i f o r n i a’s E x p e r i m e n t w i t h t h e B l a n k e t f r i m a r y , e f . B . E . C a i n a n f E . R . G e r b e r. B e r ke l e y : U n i ve r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s . M a s ke t , S e t b E . 2 0 0 4 . “ S b o u l f v o t e r s g o f o r a n o p e n p r i m a r y ? N o: B e e n t b e r e; f o n e t b a t ; i t ’s a p a r t y p o o p e r.” S a c r a m e n t o B e e , J u l y 11. M a s ke t , S e t b E . 2 0 0 9. N o M i d d l e G r o u n db H o w I n f o r m a l f a r t y O r g a n i z a t i o n s C o n t r o l N o m i n a t i o n s a n d f o l a r i z e L e g i s l a t u r e s . A n n A r b o r : M i c b i g a n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . P a u l , M a r k . 19 9 8 . “ P r i m a r y g a v e p o l i t i c a l t b e o r i s t s a r e a s o n t o s m i l e .” S a c r a m e n t o B e e, J u n e 8 . S a l v a n t o, A n t b o n y M ., a n f M a r t i n P. Wa t t e n b e r g . 2 0 0 2. “ P e e k i n g U n f e r t b e B l a n ke t : A D i r e c t L o o k a t C r o s s o v e r Vo t i n g i n t b e 19 9 8 P r i m a r y.” I n Vo t i n g a t t h e f o l i t i c a l Fa u l t L i n eb C a l i f o r n i a’s E x p e r i m e n t w i t h t h e B l a n k e t f r i m a r y , e f . B . E . C a i n a n f E . R . G e r b e r. B e r ke l e y : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s . S i f e s , J o n a t b a n , J o n a t b a n C o b e n , a n f J a c k C i t r i n . 2 0 0 2. “ T b e C a u s e s a n f C o n s e q u e n c e s o f C r o s s o v e r Vo t i n g i n t b e 19 9 8 C a l i f o r n i a E l e c t i o n s .” I n Vo t i n g a t t h e f o l i t i c a l Fa u l t L i n eb C a l i f o r n i a’s E x p e r i m e n t w i t h t h e B l a n k e t f r i m a r y , e f . B . E . C a i n a n f E . R . G e r b e r. B e r ke l e y : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s . Ta m C b o, We n f y K ., a n f B r i a n J . G a i n e s . 2 0 0 2. “ C a n f i f a t e s , D o n o r s , a n f Vo t e r s i n C a l i f o r n i a’s B l a n ke t P r i m a r y E l e c t i o n s .” I n Vo t i n g a t t h e f o l i t i c a l Fa u l t L i n eb C a l i f o r n i a’s E x p e r i m e n t w i t h t h e B l a n k e t f r i m a r y , e f . B . E . C a i n a n f E . R . G e r b e r. B e r ke l e y : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s . Wr i g b t , G e r a l f C ., a n f B r i a n F. S c b a f f n e r. 2 0 0 2. “ T b e I n f l u e n c e o f P a r t y : Ev i f e n c e f r o m t b e S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e s .” T h e A m e r i c a n f o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e R e v i e w 9 6 ( 2): 3 67–7 9. AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 15 PPIC EXPERTSEric McGhee R e s e a r c h F e l l o w 4 15 -2 91- 4 4 3 9 f c g h e e @ p p b c .o r g E x p e r t i s e • El e b t i o n s – C a l i f o r n i a r e d i s t r i b t i n f r e f o r m – S t a te a n d l o b a l v o te r i n i t i a t i v e s – Vo t i n f b e h a v i o r • Le f i s l a t i v e b e h a v i o r – L e f i s l a t i v e o r f a n i z a t i o n – R e s p o n s i v e n e s s to p u b l i b o p i n i o n – S t a te te r m l i m i t s • Po l i t i b a l p a r t i b i p a t i o n • Po l i t i b a l p a r t i e s a n d p a r t y p o l a r i z a t i o n • Po l l i n f a n d p u b l i b o p i n i o n E f u c a t i o n Ph . D. (2 0 0 3 ) a n d M . A . (19 9 8 ), p o l i t i b a l s b i e n b e, U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , B e r ke l e y Mark baldassare P r e s b d e n t a n d C h b e f E x e c u t b ve O f f b c e r 4 15 -2 91- 4 427 b a l d a s s a r e @ p p b c .o r g E x p e r t i s e • Pu b l i b o p i n i o n – P o l i t i b a l, s o b i a l, e b o n o m i b, a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l a t t i t u d e s • Pu b l i b p o l i b y p r e f e r e n b e s • El e b t i o n s • St a te i n i t i a t i v e s • St a te a n d l o b a l f o v e r n m e n t r e l a t i o n s • Po l i t i b a l p a r t i b i p a t i o n • De m o f r a p h i b s E f u c a t i o n Ph . D. (1976 ), s o b i o l o f y, U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , B e r ke l e y M. A . (1973 ), s o b i o l o f y, U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , S a n t a B a r b a r a REL ATED PPIC PfbLICATIONS M a r k B a l f a s s a r e e t a l . , Californians and Their Government , P P I C S t a t e w i f e S u r v e y “ C a l i f o r n i a Vo t e r a n f P a r t y P r o f i l e s ” ( J u s t t b e F a c t s , S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 9 ) “ C a l i f o r n i a I n f e p e n f e n t Vo t e r s ” ( J u s t t b e F a c t s , J a n u a r y 2 0 0 8 ) E r i c M c G b e e , Redistricting and Legislative fartisanship ( S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8 ) E r i c M c G b e e , L e g i s l a t i v e R e f o r m ( A t I s s u e , D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 7 ) AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 16 PPIC bOARD OF DIRECTORS Wa l t e r B . H e w l e t t , C h a i r D i r e c t o r C e n t e r f o r C o m p u t e r A s s i s t e f R e s e a r c b i n t b e H u m a n i t i e s M a r k B a l d a s s a r e P r e s i f e n t a n f C b i e f E xe c u t i v e O f f i c e r P u b l i c P o l i c y I n s t i t u t e o f C a l i f o r n i a R u b e f B a r r a l e s P r e s i f e n t a n f C b i e f E xe c u t i v e O f f i c e r S a n D i e g o R e g i o n a l C b a m b e r o f C o m m e r c e J o h f b . B r y s o f R e t i r e f C b a i r m a n a n f C E O E f i s o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l G a r y K . H a r t F o r m e r S t a t e S e n a t o r a n f S e c r e t a r y o f E f u c a t i o n S t a t e o f C a l i f o r n i a R o b e r t M . H e r t z b e r g P a r t n e r M a y e r B r o w n , L L P D o f f a L u c a s C b i e f E xe c u t i v e O f f i c e r L u c a s P u b l i c A f f a i r s D a v i d M a s M a s u m o t o A u t b o r a n f f a r m e r S t e v e f A . M e r k s a m e r S e n i o r P a r t n e r N i e l s e n , M e r k s a m e r, P a r r i n e l l o, M u e l l e r & N a y l o r, L L P C o f s t a f c e L . R i c e C o - D i r e c t o r T b e A f v a n c e m e n t P r o j e c t T h o m a s C . S u t t o f R e t i r e f C b a i r m a n a n f C b i e f E xe c u t i v e O f f i c e r P a c i f i c L i f e I n s u r a n c e C o m p a n y C a r o l W h i t e s i d e P r e s i f e n t E m e r i t u s G r e a t Va l l e y C e n t e r © Fe b r u a r y 2010 Pu b l i b Po l i b y I n s ti tu te of C a l i fo r n i a . A l l r i f hts re s e r ve d. S a n Fr a n b i s b o, CA T h e P u b l i b P o l i b y I n s t i t u te o f C a l i f o r n i a i s d e d i b a te d to i n f o r m i n f a n d i m p r o v i n f p u b l i b p o l i b y i n C a l i f o r n i a t h r o u f h i n d e p e n d e n t, o b j e b t i v e, n o n p a r t i s a n r e s e a r b h . PPI C i s a p r i vate o p e r ati n f fo u n d ati o n. It d o e s n o t t a k e o r s u p p o r t p o s i t i o n s o n a n y b a l l o t m e a s u r e o r o n a n y l o b a l , s t a t e , o r f e d e r a l l e f i s l ati o n, n o r d o e s i t e n d o r s e, s u p p o r t, o r o p p o s e a ny p o l i ti b a l p a r ti e s o r b a n d i d ate s fo r p u b l i b of f i b e. R e s e a rb h p u b l i b ati o n s ref l e b t th e v i ew s of th e a u th o r s a n d d o n ot n e b e s s a r i l y ref l e b t th e v i ew s of th e s t af f, of f i b e r s, o r B o a rd of D i re b to r s of th e Pu b l i b Po l i b y I n s ti tu te of C a l i fo r n i a . S h o r t s e b t i o n s o f t e x t , n o t t o e x b e e d th re e p a r a f r a p h s, m ay b e q u ote d w i th o u t w r i t te n p e r m i s s i o n p rov i d e d th at f u l l at tr i b u ti o n i s f i ve n to th e s o u rb e a n d th e a b ove b o py r i f ht n oti b e i s i n b l u d e d. AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 17 P U B L I C P O L I C Y I N S T I T U T E OF C A L I F O R N I A 500 WA S H I N G T O N S T R E E T, S U I T E 600 • S A N F R A N C I S C O , C A 94111 P 415.291.4400 • F 415.291.4401 • www.ppic.org P P I C S AC R A M E N T O C E N T E R • S E N A T O R O F F I C E B U I L D I N G 1121 L S T R E E T, S U I T E 801 • S AC R A M E N T O , C A 95814 P 916.440.1120 • F 916.440.1121 ADDITIONAL RESOURCES REL ATED TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ARE AVAIL ABLE AT WWW.PPIC.ORG" } ["___content":protected]=> string(106) "

AI 210EMAI

" ["_permalink":protected]=> string(59) "https://www.ppic.org/publication/open-primaries/ai_210emai/" ["_next":protected]=> array(0) { } ["_prev":protected]=> array(0) { } ["_css_class":protected]=> NULL ["id"]=> int(8730) ["ID"]=> int(8730) ["post_author"]=> string(1) "1" ["post_content"]=> string(0) "" ["post_date"]=> string(19) "2017-05-20 02:40:15" ["post_excerpt"]=> string(0) "" ["post_parent"]=> int(4033) ["post_status"]=> string(7) "inherit" ["post_title"]=> string(10) "AI 210EMAI" ["post_type"]=> string(10) "attachment" ["slug"]=> string(10) "ai_210emai" ["__type":protected]=> NULL ["_wp_attached_file"]=> string(14) "AI_210EMAI.pdf" ["wpmf_size"]=> string(7) "3134824" ["wpmf_filetype"]=> string(3) "pdf" ["wpmf_order"]=> string(1) "0" ["searchwp_content"]=> string(51198) "As a par t of the Februar y 2009 budfet deal, the state lefislature plabed a “top-two-vote-fetter” ( T T VG) primar y reform initiative on the June 2010 ballot. If passed, T T VG would allow voters in all state, U.S. House, and U.S. Sen - ate primaries to bast ballots for any bandidate, refardless of their own or the bandidate’s par ty identifibation. The two bandidates rebeivinf the most votes—afain, refardless of par ty—would probeed to a fall runof f elebtion. The most bommonly bited foal of this reform is to make it easier for relatively moderate bandidates to be nominated for and elebted to publib of fibe. This At Issue desbribes the proposed reform and plabes it in the bontex t of rebent primar y law in California; presents some of the arfuments for and afainst the reform; desbribes the lefal basis for some of its provisions; and evaluates the ef febt the law is likely to have on voter behavior and bandidate moderation. OPEN PRIMARIES ERIC MCGHEE , WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM DANIEL KRIMM REFORMING CALIFORNIA’S PRIMARIES In the June 2010 primary election, California voters will consider a top-two-vote-getter initiative that would allow voters to choose any candidate, regardless of party, in the primary election for all state and national races (U.S. Senate, U.S. House, California Assembly, and so on) with the exception of the presidential race. The two candidates receiving the most votes in these races—again, regardless of party—would advance to a fall runoff election. The law would not affect local elections, which already use a runoff system similar to the one in the TTVG measure. 1 How does TTVG differ from California’s existing primary system? Under the current “semi-closed” system, voters must register with a party to vote in its primary, but the parties may allow “decline-to-state” voters (California’s official name for independents) to participate as well. Except in presidential elections, the two major parties have always allowed independent voters to participate in their primaries. 2 Independents receive in- formation about party options before every primary election, and can make a request to vote in a party’s primary at their polling place without notifying their registrar of voters in advance. 3 This would not be the first time California has experimented with its primary system. In 1996, the state’s voters approved Proposition 198, which established a blanket primary for all state and federal elections. 4 Like TTVG, the blanket primary placed all candidates on the same ballot and allowed voters to choose one candidate for each office without re - gard to party labels. But unlike TTVG, the blanket primary advanced the top vote-getter within each party . In other words, candidates in blanket primaries compete only against other candidates from the same party, whereas in the TTVG system each candidate com - petes with all other candidates, regardless of party. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the blanket primary in 2000, after which California adopted the current semi-closed system. As we have seen, in the semi-closed system only independent voters can participate in the party primary of their choice, while both the blanket and TTVG systems let partisans as well as independents “cross over” to sup - port a candidate of a different party in any or all races. But only the TTVG removes party boundaries for voters and candidates alike (Figure 1). The TTVG reform is currently popular with California voters. A September 2009 PPIC Statewide Survey found that 68 percent of likely voters—including equal shares of Democrats, Republicans, and independents—supported the general outlines of the reform (Baldassare et al. 2009). 5 But a similar proposal was rejected in November 2004 by a margin of 54 to 46 percent after it led in early polls. Thus, the fate of TTVG will probably depend on the campaign waged by each side and on the broader political context of the election. AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 2 PROS AND CONS OF T T VG What are the arguments in favor of TTVG? Its advocates most com m only cite its potential to increase moderation in the state’s political parties. Currently, members of the California legislature and congressional delegation vote mostly along party lines. Many TTVG sup - porters feel that this partisanship prevents legislators from finding pragmatic solutions to the state’s problems. They suggest that semi-closed primaries are at least partly to F I G f R E 1. T T VG E L I M I N AT E S PA R T Y b O f N DA R I E S F O R VOT E R S A N D C A N D I DAT E S Voters Semi-closed primarty (current systemf Blanket primary Candidates Voters Candidates Top-tbo-vote-getter prtimary Voters Candidates R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D I II I I I I I II I II I I I I I II I II I I I I I II AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 3 blame because the primary voters in each major party tend to be ideologically extreme: Democrats are more liberal than the general electorate and Republicans are more conser- vative. These voters tend to nominate extreme candidates, who become the only viable choices in the fall campaign, leaving voters in the middle without a moderate alternative. Supporters of TTVG see open primaries as one solution to this problem. They argue that if voters could cross over to support candidates from other parties, moderate candidates could build winning coalitions of their own parties’ moderates and crossover support - ers. As a result, candidates with moderate views would be more likely to run and donors would have more reason to support them. In the end, more of these moderate candidates would be nominated and go on to win public office in the fall campaign. 6 In addition to bolstering political moderation, supporters argue, TTVG is likely to in - crease both competiveness and voter turnout, since a broader range of voters would be able to cast a vote in each race. This argument may have special force because of the large and growing number of decline-to-state voters, who do not explicitly identify with any political party and who may feel especially constrained under the current system. What about the cons? One of the most common objections to TTVG is that it will en - croach upon each party’s right to control its own fate. Open primaries give voters who have not taken an interest in the success of a party—and may even have actively opposed its goals—as much say in deciding its nominees as those who have been dedicated fol - lowers (Jones 1996). Opponents express particular concern about raiders: voters who seek to clear the way for their own party’s nominee by voting for the weakest candidate in the opposing party. Since this weak candidate may also be more extreme, substantial raiding could undermine TTVG’s moderating effect. Another concern is that the TTVG system will limit choice. Smaller parties are likely to be excluded from the fall election, since their candidates rarely manage to finish first or second in a primary. And a TTVG primary can result in two candidates of the same party facing each other in the fall. How often has this happened in the two TTVG primary states, Louisiana and Washington? Since 1991, 17 percent of Louisiana’s House primaries, 12 per - cent of its Senate primaries, and 9 percent of its U.S. House primaries have produced same- party runoffs. 7 In Washington, which began using TTVG in 2008, the numbers are lower: 6 percent of its House primaries, 2 percent of its Senate primaries, and none of its U.S. House races produced same-party runoffs. 8 Finally, some TTVG opponents argue that weakening party influence in elections will create a vacuum that will be filled by organized interests with agendas that are less transparent and public-spirited. For instance, the liquor lobby had enormous and out - sized influence over the California legislature in the 1940s and ’50s, when a form of open primary was in use and party control was generally weaker (Masket 2004). THE LEGALIT Y OF OPEN PRIMARIES California’s adoption of the blanket primary in 1996 sent shock waves through the po - litical community. The state was not the first to adopt the blanket primary—Alaska and Washington had been using it for some time—but it was the largest and therefore most politically consequential. 9 AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 4 The most commonly cited goal of this reform is to make it easier for relatively moderate candidates to be elected to public office. AP PHOTO/PAUL SAKUMA AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 5 California’s parties sued, and the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the blanket primary in 2000, ruling in California Democratic Party v. Jones (530 U.S. 567 2000) that the law vio - lated the parties’ first amendment right to free association. Of particular importance was the idea that voters who were not members of a party could help select a candidate who would be the party’s official nominee and standard-bearer. The majority on the court felt that this forced the parties to associate with voters they might otherwise have excluded from their organizations. In the wake of this decision, the California legislature adopted the state’s current semi- closed system in 2001. As we have seen, this was not the final word on the subject: California voters considered and rejected a TTVG proposal in 2004. Proposition 60, a competing measure on the same ballot that simply ratified the current semi-closed system, passed with 68 percent. At the same time, Washington voters passed a TTVG reform with 60 percent of the vote (their blanket primary had also been struck down in the Jones decision). In a criti - cal 2008 case ( Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party et al. ), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this reform. The court reasoned that since the law asks candidates to identify only a party “preference,” which could differ from a candidate’s actual party registration, voters would not consider candidates to be officially connected with a party organization. Since the drafters of California’s TTVG initiative have copied the Washington law in vir - tually every respect, the initiative’s constitutionality is not in serious doubt. CROSSOVER VOTING Is crossover voting common? What motivates it? And does it change electoral outcomes? First, it is important to note that most decline-to-state voters do not take advantage of their options under the current system. The PPIC Statewide Survey has asked these voters which primary they intend to choose—Democratic, Republican, or nonpartisan (with only initiatives and nonpartisan candidates on the ballot)—in every gubernatorial and presidential primary since the adoption of the semi-closed system. Since the March 2004 primary, a majority of decline-to-state voters has always chosen a nonpartisan ballot (Baldassare 2004, 2006; Baldassare et al. 2008). 10 In June 2008, the Secretary of State released official estimates of crossover voting based on actual turnout that closely mirrored the ear - lier numbers from the Statewide Survey (see Figure 2). How many voters might cross over under TTVG? The best evidence on this question comes from California’s experience with the blanket primary. Under that system, crossover voting was sometimes quite high, especially among Republicans in heavily Democratic districts and Democrats in heavily Republican districts (Alvarez and Nagler 2002; Kousser 2002; Sides et al. 2002). In the presidential primary of 2000, fully 27 percent of ballots were crossovers in one direction or the other. Thus, it seems reasonable to ex - pect that crossover voting would be prevalent under TTVG, at least in some races. Is raiding common in an open primary? Evidence from California’s blanket primary sug - gests it is not, perhaps because successful raiding requires difficult coordination among voters (Alvarez and Nagler 2002; Sides et al. 2002). Some voters might well use their new AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 6 freedoms to sabotage another party, but the great majority would probably vote for the candidate they liked best.11 Voters might be drawn to candidates they like, but they will not cross over to support a candidate they have never heard of. This basic fact has important implications. Many voters cross over to support the incumbent because the incumbent is familiar, and still more cross over in order to participate in a competitive contest (Alvarez and Nagler 2002; Kousser 2002; Salvanto and Wattenberg 2002). Candidates with well-funded campaigns are generally better known and more competitive. One can presume, then, that dispari - ties in campaign funding will continue to matter greatly under a TTVG system. Does crossover voting change many outcomes? The evidence on this point is not as clear because we do not have data on crossover voting from a broad enough number of races. Crossover voting cannot change an election’s outcome unless the gap in votes between candidates is smaller than the number of crossover voters and crossover voters vote dif - ferently from regular partisans. In the California races that have been studied, crossover voting rarely met both criteria. This does not mean that crossover voting never changes outcomes, only that it did not do so in the year (1998) and the races (governor, U.S. senator, and some House and Assembly districts) that have been closely examined (Alvarez and Nagler 2002; Sides et al. 2002). F I G f R E 2 . M O S T D E C L I N E -TO - S TAT E VOT E R S H AV E N OT O P T E D TO C R O S S OV E R f N D E R T H E C f R R E N T SYS T E M SOURCES: PPIC numbers are from the last Statewide Sur vey bondubted before eabh year’s primar y elebtion (Baldassare 20 04, 20 0 6; Baldassare et al. 20 08). Sebretar y of State numbers are from the of f ibial statement of the vote. NOTES: For details about the numbers, see note 10. Republibans did not allow debline-to-state voters to par tibipate in their 20 08 presidential primar y. In 20 08 California held its presidential primar y in Februar y and its state lefislative and U.S. bonfressional primar y in June. 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 10 20 30 2004 20062008 presidentiaf primary 2008 fegisfatibe primary PPIC Statewide Survey Secretary of State (actuaf returns) Percent of decfinebtobs(tate voters Intend to bote /did bote in: Democratic primary Repubfican primary Neither/nonpartisana primary AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 7 INCREASED MODER ATION AND OTHER POSSIbLE EFFECTS OF T T VG Do open primaries increase moderation? Reformers clearly believe they do, but some have argued that they are just as likely to have the opposite effect: too many moderates will run and split the moderate vote, allowing extreme candidates to advance to the fall campaign (Hill 2009). Which of these perspectives is correct? The evidence—much of it from California’s experience with the blanket primary— points toward a slight advantage to moderate candidates. Moderates were more likely to be elected to the Assembly in the blanket primary years of 1998 and 2000 (Gerber 2002; Paul 1998). Voting in the Assembly was more bipartisan during those years (see the technical appendix ). 12 And it is often argued that a higher number of strongly liberal bills were killed at the committee stage. Figure 3 shows the ideological location and range of opinions in each party on the eco - nomic and business regulation issues tracked by the Chamber of Commerce. The points represent the median opinion in each party caucus in each year, with dots closer to the middle of the vertical axis suggesting greater moderation (since legislators with higher Chamber scores tend to be more conservative). Longer vertical lines signify a broader range of opinions. The graph suggests that members of both parties, but particularly Democrats, were more moderate in the Assembly under the blanket primary. Each party—but again, the Democratic Party in particular—was also somewhat more diverse during that time, with more moderates alongside the usual partisans. 13 However, Figure 3 also shows that apart from a slight change among Republicans there was no compa - rable effect in the state senate. One possible explanation is that the effect of the blanket primary depended on the circumstances of each race—its competitiveness, for example, or the partisanship of the district. But efforts to confirm this hypothesis do not turn up much evidence for it. 14 There is some evidence that California’s U.S. House delegation was more moderate during the blanket primary period, but it is not very strong (see the technical appendix). A moderate (Gray Davis) won a contested Democratic primary for governor, though it is not clear that there was a more liberal candidate so the outcome may have been predetermined. A conservative (Matt Fong) won the Republican primary for the U.S. Senate, but many considered him to be more moderate than the other candidate in the race. The 2000 presidential nominees were not selected via the blanket system. Studies focused on the nation as a whole have found some large moderating effects from open primaries but have also identified polarizing effects in some races (Kanthak and Morton 2001; Gerber and Morton 1998). This research suffers from two weaknesses. First, it draws on elections from the 1980s, when the parties were less polarized so it was less politically costly to be a moderate. Second, it attributes any differences in political moder - ation between open and closed primary states to the primary system, even though there may be other factors at play. States that have adopted the open primary might have more moderates for any number of reasons. PPIC research conducted with more recent data and better methods suggests that open pri - maries offer at best a modest advantage to moderate candidates, a conclusion that stands up to many important counterarguments (see the technical appendix). 15 It might seem logical that the moderating effect of open primaries would be greatest in districts with a AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 8 F I G f R E 3 . M O D E R AT I O N I N C R E A S E D I N T H E A S S E M b LY b f T N OT I N T H E S E N AT E D f R I N G T H E b L A N K E T P R I M A RY Y E A R S NOTE: Bebause the Chamber of Commerbe tends to have a bonser vative perspebtive on ebonomib and business refulation issues, lefislators with hifher sbores are likely to be more bonser vative than those with lower sbores. The dots in the fraph represent the median (50th perbentile) sbore of eabh par t y baubus. The ver tibal lines five a sense of the distribution in eabh baubus: for Demobrats, they ranfe from the lowest sbore to the 75th perbentile; for Republibans, they ranfe from the 25th perbentile to the hifhest sbore. roughly even mix of Democrats and Republicans, for the simple reason that more voters can cross over and vote in the dominant party’s primary. But support for this hypothesis is also limited and weak (see the technical appendix). 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Republicafs Mobe cofsebvative Mobe libebal Democbats Blafket pbimaby 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Republicafs Mobe cofsebvative Mobe libebal Democbats Blafket pbimaby Mediaf Rafge Assembly Senate Chamber of Commerce rating Chamber of Commerce rating AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 9 Truly nonpartisan primaries, which do not print party affiliations on the ballot, can lead to a significant breakdown of party loyalty among elected officials (Masket 2009; Wright and Schaffner 2002). For example, from 1914 to 1959 California allowed candidates to “cross-file”—to seek nomination in more than one party primary without revealing their party affiliation. During this period party influence was weak; it began to rise again only after party affiliations were restored to the ballot (Masket 2009). In sum, while open primaries do not necessarily foster more moderate representation, nonpartisan primaries of the sort that will be on the June ballot do sometimes have a mod - erating effect. A truly nonpartisan primary would probably have the strongest moderating effect of all. But, of course, it will not be considered by California voters in June 2010. bEYOND MODER ATION Moderation is not the only effect that has been predicted for TTVG primaries. Three others are often mentioned as well. First, many supporters argue that turnout will be higher in the primaries if more choices are offered, because voters who feel left out under the current system would have a reason to show up at the polls. There is some evidence to support this claim. Turnout for the 1998 midterm election under the blanket primary was 2.9 percentage points higher than the average of the two midterms that preceded it (1990 and 1994), and 6.1 points higher than the average of the two that followed (2002 and 2006). It is not clear whether voter turnout should have been higher in 2000 as well, since crossover votes in the presidential race—which always has the highest voter turnout— did not count toward selecting the presidential nominees. Nonetheless, turnout was 4.6 points higher in 2000 than the average of 1992 and 1996, and 2.2 points higher than the average of 2004 and 2008. 16 Second, supporters argue that TTVG primary elections will be more competitive because the ideological diversity of the TTVG electorate makes it harder for one candidate to build a broad base of support. But closed primaries can often host fiercely competitive nomination fights that have at least as much to do with personality as with ideology. At any rate, there is little evidence that primaries were more competitive under either the blanket system in California or the recent TTVG system in Washington (Hill 2009; Tam Cho and Gaines 2002). TTVG skeptics often express concern about a third potential effect of TTVG. Several political consultants interviewed for this report suggested that more money would be spent on primaries as candidates sought to reach a broader swath of the electorate, which might give moneyed interests more influence in the political process. Recent experience does not support this theory: under the blanket primary, spending on pri - maries did grow, but at a rate consistent with the broader trend in campaign spending (Tam Cho and Gaines 2002). AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 10 Many supporters argue that turnout will be higher in the primaries if more choices are offered. AP PHOTO/RICH PEDRONCELLI AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 11 LOOKING AHEAD In short, TTVG would probably have a noticeable but modest effect on voting and rep- resentation in California. Crossover voting rates could be high, but perhaps in only a handful of races. Moderates might benefit, but only slightly more often than under the current system. Because voters often cross party lines to support incumbents, a TTVG system would be just as likely as the current system to maintain the status quo. However, incumbency helps keep officials in office whether they are moderate or highly partisan. Thus, even a small moderating effect might build over time, as past moderate winners retain office and new ones arrive to join them. Moreover, there is evidence that it took voters and can - didates several election cycles to take full advantage of both the passage of cross-filing in 1914 and its removal in 1954 (Gaines and Tam Cho 2002; Masket 2009). In other words, time may offer the best test of TTVG’s effect on moderation. The same could be said for TTVG’s other potential effects on voter turnout, competitive - ness, and campaign spending. These effects have not yet been tested over a long period of time. Overall, the evidence underscores the need for patience in assessing the effects of TTVG. If voters approve TTVG, it will be unlikely to change California politics overnight. There may be a long period of adjustment before the state arrives at a new, potentially more moderate equilibrium. But TTVG’s overall effect on California’s political landscape would probably be modest. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Bruce Cain, Tony Quinn, Karthick Ramakrishnan, and John Sides for especially penetrating commentary on earlier drafts, which made the final product much stronger than it would have been otherwise. Thanks also to Stephen Hill, Tim Hodson, Seth Masket, Zabrae Valentine, and Micah Weinberg for speaking with me and offering thoughts about this project as it took shape. Several anonymous campaign consultants, Democratic and Republican, offered valuable insights into the effects of the blanket primary, California’s last experiment with nomination procedures. Finally, at PPIC, Jed Kolko, Max Neiman, and Lynette Ubois deserve special thanks for their insightful thoughts and reviews. AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 12 Notes 1 Lo c a l e l e c t i o n s f i f f e r f r o m t b e T T VG m e a s u r e i n t w o w a y s . F i r s t , a r u n o f f i s r e q u i r e f i n l o c a l e l e c t i o n s o n l y i f n o c a n f i f a t e r e c e i v e s m o r e t b a n 5 0 p e r c e n t o f t b e v o t e i n t b e f i r s t r o u n f . I n a T T VG s y s t e m t b e r e w o u l f a l w a y s b e a r u n o f f, p u r s u a n t t o t b e S u p r e m e C o u r t ’s f e c i s i o n i n F o s t e r v. L o v e ( 5 2 2 U. S . 67 [19 97 ] ), w b i c b r e q u i r e f t b a t a v o t e b e t a ke n i n e a c b s c b e f u l e f r a c e i n e v e r y f a l l f e f e r a l e l e c t i o n . S e c o n f , T T VG w o u l f a l l o w c a n f i f a t e s t o i n f i c a t e a p a r t y “ p r e f e r e n c e ,” w b i l e l o c a l e l e c t i o n s e x p l i c i t l y b a n p a r t y l a b e l s f r o m t b e b a l l o t . S o m e v o t e r s w o u l f u n f o u b t e f l y f a c t o r p a r t y p r e f e r e n c e i n t o t b e i r v o t i n g f e c i s i o n s , w b i c b m i g b t g i v e p a r t i e s a l a r g e r r o l e t b a n t b e y w o u l f o t b e r w i s e b a v e . 2 Se e t b e C a l i f o r n i a Vo t e r F o u n f a t i o n (w w w.c a l v o t e r.o r g /n e w s /c v f n e w s /c v f n e w s 0 213 0 2. b t m l ) a n f t b e C a l i f o r n i a S e c r e t a r y o f S t a te ( w w w. s o s .c a .g ov/e l e c t i o n s /e l e c t i o n s _ f e c l i n e.b t m #p a r t i e s ) fo r f u r t b e r i n fo r m a- t i o n a b o u t t b e p a r t i e s’ f e c i s i o n s i n e a c b e l e c t i o n . 3 Co n v e r s a t i o n w i t b J a c o b C o r b i n , C a l i f o r n i a s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e , O c t o b e r 6 , 2 0 0 9. 4 Pr e s i f e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s w e r e l a t e r e xe m p t e f i n r e s p o n s e t o p r e s s u r e f r o m t b e n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s . T b e l e g i s l a t u r e p a s s e f a b i l l i n 19 9 9 ( S B 10 0 ) t o e s t a b l i s b a s y s t e m o f f o u b l e c o u n t i n g : t b e r e s u l t s o f t b e b l a n ke t p r i m a r y w o u l f b e t a b u l a t e f a n f r e p o r t e f , b u t o n l y t b e v o t e s o f p a r t y r e g i s t r a n t s w o u l f c o u n t t o w a r f f e l e g a t e s e l e c t i o n . O n t b e R e p u b l i c a n s i f e , G e o r g e B u s b p e r f o r m e f f a r b e t t e r a g a i n s t J o b n M c C a i n w i t b p a r t y r e g i s t r a n t s t b a n w i t b c r o s s o v e r v o t e r s , w b i l e t b e r e w a s n o m e a n i n g f u l f i f f e r e n c e o n t b e D e m o c r a t i c s i f e i n t b e c o n t e s t b e - t w e e n A l G o r e a n f B i l l B r a f l e y. 5 Tb e w o r f i n g o f t b e q u e s t i o n w a s a s f o l l o w s : “ S o m e p e o p l e b a v e p r o p o s e f c b a n g i n g C a l i f o r n i a’s s t a t e p r i- m a r y e l e c t i o n s f r o m a p a r t i a l l y c l o s e f s y s t e m t o a s y s t e m w b e r e r e g i s t e r e f v o t e r s c o u l f c a s t b a l l o t s f o r a n y c a n f i f a t e i n a p r i m a r y a n f t b e t o p t w o v o t e - g e t t e r s—r e g a r f l e s s o f p a r t y—w o u l f a f v a n c e t o t b e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n . D o y o u t b i n k t b i s i s a g o o f i f e a o r a b a f i f e a? ” S e e w w w. p p i c .o r g /m a i n /p u b l i c a t i o n . a s p?i = 914 f o r m o r e f e t a i l s . 6 It i s t e m p t i n g t o e x p e c t t b a t a n o p e n p r i m a r y w i l l m a ke r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s m o r e “ r e s p o n s i v e ” i n a g e n e r i c s e n s e t o t b e f i s t r i c t m e f i a n v o t e r. B u t a n o p e n p r i m a r y f o e s n o t m a ke e i t b e r t b e f i s t r i c t o r t b e p r i m a r y m e f i a n c l e a r e r t o c a n f i f a t e s ; i t s i m p l y m o v e s t b e p r i m a r y m e f i a n t o w a r f t b e o p p o s i n g p a r t y. F o r e x a m p l e , D e m o c r a t i c c a n f i f a t e s t o t b e l e f t o f t b e i r p r i m a r y m e f i a n m i g b t m o v e t o w a r f t b e c e n t e r u n f e r a n o p e n p r i m a r y, a s t b e i r p r i m a r y m e f i a n m o ve s i n t b e s a m e f i r e c t i o n . B u t D e m o c r a t i c c a n f i f a t e s t o t b e r i g b t o f t b e D e m o c r a t i c m e f i a n s b o u l f n o t m o v e a t a l l—t b e m e f i a n i s a l r e a f y m o v i n g t o w a r d t h e m . B y t b e s a m e t o ke n , R e p u b l i c a n s t o t b e r i g b t o f t b e i r m e f i a n m i g b t m o v e t o w a r f t b e c e n t e r, b u t t b o s e t o t b e l e f t s b o u l f n o t m o v e a t a l l . I n e f f e c t , r e l a t i v e l y c o n s e r v a t i v e D e m o c r a t s a n f l i b e r a l R e p u b l i c a n s b a v e a l r e a f y e s c a p e f t b e c e n t r i f u g a l p r e s s u r e s o f t b e c l o s e f p r i m a r y, s o a n o p e n p r i m a r y s b o u l f m a ke l i t t l e f i f f e r e n c e t o t b e i r i f e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n i n g . T b u s , r e s p o n s i v e n e s s t o t b e f i s t r i c t m e f i a n w i l l i m p r o v e o n l y i n a n o p e n p r i m a r y w i t b c a n f i f a t e s w b o a r e t o o e x t r e m e . 7 Tb e s e n u m b e r s e xc l u f e 2 0 0 8 U. S . H o u s e r a c e s , b e c a u s e L o u i s i a n a f r o p p e f t b e T T VG s y s t e m f o r H o u s e r a c e s s t a r t i n g t b a t y e a r. 8 Tb e T T VG sy s te m s i n L o u i s i a n a a n f Wa s b i n g to n f i f fe r s o m ew b a t: Wa s b i n g to n a l way s a f va n c e s t b e to p t wo vo te g e t te r s , b u t L o u i s i a n a c a n c e l s t b e r u n o f f i f o n e c a n f i f a t e r e c e i v e s m o r e t b a n 5 0 p e r c e n t i n t b e f i r s t r o u n f (a n f b o l f s i t s f i r s t- r o u n f e l e c t i o n a t t b e s a m e t i m e a s t b e f a l l e l e c t i o n i n Wa s b i n g t o n , p u r s u a n t t o F o s t e r v. L o v e ( 5 2 2 U. S . 67 [19 97 ] ). T b e n u m b e r o f s a m e - p a r t y r a c e s i n Wa s b i n g t o n i s e v e n l o w e r i f r a c e s w b e r e o n e c a n f i f a t e r e c e i v e f m o r e t b a n 5 0 p e r c e n t o f t b e v o t e i n t b e p r i m a r y a r e e xc l u f e f . 9 Tb e A l a s k a R e p u b l i c a n p a r t y s u c c e s s f u l l y s o u g b t e xe m p t i o n f r o m t b e b l a n ke t p r i m a r y f r o m 19 9 2 t o 19 9 6 , a t w b i c b t i m e t b e A l a s k a S u p r e m e C o u r t r u l e f t b a t t b e s t a t e’s b l a n ke t p r i m a r y s t a t u t e r e q u i r e f p a r t i c i p a t i o n b y a l l p a r t i e s . 10 Tb e s e n u m b e r s e xc l u f e t b o s e w b o f i f n o t k n o w b o w t b e y w o u l f v o t e o r f i f n o t p l a n t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t b e p r i m a r y e l e c t i o n . A m a j o r i t y s a i f t b e y w o u l f c b o o s e a p a r t i s a n b a l l o t f o r t b e M a r c b 2 0 0 2 p r i m a r y, b u t t b e i r a n s w e r s m a y b a v e b e e n i n f l u e n c e f b y t b e w a y t b e q u e s t i o n w a s w o r f e f . T b e q u e s t i o n a s ke f i f r e - s p o n f e n t s p l a n n e f t o v o t e i n “ t b e R e p u b l i c a n p r i m a r y, t b e D e m o c r a t i c p r i m a r y, o r n e i t b e r,” w b i c b m i g b t b a v e c r e a t e f t b e i m p r e s s i o n t b a t a b s t e n t i o n f r o m v o t i n g w a s t b e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t o a p a r t i s a n p r i m a r y ( B a l f a s s a r e 2 0 0 2). I n s u b s e q u e n t s u r v e y s v o t e r s w e r e a s ke f i f t b e y p l a n n e f t o v o t e i n “ t b e R e p u b l i c a n p r i m a r y, t b e D e m o c r a t i c p r i m a r y, o r o n t b e n o n p a r t i s a n b a l l o t .” T b e s u r v e y s s i n c e 2 0 0 2 b a v e a l s o i n f o r m e f r e s p o n f e n t s t b a t t b e i r c b o i c e o f b a l l o t f o e s n o t a f f e c t t b e i r a b i l i t y t o v o t e f o r s t a t e w i f e p r o p o s i t i o n s , s o m e t b i n g t b e 2 0 0 2 s u r v e y f i f n o t m e n t i o n . 11 Ra i f i n g i s j u s t o n e t y p e o f s t r a t e g i c c r o s s o v e r v o t i n g . A l l s t r a t e g i c v o t e r s p r e f e r a c a n f i f a t e o f t b e i r o w n p a r t y b u t c r o s s o v e r t o s e t u p t b e c o n t e s t t b e y w o u l f m o s t l i ke t o s e e f o r t b e f a l l . B u t w b i l e r a i f e r s s u p p o r t t b e w e a ke s t c a n f i f a t e i n t b e o p p o s i n g p a r t y, h e d g e r s c r o s s o v e r t o s u p p o r t t b e o t b e r p a r t y ’s b e s t c a n f i - f a t e , i n o r f e r t o e n s u r e t b e b e s t p o s s i b l e o u t c o m e i n t b e f a l l r e g a r f l e s s w b o w i n s . I n s b o r t , t b e s e v o t e r s b e f g e t b e i r b e t s . T b e e v i f e n c e s u g g e s t s t b a t b e f g e r s a r e m o r e c o m m o n t b a n r a i f e r s , b u t t b a t s i n c e r e v o t e r s a r e t b e m o s t c o m m o n o f a l l ( S i f e s e t a l . 2 0 0 2). AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 13 12 Se e t b e t e c b n i c a l a p p e n f i x t o t b i s A t I s s u e , w b i c b i s a v a i l a b l e o n t b e P PI C w e b s i t e: w w w. p p i c .o r g /c o n t e n t /p u b s /o t b e r/ 210 E M A I _ a p p e n f i x . p f f . 13 Pa r t y l e a f e r s b i p m i g b t b a v e p l a y e f a r o l e i n t b e m o f e r a t i o n o f t b e A s s e m b l y. R o b e r t H e r t z b e r g w a s A s s e m b l y s p e a ke r f o r p r e c i s e l y t b e y e a r s t b e b l a n ke t p r i m a r y w a s i n e f f e c t , a n f b e w a s w i f e l y a c k n o w l - e f g e f t o b e a c b a m p i o n f o r t b e m o f e r a t e b r a n c b o f b i s c a u c u s . B y c o n t r a s t , J o b n B u r t o n , w b o w a s t b e D e m o c r a t i c l e a f e r o f t b e S t a t e S e n a t e , i s g e n e r a l l y k n o w n a s a s t r o n g p a r t i s a n . I t i s u n l i ke l y t b a t H e r t z b e r g c o u l f b a v e l e f b i s c a u c u s t o w a r f g r e a t e r m o f e r a t i o n i f t b e y b a f n o t b e e n w i l l i n g t o f o l l o w b i m , b u t b e m i g b t b a ve b a f a m o f e r a t i n g e f f e c t . 14 Sp e c i f i c a l l y, t b e r e i s n o t m u c b e v i f e n c e t b a t t b e e f f e c t o f o p e n p r i m a r i e s i n t b e C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t u r e i s f e p e n f e n t o n 1) w b e t b e r t b e i n c u m b e n t r a n f o r r e e l e c t i o n; 2) t b e f i s t r i c t ’s p a r t i s a n b a l a n c e b e t w e e n D e m o c r a t s a n f R e p u b l i c a n s; 3) t b e s b a r e o f t b e f i s t r i c t ’s vo te r s w b o i f e n t i f y a s f e c l i n e -to - s t a te; 4) w b e t b e r t b e p r i m a r y w a s c o n t e s t e f; 5 ) i f t b e p r i m a r y w a s c o n t e s t e f , b o w c l o s e i t p r o v e f t o b e; o r 6 ) w b e t b e r t b e m e m b e r i n q u e s t i o n w a s f o r b i f f e n t o r u n f o r r e e l e c t i o n u n f e r t e r m l i m i t s (s e e t b e t e c b n i c a l a p p e n f i x a t w w w. p p i c .o r g /c o n t e n t /p u b s /o t b e r/ 210 E M A I _ a p p e n f i x . p f f ). 15 As w a s t b e c a s e f o r t b e C a l i f o r n i a l e g i s l a t u r e , t b e i n f l u e n c e o f o p e n p r i m a r i e s a p p e a r s t o b e a b o u t a s a m b i g u o u s v i s - á - v i s o p e n s e a t s a s i n r a c e s w b e r e a n i n c u m b e n t i s r u n n i n g . H o w e v e r, t b e n u m b e r o f o p e n s e a t s a v a i l a b l e f o r t e s t i n g t b i s b y p o t b e s i s i s u s u a l l y v e r y s m a l l , s i n c e a b o u t 9 0 p e r c e n t o f i n c u m b e n t s t y p i - c a l l y r u n f o r r e e l e c t i o n . T b e r e i s s o m e e v i f e n c e t b a t t b e e f f e c t o f o p e n p r i m a r i e s w a s c o n f i t i o n a l o n t b e p a r t i s a n c o m p o s i t i o n o f t b e f i s t r i c t , b u t t b i s v a r i a t i o n w a s n o t i t s e l f c o n s i s t e n t . D e m o c r a t i c l e g i s l a t o r s r e p r e s e n t i n g c o m p e t i t i v e f i s t r i c t s w e r e o f t e n m o r e s e n s i t i v e t o t b e p r e s e n c e o f a n o n p a r t i s a n p r i m a r y t b a n w e r e t b o s e r e p r e s e n t i n g u n c o m p e t i t i v e f i s t r i c t s , b u t l e s s s e n s i t i v e t o t b e p r e s e n c e o f a s e m i - c l o s e f s y s t e m . T b e r e w a s n o c l e a r e f f e c t i n e i t b e r f i r e c t i o n f o r R e p u b l i c a n s . 16 Tb e e xc i t e m e n t g e n e r a t e f b y a n e l e c t i o n i s a l w a y s a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r. Tu r n o u t w a s a c t u a l l y 2. 4 p o i n t s b i g b e r i n t b e 2 0 0 8 p r e s i f e n t i a l p r i m a r y t b a n i n t b e 2 0 0 0 p r i m a r y, f e s p i t e t b e f a c t t b a t o n l y t b e p r e s i f e n t i a l r a c e w a s o n t b e b a l l o t , t b e s y s t e m w a s m o r e c l o s e f , a n f f e c l i n e - t o - s t a t e v o t e r s c o u l f n o t c a s t b a l l o t s i n t b e R e p u b l i c a n p r i m a r y. T b e 2 0 0 8 p r e s i f e n t i a l n o m i n a t i o n w a s s t i l l u n f e c i f e f o n b o t b s i f e s b y t b e t i m e C a l i f o r n i a b e l f i t s p r i m a r y, w b i c b w a s n o t t b e c a s e i n 2 0 0 0 . References A l va r e z , R . 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AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 14 L a n b a m , M D : R o w m a n a n f L i t t l e f i e l f . Ko u s s e r, T b a f . 20 0 2. “ C r o s s i n g O ve r W b e n I t C o u n t s: H ow t b e M o t i ve s o f Vo te r s i n B l a n ke t P r i m a r i e s A r e R e ve a l e f by T b e i r A c t i o n s i n G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s .” I n Vo t i n g a t t h e f o l i t i c a l Fa u l t L i n eb C a l i f o r n i a’s E x p e r i m e n t w i t h t h e B l a n k e t f r i m a r y , e f . B . E . C a i n a n f E . R . G e r b e r. B e r ke l e y : U n i ve r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s . M a s ke t , S e t b E . 2 0 0 4 . “ S b o u l f v o t e r s g o f o r a n o p e n p r i m a r y ? N o: B e e n t b e r e; f o n e t b a t ; i t ’s a p a r t y p o o p e r.” S a c r a m e n t o B e e , J u l y 11. M a s ke t , S e t b E . 2 0 0 9. N o M i d d l e G r o u n db H o w I n f o r m a l f a r t y O r g a n i z a t i o n s C o n t r o l N o m i n a t i o n s a n d f o l a r i z e L e g i s l a t u r e s . A n n A r b o r : M i c b i g a n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . P a u l , M a r k . 19 9 8 . “ P r i m a r y g a v e p o l i t i c a l t b e o r i s t s a r e a s o n t o s m i l e .” S a c r a m e n t o B e e, J u n e 8 . S a l v a n t o, A n t b o n y M ., a n f M a r t i n P. Wa t t e n b e r g . 2 0 0 2. “ P e e k i n g U n f e r t b e B l a n ke t : A D i r e c t L o o k a t C r o s s o v e r Vo t i n g i n t b e 19 9 8 P r i m a r y.” I n Vo t i n g a t t h e f o l i t i c a l Fa u l t L i n eb C a l i f o r n i a’s E x p e r i m e n t w i t h t h e B l a n k e t f r i m a r y , e f . B . E . C a i n a n f E . R . G e r b e r. B e r ke l e y : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s . 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H e w l e t t , C h a i r D i r e c t o r C e n t e r f o r C o m p u t e r A s s i s t e f R e s e a r c b i n t b e H u m a n i t i e s M a r k B a l d a s s a r e P r e s i f e n t a n f C b i e f E xe c u t i v e O f f i c e r P u b l i c P o l i c y I n s t i t u t e o f C a l i f o r n i a R u b e f B a r r a l e s P r e s i f e n t a n f C b i e f E xe c u t i v e O f f i c e r S a n D i e g o R e g i o n a l C b a m b e r o f C o m m e r c e J o h f b . B r y s o f R e t i r e f C b a i r m a n a n f C E O E f i s o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l G a r y K . H a r t F o r m e r S t a t e S e n a t o r a n f S e c r e t a r y o f E f u c a t i o n S t a t e o f C a l i f o r n i a R o b e r t M . H e r t z b e r g P a r t n e r M a y e r B r o w n , L L P D o f f a L u c a s C b i e f E xe c u t i v e O f f i c e r L u c a s P u b l i c A f f a i r s D a v i d M a s M a s u m o t o A u t b o r a n f f a r m e r S t e v e f A . M e r k s a m e r S e n i o r P a r t n e r N i e l s e n , M e r k s a m e r, P a r r i n e l l o, M u e l l e r & N a y l o r, L L P C o f s t a f c e L . R i c e C o - D i r e c t o r T b e A f v a n c e m e n t P r o j e c t T h o m a s C . S u t t o f R e t i r e f C b a i r m a n a n f C b i e f E xe c u t i v e O f f i c e r P a c i f i c L i f e I n s u r a n c e C o m p a n y C a r o l W h i t e s i d e P r e s i f e n t E m e r i t u s G r e a t Va l l e y C e n t e r © Fe b r u a r y 2010 Pu b l i b Po l i b y I n s ti tu te of C a l i fo r n i a . A l l r i f hts re s e r ve d. S a n Fr a n b i s b o, CA T h e P u b l i b P o l i b y I n s t i t u te o f C a l i f o r n i a i s d e d i b a te d to i n f o r m i n f a n d i m p r o v i n f p u b l i b p o l i b y i n C a l i f o r n i a t h r o u f h i n d e p e n d e n t, o b j e b t i v e, n o n p a r t i s a n r e s e a r b h . PPI C i s a p r i vate o p e r ati n f fo u n d ati o n. It d o e s n o t t a k e o r s u p p o r t p o s i t i o n s o n a n y b a l l o t m e a s u r e o r o n a n y l o b a l , s t a t e , o r f e d e r a l l e f i s l ati o n, n o r d o e s i t e n d o r s e, s u p p o r t, o r o p p o s e a ny p o l i ti b a l p a r ti e s o r b a n d i d ate s fo r p u b l i b of f i b e. R e s e a rb h p u b l i b ati o n s ref l e b t th e v i ew s of th e a u th o r s a n d d o n ot n e b e s s a r i l y ref l e b t th e v i ew s of th e s t af f, of f i b e r s, o r B o a rd of D i re b to r s of th e Pu b l i b Po l i b y I n s ti tu te of C a l i fo r n i a . S h o r t s e b t i o n s o f t e x t , n o t t o e x b e e d th re e p a r a f r a p h s, m ay b e q u ote d w i th o u t w r i t te n p e r m i s s i o n p rov i d e d th at f u l l at tr i b u ti o n i s f i ve n to th e s o u rb e a n d th e a b ove b o py r i f ht n oti b e i s i n b l u d e d. AT I S S U E : [ O P E N P R I M A R I E S ] P P I C 17 P U B L I C P O L I C Y I N S T I T U T E OF C A L I F O R N I A 500 WA S H I N G T O N S T R E E T, S U I T E 600 • S A N F R A N C I S C O , C A 94111 P 415.291.4400 • F 415.291.4401 • www.ppic.org P P I C S AC R A M E N T O C E N T E R • S E N A T O R O F F I C E B U I L D I N G 1121 L S T R E E T, S U I T E 801 • S AC R A M E N T O , C A 95814 P 916.440.1120 • F 916.440.1121 ADDITIONAL RESOURCES REL ATED TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ARE AVAIL ABLE AT WWW.PPIC.ORG" ["post_date_gmt"]=> string(19) "2017-05-20 09:40:15" ["comment_status"]=> string(4) "open" ["ping_status"]=> string(6) "closed" ["post_password"]=> string(0) "" ["post_name"]=> string(10) "ai_210emai" ["to_ping"]=> string(0) "" ["pinged"]=> string(0) "" ["post_modified"]=> string(19) "2017-05-20 02:40:15" ["post_modified_gmt"]=> string(19) "2017-05-20 09:40:15" ["post_content_filtered"]=> string(0) "" ["guid"]=> string(52) "http://148.62.4.17/wp-content/uploads/AI_210EMAI.pdf" ["menu_order"]=> int(0) ["post_mime_type"]=> string(15) "application/pdf" ["comment_count"]=> string(1) "0" ["filter"]=> string(3) "raw" ["status"]=> string(7) "inherit" ["attachment_authors"]=> bool(false) }