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Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature: Did Electoral Reforms Make State Representatives More Moderate? Technical Appendix

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object(Timber\Post)#3710 (45) { ["ImageClass"]=> string(12) "Timber\Image" ["PostClass"]=> string(11) "Timber\Post" ["TermClass"]=> string(11) "Timber\Term" ["object_type"]=> string(4) "post" ["custom"]=> array(6) { ["_wp_attached_file"]=> string(20) "0418emr-appendix.pdf" ["wpmf_size"]=> string(6) "554187" ["wpmf_filetype"]=> string(3) "pdf" ["wpmf_order"]=> string(1) "0" ["searchwp_content"]=> string(13579) "Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature Technical Appendices CONTENTS Appendix A: Ideology Measures Appendix B: Additional Analysis Eric McGhee with research support from David Kordus PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 2 Appendix A: Ideology Measures This report uses three different measures of ideology. Each is derived from roll call votes on the chamber floor (i.e., excluding votes in committee), but each also uses slightly different inputs and methods of aggregation. Shor/McCarty scores Shor/McCarty scores (Shor and McCarty 2011) seek to identify a measure of ideology for state legislators that occupy a common space —that are comparable across states so that two legislators with the same score generally hold the same ideological positions on average. Identifying a common space for state legislators from roll call votes is challenging because each legislature votes on a different set of bills. If one legislature votes on many bills where liberals and conservatives take different positions, and another votes on bills that highlight other sources of difference between legislators, a grouping of legislators based on those who voted together frequently would accurately identify liberals and conser vatives in the first legislature but not in the second. Moreover, without a clear theory about how the votes in each chamber related to each other, it would be difficult to say which legislature provided clear evidence of ideology and which did not. The ty pical solution to this problem is to find bridge actors who make decisions in multiple settings. Shor and McCarty use responses to Project Vote Smart’s National Political Awareness Test, a survey about current issues sent to every candidate running for sta te legislature across the country. Those that respond to the survey and end up serving in their state legislature are bridge actors because they offer responses to a common set of questions for multiple states. Shor and McCarty generate an ideological scor e—an ideal point —based on the responses to those binary questions. If all serving state legislators responded to the NPAT survey, it would be possible to use this NPAT score as a measure of ideology. But the response rate is between 30 and 50 percent, lea ving incomplete coverage. To address this issue, Shor and McCarty derive similar ideal points for the entire population of legislators who served in office using the yeas and nays on roll call votes. The roll call scores are then projected into NPAT space by regressing the NPAT scores on the roll call scores and imputing NPAT scores for the legislators who did not respond to the survey. The ideal points themselves are derived from a basic quadratic utility model. Imagine ���� legislators taking positions on ���� different binary decisions (e.g., roll calls or survey items). Let ���� ��������=1 if legislator ���� takes the “yes” position on decision ���� and ���� ��������=0 otherwise. The value, or utility, that a legislator places on a particular outcome can be expressed as a function of the legislator’s squared distance from the outcome in an ����-dimensional policy space: ���� ��������� PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 3 substantive meanings. The ���� �������������=������������− �������������������� ���� (A4) Groseclose, et al. estimate the ���� PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 4 In this model, �������� is the mean weighted average of the adjusted scores for legislator ����. It is akin to the static ideal point estimated in the Shor/McCarty model. Howev er, in this model it is largely a nuisance parameter, since the values that matter are the ����� ��������’s. Moreover, Equation A3 also includes an error term ������������ that is uncorrelated with the legislator’s past or future errors or with the errors of other legis lators. This allows legislator scores to vary over time, making it possible to conduct analysis with the same legislators in more than one legislative session instead of limiting the data to newly -elected legislators in each year. DW-NOMINATE scores The basic theoretical basis of DW- NOMINATE is very similar to that of the Shor/McCarty ideal points described above, but it differs in three notable respects. First, it assumes a normal rather than a quadratic utility function. This is more computationally complex but might better reflect experimental evidence of decision -making ( Poole 2005) . This normal utility function produces the following probability of choosing the “yes” option on decision ���� : ���� �������������= 1 � = ���� ����� ����� ���� ���� �−1 2∑ ����������������������������2 ���� ���� = 1�− �������� ���� �−1 2∑ ����������������������������2 ���� ���� = 1� �� (A6 ) where ��������������������2= (������������− ���� PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 5 Appendix B: Additional Analysis Proposition 25 budge t threshold change There was one additional reform that might possibly have affected moderation. On the same ballot as Proposition 20 voters also approved Proposition 25, which lowered the legislative threshold for passing the state budget from two -thirds to 50 percent, effectively ending the need for Republican votes in subsequent budget negotiations. The lower threshold has certainly made it easier to pass the budget. Before the change, budget negotiations were long and tense and routinely extended into t he new fiscal year. Since the change, negotiations have entailed far less drama and budgets have all emerged from the legislature by the deadline. It is not as clear why the change would affect moderation. It is possible that the absence of a bipartisan v ote would expose swing Democrats to the political pressures of voting for the budget, thus encouraging them to take more moderate positions on other issues. The lower threshold might also have increased the incentive for conservative donors to give money t o moderate Democratic candidates in the hopes of moving the pivotal vote on the budget to the right. The threshold change came two years earlier than the other reforms considered here, so the simplest way to test its role is to rerun the results from abov e with 2010 rather than 2012 as the key reform threshold. The results of this test are in Table B1. They make the Democratic caucus appear slightly more liberal and the Republican caucus somewhat more conservative after the reform. This casts doubt on the budget threshold change as a cause of greater moderation. TABLE B1 Shor/McCarty scores with budget threshold adoption as key reform threshold Pre-reform average Post-reform average Difference (Post –Pre) Difference without Redistricting Democrats -1.61 -1.56 -0 .05 -0.06 Republicans 1.31 1.44 0.13 0.23* SOURCES: Shor/McCarty Measuring American Legislatures ideal point data; Chris Tausanovitch and Chris Warshaw (district presidential vote 2008); Daily Kos (district presidential vote 2012). NOTES: “Ideology Scores” come from Shor/McCarty ideal points, derived from roll call votes projected into a common ideological space created by the surveys from Project Vote Smart. * Statistically significant at 95% confidence level PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 6 Additional campaign finance graphs FIGURE B1 Figure 3 campaign finance calculations using data from the same election cycle SOURCE: National Institute on Money in State Politics; California Secretary of State. NOTE: Data cover legislators elected from 2004 through 2014. In these graphs, a particular source of money for a particular candidate is considered more or less Republican based on the share of that donor’s money that was given to Republican candidates in the same election cycle. This ensures that every donor can b e assigned a value. However, if the reforms made every donor more Democratic, it could partially obscure that change. PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 7 FIGURE B2 Figure 3 campaign finance calculations, open seats only SOURCE: National Institute on Money in State Politics; California Secretary of State. NOTE: Data cover legislators elected from 2004 through 2014. In these graphs, a particular source of money for a particular candidate is considered more or less Republican based on the share of that donor’s money that was given to Republican candidates in the previous election cycle. Thi s ensures that donors are defined by their behavior prior to the election in question. However, it prevents assigning a score to any donor who gave money in just one election cycle. PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 8 FIGURE B3 Figures B1 campaign finance calcul ations, open seats only SOURCE: National Institute on Money in State Politics; California Secretary of State. NOTE: Data cover legislators elected from 2004 through 2014. In these graphs, a particular source of money for a particular candidate is considered more or less Republican based on the share of that donor’s money that was given to Republican candidates in the same election cycle. This ensures that every donor can b e assigned a value. However, if the reforms made every donor more Democratic, it could partially obscure that change. PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 9 FIGURE B4 Figure 3 campaign finance calculations, independent expenditures o nly SOURCE: National Institute on Money in State Politics; California Secretary of State. NOTE: Data cover legislators elected from 2004 through 2014. In these graphs, a particular source of money for a particular candidate is considered more or less Republican based on the share of that donor’s money that was given to Republican candidates in the previous election cycle. Thi s ensures that donors are defined by their behavior prior to the election in question. However, it prevents assigning a score to any donor who gave money in just one election cycle. PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 10 FIGURE B5 Figure B1 campaign finance calculations, independent expenditures only SOURCE: National Institute on Money in State Politics; California Secretary of State. NOTE: Data cover legislators elected from 2004 through 2014. In these graphs, a particular source of money for a particular candidate is considered more or less Republican based on the share of that donor’s money that was given to Republican candidates in the same election cycle. This ensures that every donor can b e assigned a value. However, if the reforms made every donor more Democratic, it could partially obscure that change. The Public Policy Institute of California is dedicated to informing and improving public policy in California through independent, objective, nonpartisan research. Public Policy Institute of California 500 Washington Street, Suite 600 San Francisco, CA 94111 T: 415.291.4400 F: 415.291.4401 PPIC.ORG P PIC Sacramento Center Senator Office Building 1121 L Street, Suite 801 Sacramento, CA 95814 T: 916.440.1120 F: 916.440.1121" ["_edit_lock"]=> string(13) "1628192094:34" } ["___content":protected]=> string(247) "

Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature: Did Electoral Reforms Make State Representatives More Moderate? Technical Appendix

" ["_permalink":protected]=> string(167) "https://www.ppic.org/publication/political-reform-and-moderation-in-californias-legislature-did-electoral-reforms-make-state-representatives-moderate/0418emr-appendix/" ["_next":protected]=> array(0) { } ["_prev":protected]=> array(0) { } ["_css_class":protected]=> NULL ["id"]=> int(14784) ["ID"]=> int(14784) ["post_author"]=> string(1) "4" ["post_content"]=> string(0) "" ["post_date"]=> string(19) "2018-05-08 14:39:55" ["post_excerpt"]=> string(0) "" ["post_parent"]=> int(14715) ["post_status"]=> string(7) "inherit" ["post_title"]=> string(145) "Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature: Did Electoral Reforms Make State Representatives More Moderate? Technical Appendix" ["post_type"]=> string(10) "attachment" ["slug"]=> string(16) "0418emr-appendix" ["__type":protected]=> NULL ["_wp_attached_file"]=> string(20) "0418emr-appendix.pdf" ["wpmf_size"]=> string(6) "554187" ["wpmf_filetype"]=> string(3) "pdf" ["wpmf_order"]=> string(1) "0" ["searchwp_content"]=> string(13579) "Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature Technical Appendices CONTENTS Appendix A: Ideology Measures Appendix B: Additional Analysis Eric McGhee with research support from David Kordus PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 2 Appendix A: Ideology Measures This report uses three different measures of ideology. Each is derived from roll call votes on the chamber floor (i.e., excluding votes in committee), but each also uses slightly different inputs and methods of aggregation. Shor/McCarty scores Shor/McCarty scores (Shor and McCarty 2011) seek to identify a measure of ideology for state legislators that occupy a common space —that are comparable across states so that two legislators with the same score generally hold the same ideological positions on average. Identifying a common space for state legislators from roll call votes is challenging because each legislature votes on a different set of bills. If one legislature votes on many bills where liberals and conservatives take different positions, and another votes on bills that highlight other sources of difference between legislators, a grouping of legislators based on those who voted together frequently would accurately identify liberals and conser vatives in the first legislature but not in the second. Moreover, without a clear theory about how the votes in each chamber related to each other, it would be difficult to say which legislature provided clear evidence of ideology and which did not. The ty pical solution to this problem is to find bridge actors who make decisions in multiple settings. Shor and McCarty use responses to Project Vote Smart’s National Political Awareness Test, a survey about current issues sent to every candidate running for sta te legislature across the country. Those that respond to the survey and end up serving in their state legislature are bridge actors because they offer responses to a common set of questions for multiple states. Shor and McCarty generate an ideological scor e—an ideal point —based on the responses to those binary questions. If all serving state legislators responded to the NPAT survey, it would be possible to use this NPAT score as a measure of ideology. But the response rate is between 30 and 50 percent, lea ving incomplete coverage. To address this issue, Shor and McCarty derive similar ideal points for the entire population of legislators who served in office using the yeas and nays on roll call votes. The roll call scores are then projected into NPAT space by regressing the NPAT scores on the roll call scores and imputing NPAT scores for the legislators who did not respond to the survey. The ideal points themselves are derived from a basic quadratic utility model. Imagine ���� legislators taking positions on ���� different binary decisions (e.g., roll calls or survey items). Let ���� ��������=1 if legislator ���� takes the “yes” position on decision ���� and ���� ��������=0 otherwise. The value, or utility, that a legislator places on a particular outcome can be expressed as a function of the legislator’s squared distance from the outcome in an ����-dimensional policy space: ���� ��������� PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 3 substantive meanings. The ���� �������������=������������− �������������������� ���� (A4) Groseclose, et al. estimate the ���� PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 4 In this model, �������� is the mean weighted average of the adjusted scores for legislator ����. It is akin to the static ideal point estimated in the Shor/McCarty model. Howev er, in this model it is largely a nuisance parameter, since the values that matter are the ����� ��������’s. Moreover, Equation A3 also includes an error term ������������ that is uncorrelated with the legislator’s past or future errors or with the errors of other legis lators. This allows legislator scores to vary over time, making it possible to conduct analysis with the same legislators in more than one legislative session instead of limiting the data to newly -elected legislators in each year. DW-NOMINATE scores The basic theoretical basis of DW- NOMINATE is very similar to that of the Shor/McCarty ideal points described above, but it differs in three notable respects. First, it assumes a normal rather than a quadratic utility function. This is more computationally complex but might better reflect experimental evidence of decision -making ( Poole 2005) . This normal utility function produces the following probability of choosing the “yes” option on decision ���� : ���� �������������= 1 � = ���� ����� ����� ���� ���� �−1 2∑ ����������������������������2 ���� ���� = 1�− �������� ���� �−1 2∑ ����������������������������2 ���� ���� = 1� �� (A6 ) where ��������������������2= (������������− ���� PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 5 Appendix B: Additional Analysis Proposition 25 budge t threshold change There was one additional reform that might possibly have affected moderation. On the same ballot as Proposition 20 voters also approved Proposition 25, which lowered the legislative threshold for passing the state budget from two -thirds to 50 percent, effectively ending the need for Republican votes in subsequent budget negotiations. The lower threshold has certainly made it easier to pass the budget. Before the change, budget negotiations were long and tense and routinely extended into t he new fiscal year. Since the change, negotiations have entailed far less drama and budgets have all emerged from the legislature by the deadline. It is not as clear why the change would affect moderation. It is possible that the absence of a bipartisan v ote would expose swing Democrats to the political pressures of voting for the budget, thus encouraging them to take more moderate positions on other issues. The lower threshold might also have increased the incentive for conservative donors to give money t o moderate Democratic candidates in the hopes of moving the pivotal vote on the budget to the right. The threshold change came two years earlier than the other reforms considered here, so the simplest way to test its role is to rerun the results from abov e with 2010 rather than 2012 as the key reform threshold. The results of this test are in Table B1. They make the Democratic caucus appear slightly more liberal and the Republican caucus somewhat more conservative after the reform. This casts doubt on the budget threshold change as a cause of greater moderation. TABLE B1 Shor/McCarty scores with budget threshold adoption as key reform threshold Pre-reform average Post-reform average Difference (Post –Pre) Difference without Redistricting Democrats -1.61 -1.56 -0 .05 -0.06 Republicans 1.31 1.44 0.13 0.23* SOURCES: Shor/McCarty Measuring American Legislatures ideal point data; Chris Tausanovitch and Chris Warshaw (district presidential vote 2008); Daily Kos (district presidential vote 2012). NOTES: “Ideology Scores” come from Shor/McCarty ideal points, derived from roll call votes projected into a common ideological space created by the surveys from Project Vote Smart. * Statistically significant at 95% confidence level PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 6 Additional campaign finance graphs FIGURE B1 Figure 3 campaign finance calculations using data from the same election cycle SOURCE: National Institute on Money in State Politics; California Secretary of State. NOTE: Data cover legislators elected from 2004 through 2014. In these graphs, a particular source of money for a particular candidate is considered more or less Republican based on the share of that donor’s money that was given to Republican candidates in the same election cycle. This ensures that every donor can b e assigned a value. However, if the reforms made every donor more Democratic, it could partially obscure that change. PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 7 FIGURE B2 Figure 3 campaign finance calculations, open seats only SOURCE: National Institute on Money in State Politics; California Secretary of State. NOTE: Data cover legislators elected from 2004 through 2014. In these graphs, a particular source of money for a particular candidate is considered more or less Republican based on the share of that donor’s money that was given to Republican candidates in the previous election cycle. Thi s ensures that donors are defined by their behavior prior to the election in question. However, it prevents assigning a score to any donor who gave money in just one election cycle. PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 8 FIGURE B3 Figures B1 campaign finance calcul ations, open seats only SOURCE: National Institute on Money in State Politics; California Secretary of State. NOTE: Data cover legislators elected from 2004 through 2014. In these graphs, a particular source of money for a particular candidate is considered more or less Republican based on the share of that donor’s money that was given to Republican candidates in the same election cycle. This ensures that every donor can b e assigned a value. However, if the reforms made every donor more Democratic, it could partially obscure that change. PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 9 FIGURE B4 Figure 3 campaign finance calculations, independent expenditures o nly SOURCE: National Institute on Money in State Politics; California Secretary of State. NOTE: Data cover legislators elected from 2004 through 2014. In these graphs, a particular source of money for a particular candidate is considered more or less Republican based on the share of that donor’s money that was given to Republican candidates in the previous election cycle. Thi s ensures that donors are defined by their behavior prior to the election in question. However, it prevents assigning a score to any donor who gave money in just one election cycle. PPIC.ORG T echnical Appendices Political Reform and Moderation in California’s Legislature 10 FIGURE B5 Figure B1 campaign finance calculations, independent expenditures only SOURCE: National Institute on Money in State Politics; California Secretary of State. NOTE: Data cover legislators elected from 2004 through 2014. In these graphs, a particular source of money for a particular candidate is considered more or less Republican based on the share of that donor’s money that was given to Republican candidates in the same election cycle. This ensures that every donor can b e assigned a value. However, if the reforms made every donor more Democratic, it could partially obscure that change. The Public Policy Institute of California is dedicated to informing and improving public policy in California through independent, objective, nonpartisan research. Public Policy Institute of California 500 Washington Street, Suite 600 San Francisco, CA 94111 T: 415.291.4400 F: 415.291.4401 PPIC.ORG P PIC Sacramento Center Senator Office Building 1121 L Street, Suite 801 Sacramento, CA 95814 T: 916.440.1120 F: 916.440.1121" ["_edit_lock"]=> string(13) "1628192094:34" ["post_date_gmt"]=> string(19) "2018-05-08 21:39:55" ["comment_status"]=> string(4) "open" ["ping_status"]=> string(6) "closed" ["post_password"]=> string(0) "" ["post_name"]=> string(16) "0418emr-appendix" ["to_ping"]=> string(0) "" ["pinged"]=> string(0) "" ["post_modified"]=> string(19) "2018-05-08 14:40:15" ["post_modified_gmt"]=> string(19) "2018-05-08 21:40:15" ["post_content_filtered"]=> string(0) "" ["guid"]=> string(59) "http://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/0418emr-appendix.pdf" ["menu_order"]=> int(0) ["post_mime_type"]=> string(15) "application/pdf" ["comment_count"]=> string(1) "0" ["filter"]=> string(3) "raw" ["status"]=> string(7) "inherit" ["attachment_authors"]=> bool(false) }